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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the consistency of sentencing between the circuits of the New 
Zealand District Courts.  Four predictions based on a sequence or chain of theories 
incorporating the concept of bounded rationality from decision making theory, the 
influence of formal and substantive rationalities on sentencing decisions, court community 
theory, and personal construct psychology were tested.  The circuit in which sentencing 
took place was expected to affect the likelihood of incarceration and to affect the length of 
incarceration.  If these predictions were met, it was further predicted that the weight 
applied to some or all of the sentencing factors would vary between circuits.  It is 
understood to be the first study controlling for a wide range of sentencing factors 
examining the consistency of sentencing between locations in New Zealand and one of the 
first from anywhere outside of the United States. 
The four predictions were tested using sentencing data from the two years 2008-
2009 for three high volume offences (aggravated drink driving, male assaults female and 
burglary).  Sentencing was treated as a two part decision process, with the selection of a 
sentence type followed by the determination of the sentence amount.  Each prediction was 
separately modelled for each offence.  Different types of model were chosen as being more 
suitable for the specific predictions: logistic regression for the likelihood of incarceration; 
linear regression for the length of incarceration; multi-level generalised linear regression 
with random co-efficients to determine if the weight applied to specific factors varied by 
circuit in the determination of whether or not to incarcerate; and multi-level linear 
regression with random co-efficients to determine if the weight applied to specific factors 
varied by circuit in the determination of sentence length. 
The logistic regression and linear regression models demonstrated that there were 
statistically significant and substantively significant differences between circuits in the 
likelihood and length of incarceration.  The extent of inconsistency varied by offence type 
with the most marked differences occurring for aggravated drink driving and burglary.  
Offence seriousness and criminal history factors were found to be the principal influences 
on both sentence decisions for all three offences.  The multi-level models for aggravated 
drink driving and burglary revealed a core of seriousness and criminal history factors 
whose influence varied across the circuits.  The models for male assaults female were less 
informative, highlighting the likelihood that these models were limited by the omission of 
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key sentencing variables and the narrow scope of this particular assault type within the 
wider spectrum of assaults.   
The findings should not be interpreted as if they are a critique of the sentence 
imposed in any individual case or of the sentencing by any judge or in any circuit.  It is a 
critique of sentencing guidance in New Zealand and its ability to achieve a fundamental 
tenet of justice: the similar treatment of similar offenders being sentenced in similar 
circumstances. 
In addition to testing the predictions the multi-level models were extended to 
address whether the observed variation in sentencing was associated with variations in 
circuit context.  Due to the limited number of circuits (17) and multi-collinearity between 
the contextual variables, bivariate analyses had to be employed.  The modelling revealed a 
consistent difference between provincial and metropolitan circuits; the two categories of 
circuit were distinguished from one another by many of the other more specific variables 
that had a significant association with sentencing approaches.  The provincial circuits were 
more likely to incarcerate and to impose longer sentences.  However, the small number of 
circuits and multi-collinearity between the variables precluded more detailed analysis to 
identify which of the contextual variables distinguishing metropolitan and provincial 
circuits had the greatest influence. 
These findings have significant implications for the judiciary and for sentencing 
policy makers.  Urgent attention should be given to addressing opportunities to increase the 
availability of sentencing guidance to reduce the degree of inconsistency.  More detailed 
offence based sentencing guidance is required; in the current context there are two options 
that could be used.  The Court of Appeal could issue a broader range of guideline 
judgments or the legislation for the Sentencing Council and the process for developing and 
promulgating guidelines could be implemented.  For logistical and public policy reasons 
the Sentencing Council approach is preferred.  There is a risk that failure to address the 
levels of inconsistency will result in the sentencing system falling into disrepute. 
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Chapter 1: Sentencing Consistency in New Zealand: An Unresolved Debate 
 
For a short time in 2006 and 2007 sentencing consistency between regions of the New 
Zealand District Courts was the subject of discussion and debate.  This was spurred by a 
report from the New Zealand Law Commission.  In 2006 the Law Commission 
recommended that “a Sentencing Council should be established with a mandate to draft 
sentencing guidelines” (Law Commission, 2006, p. 13).  While there were multiple 
arguments raised by the Law Commission in favour of the recommendation, one 
substantive argument raised issues about the fairness of sentencing.  Informed by a 
comparison of sentencing decisions between regions the Law Commission claimed “there 
is significant inconsistency in the sentences imposed between judges and between courts, 
particularly in relation to lower end offences” (Law Commission, 2006, p. 13).  The Law 
Commission attributed the variations to the wide discretion entrusted to judges and the 
inadequacy of appellate review and other guidance as an effective check on the exercise of 
the discretion. 
The recommendation was accepted by the Government and a Bill to establish a 
sentencing council was introduced but it was not universally supported.  Despite the 
opposition the Sentencing Council Act was assented in July 2007 and came into force on 1 
November 2007.  However, following a change of government in 2008 work on the 
establishment of the Council and the development of guidelines was halted.  Subsequently 
there has been little interest in the consistency of sentencing. 
Opposition to the introduction of guidelines was founded on two arguments: 
rejection of the notion that the existing sentencing framework was inadequate; and doubts 
about the claimed inconsistency, which was dismissed as being the result of differences in 
the composition of the cases between locations.  In Parliament opponents of the legislation 
argued that: the Sentencing Act provides a comprehensive guide to judges on the factors to 
be considered in sentencing; the appeal regime provides an opportunity for any necessary 
correction; and the accrued body of appeal decisions, especially guideline judgments from 
the Court of Appeal, provide an additional more specific framework guiding the severity of 
sentence (New Zealand Parliament, 2006 & 2007). 
Doubts were raised about the degree to which the perception of inconsistency and 
the comparison of sentencing decisions constituted proof of real inconsistency.  These 
doubts were succinctly expressed in a speech by Justice Priestley after the decision to 
discontinue work on the Council and guidelines, he argued that: “Sentencing guidelines 
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would undoubtedly have curbed the discretion of sentencing judges to do justice in the 
infinite variety of cases over which they preside” (Priestley, 2009, p.34).    
A substantial body of literature addressing sentencing consistency (or variation or 
disparity) has been assembled in the United States but little work has been done elsewhere 
(Ulmer, 2012) and little work has been done in New Zealand.  The lack of research interest 
in sentencing consistency in New Zealand has not been matched by a lack of attention to it 
in sentencing policy.  For more than two decades the Court of Appeal has issued guideline 
judgments as a means of attempting to achieve greater consistency in the sentencing of 
certain offences.  In 2002 the Sentencing Act consolidating sentencing legislation and 
codifying the case law in a single statute was passed.  For the first time sentencing was 
informed by a cogent and comprehensive legislative framework enhancing the likelihood 
of greater consistency of outcomes through greater consistency of process and approach.  
Much of the framework came from the case law; the principal change was to draw it 
together in a single statute.  The Sentencing Act 2002 explicitly incorporated consistency 
into the framework as one of the principles that judges must take into account when 
sentencing.  Section 8(e) of the Act requires judges to “take into account the general 
desirability of consistency with appropriate sentencing levels and other means of dealing 
with offenders in respect of similar offenders committing similar offences in similar 
circumstances”.  A review of the Sentencing Act in 2004 described the consistency 
principle as according with the prevailing general expectations of fairness and equality 
before the law (Chhana, Spier, Roberts & Hurd, 2004).  Earlier, Hall (1991) described 
consistency as inherent in the rule of law and argued that consistency must be assumed in 
the interests of fairness and justice.  Ashworth (1998) described inconsistency as a 
manifest injustice capable of bringing a sentencing system into public disrepute. 
The policy aim of this research was to advance the uncompleted debate on the 
adequacy of the sentencing framework and the extent of inconsistency.  The debate on 
adequacy was advanced by examining how inconsistency can occur despite the provision 
of guidance such as that provided by the Sentencing Act and appellate authorities, and the 
corrective effects of the appeal regime on individual cases.  The extent of inconsistency 
was addressed by an empirical examination of sentencing decisions in the New Zealand 
District Courts in 2008-2009.  Regression models based on a specially assembled dataset 
of sentencing decisions by District Court Judges resident in the circuits and a set of 
contextual variables based on census data and Ministry of Justice caseflow and sitting time 
reports were developed.  The empirical examination also provided a practical test of the 
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adequacy of the sentencing framework.  The results are important to fill gaps in the 
theoretical framework used to understand sentencing, to advance understanding of the real 
levels of consistency or inconsistency in sentencing, and to inform future policy 
developments.  The research adds an additional perspective to the international sentencing 
research literature.  It makes a contribution to a research literature that has otherwise been 
described as being dominated by studies of the federal and some state jurisdictions in the 
United States, with a dearth of research from other jurisdictions (Ulmer, 2012).  Much of 
the United States research is from sentencing under guideline systems.  The current 
research will enable the results of research from a non-guideline system to be contrasted 
with the results from guideline systems. 
In Chapter 2 a framework for understanding sentencing disparity is advanced.  The 
framework can be likened to a chain whose links span the gap between sentencing based 
on a strict application of the law across judges and locations to a patchwork of sentencing 
approaches differing between judges and locations resulting in inconsistency between 
locations.  In the United States the framework for understanding the occurrence of 
disparity stems from a consideration of the effects of judicial discretion in sentencing and 
the difficulties confronting judges in the exercise of discretion.  Sentencing frameworks 
aim to bring consistency to sentencing outcomes but at the same time afford differing 
degrees of discretion to judges.  Discretion is allowed to enable sentences to be fitted to 
circumstances, to be individualised to particular offending and offender.  The exercise of 
sentencing and reaching decisions is complicated and challenging.  In any given case a 
judge is confronted by a broad and complex set of factors to be taken into account, 
incomplete information, the need to speculate about the future, and must reach a decision 
quickly.  According to Simon (1976) decision makers confronted with these challenges 
(complexity, incomplete information, uncertainty and time pressure) are limited by 
“bounded rationality” and restricted to “satisficing” or making good enough decisions.  In 
response decision makers, in this case judges, develop heuristic strategies or rules of 
thumb, to simplify and speed up decision making.  Sentencing discretion enables concerns 
outside formal sentencing frameworks to influence outcomes.  According to Savelsberg 
(1992) sentencing is a balance between formal rationalities based on the law or guidelines 
and substantive rationalities based on concerns, ideologies, attitudes, biases and individual 
interests.  It follows that if sentencing is a balance of rationalities that the content of any 
sentencing heuristic can be categorised into formal rationalities and substantive 
rationalities.  These concepts explain how sentencing might vary between similar cases and 
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between judges but it does not explain variation between locations.  Court community 
theory (Eisenstein & Jacobs, 1978; Eisenstein, Flemming & Nardulli, 1988) and the 
commonality and sociality corollaries from personal construct psychology (Ostrom, 
Ostrom & Kleiman, 2004) bridge the gap.  Court community theory suggests that 
sentencing is influenced by the concerns and attitudes of the local courthouse community 
(the judges, prosecutors and defence counsel who regularly appear in the same courtrooms) 
(Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977) and by the concerns and attitudes of the wider community that 
the court serves (Eisenstein, Flemming & Nardulli, 1988).  The commonality corollary 
suggests that those who share a common environment are likely to make sense of it in 
similar ways.  Sentencing approaches converge between the judges in a locality because 
they share a similar set of experiences and observations.  Convergence is reinforced by the 
sociality corollary with those who work together on a regular basis sharing their 
experiences and approaches and anticipating and adopting the behaviour of others.  
The discussion of the framework is followed by a review of empirical research of 
sentencing consistency between locations (Chapter 3).  Research into sentencing disparities 
between locations is a relatively recent development.  Disparities between ethnic groups, 
genders and, to a lesser extent, other extra-legal factors have been of greater interest.  The 
bulk of the research has been undertaken in the United States with little research 
elsewhere.  Furthermore only United States researchers have utilised multivariate 
analytical techniques to control for sentencing factors and to isolate the influence that 
location has on sentencing decisions.  The review focuses heavily on the United States but 
also summarises the findings from elsewhere.  Almost all the studies included in the 
review found evidence of disparities or inconsistency between locations.  In a limited 
number of multi-level models partitioning the influence of sentencing factors between 
cases and locations, the research found that the weight given to the factors that influence 
sentencing varies between locations.  The research was extended one step further to 
identify differences between locations in terms of socio-demographic and court caseload 
variables associated with the disparities in sentencing decisions.  The outcome of the 
research examining these contextual variables has been more equivocal.  The size of the 
locality (judge numbers or population served) and caseload pressure have commonly been 
found to be associated with disparities between locations.  There have been mixed results 
across the reported research for variables based on the proportion of ethnic minorities in 
the population, economic disadvantage, the political context, trial rates and available jail 
capacity.    
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The balance of the thesis applies the framework and learning from the research to 
the New Zealand context.  In Chapter 4 four predictions and two research questions 
founded on the framework and prior research are set out.  The primary predictions are that, 
after controlling for offence seriousness, criminal history and offender demographics, 
similar offenders will be incarcerated at different rates and subject to different terms of 
incarceration between circuits.  Subject to two conditions it was further predicted that the 
interpretation and use of some offence seriousness, criminal history and offender 
demographic variables in the determination of incarceration and incarceration sentence 
lengths will vary between circuits.  The conditions were that the predictions of different 
rates and lengths of incarceration between circuits would be proven, and secondly that the 
models would demonstrate that offence seriousness and criminal history variables were the 
principal determinants of incarceration and incarceration sentence lengths.  The research 
questions were specified on the assumption that the predictions would be supported.  The 
research questions examine whether any circuit level contextual variables are associated 
with the variation in sentence outcomes between circuits. 
The balance of Chapter 4 addresses a series of higher level methodological choices 
affecting the specification of the empirical research.  Single level regression models were 
chosen for the testing of the principal predictions of inconsistency of sentencing decisions 
between circuits.  Multi-level regression models were required to test the predictions that 
different weights would be given to some case level variables in some circuits and to 
identify any circuit level contextual variables associated with inconsistency of sentencing 
decisions between circuits.  The selection of variables and their specification for inclusion 
is discussed.  This process was challenging because of the detailed data available and the 
capacity for some variables to be expressed in a multitude of ways.  No adjustment for 
sample selection bias was made in the sentence length models.  This may be seen as a 
controversial choice.  The decision to make no adjustment was based on a concern that an 
adjustment may distort the findings, and in particular that it might increase the estimated 
level of inconsistency and result in criticisms that the model specification had “cooked the 
books”.   
Decisions affecting the detailed specification of the models are set out in Chapter 5.  
The decisions cover: the courts and circuits to be included in the models; the time span; the 
choice of offences; the choice between individual offence based models or collective 
models for the selected offences; determination of  the unit of analysis; the appropriate 
treatment of cumulative sentences; restriction of the research to sentencing by resident 
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judges; the choice between the sentence imposed at first instance or the final sentence after 
reviews/appeals; and, the exclusion of cases when the most serious charge was for an 
offence not covered by this research.  There is a description of the data sources for the 
research and the outcome or dependent variables for the models and the control variables.   
The results of the modelling are reported in Chapters 6 - 9.  Logistic regression 
models (Chapter 6) show significant and substantial levels of inconsistency between 
circuits in the use of incarceration.  Likewise, linear regression models (Chapter 7) show 
significant and substantial levels of inconsistency between circuits in the length of 
incarceration.  The extent of inconsistency differed between the three offences modelled; 
in particular there were greater levels of inconsistency between circuits in the sentencing of 
offenders for aggravated drink driving and burglary than male assaults female.  The pattern 
of results by circuit also varied between the offences.  For example the rates of 
incarceration for aggravated drink driving were spread across a wide spectrum whereas the 
rates for burglary form two broad clusters.  In addition to demonstrating inconsistency 
between circuits the logistic and linear regression models confirmed that offence 
seriousness and criminal history variables were the principal influences on the 
determination of sentences.  The conditions necessary for the predictions that the 
interpretation and use of some sentencing factors would vary between locations were 
confirmed.  The results of multi-level (hierarchical linear and hierarchical generalised 
linear) models (Chapter 8) separating the fixed and random effects (by circuit) of 
sentencing variables demonstrated significant variations in the weights applied to a broad 
range of seriousness and criminal history factors for aggravated drink driving and burglary.  
The predictions were also supported for male assaults female but the support was weaker.   
In Chapter 9 the multi-level models are expanded to examine the association 
between circuit context and sentencing inconsistency.  Due to the limited number of 
circuits (17) and multi-collinearity between the contextual variables, bivariate analyses had 
to be employed.  The modelling revealed a consistent difference between provincial and 
metropolitan circuits; the two categories of circuit were distinguished from one another by 
many of the other more specific variables that had a significant association with sentencing 
approaches.  The provincial circuits were more severe.  However, the small number of 
circuits and multi-collinearity between the variables precluded more detailed analysis to 
identify which of the contextual variables distinguishing metropolitan and provincial 
circuits had the greatest influence.     
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The final chapter draws together a discussion of the results, the limitations of the 
research, future research directions, and the implications of the findings for sentencing 
policy in New Zealand.  The strong support for the predictions of inconsistency between 
circuits and differences in the weights applied to seriousness and criminal history factors 
support the efficacy of the framework for understanding sentencing.  In particular the 
formally rational sentencing rules dominate the determination of sentences but the 
application of the factors varies due to the influence of local substantive sentencing 
concerns.  The circuits are distinct communities varying from one another.  In particular 
there is a difference in sentencing approaches between metropolitan and provincial circuits 
but the differences in conditions between the two categories is difficult to specify.  If the 
level of inconsistency is considered to be a concern then any solution must rebalance the 
influence of formal and substantive rationalities.  Judges need more guidance on the 
sentences to be applied for a given range of offending – the determination of the approach 
should not be dependent on the judge or the judges in a particular circuit.  The current 
sentencing framework is manifestly inadequate.  It is doubtful that this could be directly 
rectified by providing more detailed generic guidance in legislation.  More detailed offence 
based sentencing guidance is required; in the current context there are two options that 
could be used.  The Court of Appeal could issue a broader range of guideline judgments or 
the legislation for the Sentencing Council and the process for developing and promulgating 
guidelines could be implemented.  For logistical and public policy reasons the Sentencing 
Council approach is preferred. There is a risk that failure to address the levels of 
inconsistency will result in the sentencing system falling into disrepute.   
The findings should not be interpreted as if they are a critique of the sentence 
imposed in any individual case or of the sentencing by any judge or in any circuit.  It is a 
critique of sentencing guidance in New Zealand and its ability to achieve a fundamental 
tenet of justice: the similar treatment of similar offenders being sentenced in similar 
circumstances. 
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Chapter 2: A Framework for Understanding Sentencing Disparity 
 
The occurrence of sentencing disparities between locations has been the subject of a 
substantial body of research in the United States in recent years.  The research has found 
widespread evidence of disparity (see Johnson, 2011; Ulmer, 2012 for reviews). Before 
examining whether the Law Commission’s (2006) research indicating variation in 
sentencing for like offenders in different locations in New Zealand withstands rigorous 
scrutiny the more immediate question is why inconsistency between locations occurs.  
Those who believe that it will not withstand scrutiny base their argument on the 
proposition that the legal framework guiding the sentencing process in New Zealand is 
sufficient to achieve consistency.  The supporters of the current regime rejected the 
empirical argument suggesting that it was misconceived by failing to properly recognise 
differences between cases and compositional differences in caseload between locations.  
Conversely the Law Commission argued that the level of discretion accorded to judges 
almost makes inconsistency inevitable and pointed to the differences in rates of 
imprisonment and sentence lengths as proof.   
The arguments for and against the existence of a problem and the need for change 
both lack depth.  They are little more than assertions of a view, they do not provide a 
framework explaining how the sentencing of the myriad cases results in consistent 
sentencing between locations or how it results in disparity.  A framework for 
understanding sentencing disparity is developed in this chapter.  The framework can be 
likened to a chain whose links span the gap between sentencing based on a strict 
application of the law across judges and locations to a patchwork of sentencing approaches 
differing between judges and locations resulting in inconsistency between locations.     
In the United States the framework for understanding the occurrence of disparity is 
based on sentencing discretion and the difficulties confronting judges in the exercise of 
discretion.  In simple terms judges have discretion because sentencing is challenging.  
Judges must evaluate the widely varying circumstances of offending and offenders against 
a complex set of factors, and in doing so they are often faced with incomplete information, 
take into account uncertain future prospects and must arrive at a decision quickly.  Each 
case has to be considered separately, a sentence crafted to the circumstances of the case is 
needed to ensure justice is done.  The exercise of discretion and the consequential 
challenges form the first two links in the chain. 
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In decision making contexts characterised by complexity, uncertainty and time 
pressure, Simon (1976) suggested decision makers are limited by “bounded rationality” 
and restricted to “satisficing” or making good enough decisions.  To manage the challenges 
decision makers develop heuristic strategies or rules of thumb to simplify and speed up 
decision making.  Bounded rationality and the use of heuristic strategies are the third and 
fourth links in the chain.    
Based on the availability of sentencing discretion Savelsberg (1992) argued that 
sentencing can be understood as a balance between formal and substantive rationalities.  
Formal rationality involves the strict application of externally developed rules to the 
determination of sentences.  Examples of externally developed rules include legislation, 
sentencing guidelines and appellate authority.  Substantive rationality is the influence of 
concerns, ideologies, attitudes, biases and individual interests on sentencing.  Substantive 
rationalities are not expressed as formal rules.  If sentencing is a balance of rationalities it 
follows that the content of any sentencing heuristic can be categorised into formal 
rationalities and substantive rational rationalities.  Savelsberg’s (1992) construct is the fifth 
link in the chain. 
To this point the chain explains how sentencing might vary between similar cases 
and between judges but it does not explain variation between locations.  Substantive 
rationalities, like formal rationality, may be system wide or they may reflect concerns and 
attitudes based on local conditions and result in disparities between locations in the same 
legal system.  Earlier researchers made a similar argument suggesting that sentencing was 
influenced by the concerns and attitudes of the local courthouse community (the judges, 
prosecutors and defence counsel who regularly appeared in the same courtrooms) 
(Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977) and by the concerns and attitudes of the wider community the 
court served (Eisenstein et al., 1988).  Court community theory is the sixth link in the chain 
establishing a base for variation between locations in the recognition of the influence of the 
immediate court community and the wider community around the court. 
Using constructs borrowed from personal construct psychology Ostrom et al. 
(2004) explained how judges’ personal sentencing approaches converge into a local 
sentencing approach.  In simple terms they argued that under the “commonality corollary” 
those who share a common environment are likely to make sense of it in similar ways.  
Secondly, they argued that this is reinforced by the “sociality corollary” with those who 
work together on a regular basis sharing their experiences and approaches and anticipating 
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and adopting the behaviour of others.  The commonality and sociality corollaries form the 
seventh link in the chain.  
In the United States much of the research into sentencing disparity has been 
influenced by Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer’s (1998) focal concerns models founded 
on the exercise of discretion, the challenges of sentencing, and the use of heuristic devices 
drawing on the influence of substantive rationalities.  Although the focal concerns model is 
a general theory potentially applicable in New Zealand and elsewhere, its specific 
applicability to New Zealand is questionable in light of the specific nature of the statutory 
sentencing regime.  
In the remainder of this chapter the seven links in the chain spanning the gap from 
sentencing discretion to inconsistency between locations will be elaborated.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the applicability of the theory to sentencing in New 
Zealand. 
 
Exercising Discretion: The Sentencing Challenge 
Ostrom et al. (2004) identified sentencing as being a complex decision making task despite 
it being a routine activity for judges.  Judges are often called on to frequently sentence 
offenders for the same high volume offence type (e.g. burglary or lower level assaults).  
However, sentencing remains complex despite the frequency of the task because each case 
must be dealt with on its merits.  Describing judges as frequently sentencing burglars or 
offenders who committed minor assaults masks the reality that the offending and offenders 
within these broad categories differ widely.  The merits of a particular case can be 
challenging to determine.  Judges must evaluate the varying circumstances of offending 
and offenders against a complex set of factors, and in doing so they are often faced with 
incomplete information, have to take into account uncertain future prospects and arrive at a 
decision quickly.  Separate consideration of each case resulting in a sentence crafted to the 
circumstances of the case (individualised sentencing) has been held to be necessary to 
ensure justice is done. 
Outwardly similar cases can and sometimes should properly result in substantially 
different outcomes.  The transformation of the evaluation of the circumstances into a 
sentence may require a finely balanced choice between sentence types and almost always 
requires the determination of the quantum of sentence from a continuum or between two 
points on the continuum.   
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The ordinary complexity of weighing and balancing a multiplicity of factors is 
compounded by having to do so with incomplete information and having to overcome the 
uncertainty associated with the application of some factors.  Some factors pose little 
difficulty, for example, whether an offender pleaded guilty, was a disqualified driver, had 
prior convictions for the offence or offended while on bail can be established with 
certainty.  The sincerity of a claim of remorse or the balance between competing versions 
of the ferocity of an admitted assault cannot be so readily determined; the absence of 
complete information on the assault requires the exercise of a judgement.  Some factors are 
more challenging because they require a judgement about the future: for example, whether 
an offender is likely to re-offend; or, conversely, whether an offender can be rehabilitated. 
The challenge does not end with a determination of the factual basis for sentencing; it must 
be weighed up against any sentencing guidance and transformed into a sentence.  The 
challenge of doing all this is exacerbated by high workloads and time pressure on 
decisions.  Quicker decisions help to ensure that the consequences are felt by the offender 
as close to the offending as practicable and assist victims to get early closure.  What does 
this combination of discretion and sentencing challenges mean for sentencing decision 
making?  
 
Bounded rationality 
Many researchers who have sought to understand sentencing decision making have 
focussed on the sentencing challenges (complexity, incomplete information, uncertainty, 
and time limitations) as critical characteristics affecting the decision process (Albonetti, 
1991; Hupfeld-Heinemann & von Helversen, 2009; Ostrom et al., 2004; Steffensmeier, 
Ulmer & Kramer, 1998; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009).  These challenges are central 
to Simon’s (1976) theory of bounded rationality.  Bounded rationality has been a key 
element in theoretical frameworks explaining sentencing decision making.   
Bounded rationality was labelled in the 1970s (Simon, 1976) but it was first 
described in Simon’s original work published in 1945.  Simon criticised the classical 
notion of unbounded rationality and the assumption that decision makers sought to assess 
all options and seek information until they reached the point of being able to recognise and 
choose the optimal decision.  Simon (1976, pp. xxvi-xxvii) argued that: “economists 
attribute to economic man a preposterously omniscient rationality.  Economic man has a 
complete and consistent system of preferences that allows him always to choose among the 
alternatives open to him; he is always completely aware of what these alternatives are; 
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there are no limits on the complexity of the computations he can perform in order to 
determine which alternatives are best…”.  According to Simon (1976, p xxvii), economic 
man had “little discernible relation to the actual or possible behaviour of flesh-and-blood 
human beings”.  
Simon (1976) recognised that the ability of humans to reach optimal decisions 
when faced with complex decisions having to be made under time constraints is limited.  
Due to limited computational powers humans cannot always choose the best alternative 
(the one that has greatest utility).  Nor do they always have complete information and, due 
to time constraints, it is often impractical to seek to rectify all information deficits.   
Within the limitations imposed by bounded rationality humans must make do with 
imperfect assessment of alternatives and incomplete information and therefore accept 
outcomes that are “good enough” or “satisficing” (a decision that is hoped to be close to 
the best possible answer) but which may not be optimal.  According to Simon (1992), 
problem solving tends to involve a selective search through large numbers of alternatives.  
The search is selective because an undirected search would require an enormous amount of 
time.  Heuristics provide a means of being selective. 
Any method to make decision making or problem solving quicker and more 
manageable is a heuristic. Heuristics have a common set of features.  They simplify the 
problem (decision), reduce the time required to reach a decision, and do not require a 
judgement that the decision is optimal, just that it is good enough (Gigerenzer, 2006).  
Heuristics vary on a range of dimensions with no universal heuristic (Gigerenzer, 2006).  
When it is not possible to optimise, decisions are made by a reliance on “routines, habits, 
intuition and rules of thumb” to quicken the decision making process and find a good 
enough solution (Gigerenzer, 2006. p. 31).  Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) list three broad 
building blocks that can be found in any heuristic.  They are: rules guiding the search for 
cues (factors or information) relevant to the decision/problem at hand, rules for stopping 
the search for cues, and rules for decision making based on the cues.    
Heuristics may be compensatory or non-compensatory.  In a non-compensatory 
heuristic the search for cues ends once the decision maker finds the first cue that 
discriminates between the alternative decisions.  No combination of other cues can change 
the decision.  A compensatory heuristic requires the weighing of a series of cues to achieve 
a balanced decision, and the search only stops when the decision maker is confident that no 
combination of other cues could change the indicated decision.   
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Heuristics can be general, or they can be specific to a particular domain.  The 
recognition heuristic is an example of a general heuristic.  It can be employed to choose 
between options in any domain (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999).  The recognition heuristic 
relies on the decision maker’s ability to recognise one of the solutions to a problem but not 
any other.  Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999) gave the example of someone faced with 
choosing which of two cities is the larger.  They hypothesise that if the person has only 
heard of one of the two cities they would choose that city.  If they do not recognise either 
city or if they recognise both cities they need to find a different discriminator.  A heuristic 
used in the health system that relies on blood pressure, age and sinus tachycardia to 
determine if a heart attack patient is low or high risk is an example of a domain specific 
heuristic (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) because it relies on cues particular to the heart health 
care domain. 
Depending on the search, stopping, and decision making rules, heuristics may be 
faster or slower in terms of the time taken and more or less frugal in terms of the fraction 
of information used.  Some heuristics are known as fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer 
& Todd, 1999) because they are very fast and use only a small fraction of the available 
information.  The fastest and most frugal heuristics require only one reason for a decision 
to be made (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999).  The “take the best” heuristic is an example of 
a fast and frugal heuristic.  Cues are considered in descending order according to the 
frequency with which they have enabled a decision to be taken.  A decision is made as 
soon as the first factor that discriminates between the options is found.  Only one factor is 
needed for a decision.  It is a non-compensatory heuristic as it cannot be over-ridden by 
any other factor or combination of factors. 
Other heuristic strategies are more complex, requiring more information and more 
computation.  Simon (1992) described two more complex heuristic approaches.  First, the 
planning heuristic: the decision maker omits or puts to one side some of the detail of the 
problem and focuses on its essential features.  The simplified problem is solved to find a 
favoured solution which is used as a guide to solve the full problem and adjusted as 
necessary.  Simon (1992, p. 68) claimed use of the planning heuristic “can increase the 
speed of the solution by many orders of magnitude”.  Factoring was the second heuristic 
approach described by Simon: the decision maker breaks the problem into sub-problems 
and addresses the sub-problems with the smallest number of unknowns first.   
In sum, heuristics are any approaches employed to overcome the challenges of 
complexity, information deficits and uncertainty, and time pressure on decision making.  
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There are many types of heuristic and they vary in complexity and the speed of decision 
making and the amount of information required. 
 
Sentencing heuristics 
The axiom that sentencing is an art rather than a science suggests that sentencing is a 
search for “good enough” or “satisficing” decisions (decisions hoped to be close to the best 
possible) and that it is not possible to optimise.  The discretion entrusted to sentencing 
judges, the limited guidance provided to assist the exercise of this discretion, the 
conditions under which sentencing commonly occurs (complexity, uncertainty and time 
pressure) combine to suggest that the sentence decision making domain is one that is likely 
to be subject to bounded rationality and the use of heuristics.  The use of heuristics in 
sentencing (or other legal decision making) has been assumed to be reasonable because of 
the nature of the decision making environment (Gigerenzer, 2006; von Helversen & 
Rieskamp, 2009).     
Some general propositions can be made about any sentencing heuristics.  First, it is 
assumed that they will be domain specific.  The statutory framework, the common law and 
the specific qualifications and background of judges point toward domain specific 
heuristics.  Sentencing decisions are explained in terms of factors that are particular to the 
criminal justice and sentencing domains, and are often specific to the particular offence 
being sentenced.  The need to justify sentences in terms of domain specific factors is 
reinforced by the appellate process.  
Second, it is likely that any heuristics will be compensatory rather than non-
compensatory.  The expectation in New Zealand that the sentence represents the net 
consequence of considering the effects of aggravating and mitigating factors suggests a 
compensatory approach.  As a result faster and more frugal heuristics are unlikely to be 
prominent in judicial decision making.  The multiplicity of factors expected to be taken 
into account in any sentencing decision suggests that there will be few circumstances in 
which a one reason decision could be made.  The differing roles of the prosecution and 
defence counsel and the opportunities they have to influence the sentencing decision, the 
requirement on the judge to call for and take account of various pre-sentence reports and 
the disciplining effect of appeals can be viewed as mechanisms likely to encourage the 
balancing of multiple factors.  Within the overall decision process there may be some 
decisions (problems) that are solved more quickly and frugally than others.  For higher 
volume, less serious offences, the sentencing alternatives tend to be more limited.  For 
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example, in New Zealand most offenders sentenced for a first drink drive offence are fined.  
In the three years from 2004 to 2006 89.2% of 24,993 offenders sentenced for a first drink 
drive offence with no accompanying charges had a fine as their most serious sentence (this 
information was derived from a dataset sourced from data supplied to the Sentencing 
Establishment Unit and obtained from the Law Commission under the Official Information 
Act).  Even though a fine was imposed in a high proportion of cases the judge would still 
check for cues indicating that a fine is impracticable or otherwise inappropriate.  The 
particular attributes of any heuristics employed are likely to vary by offence type, with 
some employing fewer cues and being faster and more frugal than others.   
In addition to the system settings that militate against fast and frugal heuristics in 
sentencing, the principle of individualised justice, the determination of the sentence having 
regard to the particulars of the offending and the offender, and the need for the judge to 
have sufficient comfort with the “good enough” sentence also militate against faster and 
more frugal heuristics.  The weight of the responsibility entrusted to the judge to do justice 
means that judges cannot too readily sacrifice accuracy (effectiveness) in decision making 
for greater speed (efficiency).  The risk or threat of an appeal may also discipline judges to 
not be too fast or frugal in their approach.   
A busy judge considering whether or not an offender should be imprisoned might 
be expected to make a decision once he or she has identified a factor or a combination of 
factors that he or she is convinced resolve whether imprisonment is or is not appropriate.  
The search for additional information ends once the judge is “satisficed” (comfortable that 
the choice is good enough).  Sometimes this might occur relatively quickly and easily.  For 
example, a judge may determine that imprisonment appears to be the only reasonable 
sentence for a recidivist drink driver, a scan of other cues may not reveal anything that 
warrants re-consideration of that initial judgement, and the judge moves on to the task of 
determining the term of imprisonment.  On other occasions it may be more difficult.  For 
example, the number of prior convictions may place the offender on the cusp of 
imprisonment.  The judge then seeks more information on factors such as the offender’s 
driving behaviour, the recency of prior convictions, previous compliance with community 
sentences, other indicators of the risk of re-offending and the potential for rehabilitation, 
before weighing up the pros and cons and coming to a decision. 
The development of heuristic strategies to overcome the challenges of sentencing is 
a key link in the chain.  The focal concerns theory developed by Steffensmeier et al. 
(1998), and discussed in more detail later, is a broad description of a heuristic strategy.  
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However, it is difficult to define the content of specific heuristics used in sentencing.  The 
content of any heuristic strategy is likely to vary from offence to offence and depends on 
views about which factors are important and the seriousness of the offence.  It is sufficient 
for the purposes of this study to recognise the applicability of heuristic strategies as a 
means of responding to the challenges of sentencing. 
 
Formal and Substantive Rationalities and Court Communities 
In an influential article Savelsberg (1992) described sentencing as a balance between 
formal and substantive rationalities.  At the time Savelsberg was discussing why the 
uniformity of sentencing sought by the development and implementation of sentencing 
guidelines may fail to be achieved to the extent expected by the architects of the 
guidelines.  The concepts have wide application and have been used widely in subsequent 
research (e.g., Dixon, 1995; Johnson, 2005).  
Savelsberg (1992) distinguished formal rationality, the making of decisions 
according to a set of rules, from substantive rationality, the influence on those decisions of 
circumstances and considerations not contained in the rules but perceived to be relevant to 
sentencing.  The concepts were developed in light of the widespread movement toward 
sentencing guidelines in the United States.  Savelsberg (1992) described the guidelines as 
an attempt to impose greater uniformity on sentencing by prescribing rules intended to be 
applied universally.  
Sentencing guidelines with defined ranges for sentence based on explicit legal 
criteria are a good example of formal rationality (Johnson, 2005).  Formal rationality has 
been characterised as resulting in sentences based on legal rules and criteria applied 
equally in all cases (Dixon, 1995).  Formal rationalities are externally imposed and apply 
across a jurisdiction.  Conversely, substantive rationality is said to be guided by non-legal 
factors applied on an individual basis to specific cases (Johnson, 2005).  The capacity built 
into the guidelines for judges to depart from the guidelines and impose a sentence different 
from that indicated by strict application of the guidelines was identified by Savelsberg 
(1992) as an opportunity for substantively rational sentencing concerns to modify the 
formally rational sentence.  The critical feature of the framework is that the balance is 
dependent on the extent of judicial discretion.  As such, the proposition that sentencing can 
be understood as a balance between formal and substantive rationality is applicable to 
virtually any criminal justice system. 
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Formal rationality involves the strict application of externally developed rules to 
the determination of sentences.  Examples of externally developed rules include 
legislation, sentencing guidelines and appellate authority.  Substantive rationality is the 
influence of concerns, ideologies, attitudes, biases and individual interests on sentencing.  
Substantive rationalities are not expressed as formal rules and are not externally imposed.  
If sentencing is a balance of rationalities it follows that the content of any sentencing 
heuristic can be categorised into formal rationalities and substantive rational rationalities.   
The concepts of legal and extra-legal factors frequently used in the sentencing 
research literature correspond to formal and substantive rationality.  Legal factors are 
mandated by the formally rational rules; they are factors that are intended to influence 
sentencing.  Conversely, extra-legal factors are not intended to influence sentencing; they 
do not spring from the formally rational rules and are the manifestation of substantive 
rationality.  Ethnicity and gender are the most common examples of extra-legal factors that 
may influence sentencing.  Moreover, the influence of substantively rational sentencing 
concerns is not limited to taking account of extra-legal factors.  The influence may be 
expressed via the interpretation and application of formally rational rules.  
 
Court community theory 
The concepts of formal and substantive rationality complement two competing metaphors 
for understanding courts and sentencing described by Eisenstein et al. (1988).  According 
to the traditional legal metaphor, courts and outcomes (like sentencing) are simply 
understood as the result of the application of the law (formal rationality).  The law is 
described “as a set of rules transcending time, geography and the circumstances 
surrounding specific cases” (Eisenstein et al., p.5) expected to afford all individuals 
equality before the law.  The competing community metaphor, preferred by Eisenstein et 
al. (1988), identifies courts as communities and locates them as political bodies.  They are 
political because the discretion afforded to judges affords them the opportunity to interpret 
the law and to make policy within the broad boundaries established by the law.  In doing so 
they are influenced by local conditions (substantive rationalities). 
Eisenstein et al. (1988) adopted two usages of community from the social sciences 
in the development of the community metaphor.  The two usages were, first, the notion of 
communities as neighbourhoods and, second, the notion that “undercover” communities 
form within organisations and institutions.  The two usages of community correspond to 
Eisenstein & Jacob’s (1977) earlier conception of local context as comprising the influence 
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of two distinct, sometimes complementary and sometimes competing, environments: the 
influence of the courtroom workgroup (an undercover community); and the wider 
influence of the community the court is located within (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1997; 
Eisenstein et al., 1988).   
Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) conceived of the courtroom workgroup as having at its 
core the judge and the prosecutor(s) and defence counsel who appear in the judge’s 
courtroom.  Courtroom workgroups were theorised as having four goals: doing justice; 
disposing of the caseload; maintaining group cohesion; and reducing uncertainty.  
Differences in the characteristics of workgroups between locations could lead to variation 
in outcomes (including sentencing) between locations (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977).  
Workgroup members’ familiarity with one another, dependence on one another, stability, 
and the relative importance attached to the four goals and task specialisation could all vary 
between locations and influence outcomes.  Individual roles may vary from location to 
location depending on the control exercised by sponsoring organisations.  For instance the 
role of prosecutors may be affected by the way they are assigned to courts, by the control 
extended over them by their organisation and the existence of policies affecting their 
discretion.  In instances where prosecutors, such as the state attorney, were elected or 
appointed their behaviour or control over their prosecutors may be influenced by political 
parties or other organisations instrumental in their election or appointment.  Outcomes can 
also be influenced by pressures from groups within the wider environment including the 
police, appellate courts, media and political organisations.  Variability in the weights 
placed on the goals and the impact of the characteristics theorised to influence outcomes 
could result in variation in sentencing between locations.   
As substantive rationalities are not externally imposed they can vary from judge to 
judge and place to place.  Substantive rationalities based on local conditions, concerns, 
ideologies, and biases and individual interests can subvert the formal rationality of 
guidelines (Kramer & Ulmer, 2002).  This is not to say that they must necessarily be 
unique to a location as they may be the same or similar to the extent that locations share 
common characteristics and concerns.  In some instances particular conceptions of 
substantive rationality may apply across most localities.  For example, concerns or biases 
based on stereotypical views of personal characteristics, such as gender or ethnicity, that 
are not incorporated into or founded on the formally rational rules may be pervasive across 
localities. 
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Ostrom et al. (2004) identified why judges personal sentencing constructs formed 
within the bounds of discretion and influenced by local conditions and substantive 
rationalities could be expected to converge into local sentencing constructs.  Using two 
concepts from personal construct psychology, the commonality corollary and the sociality 
corollary, Ostrom et al. (1998) explained the patterned responses exhibited by judges 
within a locality.  They postulated that individual judges develop personal constructs as the 
means by which they make sense of their world.  To deal with complexity and uncertainty 
the judges develop personal theories based on their observations, and test them against 
actual experience and replace or refine the construct in light of that experience.  Under the 
commonality corollary “people who share a similar work environment and similar cultural 
norms also likely share similarities in how they “make sense” of their experience” (Ostrom 
et al., 2004 p.45) promoting convergence of approaches locally.  Although the construct is 
personal to the individual, in this case the judge, the common features of the environment 
and the common elements of the backgrounds of the judges tend to cause the constructs of 
local judges to converge.  The convergence of sentencing approaches will be enhanced to 
the extent that all judges have some common background from their training and to the 
extent that their life experiences are more or less similar.  However, if their life 
experiences are different, or if they live in different communities and have had different 
types of legal practice, their personal constructs can diverge.  The sociality corollary 
strengthens the influence of the locality on personal sentencing constructs.  As summarised 
by Ostrom et al (2004, p.46) “individuals who work together on a regular basis will 
naturally begin to anticipate the behaviour of others.  In doing so, individuals develop and 
adopt practices based on group expectations and established ways of understanding the 
world.  Unwritten rules and practices within the group tend to be reinforced by the give 
and take of everyday observation and interaction.  Therefore, we should not be surprised 
that as judges anticipate, and sometimes emulate, the conventional sentencing practices of 
their colleagues, patterned responses in sentencing outcomes emerge.”  
 
Focal concerns theory 
In the United States focal concerns theory (Steffensmeier et al., 1998) has been used by 
many researchers as the foundation for examining sentencing disparities.  Ulmer (2012) 
described focal concerns as an elaboration of Savelsberg’s (1992) theory.  Based on 
interviews with judges, prosecutors and defence counsel in Pennsylvania Steffensmeier et 
al. (1998) argued that judges determine sentences based on judgements about three “focal 
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concerns”: blameworthiness; protection of the community (dangerousness/rehabilitative 
potential); and, the practical implications of sentencing decisions.  Sentences are the 
outcome of an assessment of offence seriousness and the offender’s criminal history 
against these three concerns.   
Blameworthiness takes account of the offender’s culpability and the harm done by 
the offending.  It is associated with retributive sentencing or just deserts, and focuses on 
the severity of the offending ensuring that the punishment fits the crime.  The judgement 
about severity may be modified by offender factors.  Relevant prior offending may 
increase blameworthiness, whereas personal circumstances (physical and mental health, an 
abusive upbringing) may decrease it.  
Community protection draws on similar factors but is conceptually distinct because 
it focuses on the need to protect the community by either incapacitating the offender or 
deterring would-be offenders.  To achieve community protection the sentence based on 
blameworthiness may need to be varied.  The risk that an offender will re-offend is 
inherently uncertain.  As a result, Judges rely on attributions based on the nature of the 
offence (e.g., violent or property), case information, relevant prior offending, particular 
facts of the crime (e.g., the use of a weapon), and offender characteristics such as drug 
dependency, education, employment, or family history to identify those expected to re-
offend (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).     
Practical implications cover a range of distinct potential organisational and 
individual impacts arising from a possible sentence.  The organisational impacts include 
“maintaining working relationships among courtroom actors, ensuring the stable flow of 
cases, and being sensitive to local and state correctional crowding and resources” 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998 p. 767).  Individual impacts include the ability of the offender to 
serve the sentence and the impact of sentence on an offender’s family (Steffensmeier et al., 
1998). 
The focal concerns provide a structure for organising the considerations relevant to 
determining sentence.  It does not eliminate the practical challenges of sentencing but it 
does organise the decision process and to that extent reduces complexity.  When the 
practical challenges of sentencing leave judges uncertain about the sentence based on an 
assessment of legal or formally rational factors they are said to resort to “perceptual 
shorthand” (substantive rationality) based on the gender, race, and age of offenders.  
The idea of perceptual shorthand followed Albonetti’s (1991) bounded 
rationality/uncertainty avoidance perspective.  Albonetti assumed that uncertainty about 
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the likelihood of re-offending caused judges the greatest difficulty in determining the 
sentence.  Albonetti (1991) argued that in order to overcome the effects of bounded 
rationality on the judging of the likelihood of re-offending judges rely on patterned 
responses to reach a decision (sentence).  The patterned responses relied on an attribution 
process influenced by causal judgements of the propensity of different types of offender to 
re-offend across a range of factors.  The range of factors was a mix of formal and 
substantive rationalities.  Factors such as prior record (expected to increase sentence 
severity because it indicates a disposition to re-offend) or the use of a weapon (expected to 
increase sentence severity because it indicates a disposition toward more serious offending 
and a higher likelihood of re-offending) can be categorised as formally rational.  If the 
judge remained uncertain of how to proceed based on formally rational factors Albonetti 
(1991) suggested they rely on attributions based on substantive rationalities focussed on 
race and sex.  Being black would increase sentence severity because of stereotypical views 
that blacks are more likely to re-offend than whites.  Conversely, being female would 
reduce sentence severity because females are viewed as caregivers and less likely to re-
offend than males.   
Based on previous research Steffensmeier et al. (1998) predicted, like Albonetti 
(1991), that racial and gender stereotypes influence sentencing judges, with a perceived 
greater pre-disposition on the part of blacks to offend channelled through the focal 
concerns to decisions to imprison and to imprison for longer.  They also predicted that 
sentencing would be influenced by the age and gender of the offender in addition to race, 
such that sentencing would be more severe for blacks, males, and younger offenders.  
Furthermore they predicted that interactions between demographic factors would result in 
more severe sentencing for some sub-groups, and that in particular young, black males 
would be sentenced more severely than any other race-age-gender grouping because they 
were perceived to be the most dangerous or crime-prone group (requiring the community 
to be protected) and less likely to be harmed by incarceration (suffering no practical 
consequence from the sentence).  Irrespective of the influence of perceptual shorthand the 
authors also expected that offence severity and prior record would be strong predictors of 
sentence severity net of other factors. 
Focal concerns theory describes a broad heuristic simplifying the determination of 
sentences.  Sentencing is based on a three part structure for organising the consideration of 
sentencing factors and a means (perceptual shorthand) for resolving difficult cases.  It is a 
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heuristic specific to the sentencing domain, using the language of sentencing to describe 
how satisficing or good enough decisions are reached.   
Researchers (see Crow & Gertz, 2008; Johnson, 2005; Kramer & Ulmer, 2002; 
Ulmer, Eisenstein & Johnson, 2009) who have employed the focal concerns framework to 
study sentencing disparity have found disparities between locations in addition to gender 
and ethnic disparities.  Kramer and Ulmer (2002) suggest that the focal concerns are 
generally applicable across regimes they are not given the same meaning or emphasis in all 
locations.  “The meaning, relative emphasis and priority, and situational interpretations” 
afforded to the focal concerns can vary between locations because they are “embedded in 
local court community culture, organisational contexts, and politics” (Kramer and Ulmer, 
2002, p.903).  Seemingly local substantive rationalities within the court community 
influence sentences within the focal concerns framework.   
 
Summary of the Framework  
Sentencing disparity and the formation of distinct local sentencing approaches can be 
understood as the outcome of sequence of effects explaining how sentencing based on a 
common legal framework applying across judges and locations can be transformed into a 
patchwork of sentencing approaches differing between judges and locations. 
Sentencing frameworks aim to bring consistency to sentencing outcomes but at the 
same time afford differing degrees of discretion to judges.  Discretion is allowed because 
of the challenges of sentence decision making to enable sentences to be fitted to the 
circumstances of individual cases.  When decision makers are confronted with the 
challenges (complexity, incomplete information, uncertainty and time pressure) facing 
judges they are limited by “bounded rationality” and restricted to “satisficing” or making 
good enough decisions (Simon, 1976).  In response, decision makers, in this case judges, 
develop heuristic strategies or rules of thumb to simplify and speed up decision making.  
Sentencing discretion enables concerns outside formal sentencing frameworks to influence 
outcomes; sentencing is a balance between formal rationalities based on the law or 
guidelines and substantive rationalities based on concerns, ideologies, attitudes, biases and 
individual interests (Savelsberg, 1992).  It follows that if sentencing is a balance of 
rationalities then the content of any sentencing heuristic can be categorised into formal 
rationalities and substantive rationalities.  These concepts explain how sentencing might 
vary between similar cases and between judges but do not directly explain variation 
between locations.  Court community theory (Eisenstein & Jacobs, 1978; Eisenstein et al., 
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1988) and the commonality and sociality corollaries from personal construct psychology 
(Ostrom et al., 2004) bridge the gap.  Court community theory suggests that sentencing is 
influenced by the concerns and attitudes of the local courthouse community (the judges, 
prosecutors and defence counsel who regularly appeared in the same courtrooms) 
(Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977) and by the concerns and attitudes of the wider community the 
court serves (Eisenstein et al., 1988).  The commonality corollary suggests that those who 
share a common environment are likely to make sense of it in similar ways.  Sentencing 
approaches converge between the judges in a locality because they share a similar set of 
experiences and observations.  Convergence is reinforced by the “sociality corollary” with 
those who work together on a regular basis sharing their experiences and approaches and 
anticipating and adopting the behaviour of others.  
  
Applying the Framework to New Zealand 
Is the framework for understanding sentencing disparity applicable to sentencing in New 
Zealand?  The applicability of the framework is conditional on three factors.  Do judges 
have discretion in the determination of sentences?  Do the challenges confronting judges in 
determining sentences apply to sentencing in New Zealand?  Are the criminal justice and 
court systems configured in a way that is consistent with the opportunity for local 
sentencing constructs to form?   
 
Sentencing discretion in New Zealand 
It is widely recognised that judges have very broad sentencing discretion.  In his opposition 
to increased guidance and denial of inconsistency Priestley (2009) recognised the breadth 
of discretion.  The judge explained that it is the role of judges to do justice in individual 
cases by sentencing offenders within the broad framework established by Parliament.  
Parliament proscribed specific behaviours as crimes and set maximum penalties for those 
crimes, and guided the sentencing process by laying down broad purposes and principles in 
the Sentencing Act 2002.  The courts were described as holding the balance between the 
Crown and the citizen.  The judge argued that any curbing of sentencing discretion beyond 
these limits would have reduced the ability (and discretion) of judges to do justice.   
The Law Commission (2006) relied on broad discretion to explain sentencing 
disparity.  The Commission pointed out that the statutory regime left it to the judge(s) to 
determine where the threshold lies in terms of sentencing an offender to imprisonment or 
imposing a less severe sentence, and that for the most part the term of imprisonment was 
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only limited by the maximum penalty.  While acknowledging that the extent of discretion 
has been limited by the development of a body of appellate decisions relied on as 
precedent for sentencing decisions the Commission saw severe limitations in the guidance.  
Counsel were said to be able to find competing precedents for the same offence and 
counsel and judges can often readily distinguish the immediate case from any claimed 
precedents.  While the introduction of guideline judgments providing guidance that is not 
fact-specific and able to be generally applied to the run of cases addressed in the judgment 
has strengthened appellate authority the impact has been limited because the guidance only 
applies to a restricted number of the most serious offences.   
The Sentencing Act 2002, which largely codified case law (Robertson, 2007; Hall, 
2008), primarily places a framework of purposes and principles around sentencing.  It 
supports the process by informing judges about what to take into account at a generic level 
but provides no substantive guidance on custodial thresholds or sentence lengths beyond a 
requirement to impose the least restrictive sentence appropriate.  The Law Commission 
(2006, p.18) described the legislation as “highly permissive” and “characterised by 
substantial judicial discretion as to the way in which the purposes and principles of 
sentencing should be translated into sentencing levels”.  The purposes range across 
accountability, reparation, deterrence, community protection, and rehabilitation.  The 
selection is be made case by case, the purposes can be used as a mandate for more punitive 
approaches or for therapeutic justice approaches depending on the preferences of judges.  
The choice is guided by the principles of sentencing.  This is significant because the Courts 
have long interpreted the principles as a framework for proportionate sentencing 
(Robertson, 2007).  The requirements that the judge take account of: the gravity of the 
offending, including the offender’s culpability; the seriousness of the type of offence in 
comparison with other types of offences, as indicated by the maximum penalties; and the 
general desirability of consistency has been interpreted as a recipe for proportionate 
sentencing (Robertson, 2007).   
Strict proportionality does not always prevail.  Robertson (2007) lists four 
exceptions defined in case law allowing departure from proportionality: 1) an offender who 
poses a particularly high risk of reoffending may receive a longer sentence for the 
protection of the community; 2) a reduced sentence may be imposed if justified by the 
offender’s potential for rehabilitation; 3) a sentence that would otherwise be proportionate 
may be reduced for merciful reasons; and 4) in exceptional cases, where a sentence will 
have a disproportionate impact and cause exceptional hardship to either the offender or the 
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offender’s family as a result of ill health or other personal circumstances, a reduced 
sentence may be justified.  
The breadth of judicial sentencing discretion in New Zealand is arguably greater 
than the United States.  The development since the early 1970s of sentencing guidelines by 
state governments and the Federal government (Johnson, 2011) has set thresholds for the 
use of imprisonment and sentence ranges that are tied to specific offence seriousness and 
criminal history factors.  The guidelines limit discretion in ways that are not mirrored in 
New Zealand.      
 
Sentencing challenges 
Although it may be tautological, or circular reasoning, it can be inferred from the wide 
discretion afforded to judges in New Zealand that the judges face the challenges of 
discretionary sentencing.  In simple terms judges have discretion because sentencing is 
challenging.  Judges must evaluate the widely varying circumstances of offending and 
offenders against a complex set of factors, and in doing so they are often faced with 
incomplete information, take into uncertain future prospects, and need to arrive at a 
decision quickly.   
The judge must determine the purpose(s) of sentencing relevant to the case and 
choose the sentence type(s) and quantum of the sentence.  These decisions have to be taken 
after evaluating the seriousness of the offending, the culpability of the offender, the 
significance of criminal history on sentence, the adjustments necessary to take account of 
aggravating and mitigating factors personal to the offender and the reduction to be made 
for a guilty plea.  Depending on the offence there can be a substantial number of factors 
required to be taken into account in the evaluation of each component of the sentencing 
equation.  The models reported in later chapters and the lists of potentially relevant 
variables set out in Appendix E demonstrate the wide range of factors that may be 
pertinent in any specific case.   
 
The configuration of the criminal justice and court systems 
New Zealand has a unitary system of government.  The criminal justice statutes (including 
the Sentencing Act) and appellate authority apply to everyone equally and do not depend 
on location; there are no states or provinces that may enact different laws in different 
places.  
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Adult sentencing occurs in the District Courts and the High Court but it is 
monopolised by the District Courts.  Described as the workhorses of the courts by Joseph 
(2007), the District Courts undertake 99% of adult sentencing.  The 63 District Courts are 
organised into 18 circuits.  The circuits are relatively autonomous.  Each circuit, apart from 
one, has a cadre of judges resident in the circuit.  In almost all instances the resident judges 
have their chambers in the largest court in the circuit.  The resident judges in each circuit 
undertake most of the sentencing (>80%) in the circuit.  However, the effect of the 
structural separation of the courts by circuit is reduced by the use of visiting judges who 
undertake the balance of sentencing.   
The separation of the District Courts into circuits creates an opportunity for 
courtroom workgroups (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977) and the wider circuit community 
(Eisenstein et al., 1988) to influence local sentencing norms.  The judges in each circuit 
share a common environment, they sentence in the same set of courts and they are co-
located.  There is an opportunity for commonality of experience and socialisation of that 
experience between the judges for personal sentencing constructs to converge and result in 
distinct sentencing patterns between locations.   
 
The applicability of focal concerns theory and other heuristic strategies 
Despite widespread acceptance and utilisation of focal concerns theory in the United States 
the theory is not readily applicable in the New Zealand context because of the role of the 
Sentencing Act.  The purposes and principles in the Act guide the process.  However, the 
difference is more semantic than substantive.  The purposes and principles in the 
Sentencing Act and the focal concerns can be reconciled.  Blameworthiness corresponds to 
three purposes: holding the offender to account; instilling a sense of responsibility in the 
offender; and denunciation of the offending.  Protection of the community corresponds to 
three purposes: deterrence; protection of the community; and providing for the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender.  The third focal concern, practical 
constraints, is not matched by any of the purposes.  It is reflected in the sentencing 
principles requiring the personal circumstances of the offender to be taken into account 
and, in the exceptions to strict proportionality, allowing for merciful sentencing and 
reduction of a sentence that would have a disproportionate impact on the offender or their 
family.  Two purposes from the Sentencing Act do not readily reconcile to the focal 
concerns, they are providing for the interests of the victim, and providing reparation.  
These purposes do not set up a substantive difference between the Sentencing Act and 
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focal concerns.  The Sentencing Act, via the purposes and principles, is a heuristic device; 
it provides a constant framework, albeit not one that is likely to greatly increase the speed 
of decision making.   
The specification of a preferred sentencing methodology for the determination of 
sentence length by the Court of Appeal (R v Taueki, 2005) is a specific example of a 
planning heuristic (Simon, 1976).  Sentencing is broken into three steps (R v Taueki, 2005; 
Hall, 2008; Robertson, 2007).  In the first step the judge determines a starting point 
sentence based on the seriousness of the offence and the offender’s culpability.  Any 
personal aggravating and mitigating factors are then taken into account to adjust the 
sentence in the second step.  Finally, in the third step the sentence is further adjusted to 
take account of a guilty plea, if there was one, and any assistance provided to the 
authorities.  At each step a limited selection of factors is used to progressively determine 
the sentence.     
From time to time judges’ sentencing decisions indicate more informal use of the 
planning heuristic.  For example, in reading sentence notes for this research the following 
statements represent indications of sentencing approaches used by judges for drinking and 
driving.  One judge, referring to prior convictions for drink driving, said “my practice is, 
unless there are exceptional reasons after three, you go to jail”.  Another judge offered a 
slightly more complex approach, saying “the general rule in this area is that if you offend 
three times or more in the period of ten years we start with imprisonment”1.  The first 
judge began by looking at a single factor to determine sentence type; the second judge used 
the same factor (prior convictions) but took into account the age of those convictions.  In 
both examples the judge simplified the sentencing task by focussing on one or two factors 
before testing the indicative decision against the wider set of factors relevant to the case.   
 
Concluding Comment 
The framework for understanding sentencing disparity between locations is applicable to 
New Zealand.  Judges have wide discretion in the determination of sentences and confront 
the challenges of sentencing.  The criminal justice and court systems are configured in a 
way that is consistent with the opportunity for local sentencing constructs to form.  Given 
the relevance and applicability of the theory to the New Zealand context disparity would be 
expected between District Court locations.    
                                                 
1 These quotes are not referenced because this research proceeded on the basis that it would not 
directly or indirectly result in the identification of a particular judge. 
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Chapter 3: Sentencing Disparity by Location, the Findings from Empirical Research 
 
There is only a limited body of empirical research investigating sentencing disparity 
between locations.  Almost all of the research has been undertaken in the United States 
(see Johnson, 2011; Ulmer, 2012; for reviews), with only limited research in other 
jurisdictions.  The United States research has been more sophisticated than elsewhere using 
multivariate regression techniques to isolate the influence of location and other factors on 
sentencing outcomes.  The research carried out elsewhere has been relatively 
unsophisticated, often relying on comparisons of sentencing outcomes by location with no 
controls for legal or extra-legal factors that might explain differences between locations.   
Research into sentencing disparities between locations is a relatively recent 
development.  Disparities between ethnic groups, genders and, to a lesser extent, other 
extra-legal factors have been of greater interest.  Kautt (2002, p. 635) expressed surprise at 
the lack of research focussed on location, noting that: “since the [sentencing] guidelines 
were expressly intended to minimise the impact of extra-legal factors over the sentencing 
decision, variation in sentences by geographic location (which is also extra-legal) 
intuitively should be of particular interest.  Yet, this potentially significant source of extra-
legal disparity is inexplicably given short shrift by most studies of post guidelines 
sentencing.”  Johnson et al. (2008, p. 741) echoed Kautt, suggesting that “Concern over 
interjurisdictional variation in federal sentencing is not new; yet interdistrict variation in 
such disparity remains seriously under-studied”, and suggested researchers had focussed 
more on controlling for jurisdictional variation than investigating it.  
Recent reviews highlighted the need for further research into all aspects of 
sentencing disparity (Johnson, 2011, Ulmer, 2012), with Ulmer (2005, p. 1501) noting that 
“the most glaring gap in the literature is that almost all of the research on sentencing 
disparity is limited to the contemporary North American – particularly U.S. – context.” 
Influenced by the volume and methodological imbalances between the United States and 
elsewhere in the empirical research this review of findings is split between the United 
States research and the research elsewhere.  With a small number of exceptions that will be 
highlighted, the review covers studies that employed multivariate regression analysis.  The 
exceptions arise when there is a paucity of research.  Only findings that are statistically 
significant at the conventional standard (i.e. p < .05) are treated as significant in this 
review, although in limited instances some researchers treated findings as significant if p < 
.10. 
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United States Research 
The review of United States research addresses studies that either focussed directly on 
location or included it as a control factor in research with a different focus.  The review is 
presented in four parts.  The first part is a presentation of the findings of the influence of 
location on sentencing outcomes.  The second part addresses the influence of other 
variables, both legal and extra-legal, on sentencing outcomes.  The third part addresses 
research findings on the contextual variables that may account for disparity between 
locations.  The fourth part draws together the explanations offered for the influence of 
location and the influence of contextual variables.   
Research examining disparity in sentencing between locations has varied in terms 
of the legal system examined (federal, state, multi-state), the level of geographic unit 
explored (circuits, districts, counties or aggregations of these units), the range of offences 
included (all offences, just felonies or a single offence type), and the extent of controls for 
relevant variables.  Many earlier studies suffer from a failure to adequately measure 
offence seriousness (e.g., Eisenstein et al., 1988; Myers & Talarico, 1987), thus making 
any disparity in sentencing between locations difficult to interpret.  
The research has primarily focussed on two sentencing decisions.  The first 
decision focuses on the choice of sentence type, which has typically been reduced to a 
dichotomous choice between incarceration (custody) and other (non-custodial) sentences.  
This decision is often described as the “in-out” decision, referring to whether the defendant 
is put into custody or not.  The second focus has been on the length of incarceration.  To a 
lesser extent researchers have addressed departure decisions.  The decision to depart from 
sentencing guidelines is most often addressed as a dichotomous choice between departing 
and not departing but sometimes the magnitude of the departure is the focus of the study. 
The variables included in the models have been labelled as “legal” (flowing from 
formally rational rules) or “extra-legal” (the influence of substantive rationality).  Legal 
factors are those that are relevant to sentencing and intended to influence it.  Conversely, 
extra-legal factors are supposed to be irrelevant and should have no influence (Hofer, 
Blackwell & Ruback, 1999).  Demographic variables are typically described as extra-legal 
because they are not intended to have a direct influence on sentencing decisions.     
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The influence of location on sentencing outcomes 
A literature search identified 31 relevant studies from the United States that included 
location as a sentencing variable.  Sixteen of these studies (listed in Table 3.1) either had 
location as the prime focus or at least addressed it as more than simply a control factor.   
 
Table 3.1: United States sentencing research actively addressing the influence of 
location   
Author(s) 
Year of 
Publication 
Year(s) 
studied Offences Jurisdiction 
Britt 2000 1991-1994 General Pennsylvania 
Crow & Gertz 2008 1994-2003 General Florida 
Dixon  1995 1993 Felonies Minnesota 
Iles, Bumphus & Zehel  2011 2006 Drug Federal (Michigan) 
Johnson 2005 1999-2000 General Pennsylvania 
Johnson  2006 1999-2000 Felonies Pennsylvania 
Johnson, Ulmer & Kramer 2008 1997-2000 General Federal  
Kautt 2002 1998-1999 Drug Federal 
Kautt & Spohn 2007 1997-1998 Drug Federal  
Ostrom, Ostrom & Kleiman 2004 1995 General Michigan 
Pasko 2002 1995 Drug Federal  
Sharp 2007 1993-2003 General Federal  
Ulmer  2005 1996-2000 General Federal  
Ulmer & Johnson 2004 1997-1999 Felonies Pennsylvania 
Ulmer & Kramer 1996 1985-1991 General Pennsylvania  
Wiseman & Connolly 2008 2003-2006 Selected 
offences 
Wisconsin  
 
Twelve studies (listed in Table 3.2) treated location as a control factor but did not 
substantively address the effect it had on sentence outcomes.  These studies add depth to 
the measurement of disparity and the degree to which it is pervasive across state and 
federal jurisdictions.   
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Table 3.2: United States sentencing research with controls for location but that did 
not actively address the influence of location 
Author(s) 
Year of 
Publication 
Year(s) 
studied Offences Jurisdiction 
Albonetti 1997 1991-1992 Drug Federal  
Albonetti & Baller 2010 1998-1999 Drug Federal 
Austin 1981a 1976 Felonies Iowa  
Austin 1981b 1976 Felonies Iowa  
Everett & Wotjkiewicz 2002 1991-1993 General Federal 
Farrell, Ward & Rousseau 2010 2000-2002 General Federal 
Kautt and Delone 2006 1997-1998 Drug Federal 
Myers & Talarico 1987 1976-1985 Felonies Georgia  
Ostrom, Ostrom, Hanson & 
Kleiman 
2008 2002 Varieda 
Michigan, 
Minnesota and 
Virginia 
Steffensmeier, Ulmer & 
Kramer 
1998 1989-1992 General Pennsylvania  
Ulmer & Light 2010 
2001-2007 
(in 3 
sections) 
General 
(excl 
immigration) 
Federal 
Wheeler, Weisburd & Bode 1982 1976-1978 White collar Federal 
a The analysis covered all offences for Michigan and Minnesota and assaults and burglary 
for Virginia. 
 
The 28 studies listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 all confine their analyses to a single 
legal system; that is, they either analyse the federal courts or they analyse a single state, so 
that the same law applies across all cases.  One study, Ostrom et al. (2008), addressed three 
states but analysed separate models for each state.  The studies excluded from this review 
addressed sentencing variability at county level but did so across a number of different 
states (Fearn, 2005; Weidner & Frase, 2003; Weidner et al., 2005).  None of these studies 
controlled for the state in which the county was situated and nor was there any discussion 
of the sentencing systems across the states.  Any differences between counties from 
different states may have been due to differences in legal frameworks.  Any such 
differences could have been, at least partially, controlled for by a categorisation based on 
the differences in sentencing systems.  In the absence of controls it is possible that the 
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differences found were attributable to sentencing law and policy rather than to the 
sentences imposed by the local judges or to some combination of the two.   
The concept of location appears to have one key common feature.  Each location 
has a unique complement of judges responsible for sentencing.  Beyond that observation 
there is substantial variation in the degree of aggregation or disaggregation that applies.  
The focus of federal studies ranges from all circuits (e.g., Pasko, 2002), or all districts 
(e.g., Sharp, 2007), to a selection of districts (e.g., Ulmer, 2005) or an aggregation of 
circuits into larger regional bodies (e.g., Everett & Wotjkiewicz, 2002).  The state based 
studies focus on counties and range from all counties (e.g., Crow & Gertz, 2008), to a 
representative selection based on particular criteria (e.g., Ulmer & Kramer, 1996), or an 
aggregation of counties into groups (e.g., Steffensmeier et al., 1998), and some drew a 
limited comparison between one or more specific counties and an aggregation of the rest of 
the counties in the state formed into a single unit (e.g., Wiseman & Connolly, 2008). 
With three exceptions the studies do not make any allowance for elements of the 
sentencing regime.  Kautt and Spohn (2002) and Kautt and Delone (2006) separately 
modelled and compared the results for federal drug offenders who were subject to 
mandatory minimum sentences and those who were subject to the federal sentencing 
guidelines with no mandatory minima.  Ulmer and Light (2010) separately modelled and 
compared federal sentencing across three different time periods characterised by 
differences in the degree to which judges were obliged to follow the sentencing guidelines. 
Much of the research has been reported in the 2000s.  Fourteen of the 16 studies 
with an overt focus on location and six of 12 studies controlling for location were reported 
in the 2000s.  There is a relatively even spread between single level (9) and multi-level 
models (7) among the 16 studies with an overt focus on location. 
The studies vary according to the type of sentencing decision analysed.  The most 
common focus is on the in-out decision and incarceration sentence length, with 
comparatively fewer studies focussed on or including decisions to depart from the 
guidelines.  Eighteen of the 28 studies analysed both the in-out and sentence length 
decisions separately (two of these also analysed departures).  Five studies analysed 
sentence length (including one that also analysed departures).  Two studies analysed the in-
out decision (including one that also analysed departures).  Two studies focussed solely on 
departures.  Overall, 23 studies included sentence length, 20 included the in-out decision 
and six included departures. There was one study that could not be readily categorised in 
these terms: Everett and Wojtkiewicz (2002) formed the in-out decision and length into a 
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single scale and reported an overall concept of severity.  All others focussed on a single 
decision or took the approach that the in-out decision and the determination of length were 
separate decisions that may reflect different drivers and should therefore be modelled 
separately.   
The sixteen studies in Table 3.1 all hypothesised that sentencing would vary by 
location.  The hypotheses were commonly based on two propositions.  The three focal 
concerns were theorised to be uniform across locations but the emphasis and subjective 
interpretation of each concern and the factors used to evaluate the offending would vary 
between locations.  Variation was expected because “the meaning, relative emphasis and 
priority, and situational interpretations of them is embedded in local court community 
culture, organisational contexts and politics” (Kramer & Ulmer, 2002, p. 903).  In other 
words, sentencing decisions were expected to vary between locations because the balance 
between the influence of formally rational rules (guidelines) and substantively rational 
sentencing concerns varies by location.   
In sum there is widespread evidence of variation or inconsistency between 
locations in support of the hypothesis.  The hypothesis is supported across all the 
sentencing decisions modelled: the decision to incarcerate, the determination of the length 
of incarceration and the decision to depart from the sentence indicated by the guidelines 
(e.g., Johnson, 2005; Sharp, 2007; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  
Statistically significant parameter estimates for location variables, indicating inconsistency 
or disparity between locations, were found in 63 of 71 contrasts across the 28 studies that 
either overtly focussed on or controlled for location.  The ratios were highest for departures 
(100% of contrasts or 14/14) and the in-out decision (92% of contrasts or 24/26), compared 
to sentence length (81% of contrasts or 25/31).  The higher rate for the in-out decision may 
reflect the fact that it and most of the departure contrasts are binary choices, whereas 
sentence length is more subtle with the judge fixing the sentence along a continuum.   
More than half the contrasts come from three settings.  In studies based on 
Pennsylvania, 100% of contrasts (13/13) found some degree of disparity.  In studies based 
on the Federal District Court covering offending in general, 100% of contrasts (21/21) 
found some degree of disparity.  In studies of Federal District Court sentencing of drug 
offenders, 85% of contrasts (11/13) found some degree of disparity.  The two non-
significant contrasts in the sentencing of drug offences in the Federal District Courts were 
found by Kautt and Spohn (2007) in the limited circumstance of sentence length models 
addressing the sentencing of offenders subject to mandatory minimum sentences.    
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Overall there was only one study that did not find any significant effects.  Wiseman 
and Connolly (2008) found no effects for the in-out or sentence length decisions in a study 
of sentencing in Wisconsin. Their findings may be the result of data limitations that 
reduced the study down to two locations, Milwaukee versus a composite of the rest of the 
state.  A similar limitation applies to three non-significant contrasts reported by Ostrom et 
al., (2008) in their comparison of the effectiveness of guidelines in Michigan, Minnesota 
and Virginia.  The examination of disparity was limited to the largest counties versus rest 
of state aggregations.  More nuanced differences may have been lost due to the levels of 
aggregation in these studies. 
Some of the significant results may have been reduced in magnitude by similar 
issues to those that affected Wiseman and Connolly’s (2008) study.  For example, 
Steffensmeier et al. (1998) grouped Pennsylvania’s 67 counties into three categories 
representing large, medium and small courts.  The odds of incarceration were a statistically 
significant 1.38 times greater in small compared to medium courts, and in large courts 
were only 0.32 times the odds of incarceration in medium courts.  Dixon (1995) split the 
73 counties in Minnesota into two groupings based on the level of bureaucratisation of the 
courts and prosecutors’ offices.  Had all the counties in these studies been represented 
individually a wider spread of significant differences may have been found and clusters of 
counties with similar results may have been identified. 
 
The influence of legal and extra-legal factors on sentencing outcomes 
A common finding across all studies listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 was that legal factors 
describing aspects of the seriousness of offending and criminal history were the 
predominant influence on sentencing decisions.  A substantial proportion of researchers 
also found that extra-legal factors representing ethnicity and gender have also influenced 
sentencing. 
The influence of ethnicity across studies is demonstrated in a narrative review 
(Spohn, 2000) and a meta-analysis of effects (Mitchell & Mackenzie, 2004).  Based on a 
review of 40 studies published from 1983 to 2000, Spohn (2000) found blacks were 
sentenced more severely than whites 41 times, more leniently 4 times and there was no 
significant difference in 50 of 95 contrasts.  Hispanic offenders were sentenced more 
severely than whites 8 times, more leniently twice and there was no significant difference 
in 19 of 29 contrasts.  At Federal level blacks were sentenced more severely in 15 of 22 
contrasts and Hispanics more severely in 10 of 21 contrasts.  Neither blacks nor Hispanics 
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were sentenced more leniently in any of the Federal level studies.  Based on the totality of 
these results Spohn (2000) concluded that black and Hispanic offenders sentenced at state 
level and in the Federal system face higher odds of incarceration and in some jurisdictions 
longer sentences and lower chances of downward departure.   
Mitchell and Mackenzie (2004) took the assessment of the wider body of research a 
step further, undertaking a meta-analysis of sentencing studies at state and Federal level.  
The analysis covered 122 distinct sentencing contexts drawn from 71 studies.  The results 
across the studies were mixed, with a high proportion finding that minorities were 
sentenced more severely.  African Americans were sentenced more severely than whites in 
83% of the contrasts across the Federal system and 77% of contrasts across state systems 
and Latinos were sentenced more severely than whites in 72% of the contrasts across both 
Federal and state systems.   
Twenty-four of the studies from the United States included in this review controlled 
for gender2.  Females were significantly less likely to be incarcerated in 29 out of 33 
contrasts in 20 studies; were sentenced to significantly shorter terms in 22 out of 26 
contrasts in 21 studies; and more likely to receive downward departures in 3 studies 
(Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al., 2008; Sharp, 2007) and less likely to receive upward 
departures (Johnson, 2005).  Johnson et al. (2008) found that the magnitude of downward 
departures was larger for females.   
A summarised review of the influence of extra-legal factors on sentencing is 
attached at Appendix A.  The effects of gender and ethnicity are typically small by 
comparison to offence seriousness and criminal history factors (Johnson, 2011). 
The combination of findings of disparity between locations, the predominant 
influence of legal factors and the influence of extra-legal factors led some researchers to 
hypothesise that the interpretation and use of legal and extra-legal factors varies between 
locations.  To test the hypothesis researchers used multi-level models to separate the fixed 
and random effects components for both legal and extra-legal factors.  Six of the studies 
with an overt focus on location addressed random effects (Crow & Gertz, 2008; Johnson, 
2005 & 2006; Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  Without 
                                                 
2 The studies were: Albonetti, 1997; Albonetti & Baller, 2010; Britt, 2000; Crow & Gertz, 2008; 
Everett & Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Farrell et al, 2010; Fearn, 2005; Johnson, 2005 & 2006; Kautt, 2002; Kautt & 
Delone, 2006; Ostrom et al., 2004; Pasko, 2002; Sharp, 2007; Spohn, 2000; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; 
Ulmer, 2005; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Ulmer & Kramer, 1996; Ulmer & Light, 2010; Weidner & Frase, 
2003; Weidner, Frase & Schultz, 2005; Wheeler, Weisburd & Bode 1982. 
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exception the research found that the influence of individual legal and extra-legal factors 
varied significantly between locations.  The findings span a number of jurisdictions and 
decision types.  In the Federal District Courts significant variation in the influence of legal 
and extra-legal factors on sentence length (Kautt, 2002) and the likelihood of departure 
(Johnson et al., 2008) was reported.  In Florida significant variation in the influence of 
legal and extra-legal factors on the likelihood of incarceration and sentence length was 
recorded by Crow and Gertz (2008).  In Pennsylvania significant variation in the influence 
of legal and extra-legal factors on the likelihood of incarceration and sentence length 
(Johnson, 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004) and the likelihood of departure (Johnson, 2005) 
was reported.     
 
Modelling the influence of context on sentencing variation between locations 
Taken as a whole it is apparent from the United States literature that there are significant 
disparities between locations.  According to Ulmer (2012, p. 14) “In sum, substantial 
evidence exists that what kind of sentence one gets, and the factors that predict why one 
gets it, in significant part depends on where one is sentenced” (emphasis in the original). 
Having determined that sentencing varies by location and that the variation is 
embedded in the local context some researchers (Britt, 2000; Crow & Gertz, 2008; 
Johnson, 2005 & 2006; Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004) 
extended their models to identify contextual variables associated with disparity between 
locations.     
There are common themes across the research.  The following discussion is 
organised thematically drawing together similar theoretical bases for hypotheses, the 
measures used to test the hypotheses and the results from across the studies.  The 
discussion begins with an examination of effects from the wider community; followed by 
an examination of the influence of the size of the location; and finally an examination of 
effects associated with the courthouse community.  Size has been separated out because it 
relates to both the wider community, with larger populations associated with larger courts, 
and the courthouse community, with differing dynamics between judges, prosecutors and 
defence counsel depending on numbers.  
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Racial threat: the influence of ethnic minorities on sentencing     
The most pervasive theory addressing wider community contextual influences across the 
studies is the proposition that sentencing may vary between locations according to 
perceptions of racial threat (Britt, 2000; Crow & Gertz, 2008; Johnson, 2005 & 2006; 
Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  It is hypothesised that ethnic 
or racial minorities are perceived to be a threat to the established order and as a result are 
sentenced more severely.  Black and Hispanic offenders feature more in media coverage of 
crime enhancing fear of crime and racial typification of crime (Britt, 2000; Johnson et al., 
2008).  Racial threat hypotheses suggest that the greater the proportion of black people or 
Hispanic people in a location the more severe sentencing will be in that location.  Some 
researchers tested the hypothesis by including dummy variables for both the percentage of 
black people in the location and the percentage of Hispanic people in the location (Crow & 
Gertz, 2008; Johnson, 2005; Kautt, 2002; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004), or just the percentage 
of black people (Britt, 2000; Johnson et al., 2008).  Britt (2000) also employed a measure 
of ethnic heterogeneity3.  Britt hypothesised that more ethnically heterogeneous locations 
(those with larger minority populations) would sentence more severely.  In addition 
Johnson (2006) included the percentage of Hispanic people as a control variable.   
The results were mixed with statistically significant effects found in four of the 
seven studies.  Contrary to the racial threat hypothesis, Crow & Gertz (2008) found that the 
likelihood of incarceration was lower in Florida counties with a higher percentage of black 
people in the population but had no effect on sentence length.  The authors queried whether 
this was due to the proposition that once a racial minority reaches a certain threshold it 
starts to gain political power and hence racial disparity may disappear.  A limited 
examination of counties with larger proportions of racial minorities did not support the 
threshold proposition and the authors suggested that further research was required.  Britt 
(2000) found that the likelihood of incarceration was higher but sentence lengths were 
shorter in Pennsylvanian counties with a higher proportion of black people in the 
population.  The sentence length finding was unexpected.  Britt (2000) suggested it may be 
a selection effect as counties with higher rates of incarceration may have shorter sentence 
                                                 
3 Ethnic heterogeneity was measured by subtracting the sum of the squares for the proportion of the 
population made up by each of five ethnic groups from 1.    The highest possible score with five groups is .8, 
this occurs when each of the five groups is an equal proportion of the population and means that the 
population is fully ethnically heterogeneous.  The lowest possible score is 0; this score occurs when a single 
group makes up the entire population and the other groups are not represented and means that the population 
is fully ethnically homogenous. 
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lengths because less serious offending has resulted in incarceration.  Britt (2000) found the 
level of racial heterogeneity had no significant influence on either the likelihood of 
incarceration or on sentence length.  Ulmer & Johnson (2004) in a later study did not 
replicate Britt’s (2000) findings, instead reporting that the percentage of black people had 
no significant influence on the likelihood of incarceration or sentence length between 
counties in Pennsylvania.  Johnson (2005) found that sentencing was more severe in 
Pennsylvanian counties with a higher percentage of Hispanic people in the population.  In 
addition, Johnson (2006) found that sentence lengths were longer in Pennsylvania in 
locations with a higher percentage of Hispanic people in the population but there was no 
effect on the likelihood of incarceration.  However, the percentage of black people had no 
effect on sentence lengths imposed on drug offenders in the Federal District Courts (Kautt, 
2002), and no effect on rate or magnitude of departure between Federal District Courts 
(Johnson et al., 2008).  Similarly, two studies found no effect for the percentage of 
Hispanic people on the likelihood of incarceration or sentence length in Pennsylvania 
(Ulmer & Johnson 2004), and Kautt (2002) found no effect on sentence lengths for drug 
offenders sentenced in the Federal District Courts.   
The combined results are difficult to reconcile.  There is evidence that the size of 
racial minorities has an influence on the severity of sentencing between locations.  Three 
studies provided evidence of greater severity (Britt, 2000; Johnson, 2005 & 2006), 
although Britt (2000) found evidence of greater leniency but suggested it may be a 
selection effect.  One study (Crow & Gertz, 2008) did find greater leniency.  The findings 
may reflect a jurisdictional difference with greater severity demonstrated in studies of 
sentencing in Pennsylvania and lenience in a study of Florida sentencing.  Crow and 
Gertz’s speculation of a threshold effect may explain the difference between the states.  
The most common effect across the studies was that the size of racial minorities had no 
significant influence on sentencing severity between locations.  Further research is 
required.   
 
Economic threat: the influence of relative levels of disadvantage on sentencing   
The second theory addressing wider community contextual influences across the studies is 
the proposition that sentencing may vary between locations according to perceptions of 
economic threat (Britt, 2000; Crow & Gertz, 2008; Johnson, 2005 & 2006; Johnson et al., 
2008; Kautt, 2002).  Economically disadvantaged groups are perceived to be a threat to the 
established order and as a result are sentenced more severely.  Johnson et al., (2008) 
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theorised, based on a neo-Marxist perspective, that greater socio-economic stratification 
increases social conflict leading to more punitive sentencing to control and contain the 
higher proportion of less advantaged members of the community.  Economic threat 
hypotheses suggest that the greater the proportion of economically disadvantaged people in 
a location the more severe sentencing will be in that location.  Most researchers (Crow & 
Gertz, 2008; Johnson, 20054 & 2006; Kautt, 2002) tested the hypothesis by including the 
unemployment rate in models.  Johnson et al. (2008) used a composite measure of socio-
economic disadvantage that combined median income per capita and the percentage of the 
population below the poverty line.  Britt (2000) employed four measures: per capita 
income, racial income inequality, the unemployment rate, and the trend in the 
unemployment rate. 
The results were mixed with statistically significant effects supporting the 
hypothesis in two of the six studies.  Crow and Gertz (2008) found that higher 
unemployment rates in Florida counties were associated with higher rates of incarceration 
and longer sentences.  Johnson et al. (2008) found that there was a decreased likelihood of 
departure in those districts of the Federal District Court with higher levels of socio-
economic disadvantage but that there was no effect on the magnitude of departures.  Britt 
(2000) found no effects on the likelihood of incarceration or sentence lengths between 
Pennsylvania counties based on differences in per capita income, racial income inequality, 
the unemployment rate, or the trend in the unemployment rate.  The unemployment rate 
had no effect on sentence lengths for drug offenders sentenced in the Federal District 
Courts (Kautt, 2002), the likelihood of incarceration or sentence length in Pennsylvania 
(Johnson, 2006), or the likelihood of departure in Pennsylvania (Johnson, 2005).  The 
results provide partial but limited support for the hypothesis that sentencing is more severe 
in locations with greater economic disadvantage. 
 
Political context: the influence of local political leanings on sentencing     
The third perspective on the wider community context was the political context, described 
by Crow & Gertz (2008) as the local democratic sub-culture, the politics, attitudes and 
major values of the people in the community.  It was hypothesised that courts in more 
conservative locations would sentence more severely than courts in more liberal locations.  
The measures of conservatism used varied between the studies.  Crow and Gertz (2008) 
                                                 
4 The unemployment rate was included as a control rather than as an explanatory variable. 
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and Johnson (2006) used the percentage of electors registered as Republicans, Ulmer and 
Johnson (2004) used the percentage of Pennsylvanian electors voting for the Republican 
candidate in the 1996 presidential election, and Johnson et al. (2008) used a liberalism 
score, developed by the American Civil Liberties Union, based on voting patterns in the 
United States Senate. 
The results were mixed with statistically significant effects supporting the 
hypothesis in two of the four studies.  Crow and Gertz (2008) found that higher 
percentages of registered voters identified as Republican were associated with higher rates 
of incarceration in Florida counties but had no effect on sentence length.  Johnson et al. 
(2008) found that the more liberal a district of the Federal District Courts was the more 
likely it was to grant downward departures (i.e., to sentence more leniently) but there was 
no effect on the magnitude of departure.  Measures of conservatism did not have any 
significant effects on the likelihood of incarceration or sentence lengths in Pennsylvania 
(Johnson, 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  The results provide partial support for the 
hypothesis that sentencing is more severe in more politically conservative locations.   
 
The effects of the size of the location 
Five studies included hypotheses that court size (judge numbers or population served) is 
related to sentence severity, with larger courts hypothesised as being more lenient (Kautt, 
2002; Johnson, 2005 & 2006; Johnson, et al., 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  In four of 
these studies size was conceptualised based on measures of the courthouse community.  
Johnson (2005) split courts into three categories (large, medium and small) but did not 
describe the measures or thresholds used to separate the categories.  Johnson (2006) and 
Ulmer and Johnson (2004) used the same three categories according to a mix of judge 
numbers and proportion of cases.  Johnson et al. (2008) conceptualised size as judge 
numbers.  Kautt (2002) diverged from the other researchers and conceptualised size as 
population served.  Despite the difference in the measures used the choice potentially 
makes little difference if population and judge numbers rank courts in a similar way.  Britt 
(2000) did not address size directly but applied a measure of urbanisation based on the 
proportion of the population living in a census defined urban area.  The study has been 
included in the discussion of size for two reasons.  Britt (2000) noted that the more rural 
courts tended to be smaller, and secondly used similar arguments to link it to a sentencing 
effect as the others used to link size to sentencing.  Britt (2000) did not offer a specific 
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hypothesis of the effect of urbanisation on sentence outcomes but just hypothesised that 
there would be an effect.  
The hypotheses are based on a range of inter-related propositions.  Based on 
propositions first put forward by Eisenstein et al. (1988) larger and urban courts are said to 
be more bureaucratic, have less social interaction between members of the courthouse 
community, are less visible in dealing with routine offending, offer greater ease of plea 
bargaining, and are exposed to a larger, more diverse amount of deviant behaviour and 
hence are more tolerant of crime (Johnson et al., 2008).  Kautt (2002) argued that larger 
populations are likely to be associated with a desire for faster disposals to maintain the 
viability of the court leading to greater leniency in order to induce resolution of cases.   
The results were mixed with statistically significant effects found in four of the six 
studies.  Three studies supported the hypothesis.  Ulmer and Johnson (2004) and Johnson 
(2006) found that offenders were less likely to be incarcerated in larger counties in 
Pennsylvania but found no effect on sentence length.  Johnson (2005) found that offenders 
were more likely to be granted downward departures in larger counties in Pennsylvania.  
Conversely, Britt (2002) found offenders sentenced in more urbanised (larger) counties in 
Pennsylvania were more likely to receive longer sentences but found no effect in relation 
to the likelihood of incarceration.  Neither of the studies focussed on districts of the 
Federal District Court found any effect associated with size.  Kautt (2002) found no effect 
on sentence length for drug offenders, and Johnson et al. (2008) found no effect on the 
likelihood of departure or the magnitude of departure for offenders across all offences.   
The overall results provide moderate support for the hypothesis that sentencing is 
more lenient in larger locations.  The hypothesis was supported in three of five studies that 
directly addressed size (Johnson, 2005 & 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004) but not in one 
study which used a measure of urbanisation rather than size (Britt, 2000).  Support for the 
hypothesis in the five studies focussed on direct measures of size was limited to decisions 
involving a binary choice (to incarcerate or not, or to depart or not) and not decisions 
affecting the quantum of the sentence.  The hypothesis was supported by studies based on 
sentencing in Pennsylvania but not studies of federal sentencing.    
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The effects of contextual variables from the courthouse community 
A range of measures were applied to identify contextual variables from within the 
courthouse that may form part of the explanation for variation of sentencing outcomes 
between locations.  The identification of variables was informed by two overlapping 
perspectives, organisational maintenance and practical constraints.   
Organisational maintenance focuses on the smooth running of the courts.  Courts 
that are under pressure are hypothesised to sentence more leniently in order to induce case 
disposals.  This hypothesis mirrors one of the rationales for the influence of size.  It is 
logical to expect a relationship between the size of the caseload and the size of the court.  
Examination of caseload pressures is not limited to the size of the caseload but in some 
studies also takes into account the trial rate.  Courts with higher trial rates are assumed to 
be under more pressure that those with lower trial rates. 
Practical constraints focus on factors that limit or influence the choice of sentencing 
outcomes.  It is one of the three focal concerns posited by Steffensmeier et al. (1998) that 
may influence sentence outcomes.  Caseload pressure can be construed as a practical 
constraint (see Ulmer & Johnson, 2004) affecting organisational efficiency linked to the 
maintenance of the organisation (court) as an effective operation.  In addition researchers 
have also addressed the influence of available jail capacity as a practical constraint on the 
choices available to judges. 
 
The influence of caseload pressures on sentencing   
Caseload pressure has been conceptualised in two ways: the pressure due to the volume of 
new cases per judge; and the pressure due to the rate of cases proceeding to trial.  In three 
studies, courts with a higher number of cases per judge were hypothesised to be more 
lenient (Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al., 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  All three studies 
found support for the hypothesis.  Johnson (2005) found that higher caseloads increased 
the likelihood of downward departure but had no effect on the likelihood of upward 
departures between counties in Pennsylvania.  Johnson et al. (2008) found that higher 
caseloads increased the likelihood of downward departure between districts of the Federal 
District Court but conversely that the magnitude of departures reduced.  The authors 
suggested that these contrary effects may be the result of a selection effect with higher 
rates of departure associated with less meritorious cases and hence reduced magnitudes.  
Ulmer and Johnson (2004) found that higher caseloads reduced the likelihood of 
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incarceration but had no effect on the length of incarceration between counties in 
Pennsylvania.   
When caseload pressure is conceptualised as cases per judge there is evidence to 
support a hypothesis that as the number of cases per judge increases in a location 
sentencing will be more lenient in that location.  All three studies (Johnson, 2005; Johnson 
et al., 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004) found evidence of greater leniency in the rate of 
departures or in the rate of incarceration.  While Johnson et al. (2008) also found evidence 
of greater severity - smaller deductions for downward departures - the result may have 
been due to a selection effect.  Higher levels of departure after controlling for sentencing 
factors means that less deserving cases resulted in departures and smaller reduction in 
sentence length.  Support for the hypothesis in the three studies was limited to decisions 
involving a binary choice (to incarcerate or not, or to depart or not) and not decisions 
affecting the quantum of the sentence.    
Trial rates are also expected to influence sentencing outcomes between locations. 
Johnson et al. (2008) and Johnson, (2005) hypothesised that offenders in locations with 
higher trial rates would be less likely to receive downward departures and the magnitude of 
departures would be lower.  The rationale for this hypothesis was that judges would be 
more likely to reward offenders who entered guilty pleas than those who imposed greater 
pressure on the courts by going to trial.  The hypothesis was not supported; trial rates had 
no significant influence on either the likelihood of downward departure or the magnitude 
of departure in either study.  Ulmer and Johnson (2004) included county level trial rates as 
a control variable in multi-level models of the likelihood of incarceration and sentence 
length in Pennsylvania.  Trial rates did not have a significant influence on either decision.  
When caseload pressure was conceptualised as trial rate, there was no evidence to support 
the hypothesis that as the trial rate rises in a location sentencing will be more severe in that 
location.  
 
The influence of available jail capacity on sentencing 
Available jail capacity has been hypothesised to increase the rate of incarceration and 
sentence length (Johnson, 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004), and reduce the likelihood of 
downward departures in locations with greater capacity (Johnson, 2005).  In all three 
studies, available jail capacity was calculated as the ratio of the number of beds to the 
number of cases.  Both Johnson (2006) and Ulmer and Johnson (2004) reported that the 
rate of incarceration was significantly greater in locations with greater jail capacity but that 
65 
 
there was no effect on sentence length.  Johnson (2005) found there was no effect on 
departure rates from jail capacity.  There was moderate support for the hypothesis but, in 
keeping with the findings on size and caseload pressure, the support was limited to 
decisions involving a binary choice (to incarcerate or not, or to depart or not) and not 
decisions affecting the quantum of the sentence.    
 
Summary of the research investigating the influence of contextual factors   
The research found support for a range of hypotheses that specified contextual variables 
will influence (be associated with) variations on sentencing decisions between locations.  
The findings support contextual variables that originate from within the courthouse and the 
wider community.   
Because the findings come from just three jurisdictions (Florida, Pennsylvania and 
the Federal District Court) with four of the seven studies examining sentencing in 
Pennsylvania the degree to which the conclusions can be generalised is limited.  The 
identification of the contextual factors that may be associated with sentencing disparities 
between locations requires more research.  The reported studies suggest that court size and 
caseload pressure (cases per judge) should certainly be included and a moderately strong 
case can be made for inclusion of the ethnic composition of the population.  None of the 
variables tested can be firmly rejected. 
The contextual variables investigated in the studies reported here provide an 
indication that context has greater influence on binary decisions (to incarcerate or not, or to 
depart or not) than on sentence lengths or the magnitude of departures.  Binary decisions 
accounted for 15 of the significant findings compared to four for sentence length type 
decisions.  It may be that selection effects, as mooted by Britt (2000), confound the effects 
for sentence length type decisions.  Higher rates of incarceration in some locations mean 
that less serious cases attract incarceration with a concomitant downward effect on 
sentence lengths in locations expected to sentence more severely.   
 
Research Outside of the United States 
Few studies from outside the United States have addressed the influence of location on 
sentence outcomes.  Of the studies that have been completed there is a lack of adequate 
controls for other sentencing factors.  The most significant body of sentencing disparity 
research has been a series of studies investigating sentencing of indigenous offenders in 
Australia (Bond, Jeffries & Weatherburn, 2011; Bond & Jeffries, 2011; Jeffries & Bond 
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2009; Snowball & Weatherburn, 2006, 2007).  Although these studies have not controlled 
for location they do provide useful conclusions on the influence of legal and extra-legal 
factors on sentencing.  The findings from the studies are included in Appendix A.   
 
Canadian and United Kingdom research on the effect of location on sentence 
Although location was not addressed or controlled for in any of a series of Canadian 
studies of the sentencing of indigenous offenders a review of one study shed light on the 
effects of location suggesting that the authors may have erred in not accounting for 
location.  Latimer and Foss (2005) addressed the sentencing of aboriginal and non-
aboriginal youth using a sample of youth court cases drawn from five large cities.  They 
found that aboriginal offenders were significantly more likely to be sentenced to longer 
custodial terms.  Doob and Sprott (2007) were surprised by this finding and re-analysed the 
data, finding that the effect was due to an uneven distribution of aboriginal offenders 
across the five cities.  The distribution mattered because sentencing severity varied 
between the cities.  Aboriginal youth were only present in significant numbers in the three 
cities that imposed the longest custodial sentences for any offender irrespective of 
ethnicity.  According to Doob and Sprott (2007) the real position was that young offenders 
were receiving longer sentences in some cities compared to others.  There was disparity 
between cities not ethnicities.  At the very least these findings highlight the necessity of 
controlling for location when data is pooled across disparate locations. 
No multivariate studies could be located for the United Kingdom.  Tarling (1979, 
2006) has twice reviewed sentencing practice in the Magistrates’ Courts in England and 
Wales.  A substantial range of imprisonment rates was found.  In 1975 the range was 3.1% 
to 19.1% (Tarling, 1979) and in 2000 it was 8.6% to 27.7% (Tarling, 2006).  Tarling 
(2006) recognised that the variation may be due to differences in the type of offences and 
offenders sentenced.  A limited attempt was made to investigate this by separately 
focussing on two offence types, burglary and shoplifting.  The resultant range of 
imprisonment rates for each offence was wider than for all offending.  These results 
indicate that geographic disparity may be present but did not establish that it is.  
In 2007 the Ministry of Justice in the United Kingdom completed a study of local 
variation in sentencing in England and Wales (Mason et al., 2007).  The study addressed 
the use of imprisonment and average custodial sentences by the Magistrates’ Courts and by 
the Crown Court in 2006 across 42 criminal justice areas.  In the Magistrates’ Courts 
imprisonment rates varied from 6% to 16% and average custodial sentence lengths from 
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2.4 to 3.6 months (this was against a cap of six months, the maximum sentence a 
magistrate may impose).  In the Crown Court imprisonment rates varied from 45% to 68% 
and average custodial sentence lengths from 19.5 to 28.3 months.  The study used bivariate 
analyses to determine the degree to which the imprisonment rates and average sentence 
lengths were associated with offence mix, the rate of committal of cases to the Crown 
Court (an indication of greater perceived seriousness), crime rates, and changes in the 
crime rate.  The study found that variation in the mix of cases partially explained the 
Crown Court range and that variation in the crime rate provided a limited explanation for 
variation in the imprisonment rate in the Magistrates’ Courts.  Mason et al. (2007) 
concluded that factors like offence seriousness and offender characteristics only explained 
part of the variation in sentencing and that the balance may be due to variations in local 
court cultures.  The results indicate that disparity between locations may be present but do 
not conclusively establish that it is.  
 
New Zealand research on the effect of location on sentence 
There has only been limited research into the effects of location on sentencing in New 
Zealand (Law Commission, 2006; Spier, 1989).  In 1989 the Department of Justice 
undertook a study of regional differences in the use of custodial sentences in the District 
Courts and found “significant variations between the district court areas in the proportion 
of offenders given a custodial sentence and in the average custodial sentence length 
imposed” (Spier, 1989, p. 49) for seven of the eight offence types studied.  The study, 
however, employed minimal controls due to a lack of available data.   
Furthermore, Spier’s research was undertaken over 20 years ago and may not be a 
good indicator of the current position due to changes to the sentencing regime. First, the 
Sentencing Act 2002 codified the sentencing framework and made it more accessible.  This 
may have resulted in a greater convergence between circuits.  Secondly, the range of 
sentences was broadened in 2007.  Two new sentences (community detention and intensive 
supervision) were introduced and home detention became a sentence available to a judge 
rather than a way of serving a sentence of imprisonment at the discretion of the Parole 
Board.  The new sentences filled a gap in the sentence structure between community work 
and imprisonment, providing judges with greater choice in respect of offenders on the cusp 
of imprisonment, and potentially reducing the degree of variation.   
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The degree to which the expectation of consistency is being met in New Zealand 
was questioned by the Law Commission in 2006.  The Commission claimed there was a 
great deal of anecdotal evidence of inconsistency between locations.  Empirical research 
undertaken for the Commission compared imprisonment rates and terms of imprisonment 
for a series of higher volume offences sentenced in 2004 and 2005 across regions of the 
District Courts.  The Commission believed that the results revealed variations so large it 
was unlikely they reflected differences in the seriousness of the cases and concluded that 
some regions were systematically more severe than others (Law Commission, 2006).  The 
research undertaken for the Law Commission was methodologically limited.  It was a 
comparison between regions on the use of imprisonment and the length of imprisonment.  
The only form of control was to limit the comparison to regions with higher volumes.  
Volume was relied on as a means of enabling a “robust analysis”, leading to the conclusion 
that the variations were “unlikely to be explicable on the basis of differences in offence or 
offender variables” (Law Commission, 2006, p. 20).  The Law Commission (2002) 
attributed the observed variations between locations to the wide discretion afforded to 
judges when sentencing. 
 
The influence of factors other than location on sentencing outcomes  
The findings from the United States on the primary influence of legal factors on sentencing 
outcomes were replicated in the multi-variate research in other jurisdictions.  While much 
of the research in the other jurisdictions that employed controls for legal factors were 
addressing other forms of disparity or sentencing in general the findings are instructive.  
Canadian research which focussed on the influence of indigeneity on sentencing in a 
variety of contexts found that offence severity and criminal history explained all or a 
substantial part of the variation in sentences (Latimer & Foss, 2005; Weinrath, 2007; 
Welsh & Ogloff, 2008).  Similarly, the series of Australian studies across several states on 
the influence of indigeneity found that offence severity and criminal history explained all 
or most of the variation in sentence decisions (Bond, Jeffries & Weatherburn, 2011; Bond 
& Jeffries, 2011; Jeffries & Bond 2009; Snowball & Weatherburn, 2006, 2007).   
In New Zealand, a major statistical study of sentencing (Triggs, 1999) found that 
seriousness and criminal history were the most significant factors, ethnicity was not 
significant but gender was.  A study comparing sentencing of men and women for more 
serious offences in Christchurch found that a series of offence seriousness and criminal 
history factors explained apparent differences in the in-out decision (Jeffries, Fletcher & 
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Newbold, 2003).  The same factors also had a substantial influence in determining 
sentence length but the sex of the offender remained significant (Jeffries et al., 2003). 
 
Summary 
The empirical research almost universally supports the proposition that sentencing 
outcomes within the same jurisdiction in the United States are dependent on where an 
offender is sentenced.  The research universally finds that formally rational or legal factors, 
predominantly associated with offence seriousness and criminal history, are the most 
influential determinants of sentence.  A significant proportion of studies also find that 
extra-legal factors, particularly gender and ethnicity, also influence sentencing decisions in 
some jurisdictions.  
In combination these findings suggest that the interpretation and use of both legal 
and extra-legal factors varies between locations.  In turn this suggests that sentencing 
decisions are influenced by contextual differences between locations.  Using multi-level 
models a subset of the researchers universally found support for the proposition that the 
interpretation and use of both legal and extra-legal factors varies between locations.  
Researchers subsequently expanded the models to explore which variations in the 
circumstances or contexts of the locations are associated with sentencing variation and 
therefore act as influences on local sentencing decisions.  The results from this research 
have been much more equivocal.  Within the limited range of studies the strongest results 
were for the size of the location and caseload pressure (expressed as cases per judge).  
With the exception of caseload pressure (expressed as trial rate) there were varying degrees 
of support for all the factors considered.  It is evident that more research is required before 
firm conclusions can be drawn on the contextual variables that have the greatest influence 
on variation in sentencing decisions between locations.  The results of the research 
exploring contextual variables suggests that the influence of substantively rational 
sentencing concerns do not just vary between locations but that they also vary between 
sentencing systems.  This possibility is evidenced by the differences in the findings 
between Florida, Pennsylvania and the Federal District Courts.   
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Chapter 4: Predictions, Research Questions & Statistical Methods 
 
The United States research and the limited research from New Zealand and elsewhere 
suggests there will be inconsistency in sentencing decisions between locations in New 
Zealand.  Although the sentencing regimes differ between New Zealand and the United 
States the difference means that inconsistency is arguably more likely in New Zealand.  
The key difference is the widespread use of sentencing guidelines in the United States.  
The guidelines provide guidance on sentence levels that are directly related to offence 
seriousness and criminal history.  As a consequence judicial discretion is more restricted in 
the United States than in New Zealand.  Multi-variate research is required to determine the 
extent, if any, of variation in sentencing between locations in New Zealand. 
In keeping with the pattern of research that has evolved in the United States the 
research will proceed in a sequence of three steps.  First, the research will address whether 
there are statistically significant and substantively significant differences in the severity of 
sentencing between locations after controlling for compositional differences in caseloads.  
Second, the research will examine whether the influence of legal and extra-legal factors on 
sentencing decisions varies between locations.  Third, the research will explore 
associations between variations in context and variations in sentencing between locations.    
Sentencing consistency will be addressed via a series of regression models 
separately applied to the sentencing of aggravated drink drive, male assaults female and 
burglary offenders in the circuits of the New Zealand District Courts in 2008-2009.  These 
offences were chosen because large numbers (for New Zealand) of offenders are sentenced 
for each offence and they represent different categories of offending.  A more detailed 
discussion of the choice of courts, years, selected offences, the unit of analysis, other 
inclusions and exclusions, data sources and the variables to be included in the models is 
found in Chapter 5.   
The modelling will include controls for gender and ethnicity as extra-legal factors.  
However, as disparities between the genders and ethnicities are not the focus of this 
research they will not be the subject of detailed analysis.  However, both variables are 
likely to be of interest to readers and will be included in the modelling and reported 
whether they are statistically significant or not.  
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Predictions 
Consistent with the framework for understanding disparity in sentencing and prior research 
it is predicted that sentencing will be inconsistent between District Court circuits and there 
will be variations in the interpretation and use of sentencing factors between circuits.   
Judges in New Zealand have wide sentencing discretion and are confronted by the 
challenges of sentencing (complexity, incomplete information, uncertainty and time 
pressure) that suggest judges could be subject to bounded rationality.  The organisation of 
the courts into circuits, with each circuit having a separate cadre of judges enables distinct 
courthouse communities to form and places the judges within distinct communities 
differentiated by socio-economic, political and caseload factors.  To the extent that, 
consistent with theory, sentencing is a balance between formal rationality and substantive 
rationality, the influence of substantive rationalities can vary between circuits.       
The combination of court community theory (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Eisenstein 
et al., 1988) and personal construct psychology put forward by Ostrom et al. (2004) 
explains how substantive rationalities based on local context interact with the formal 
rationality of the law and other rules resulting in the development of different sentencing 
approaches between locations.  The commonality and sociality corollaries from personal 
construct psychology explain how personal sentencing constructs can converge into 
distinctive local sentencing constructs.  Decision makers who share a similar work 
environment and similar cultural norms share similarities in how they “make sense” of 
their experience (the commonality corollary).  The similarities are likely to be strengthened 
by the sociality corollary.  Judges who sit in the same courts and share the same common 
room may, like any group of individuals who work together, anticipate the behaviour of 
others and develop and adopt practices based on group expectations and beliefs.  The 
tendency for sentencing approaches to converge locally is likely to be reinforced by the 
behaviours of prosecutors and defence counsel who with the judges comprise the 
courthouse community.  The expectations and submissions of local prosecutors and 
defence counsel are likely to be based on local conditions and sentencing practices thus 
informing and reinforcing local norms and going rates. 
The framework for understanding sentencing disparity is generalisable and 
applicable to New Zealand.  The underlying conditions (complexity, uncertainty and time 
pressure) that trigger the application of Simon’s theory of bounded rationality are present 
in New Zealand.  Judicial discretion is substantial in New Zealand. The expression of 
formal rationality in statute (the Sentencing Act 2002) focuses more on the sentencing 
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process, sets out broad purposes, non-exhaustive lists of factors and relies on appellate 
authority to provide more specific guidance.  Thus the law provides little direct offence 
specific guidance.  Unlike guideline systems the law does not point to offence specific 
factors expected to be used to determine sentences.  Instead the law lists broad concepts 
and generalised guidance on what to take into account.  With the exception of a limited 
range of guideline judgments, which do not apply to higher volume offences, the influence 
of appellate authority is limited.  Judges are largely left to determine their own sentencing 
approaches, these approaches are influenced by substantive rationalities based on local 
context potentially leading to a convergence of personal approaches into local circuit level 
approaches.  Two predictions flow from the theory and the empirical research. 
 
Prediction 1:  
The circuit in which an offender is sentenced will affect the likelihood of incarceration.  
After controlling for seriousness of offence, criminal history and offender demographic 
variables, similar offenders will be sentenced differently between circuits. 
 
Prediction 2:   
The circuit in which an offender is sentenced will affect the length of incarceration 
sentences.  After controlling for seriousness of offence, criminal history and offender 
demographic variables, similar offenders will be sentenced to different lengths of sentence 
between circuits. 
 
Subject to one further condition being met and assuming that the primary 
predictions of inconsistency between circuits are confirmed, two further predictions arise.  
The additional condition is that, consistent with prior research, the testing of the primary 
predictions demonstrates that seriousness of offence and criminal history variables are the 
principal influences on the determination of sentence.  If both conditions are met it follows 
that the interpretation and use of offence seriousness and criminal history factors varies 
between circuits.  The formal rationality of the law and appellate authority is conditioned 
by local substantively rational sentencing concerns.  If the testing demonstrates that 
sentencing is significantly influenced by any extra-legal factors the influence of these 
factors may also vary between circuits. This reasoning leads to two predictions. 
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Prediction 3:  
If the circuit in which an offender was sentenced affected the likelihood of incarceration 
and the seriousness of offence and criminal history variables were the principal influence 
on incarceration, the interpretation and use of some or all of the seriousness of offence, 
criminal history or extra-legal variables will vary between circuits. 
 
Prediction 4:  
If the circuit in which an offender was sentenced affected the length of incarceration and 
the seriousness of offence and criminal history variables were the principal influence on 
length, the interpretation and use of some or all of the seriousness of offence, criminal 
history or extra-legal variables will vary between circuits. 
 
Research Questions 
If the predictions are supported the theories based on courthouse communities (Eisenstein 
& Jacob, 1977) and wider court communities (Eisenstein et al., 1988) suggest that the 
variation is likely to be associated with contextual differences between circuits.  The 
results of prior research have found the identification of community level factors to be 
elusive.  Identification of the contextual factors linked to sentencing variations provides 
some insight into the otherwise invisible influences on the exercise of substantive 
rationalities on sentencing.  Predictions on what factors might be associated with 
sentencing outcome variations between circuits in New Zealand cannot be made.  
However, the influence of contextual differences on sentencing variation between circuits 
can be explored.  Two research questions addressing the association between circuit 
context and sentencing approach will be addressed if either Prediction 1 or Prediction 2 is 
supported. 
 
Research Question 1:  
What circuit level contextual variables, if any, are associated with any circuit level 
variation in the likelihood of incarceration? 
 
Research Question 2:  
What circuit level contextual variables, if any, are associated with any circuit level 
variation in the length of incarceration sentences? 
 
75 
 
Two Stage Modelling Strategy 
A two stage modelling strategy was developed to test the predictions and answer the 
research questions.  The first stage addressed the two primary predictions that the circuit an 
offender was sentenced in would influence the likelihood and length of incarceration.  The 
second stage addresses the predictions that the influence of some or all of the offence 
seriousness, criminal history and other variables vary between circuits, and the research 
questions exploring contextual differences between circuits associated with sentence 
variation between circuits.   
 
Stage one: single level modelling 
Stage one sought to bring a more definitive empirical perspective to the debate about the 
existence (and extent) of sentencing inconsistency between circuits.  Single level logistic 
regression (in-out decision) and linear regression (sentence length) models, using SPSS 
version 18, with case level variables and circuit as explanatory variables, were analysed to 
determine whether and to what extent there is inconsistency of sentencing between circuits.   
At the design stage consideration was given to the use of multi-level random 
intercept models with case level variables as the first level and the circuits as the second 
level.  Because the cases are nested within circuits there were good theoretical reasons for 
the use of a multi-level modelling approach.  The concept of nesting is often explained by 
reference to the education sector and research involving students, classes and schools (e.g., 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  In education research focussing on students across classes 
and schools it is recognised that the achievement of students will be partially dependent on 
the classes they are in or the schools they attend.  Failure to account for the influence of 
classes or schools can result in models that are mis-specified and produce erroneous 
findings.  This arises because statistical dependencies are likely to arise among clustered 
observations and they potentially share similarities that are not taken into account.  As a 
consequence residual errors may be correlated and the assumption of independence of 
errors violated, resulting in underestimation of standard errors and overestimation of 
statistical significance.  Multi-level models have increasingly been used in sentencing 
research (e.g., Britt, 2000; Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002) to address the 
“nesting” effect when the research seeks to include contextual variables that pertain to a 
community (or in this case a circuit) in addition to case-level variables.   
Despite these risks single level modelling was considered to be preferable.  A 
single level model was chosen because the immediate focus was on the degree to which 
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similar offenders were sentenced to similar sentences at circuit level.  The focus was on the 
case level variables that attached to either the offending or the offender being sentenced, 
and the circuit the sentencing occurred in.  In the first stage the modelling did not 
incorporate any contextual measures applying to or describing the circuits.  The model was 
limited to measuring the impact of the circuit on sentencing having controlled for case 
level variables, and measuring the relative influence the variables included in the models 
have on sentencing decisions.  The single level models had the advantage of producing a 
more detailed view of the differences between the circuits.  The failure to account for 
judicial preferences for more severe or more lenient sentences in single level models was 
not relevant to the immediate examination of sentencing consistency between circuits.  
These propositions do not of themselves negate the risk of underestimation of standard 
errors and overestimation of statistical significance.  However, because the second stage of 
the modelling was a multi-level approach it was possible to proceed on the basis that the 
potential under-estimation of standard errors and over-estimation of statistical significance 
could be tested by comparing the estimates reported for the single level models against 
multi-level random intercept models utilising the same data and variables.  The results of 
the comparison are reported in Appendix B.  No problems were found and the single level 
models were retained as the preferred means of assessing and depicting the consistency of 
sentencing between circuits.  
In retrospect the single level models had another advantage over multi-level 
models.  The scope of the variables able to be included in the single level models was 
substantially greater than the multi-level models.  The variables used in the single level 
models had to be simplified in four of the multi-level models to enable the models to 
converge. 
 
Stage two: multi-level modelling 
Stage two aimed to increase understanding of inconsistency, assuming inconsistency was 
found after controlling for case level factors and circuit at stage one.  Stage two involved 
two different modelling approaches using HLM7 software.   
Multi-level random co-efficient models comprised of case level variables were used 
to address Predictions 3 and 4.  A hierarchical generalised linear model was used to 
address Prediction 3 by identifying factors whose influence on the likelihood of 
incarceration varied between circuits.  A hierarchical linear model was used to address 
Prediction 4 by identifying factors whose influence on the length of incarceration varied 
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between circuits.  The sentencing variables found to be significant in the single level 
models formed the basis for these models.  All these variables could be expected to have 
significant fixed effects but would not necessarily have random effects.   
The random co-efficient multi-level models were extended to include contextual 
variables to explore the degree to which there was any association between sentencing per 
circuit, after controlling for case level factors, and any circuit level contextual factors 
(Research Questions 1 & 2).  The multi-level models incorporating circuit level variables 
were severely limited due to the small number of circuits.  The rule of thumb that a model 
can only support one higher level variable for every 10 units, limited the analysis to one 
circuit level variable at a time.  As a result the modelling was limited to a series of 
bivariate models examining the influence of circuit level contextual variables.  
 
Assembling and Interpreting the Models 
The single level logistic and linear regression models were assembled on an iterative basis 
using the available predictor variables that sentencing research, sentencing texts, appellate 
authority, the draft sentencing guidelines and the sentencing notes suggested were relevant.  
The assumption of linearity between each of the continuous predictor variable included in 
the logistic regression models and the log (logit) of the outcome variable was tested, and 
all predictor variables were assessed for any evidence of multi-collinearity. 
The assumption of linearity was addressed by determining if the interaction term 
between the continuous predictor variable and its log transformation was significant; a 
significant interaction term indicated that the assumption of linearity of the logit was 
violated for the continuous predictor variable (Field, 2009).  The assumption was breached 
by a number of continuous variables.  The affected variables were re-configured as 
categorical variables for the logistic regression models. 
Multi-collinearity occurs when two or more predictors are highly correlated with 
one another.  If they are, the estimates of the regression co-efficients become unreliable 
and it is difficult to assess the importance of each predictor (Field, 2009).  The presence of 
multi-collinearity can be detected by examining the variance inflation factors (Chatterjee & 
Hadi, 2006).  The variance inflation factor measures the degree to which the regression co-
efficient of a predictor variable is increased due to its linear association with other 
predictor variables, with values greater than 10 being taken as an indication of multi-
collinearity (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006).  The examination of the variables did not reveal 
any problems.  
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Once the suitability of the variables was confirmed the modelling commenced.  The 
initial model was formed from the available predictor variables that sentencing research, 
sentencing texts, appellate authority, the draft sentencing guidelines and the sentencing 
notes suggested were relevant, plus the demographic variables and the circuit variable.   
The case processing variables were incorporated into the offence seriousness 
category because the case processing variables were at least partial proxies for seriousness.  
The time from charge to charge outcome can be an indication of remorse.  A shorter time 
suggests the early entry of a guilty plea, and early plea is often interpreted as the offender 
taking responsibility for their actions and being remorseful.  Conversely a later plea or a 
finding of guilt at trial is interpreted as a failure to take responsibility and a lack of 
remorse.  The charge laid type (whether the charge was laid summarily or indictably) was a 
proxy indicator of seriousness – summarily laid charges are generally less serious.     
Each model was progressively refined by excluding non-significant variables and 
by simplifying some variables.  Exclusion of non-significant variables helped to ensure the 
models were as parsimonious as possible.  This was particularly important given the wide 
range of variables available.  The exclusion of non-significant variables was not followed 
for the demographic variables because of the wider interest some readers may have in the 
specific results for these variables.  Statistical non-significance does not mean that the 
excluded variables do not exert any influence on sentencing, they may be important on a 
case by case basis.  Non-significance indicates that at an aggregate level the variable did 
not play a significant role in the determination of sentence. 
For a range of variables, especially the criminal history variables found to breach 
the assumption of linearity, there was a need to find the best expression of the variable via 
repeated running of models with variations in the definition of the variable.  The sources 
used to identify relevant variables provided a general description but not a detailed 
specification of the variables.  This is a critical difference distinguishing this research from 
much of the prior research.  For instance in prior research criminal history is often reduced 
to a simple dichotomous variable splitting no prior offending from some prior offending.  
For this research the data enabled criminal history to be expressed in polychotomous 
categorisations.  The variables could be expressed in more or less detail, for example the 
criminal history of a burglar could be split into separate variables for burglary, receiving 
and other serious dishonesty.  Alternatively the three variables could be combined into a 
single serious dishonesty variable.  In addition the age of prior convictions could be taken 
into account.  For example, the age of aggravated drink driving convictions was 
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represented by three dummy variables representing different counts of convictions in the 
previous ten years against a reference category of no convictions in the previous ten years.  
Elapsed time since the last conviction for aggravated drink driving was also represented 
with two dummy variables (a last conviction within 18 months of the current conviction, 
and over 18 months but within 5 years) against a reference category of a last conviction 
over 5 years ago.  
The effects on parameter estimates of excluding some variables and the trialling of 
different specifications for some variables was monitored by comparing the parameter 
estimates between models to ensure there was limited change to other variables in the 
models.   
The single level models cannot be easily categorised as either explanatory or 
exploratory.  The selection of the variables based on sentencing research, sentencing texts, 
appellate authority, the draft sentencing guidelines and sentencing notes supports a 
description of the models as explanatory.  However, the trialling of some variables, 
especially those capable of a range of polychotomous definition, supports a description of 
the models as exploratory.  As these variables were based on generic descriptions of the 
variables and required specific definition to enable effective modelling the models are 
closer to the explanatory end of the spectrum but nonetheless the models are best described 
as a hybrid form. 
The data could be conceived of as a population but that is misleading.  While the 
models are based on almost all sentencing by resident judges in their home circuits for a 
given time span they are a random subset of the cases the judges could have been called on 
to sentence.  There is no systematic basis for the allocation of cases between resident and 
visiting judges.   
Once each model was refined a confirmatory check was made to ensure there was 
no multi-collinearity and residual statistics were reviewed to identify influential cases and 
potential outliers.  To ensure that there were no individual cases exerting an undue 
influence on the model as a whole the Cook’s distance statistics were reviewed to ascertain 
that all values were below the threshold level of 1 (Field, 2009).  The standardised DFBeta 
measures were scrutinised to determine if there were any cases that substantially 
influenced the estimate of any of the model parameters.  Standardised residuals were 
reviewed to identify problems with potential outliers.  As a first step, counts of the number 
of cases with absolute values more than 1 and 2 standard deviations from the mean were 
taken to test whether the numbers were within acceptable limits.  Secondly, all cases with a 
80 
 
standardised residual with an absolute value in excess of 3 were investigated as potential 
outliers (Field, 2009).  The results of these checks are reported in conjunction with each 
model. 
 
The choice of the reference circuit  
The selection of the reference circuit for logistic regression or the circuit to be omitted 
from the creation of dummy variables for linear regression was a significant decision.  The 
same circuit was chosen as the reference circuit across all three offences and for both 
decisions to facilitate comparisons of the parameter estimates and relative risks for each 
circuit between the models.  Three parameters guided the choice.  A circuit with a higher 
volume of offenders sentenced was preferred.  Second, any circuit with a known or 
suspected distortion or truncation of caseload was discounted.  This meant that two circuits 
that did not host jury trials were ruled out.  Third, for ease of presentation and discussion 
of the results from the logistic regression analyses, a circuit from the lower end of the 
spectrum of incarceration rates was chosen.  This meant that it was likely that for the most 
part any significant differences would be in the same direction and more easily presented.  
Ultimately the choice was relatively simple, as only one larger volume circuit was toward 
the lower end of the incarceration rate spectrum for all three offences.  The choice of the 
reference circuit affects the parameter estimates for the circuits and the representation of 
inconsistency but it does not make a substantive difference to the results.  
 
No adjustment for sample selection bias  
Sample selection bias arises “when a researcher is limited to information on a non-random 
sub-sample of the population of interest” (Bushway, Johnson & Slocum, 2007, p.152).  It 
has become increasingly common for sentencing researchers to include a corrective factor 
for sample selection bias, particularly in models of sentence length.   
The example is pertinent to much sentencing research and in particular to this 
research because it models sentencing as a two stage process.  Determination of sentence 
type (typically non-custodial versus custodial) and the quantum of the sentence (typically 
custodial or incarceration sentence lengths) are often modelled separately.  Many 
researchers have accepted that the offenders who are imprisoned or incarcerated are a non-
random subset of convicted offenders and that there is a risk of biased inferences regarding 
sentence length (see Bushway et al., 2007 for a general review and specific examples in 
Johnson, 2006, Kautt & Delone, 2006; Ostrom et al., 2004; Ulmer & Kramer, 1996).   
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The common solution to the non-random or biased selection of a sample has been 
to include a correction factor estimating the probability of imprisonment/incarceration in 
sentence length models, but not every researcher has done so.  Some researchers (see for 
example Iles et al., 2011; Kautt, 2002) recognised the threat but made no correction as the 
risk of bias was limited because an overwhelming proportion of offenders were 
incarcerated.  Others assembled models with and without correction factors and compared 
the results, and if the models were similar proceeded with the uncorrected model (e.g., 
Fearn, 2003; Kautt & Mueller-Johnson, 2009).  In these studies the rationale for choosing 
the uncorrected model was the risk posed by collinearity between the correction factor and 
other variables in the model.  Collinearity arises because the correction factor incorporates 
the other variables in the sentence length model that are influential in the choice of 
sentence type.  
For the purposes of this research the choice to not correct for sample selection bias 
was informed by an examination of how non-random selection occurs in the data 
(Stolzenberg & Relles, 1997).  In this case it results from the decisions of judges in some 
circuits systematically choosing to not incarcerate offenders who would be incarcerated in 
other circuits.  Consequently the model is potentially missing the sentence length values 
for those cases that should but did not result in incarceration.  There is no way to know for 
sure what sentence lengths would be imposed if these cases were to result in incarceration 
(Stolzenberg & Relles, 1997).  The primary concern is that the mean sentence lengths for 
circuits with higher rates of incarceration are understated because the less serious instances 
of offending resulting in incarceration are associated with shorter terms of incarceration, 
possibly suggesting that there is no significant difference when there is a real difference.  
However, a review of the incarceration rates and sentence lengths indicates that was not 
the case, circuits with higher rates of incarceration also tended to impose longer terms for 
each of the three offences.  In this circumstance any correction would increase the degree 
of difference between circuits.  The choice was made not to add a correction factor to the 
models and recognise that the degree of difference revealed could be considered to be a 
conservative view of the difference.  This approach also avoids any suggestion that the 
models represent a “cooking of the books”. 
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Reporting the results from logistic regression: Odds ratios and relative risk 
The odds ratio and the 95% confidence interval for the odds ratio are among the most 
important statistics for interpreting the results.  However, the odds ratio can be difficult to 
comprehend and is sometimes confused with relative risk.  The following fictitious 
example using female and male offenders seeks to make the meaning of the terms clear 
and describe the difference between them.   
The odds ratio is an estimate of the odds of incarceration for one category of 
offenders (in this example, females) compared to a reference category (males).  If females 
were incarcerated at a rate of 9 per 10 offenders sentenced the odds would be 9:1.  If males 
were incarcerated at a rate of 3 per 4 offenders sentenced the odds would be 3:1.  The odds 
ratio is the odds for females divided by the odds for males, in this example the odds ratio: 
(OR) = (9 / 1)/ (3 / 1) = 9 / 3 = 3.   
The odds of incarceration for females are three times greater than the odds for 
males.  This does not mean females are three times more likely to be incarcerated.  The 
number of times more likely is a different measure known as relative risk.  Relative risk is 
the probability of occurrence for females divided by the probability of occurrence for 
males, in this example the relative risk: 
(RR) = (9 / 10)/ (3 / 4) = .9 / .75= 1.2.   
For small effects the odds ratio approximates the relative risk.  When the odds ratio 
is applied in a setting with larger effects, as can be the case with sentencing, it is 
misleading to describe it in terms of the likelihood of occurrence.  The odds ratio increases 
more rapidly than the relative risk as the probability of an event increases (Localio, 
Margolis & Berlin, 2007).  Many readers may prefer to be able to view the comparisons in 
terms of relative risk rather than how many times greater the odds are.  Relative risk is a 
more intuitively understandable measure.  To that end the odds ratio was converted to a 
measure of relative risk using the following conversion formula:  
RR = OR/ ([1 - p0] + [p0 * OR])  
p0 is an estimate of the unadjusted risk for the reference group (Localio et al., 2007).  The 
relative risk calculated via the formula cannot fully replace the odds ratio because the 
confidence intervals cannot be reliably estimated (Localio et al., 2007). 
The calculation of the relative risk facilitates a more ready comparison of the 
impact of the controls applied in the model and the materiality of the differences between 
circuits.  The relative risk after application of the controls can be compared to the raw or 
unadjusted relative risk.  It can be used to indicate how many more or fewer offenders per 
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100 are likely to be incarcerated in a given circuit relative to the reference circuit assuming 
an incarceration rate for one of the circuits.  
 
Incidental insights: the influence of offender gender and ethnicity 
Consistent with the findings of the empirical research supporting the theories it is expected 
that sentencing approaches in New Zealand will have a common core based on offence 
seriousness and offenders’ criminal histories.  It is evident from the research elsewhere that 
variables for gender and ethnicity should be incorporated into this research.  Gender and 
ethnicity have often been the focus of research on sentencing disparity.  Consequently the 
particular results for these variables will of interest in their own right to readers of this 
thesis.  Because of this interest these variables have been included in all models 
irrespective of their degree of influence.  It is important that those interested in the 
influence of gender and ethnicity note that this research is limited to sentencing by resident 
judges, and excludes the 15-20% of sentencing undertaken by visiting judges.  The 
exclusion of sentencing by visiting judges matters because it is known that there are 
systematic differences between circuits in the level of support provided by visiting judges. 
 
Interpreting the results  
The models are based on relatively large numbers of sentencing observations.  One 
consequence of this is that small effects are likely to achieve statistical significance.  It is 
important not just to focus on the evidence of difference but also to examine the 
substantive effect of the difference.  A difference of a few per cent in the likelihood of 
incarceration or a small span of time in sentence length may be statistically significant but 
of minimal real impact system wide even though there may be a significant impact on 
individuals who receive a more or less favourable sentence as a result.  If the differences 
are not substantive then the existence of a statistically significant but substantively small 
difference might be considered to be a satisfactory “price” to pay for the benefits of an 
individualised sentencing system with substantial judicial discretion.  Therefore the 
interpretation of the models takes account of both statistical and substantive significance.  
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Chapter 5: Scope, Data Sources & Variables 
 
To create the models described in the previous chapter, decisions were required on the 
scope of the models, the data that was required, and the structure and detail of the 
dependent and independent variables.  This chapter works through the determination of the 
scope of the models and the data and variables for the models. 
 
The Scope of the Sentencing Models 
The scope of the sentencing models was determined by addressing the alternative settings 
available for a range of parameters.  The following questions were addressed.  Which 
courts should be included?  What time span should the research cover?  Which offences 
should be included?  Should the offences that are included be addressed collectively or 
individually?  At a more detailed level, decisions were required on the unit of analysis, the 
treatment of cumulative sentences, whether to include or exclude sentencing by visiting 
judges, how to deal with changes of sentence, and the inclusion or exclusion of cases 
depending on whether one of the chosen offences was the most serious offence in the case. 
 
The choice of courts 
New Zealand has a unitary court system headed by the Supreme Court accompanied by 
two other superior courts, the Court of Appeal and the High Court, and a series of inferior 
courts with limited statutory jurisdiction (Joseph, 2007).  It is significant for sentencing 
research that New Zealand has a unitary system.  It is free of the difficulties that can arise 
in federal systems with separate laws and court structures and varying jurisdictional 
boundaries between states and between state and federal systems that complicate and 
potentially confound research. 
The sentencing of adult offenders in New Zealand takes place in the District Courts 
and the High Court.  The High Court has exclusive first instance jurisdiction over the most 
serious offences, most notably murder, attempted murder and manslaughter (Brookbanks, 
2007).  Conversely, the District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the least serious 
cases.  The High and District Courts have shared jurisdiction for the more serious cases 
spanning the gap between their respective exclusive jurisdictions.  The District Courts 
dominate sentencing, with almost 99% of adult offenders sentenced in the District Courts. 
The 99% included a majority of the more serious cases where there was shared jurisdiction 
between the High and District Courts.  For instance, in the three years 2004-2006, 78% of 
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offenders sentenced for sexual violation (rape), 94% of offenders sentenced for aggravated 
robbery, and 95% of offenders sentenced for the most serious physical assaults were 
sentenced in the District Courts (Sentencing Establishment Unit, 2008).  These figures 
exemplify Joseph’s (2007) description of the District Courts as the workhorses of the 
judicial system. 
The dominance of the District Courts makes it the obvious choice for this research.  
Inclusion of High Court sentencing would confuse the analysis.  The High Court is 
organised on a different geographical basis, with 18 courts across 3 circuits compared to 63 
courts across 18 circuits in the District Courts.  The sentencing experiences of High Court 
judges are very different from those of District Court judges.  The High Court judges are 
exposed to a much narrower range of offences, with most of the offending at the high end 
of the seriousness spectrum and are only exposed to less serious matters in their appellate 
roles hearing appeals from the District Courts either in the High Court or as part of a 
divisional court in the Court of Appeal.   
 
The offences 
In determining the scope of offending to be covered the first consideration was whether to 
cover a range of offences in the same model or to have separate models for a selection of 
offences.  It is common for studies to cover a broad range of offence types within a single 
model and to control for differences by the inclusion of offence type as a dummy variable 
(Crow & Gertz, 2008; Fearn, 2005; Johnson et al., 2008; Sharp, 2007; and Ulmer, 2005 are 
examples of studies covering a range of offence types).  Doing so inevitably imposes 
limitations on the range of other variables that can be taken into account.  This can be 
limiting if the relevant sentencing factors can vary widely between offences.  In the United 
States the ability to use guideline scores may overcome this limitation to a substantial 
degree.  There is no equivalent mechanism available in New Zealand that would enable a 
more broadly based study to be undertaken.  Despite the availability of guideline scores 
some United States researchers chose to limit their studies to a single offence (Iles et al., 
2011; Kautt, 2002; Pasko, 2002).  Kautt (2002) expressed concern about the reliability 
issues that arise as a consequence of the need to include a greater number of independent 
variables to cover a range of offence types and chose to focus on drug trafficking offences.   
In New Zealand it would be difficult to draw conclusions from or to defend a study 
that analysed a range of diverse offence types without developing a generic seriousness 
scale.  The variation in the relevant sentencing factors between dishonesty, violent, drug, 
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sexual, and traffic offending is too great to be resolved by including each type as a dummy 
variable.  The preference here is for a multi-offence study with separate models for each 
offence.  The selection of offences from different subsets of general offending offered the 
possibility of gaining insight into the degree to which any effects are pervasive or whether 
they vary by offence.     
Burglary, male assaults female, and aggravated drink driving were chosen as the 
best offences to include in this study because they had the best fit against the following 
considerations.  The total number of offenders sentenced needed to be sufficient to support 
effective modelling.  The rate of use of incarceration had to be sufficient to result in a large 
enough number of incarcerated offenders to support effective modelling of sentence length.  
The rate of use of incarceration could not be too high because it would otherwise preclude 
effective modelling of the decision to incarcerate.  The choice of offences needed to avoid 
any peculiarities affecting the sentencing of the selected offences that could confound the 
development of effective models.  The chosen offences should ideally represent different 
categories within the population of offence types.   
The obvious omissions from study were any form of drug offending or sexual 
offending.  With the exception of dealing in Class C drugs (mainly cases involving 
cannabis), none of the drug or sexual offences was sentenced in sufficient volume to 
support modelling.  In addition a feature of the sentencing of sexual offences would, in any 
case, have made the inclusion of a sexual offence less desirable.  Offenders convicted of 
serious sexual offences may be sentenced to preventive detention (Sentencing Act, 2002).  
Preventive detention is an indeterminate sentence designed to protect the community from 
the offender.  Once offenders have served any minimum term prescribed by the judge they 
may be released but are subject to lifetime recall.  This sentence may only be imposed by a 
High Court Judge.  If a District Court Judge considers that the sentence may be appropriate 
for an offender they transfer the case to the High Court for sentencing (Robertson, 2007).  
The usefulness of these offences in a study of consistency within the District Courts is 
therefore reduced.  It may result in varying proportions of the more serious instances of 
offenders appearing for sentence in the various circuits being excluded from the analysis.       
While the Class C dealing volume was sufficient, the offence was rejected because 
of severe limitations on the term of imprisonment available to District Court judges if the 
charge was laid summarily or if the offender pleaded guilty at an early stage to an 
indictably laid charge.  In these circumstances The Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 only allowed 
District Court judges sentencing offenders convicted of dealing in Class C drugs to 
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sentence up to a maximum of one year’s imprisonment compared to the legislated 
maximum of eight years.  If the judge was sentencing an offender convicted of cultivating 
prohibited plants they were restricted to a maximum of two years compared to the 
legislated maximum of seven years.  In any instance where limits restricted the sentence 
available to a District Court judge, the judge could decline jurisdiction and transfer the 
case to the High Court where the only limit was the statutory maximum penalty 
(Robertson, 2007).    
The numbers of offenders sentenced, incarcerated and the incarceration rates for the 
offences considered are set out in Tables 5.1 (property/dishonesty and drugs), 5.2 (violent 
and sex offences) and 5.3 (serious driving).   
 
Table 5.1: Mean annual sentencing volumes for selected property/dishonesty and 
drug offences 2004-2006 
Offence 
Number 
sentenced 
Number 
incarcerated 
Incarceration 
rate 
Burglary 3205 1411 0.44 
Deception 2600 456 0.18 
Unlawful taking of a motor vehicle  948 281 0.30 
Theft (incl. shoplifting) 6940 437 0.06 
Theft (excl. shoplifting) 3093 280 0.09 
Shoplifting 3847 157 0.04 
Receiving 1211 201 0.17 
Arson 142 73 0.51 
Intentional/wilful damage 3022 45 0.01 
Class C Drugs - dealing offences* 435 206 0.47 
Class B Drugs - dealing offences* 314 162 0.52 
* Dealing includes importation, manufacture, sale, supply and possession for supply. 
Source: The table was compiled from unit data obtained from the NZ Law Commission 
under the Official Information Act.  The Law Commission originally obtained the data 
from the Ministry of Justice who extracted it from their administrative systems. 
 
The higher number and rate of burglars incarcerated distinguished burglary from 
the other offences that could have been chosen.  A potential problem for sentence length 
research addressing burglary is a five-year sentence limit on judges without a jury warrant 
sentencing a burglar charged indictably.  In theory this could result in a bulge in sentences 
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at or near the five year point.  However, this was purely a nominal issue because all 8 of 
the offenders charged indictably and sentenced to more than 4 ½ years and up to 5 years 
were sentenced by a jury warranted judge.  Burglary was not subject to any other known 
idiosyncrasies that could confound the analysis.   
 
Table 5.2: Mean annual sentencing volumes for selected violent and sexual offences 
2004 - 2006 
Offence 
Number 
sentenced 
Number 
incarcerated 
Incarceration 
rate 
Male assaults female 2709 377 0.14 
Robbery 504 397 0.79 
Grievous assaults 236 207 0.88 
Injuring with intent to injure 301 189 0.63 
Breach Domestic Violence Act 1086 171 0.16 
Assault with a weapon 610 164 0.27 
Assault with intent to injure 436 157 0.36 
Threaten to kill or do GBH 427 102 0.24 
Common assault (Crimes Act)* 2457 177 0.07 
Common assault (Summary Offences 
Act)* 2111 46 0.02 
Assault on a child 217 27 0.12 
Sexual violation 174 168 0.97 
Indecent assault or act (child or young 
person) 172 114 0.66 
Indecent assault (adult) 108 40 0.37 
* The two forms of common assault are differentiated by penalty; the Crimes Act has a 
maximum penalty of 12 months whereas the Summary Offences Act is 6 months.   
Source: The table was compiled from unit data obtained from the NZ Law Commission 
under the Official Information Act.  The Law Commission originally obtained the data 
from the Ministry of Justice who extracted it from their administrative systems. 
 
More offenders were sentenced for male assaults female than any other sexual or 
violent offence and male assaults female was second to robbery for the number of 
offenders incarcerated.  For research purposes male assaults female had two advantages 
over robbery.  First, robbery was a composite set of offences with multiple maximum 
penalties (7, 10 and 14 years) whereas male assaults female was a singular offence.  
Secondly, the total volume for male assaults female was substantially larger, resulting in 
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much higher volumes per circuit.  Only three circuits sentenced more than 50 robbery 
offenders per annum, whereas only one circuit sentenced fewer than 50 male assaults 
female offenders per annum.  The other high volume offences such as the two forms of 
common assault had much lower numbers incarcerated (177 and 46 respectively compared 
to 377 for male assaults female). 
Like all violent offences male assaults female poses a challenge because it sits in a 
hierarchy of overlapping offences.  A less serious instance of male assaults female could 
be charged as common assault, whereas a more serious instance could be charged as 
assault with intent to injure.  Variations in charging practices may contribute to differences 
in the mix of cases between circuits.  However, any disadvantage created by the 
overlapping charging structure was considered to be outweighed by the usefulness of 
including a violent offence alongside the other chosen offence types.  
The sentencing outcomes for male assaults female could be influenced by the 
offender being sentenced in a Family Violence Court.  To control for sentencing in family 
violence courts a variable denoting court type was included in the modelling.   
 
Table 5.3: Mean annual sentencing volumes for selected serious driving offences 
2004-2006 
Offence 
Number 
sentenced 
Number 
incarcerated 
Incarceration 
rate 
    
Adult 3rd or subsequent  drink driving 3939 940 0.24 
3rd or subsequent disqualified driving 2347 756 0.32 
Serious driving causing death or injury 253 120 0.47 
Careless driving causing death or injury 836 7 0.01 
Source: The table was compiled from unit data obtained from the NZ Law Commission 
under the Official Information Act.  The Law Commission originally obtained the data 
from the Ministry of Justice who extracted it from their administrative systems. 
 
Both 3rd or subsequent drink driving (aggravated drink driving) and 3rd or 
subsequent disqualified driving were viable candidates for inclusion.  Drink driving was 
chosen because the volumes were larger.   
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The time span 
Three considerations informed the choice of the time period for the study.  The period 
needed to be recent to avoid any concern that the results could be described as true of the 
past but not relevant now because of changes to the legislation or appellate authorities.  
The period needed to be long enough to result in sufficiently large numbers of offenders 
sentenced.  The law and system settings needed to be stable through the time period. 
The two years 2008-2009 were relatively recent.  There had not been any change to 
the law or other settings that had the potential to change sentencing outcomes.  The law 
and other system settings were stable through 2008-2009.   
No guideline judgments were issued in relation to any of the three offences during 
the period.  The only potentially significant change that occurred was the issuing of a 
short-lived generic guideline judgment on sentencing discounts for guilty pleas (R v 
Hessell, 2009) issued by the Court of Appeal in October 2009.  In the absence of any 
studies of the impact of the judgment it is impossible to be definitive about its effect on 
sentences.  However, there are two reasons for assuming it would have had little impact on 
sentencing outcomes in relation to this study.  First, it only applied to one-eighth of the 
timeframe.  Secondly, it was not expected to result in significant change.  The Court did 
not believe that the guideline differed significantly from the practices being followed by 
many judges (R v Hessell, 2009), although it may have resulted in a reduction in the 
proportion of cases receiving the maximum discount because some judges may have 
altered their sentencing approaches in response to the Court taking a stricter approach to 
the definition of an early guilty plea.  The guideline was replaced in 2010 by a revised 
guideline issued by the Supreme Court; the revised guideline (Hessell v R, 2010) did not 
apply to sentencing in 2008-2009.  
 
The unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis used in this research is the case.  For the purposes of this research a 
case includes a single offender sentenced on one or more charges on the same day at the 
same court by the same judge.  This concept of case was the only realistic choice because 
in New Zealand sentencing is governed by a totality principle requiring the judge to tailor 
the total sentence to fit the totality of the offending.  The sentence on any single offence 
when there are multiple convictions may therefore be affected by the sentences for the 
other offences.   
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Concurrent and cumulative sentences 
Defining the term of incarceration was complicated by the ability of the judge to impose 
concurrent sentences, cumulative sentences or a mix of both when sentencing on multiple 
charges.  If all the sentences were concurrent the effective sentence was the longest 
concurrent sentence.  If some or all of the sentences were cumulative the effective sentence 
was the longest cumulative sentence.   
It was important to include both concurrent and cumulative sentences in the 
modelling of sentence length; exclusion of cumulative sentencing cases would have been 
likely to skew the results.  Any skew would be exacerbated if there was variation in 
judicial practice in the use of concurrent and cumulative sentences between the circuits.  
The rate of use of cumulative sentences was substantial with 17.0% of 1,592 aggravated 
drink drivers, 20.8% of 2,048 burglars, and 36.8% of 558 male assault female offenders 
incarcerated on multiple offences receiving cumulative sentences.  Importantly, there was 
also a substantial difference in the term of the effective sentence between the two forms.  
The average cumulative sentence for aggravated drink drivers was 13.6 months compared 
to 8.7 months for concurrent sentences; burglars 18.6 months compared to 15.3 months; 
and for male assaults female 10.1 months compared to 6.6 months.  If cumulative 
sentences had not been included the datasets would have been substantially smaller, with 
the sentence range more limited and unduly weighted toward shorter sentences. 
 
Categorisation of judges and courts and the implications for this research  
The sentencing in any circuit was undertaken by a combination of resident judges (judges 
whose common room was in the circuit) and visiting judges from other circuits.  With one 
significant exception sentencing in any circuit was primarily undertaken by judges who 
were resident in the circuit.  The exception was Gisborne where there were no resident 
judges and all sentencing was by visiting judges.  Excluding Gisborne, visiting judges 
undertook a minor but material proportion of sentencing; 17.1% of aggravated drink 
driving, 16.7% of burglary, and 13.8% of male assaults female sentences were imposed by 
visiting judges.  The proportion of sentencing by visiting judges varied substantially 
between circuits; ranging from 6.4% to 47.5% for aggravated drink driving, from 5.4% to 
45% for burglary, and from 1.8% to 49.7% for male assaults female.  The inclusion of 
sentencing by visiting judges could have obscured the real sentencing outcomes 
attributable to the circuit and its resident judges.  Sentencing by visiting judges was, 
therefore, excluded from the analysis, meaning that the Gisborne circuit was excluded. 
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The resident judges involved in sentencing in each circuit can be sorted into two 
categories, Family Court judges and criminal/general judges.  The Family Court is a 
division of the District Courts but only judges with a specialist Family Court warrant can 
sit in the Family Court.  Family Court judges generally do much less criminal work and 
sentencing than their colleagues.  Anecdotally it is understood that Family Court judges 
spend about 75% of their time in the Family Court and 25% in other District Court work 
(this understanding was confirmed with staff at the Chief District Court Judge’s 
Chambers).  The sentences imposed by the two categories of judge could vary due to their 
different roles and experiences.  To allow for this possibility judge type was included in the 
list of variables to be included in the modelling process.  
In some circuits the judges have opted to run specialist Family Violence Courts.  In 
2008-2009 six circuits hosted specialist Family Violence Courts for all or part of the period 
(Ministry of Justice, 2010).  The Family Violence Courts bring together like cases to be 
heard in the same session, with a view to remedying the problems giving rise to family 
violence while holding offenders to account (Ministry of Justice, 2010).  The courts follow 
a ‘therapeutic justice’ model seeking speedy disposition to achieve accountability, safety 
and family repair.  Offenders convicted of male assaults female offences may have been 
sentenced in these courts.  The Family Violence Courts may have had a systematic 
influence on sentencing outcomes and consequently a variable distinguishing those courts 
hosting Family Violence Courts from those that do not was included in the list of variables 
to be included in the modelling process.  
 
Changes of sentence – focus on the first or the final sentence 
Some cases had a complex sentencing history with different sentences imposed on 
different dates due to re-sentencing or the outcome of an appeal.  Re-sentencing can occur 
in several circumstances.  The most common is a change because the offender breaches the 
original sentence and is re-sentenced.  It can also occur when an offender is sentenced on 
new charges and the original sentence is incompatible with the new sentences; when an 
offender’s circumstances have changed and the sentence is inappropriate; or when there is 
a successful appeal. 
In this research only the sentences that were imposed on the earliest sentencing date 
were included.  It was the sentence the judge considered was appropriate to the offending 
and the offender at the time.  Re-sentencing is due to subsequent events unknown by the 
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original sentencing judge.  Changes on appeal occur due to new information or because the 
appellate court found that the sentence was wrong in some aspect. 
 
Primary and secondary offences 
Having chosen the case as the unit of analysis consideration was required to be given to 
whether all cases that included a charge of aggravated drink driving, male assaults female 
or burglary should be included in the research.  The cases could be divided into two 
groups, those where one of the three offences was the most serious or primary charge for 
sentence and those where some other charge was more serious.   
The analysis was restricted to those cases where one of the three offences was the 
most serious offence.  Inclusion of the cases where some other offence was more serious 
would have skewed the sentencing outcomes because the sentence on the more serious 
charge would have largely dictated the outcome.  For instance, if an offender sentenced for 
aggravated robbery as the lead offence was also being sentenced for aggravated drink 
driving the judge’s choices could be limited.  If the aggravated robbery resulted in 
imprisonment the judge could either imprison or convict and discharge for the drink 
driving but could not impose a fine or any other intermediate sentence.  In that 
circumstance the judge might impose a nominal sentence of imprisonment for the 
aggravated drink driving but that might not reflect what would have happened in the 
absence of the aggravated robbery.  A series of tests primarily based on charge outcomes, 
sentence types and quantum, and the generic seriousness of the offence type were applied 
to ensure that cases with a burglary, male assaults female or aggravated drink driving 
charge as the most serious charge were retained in the final dataset for analysis.  A more 
detailed summary of the tests is set out in Appendix C.  
 
Summary of the scope 
The models addressed the original sentencing by resident judges of offenders convicted for 
aggravated drink driving, burglary and male assaults female in the District Courts in 2008-
2009 where that was the most serious offence if there were multiple convictions in the 
case.  The unit of analysis was the case comprising all sentences imposed on a particular 
offender in the same court on the same day by the same judge.  The models included both 
concurrent and cumulative sentences, with sentence length expressed as either the longest 
concurrent sentence or the longest chain of cumulative sentences.   
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The Data 
The modelling made use of data from three sources.  The logistic and linear regression 
models were created from case records assembled from administrative data maintained by 
the Ministry of Justice.  The contextual circuit level variables for the hierarchical models 
were assembled from census data and from caseload and caseflow reports obtained from 
the Ministry of Justice.  Judges’ sentence notes (a transcript of their sentencing remarks) 
were expected to provide an additional source of information on sentencing factors for 
inclusion in the sentence length models.  However, the dataset that was assembled was not 
representative of the circuits and could not be used in the final models.  The effort in 
assembling and examining the data had some benefits; it informed the assessment of 
limitations of the current research.  An expanded discussion of the sentence notes and the 
problems encountered can be found in Appendix D. 
 
Data source one: Case level administrative data  
The Ministry of Justice provided an electronic extract of raw data on all offenders 
sentenced for aggravated drink driving, male assaults female and burglary in 2008-2009.  
The data was drawn from the Justice Data Warehouse which is a comprehensive database 
of all persons charged with an offence and the disposition of the charges against them, 
including sentencing.  The database takes a daily update of information from the Case 
Management System (CMS) managed by the Ministry of Justice.  CMS is an 
administrative computer system supporting operational case management in the court 
registries and the courtroom.  The conviction and sentencing data in CMS is subject to an 
auditing process providing assurance that the data entered is materially accurate. 
The raw data provided by the Ministry of Justice was in three tables covering the 
offenders, the charges they had faced, and any sentences imposed on those charges.  The 
Offenders Table included the sentencing date, offence type and core demographic data 
(sex, race and date of birth) on all offenders sentenced for any of the three offences in 
2008-2009.  The Charges Table contained all charges that those offenders had ever faced at 
any time and included the charge outcome type and date and other case processing data.  
The Sentences Table contained all sentences that had ever been imposed on any of the 
charges the offenders had been convicted of at any time, including the sentence type and 
amount and some case processing data.  
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Linking the tables 
The tables of raw data were able to be linked together through a series of identifiers.  The 
Ministry created a unique identifier for each individual offender specifically for this 
research, and attached it to each observation in all three tables.  The tables of charges and 
sentences both included the “charge record number” (crn) - a unique identifier attached to 
each charge created in CMS when a charge is laid.  The crn enabled each charge and the 
sentences imposed on the charge to be linked.   
The raw extract included 36,636 offender observations for 26,117 individuals 
discharged without conviction, convicted and discharged or convicted and sentenced for 
one of the three offences.  Some offenders were sentenced on multiple occasions over the 
two years.  The Charges Table included 850,332 charges for the 26,117 offenders and the 
Sentences Table included 935,668 sentences imposed on those charges.   
The data provided was at the lowest level of aggregation possible in order to 
facilitate its extraction by the Ministry of Justice, but it was not in a form readily 
susceptible to analysis.  Before it could be used to model sentencing decisions, the raw 
data had to be transformed in accordance with the specification for the research.   
 
Transforming the raw data into cases for sentencing  
The transformation occurred in two parts.  The first part was the refinement of the data to 
exclude some duplicated offender observations and to exclude any observations where an 
offence other than aggravated drink driving, male assaults female or burglary was the most 
serious offence.  The original extract included duplicated offender observations when the 
same offender had been sentenced on the same day for multiple instances of one of the 
three offences and the offences had different offence codes.  The duplicates were readily 
able to be recognised and deleted.  After 8,021 duplicates were deleted, the number of 
potential cases was reduced to 28,615.   
The next step was to determine whether the remaining aggravated drink driving, 
male assaults female and burglary observations were the most serious offences within the 
case.  A detailed specification was drawn up with a prioritised series of tests employed to 
determine status.  A summary of the tests is described in Appendix C.  The application of 
the tests eliminated 2,297 observations because an offence other than aggravated drink 
driving, male assaults female or burglary was more serious, leaving 26,318 observations. 
The second stage of the transformation was to expand each of the remaining 
observations into a single case record including the offender’s demographic profile, the 
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circuit, the judge, a summary of the case being sentenced, the sentence(s) on the case, and 
the offender’s criminal history.  When this process was completed a further tranche of 
observations/cases were removed, including: 4,877 cases sentenced by a visiting judge; 
173 aggravated drink drive cases for offenders who did not have the two prior convictions 
necessary for the offence; 12 cases shown as having been sentenced in the High Court or 
Youth Court; 12 cases that did not have any sentences; and 56 cases that had sentences 
shown as cumulative on a sentence imposed on a separate case on an earlier date.  The 
latter group of cases was excluded because it was impossible to determine whether the 
determination of sentence type or length was constrained by the sentencing of the earlier 
case.  The finalised data was split into three datasets: aggravated drink driving (9,282 
cases); male assaults female (6,166 cases); and burglary (5,740 cases).  
 
Data source two: District Courts caseload, caseflow reports and sitting time reports 
The second source of data was a set of reports on criminal summary and jury trial case 
volumes and judge sitting hours for the District Court circuits assembled by the District 
Courts Operating Unit of the Ministry of Justice.   
 
Caseload and caseflow reports 
The caseflow reports were detailed, with the information split into several categories based 
on how a case proceeded.  There was separate information on undefended summary cases 
(where no plea was entered or the case was resolved by an initial plea of guilty); not guilty 
summary cases (where the defendant entered a not guilty plea but no defended hearing was 
set down); defended summary cases (where the defendant pleaded not guilty and a 
defended hearing date was set); and jury trial cases (where the defendant was committed 
for trial by jury).   
The data was organised by court and included the balance of cases on hand at the 
beginning of the period, new cases filed, administrative actions that added to and deducted 
from the caseload, transfers of cases between courts, a range of case resolution categories 
and the balance of cases on hand at the end of the period.  The data was able to be 
aggregated up to circuit level and was used to calculate or contribute to five contextual 
variables: the number of new cases per thousand adults; the number of new cases per 
judicial officer; the average active criminal cases per judicial officer; the number of cases 
disposed per judicial officer; and the proportion of cases disposed by a hearing of the 
charges. 
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Sitting time and judge strength  
Judge strength in a circuit could have been measured by simply counting the number of 
judges in the circuit.  However, this would have been a crude measure for three reasons.  
First, the judges did not just sit in the circuit they resided in, with judges also sitting as 
visiting judges in other circuits.  The rate at which they did so was not uniform between the 
circuits.  Second, the judges were not the only judicial officers to decide cases; a 
proportion of less serious cases were dealt with by justices of the peace or community 
magistrates.  The proportionate contribution made by these judicial officers was not 
uniform across the circuits; particularly as community magistrates were only located in a 
small number of circuits.  In Hamilton justices of the peace and community magistrates 
accounted for 35% of criminal summary sitting time, whereas in Manukau they accounted 
for only 6%.  Third, the contribution of different classes of judge to the criminal 
jurisdiction varied.  A simple count of judges takes in all judges irrespective of 
contribution; the contribution by judges with a Family Court warrant could vary between 
circuits. 
The best available measures of effective criminal judge strength per circuit were the 
amount of criminal sitting time associated with all judges or all judicial officers.  Sitting 
hours were converted to a full time equivalent count by dividing by two (to account for the 
two years) and then dividing by an estimate of expected sitting time per judge or per 
judicial officer per annum (768.6 hours).  The estimate was formed after discussion with 
staff from the Chief District Court Judge’s Chambers and assumed each judge was 
available to sit 183 days per annum and that they sat on average for 80% of the standard 
5.25 sitting hours per day.  The 183 days incorporated a standard deduction for planned 
and unplanned absences. 
 
Data source three: 2006 census data 
The third source was an extract of data sorted by District Court circuit from the 2006 
census undertaken by Statistics New Zealand.  It was made possible due to previous work 
undertaken by the Ministry of Justice to map the 40,954 census meshblocks to the 63 
District Courts.  Because each court had a one to one relationship with a circuit, it was a 
simple matter to link the meshblocks to the 18 circuits.  The meshblocks are the smallest 
geographic units the census data is collected and processed in (each meshblock represents 
approximately 100 people).   
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The extract was limited to the adult population (those aged 17 or more).  This 
definition of adult was adopted because it corresponded to the threshold between the youth 
and adult courts.  There are some individuals under 17 who are sentenced in the adult 
courts but the number is very low.  The data covered the sex, ethnicity, educational 
achievement, employment status and income of respondents.  The data was used as the 
source of socio-demographic variables to be taken into account as part of the sentencing 
context at circuit level.  It was also used in conjunction with various measures of caseload 
to create measures of offending and sentencing relative to population. 
 
The Variables Modelled 
 
The case level outcome variables 
The substantive sentence is a combination of sentence type and quantum.  Many 
researchers have focussed on these two core decisions and conceptualised sentencing as a 
two-step process with two outcome variables, one for the type of sentence and the other for 
quantum (Britt, 2000; Dixon, 1995; Kautt & Delone, 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  
Research undertaken by Wheeler et al. (1982) is often cited as justification.  Interviews 
conducted by Wheeler et al. (1982) conducted with judges revealed that the judges 
commonly decided first whether to imprison or not and then addressed the quantum.  They 
also found that the factors predicting type and quantum may not be the same, indicating 
that they are separate decisions.   
Bushway and Piehl (2001) challenged the use of the two-step process as an 
inadequate representation of sentencing under guidelines.  They argued that the guidelines 
resolved the sentence type and that sentencing was a single step process with the judge 
only having to address quantum.  The challenge is not relevant to New Zealand as the 
choice of sentence type is made by the judge.  The idea that judges might be indifferent to 
sentence type is contrary to the statutory schema.  Judges are required to “impose the least 
restrictive outcome that is appropriate in the circumstances” (section 8(g) of the Sentencing 
Act 2002).  They must impose the least restrictive outcome in accordance with the 
hierarchy of sentence types set out in the Act.  Restrictiveness is essentially a function of 
the nature of the sentence type rather than the quantum of the sentence.   
Not all research has focussed just on type or quantum.  Some researchers 
(Albonetti, 1997; Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al., 2008) addressing guideline sentencing 
systems have focussed on the decision to depart from the guideline.  These decisions are 
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not relevant to this research because there are no similar departure decisions for the 
offences covered. 
 
The sentence type decision 
The dependent variable for the sentence type decision was specified as a dichotomous 
categorical variable with incarceration (imprisonment and home detention) coded 1 and 
non-incarceration (community detention, intensive supervision, community work, 
supervision, fines, reparation, orders to come up for sentence if called upon, and 
discharges) coded 0. 
Most researchers have reduced the sentence type decision to a dichotomous choice 
between imprisonment or incarceration on one hand and non-custodial sentences on the 
other hand.  It is commonly described as the “in-out decision”, reflecting whether or not 
the offender was placed in custody.  The precise definition of the variables needs to be 
relevant to the jurisdiction being researched.  In New Zealand, the key definitional issue is 
whether home detention should be treated as incarceration in the specification of the in-out 
decision.  The decision could have been specified as the choice between imprisonment and 
any other sentence.  Doing so would recognise that home detention is qualitatively 
different from imprisonment.  The offender is restricted to a residential address with no 
physical barrier restraining them, but they are subject to electronic monitoring so that any 
movement beyond the address is picked up quickly.   
There were three reasons for combining imprisonment and home detention into an 
incarceration grouping.  First, home detention imposes substantial restrictions on the 
freedom of movement of the offender and in doing is qualitatively different to other non-
imprisonment sentences and more similar to imprisonment.  Second, under the law a judge 
should only impose home detention if he or she would otherwise have imposed a sentence 
of imprisonment of two years or less.  Third, some offenders are imprisoned despite a 
judge preferring home detention.  The distinction between home detention and 
imprisonment is blurred because for practical reasons home detention is not available in 
every case.  It may not be available in the general location or for some specific residences 
due to cell phone coverage issues.  In some cases the offender may not be able to offer a 
residence acceptable to the court or another resident may withhold consent for the offender 
to serve home detention at the address.  Judges may have to impose imprisonment when 
they would prefer to impose home detention.  There was no foolproof way in which such 
cases could be distinguished. 
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Two outcomes, discharges without conviction and conviction and discharge, which 
might not be thought of as sentences but which are sentence-like, have been included as 
non-custodial sentencing outcomes.  Discharges are determined by a judge after a process 
that is similar to the sentencing process.  The offender will have either pleaded or been 
found guilty.  The judge is likely to have received submissions or heard argument from 
counsel and considers the offending and the offender in the same way as when imposing a 
substantive sentence.  Both forms of discharge may result in the offender paying monies, 
undertaking some voluntary work or getting some help for a problem linked to their 
“offending” behaviour.  These actions are akin to fines, reparation, community work or 
supervision sentences.   
 
The sentence quantum decision 
The length of incarceration sentences was adopted as the sentence quantum variable 
preferred for this research.  The length of incarceration was specified as a continuous 
variable measured in months.  It was preferred to the alternative of creating a single scale 
standardising all sentence types, via a series of adjustments to the different measures, for 
practical reasons.  The measures used for each of the sentence types would need to have 
been reconciled and translated onto a single scale.  The dollar value of fines, the months of 
supervision, the curfew term in community detention, the hours of community work and 
time in prison or on home detention would all need to have been equated.  This would have 
been a somewhat arbitrary exercise, because the actual requirements of some sentence 
types can mean that two similar sounding sentences are quite different in detail.  For 
example, a 12 month supervision sentence with regular reporting requirements is less 
onerous than such a sentence with the same reporting requirements but additional 
requirements to attend three programmes.  Similarly, the specific hours of a community 
detention curfew can result in some offenders serving most of their sentence while asleep 
each night, but others might be detained across each weekend for the duration of the 
sentence.  Thus, it was decided to focus on incarceration where there was little uncertainty 
in the measurement of the quantum. 
 
Measuring the term of incarceration 
Measurement of the term of incarceration required reconciliation of imprisonment and 
home detention sentences.  The first decision required was to choose the most appropriate 
representation of imprisonment.  In theory there was a choice between the nominal 
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sentence imposed by the judge and the actual time served.  In New Zealand the effect of 
the nominal sentence depends on whether the offender is sentenced to a short sentence 
(defined as two years or less) or a long sentence (defined as a sentence of more than two 
years).  Offenders serving short sentences (two years or less) must be released at half 
sentence and cannot be recalled.  Offenders serving long sentences are subject to the 
possibility of release on parole at a minimum of one-third time served, but may be required 
to serve the full sentence.  Release on parole is determined by the Parole Board based on 
the risk the offender poses to the community.  An offender released on parole may be 
recalled.  Actual time served on long sentences can vary from one-third to the full term on 
a case by case basis.  The actual time served by those sentenced to a long sentence is 
determined by the Parole Board and is not a sentencing decision. 
For the purposes of this research the best measure is the nominal sentence imposed 
by the judge.  In New Zealand it is not the judge’s responsibility to determine the time the 
offender should serve.  The original sentencing decision is based on the seriousness of the 
offence and culpability of the offender for that offending.  The nominal sentence reflects 
the quantum the judge considers appropriate.  
An adjustment to home detention sentences was required to equate home detention 
with imprisonment.  Home detention sentences are only available if the judge has decided 
that a short term of imprisonment would otherwise be imposed (Sentencing Act, 2002).  
However, home detention is not specified as a term of two years or less with the offender 
released having served half the term.  Instead the term can be for any length from a 
minimum of three weeks to a maximum of twelve months with the offender serving the 
full term.  To equate home detention to the nominal term of a short sentence of 
imprisonment the home detention sentence was doubled. 
The decision to double the term of home detention was tested by capturing 
examples of sentencing decisions where the judge’s sentencing remarks included reference 
to the term of imprisonment that would have been imposed and the term of home detention 
actually imposed.  Many decisions included an acknowledgement by the judge that 
imprisonment was warranted, but they sentenced without any explicit reference to what the 
corresponding term of imprisonment would have been.  Sixty-seven decisions were found 
that included the conversion mathematics.  Two of the 67 were excluded as extreme 
outliers.  In one case the judge made no adjustment and appeared not to realise that the 
rules were different for the two sentences.  In the second case the judge acknowledged and 
quantified the appropriate imprisonment term but then struck the home detention term as 
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the time required to complete a residential drug treatment programme.  In 43 of the 
remaining 65 cases the ratio of home detention to half the posited nominal term of 
imprisonment was 1:1.  With the outliers excluded the mean of the ratio for the 65 cases 
was 1.01 (the mean term of home detention was 1% higher than the nominated term of 
imprisonment) with a standard deviation of 0.14.  The result confirmed that the decision to 
double the term of home detention was reasonable. 
 
The case level predictor variables  
The predictor or independent variables cover a generic set of demographic variables, 
offence specific sets of offence related seriousness and case processing variables and 
criminal history variables.  The determination of the variables was informed by the 
research literature, New Zealand reference texts on sentencing, appellate decisions, the 
draft sentencing guidelines and sentencing notes.   
The variables used to develop the models are described in a series of tables in 
Appendix E.  The description in the tables includes the coding for each variable and the 
expected effect of the variable on sentencing.  The coding distinguishes between 
continuous and categorical variables.  Some variables are listed as both continuous and 
with a categorical alternative.  This was necessary because some of the continuous 
variables breached the assumption of linearity necessary for inclusion in regression 
models.  The expected effects are primarily described in terms of whether the variable was 
expected to aggravate or mitigate the severity of the sentence but in some cases the effect 
is described as uncertain.  Some variables were subsequently simplified for inclusion in the 
multi-level models.  This was necessary because of the added complexity of those models.  
The changes made are detailed in Chapter 8.   
The range of offender demographic variables was limited to the offender’s age, 
gender and ethnicity.  Information on employment status, occupation, wealth, marital 
status, family responsibilities, health status, education, or religious belief variables that 
have sometimes been included in research elsewhere was not available.  
 
Circuit level contextual variables for multi-level modelling 
Researchers have used a broad range of contextual measures at the circuit level, including 
population demographics, urbanisation, income, education, political preferences, 
employment levels, crime rates, caseloads and trial rates (Austin, 1981a; Britt, 2000; 
Dixon, 1995; Eisenstein et al., 1988; Johnson, 2005; Johnson, Ulmer & Kramer, 2008; 
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Kautt, 2002; Myers & Talarico, 1987; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  The factors modelled 
were determined from the research literature and shaped and limited by the available data.   
 
Demographic and socio-economic contextual variables  
Five demographic and socio-economic contextual variables from the census were used in 
the modelling.  The five variables were: the adult population; median personal income; 
racial homogeneity; the proportion of adults with no educational qualifications; and the 
proportion of adults unemployed.  The separation in time between the census data (2006) 
and the caseload and sentencing data (2008-2009) might have resulted in some degree of 
mismatch.  This is unlikely to be significant in relation to population, income, ethnic 
homogeneity or educational levels.  These measures were considered to be unlikely to have 
changed in such a way that the relationships between the circuits would be materially 
different.  Any changes to unemployment rates might have varied between circuits, hence 
any findings in relation to unemployment need to be treated with greater caution.   
Four of the five variables are self-explanatory, the exception being ethnic 
homogeneity.  It is a variable based on the concept of ethnic heterogeneity introduced by 
Britt (2000).  Ethnic heterogeneity was calculated as 1 minus the sum of the squares of the 
proportions each ethnic group was of the total population.  Thus a population made up of a 
single ethnic group would score zero (1 – 1), and would be perfectly homogeneous.  The 
higher the score the less ethnically homogeneous and more mixed or heterogeneous the 
circuit population is.  The highest possible score occurs when all ethnic groups are of equal 
size.  In the current research the highest possible score was 0.75 because there were four 
ethnic groupings (European, Māori, Pacific Peoples and All others). 
An additional categorical variable distinguishing metropolitan and provincial 
circuits was created.  Circuits were defined as metropolitan if more than 70% of the adult 
population was resident within the boundaries of city or suburban courts within the circuit.    
 
Generic caseload and caseflow contextual variables 
Seven generic caseload and caseflow variables were used in the modelling.  There were 
two variables representing the judicial resource employed to address the caseload: the 
number of judicial officers undertaking criminal work (judges, justices of the peace and 
community magistrates) on a full-time equivalent basis; and the number of judges 
undertaking criminal work on a full-time equivalent basis.  The crime rate was represented 
as the number of new cases per 1,000 adults.  Caseload and caseflow as experienced by the 
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judicial officers was represented by three measures: the number of new criminal cases per 
full-time equivalent judicial officer; the average number of active cases per full-time 
equivalent judicial officer; and the number of cases disposed per full-time equivalent 
judicial officer.  The hearing rate was represented as the proportion of disposals associated 
with the full or partial hearing of cases.   
 
Offence specific caseload and caseflow contextual variables 
Four variables were separately calculated for each of the three offences modelled.  The 
four variables were: the number of offenders sentenced for the offence per 1,000 adults; 
the number of offenders sentenced for the offence per full time equivalent judge 
undertaking criminal work; the mean number of days from charge to sentence for the 
offence; and the proportion of offenders sentenced within 3 months of charge.  
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Chapter 6: Consistency between Circuits in the Use of Incarceration 
 
This chapter reports descriptive statistics and the results of the in-out models addressing 
the likelihood of incarceration for each of the three offence types.  The material is 
organised by offence with descriptive statistics followed by the sentence length linear 
regression models.  The discussion of residual statistics has been consolidated into a single 
section to minimise duplication. 
Inconsistency in the use of incarceration between circuits was demonstrated in the 
models for each of the offences.  The position of the circuits in the spectrum from lenient 
to severe sentencing varied between the three offences, being significantly more severe for 
one offence did not mean significant differences existed for the other offences.  Although 
similar numbers of circuits were significantly different to the reference circuit for 
aggravated drink driving (15 circuits) and burglary (13) fewer were different for male 
assaults female (7).  The spread of relative risk also varied between the offences, there was 
wide variation for aggravated drink driving but substantial clustering for burglary and male 
assaults female.  These differences validate the decision to proceed with separate models 
for each offence.  All of the circuits that were statistically significantly different from the 
reference circuit were also substantively different from the reference circuit.  Contrary to 
the proposition made by Priestley (2009) there is no evidence that compositional 
differences in caseload explain the variations between locations observed by the Law 
Commission. 
Offence seriousness and criminal history variables were the principal influence on 
the likelihood of incarceration for all three offences.  This finding is consistent with the 
findings from almost all sentencing research.  Gender and ethnicity had an influence on 
sentencing decisions for burglary but not the other two offences.   
The inconsistency between the circuits supports the theory that sentencing is a 
balance between formal and substantive rationalities.  The influence of offence seriousness 
and criminal history variables suggests that formal rationalities are more significant and 
dictate the factors to be taken in to account.  The finding of inconsistency combined with 
the dominant influence of offence seriousness and criminal history variables suggests that 
some of the influence of substantively rational sentencing concerns occurs via the 
interpretation and use of offence seriousness and criminal history factors.  In the case of 
burglary the influence of substantively rational concerns is also seen in the effect of gender 
and ethnicity as sentencing factors.   
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Aggravated Drink Driving: Descriptive Statistics 
In 2008-2009, 9,282 offenders were sentenced for aggravated drink driving by resident 
judges in the 17 circuits included in this study.  Of these offenders 2,452 (26.4%) were 
incarcerated. 
 
The demographic profile of offenders sentenced for aggravated drink driving 
The demographic profile of the offenders sentenced is set out in Table 6.1. Male and Māori 
and Pacific offenders were over-represented compared to their respective shares of the 
population aged 17 or older in the 2006 census.  Males were 86.4% of sentenced offenders 
compared to 48.0% of the population; Māori were 41.5% of sentenced offenders compared 
to 10.1% of the population; and Pacific offenders were 9.9% of sentenced offenders 
compared to 4.8% of the population.  
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for the demographic variables for aggravated drink 
drivers sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 9,282)  
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 Age at the time of offending 39.70 10.90 17 81 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Gender     
    Male 0 8018 86.4  
    Female 1 1264 13.6  
 Ethnicity     
    European 0 4031 43.4  
    Māori 1 3850 41.5  
    Pacific 2 919 9.9  
    Other or unknown 3 482 5.2  
 Age at the time of offending      
    17 - 31 0 2320 25.0  
    32 - 39 1 2347 25.3  
    40 - 47 2 2409 25.9  
     48 or older 3 2206 23.8   
 
Aggravated drink drivers were older than offenders in general.  Almost 50% of 
aggravated drink drivers were 40 or older compared to 21% of offenders in general, and 
less than 1% of aggravated drink drivers were aged 17-19 compared to 20% of offenders in 
general.5  In part the difference is likely to be due to the time taken to acquire the prior 
                                                 
5 The comparison is not perfect, because the general age of offenders is measured at the time of 
sentencing whereas the age variable used in this research is the age of the offender at the time 
of offending.  The data for all offenders was obtained on 6 March 2013 using the convicted 
offender calendar year statistics available from Statistics New Zealand  
(http://www.statistics.govt.nz/tools_and_services/tools/TableBuilder/justice-statistics.aspx)  
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convictions to qualify for the aggravated drink drive offence.  It may also indicate that the 
mix of factors that contribute to offenders in general maturing out of criminal offending do 
not apply in the same way to drink driving.   
 
Offenders sentenced by circuit 
The volume of offenders sentenced per circuit is set out in Table 6.2.  The volumes vary 
widely, ranging from 127 to 1,302 (M = 546, SD = 333).   
 
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for the circuit variable for aggravated drink drivers 
sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 9,282) 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n % 
 Circuit 0 0 818 8.8 
 Circuit 1 1 1117 12.0 
 Circuit 2 2 224 2.4 
 Circuit 3  3 674 7.3 
 Circuit 4 4 127 1.4 
 Circuit 5 5 1302 14.0 
 Circuit 6 6 559 6.0 
 Circuit 7 7 218 2.4 
 Circuit 8 8 252 2.7 
 Circuit 9 9 347 3.8 
 Circuit 10 10 427 4.6 
 Circuit 11 11 485 5.2 
 Circuit 12 12 791 8.5 
 Circuit 13 13 372 4.0 
 Circuit 14 14 194 2.1 
 Circuit 15 15 715 7.7 
  Circuit 16 16 660 7.1 
 
Offence seriousness variables 
The majority of offenders (60.5%) were sentenced for a single aggravated drink driving 
offence with no other accompanying convictions (see Table 6.3).  On average aggravated 
drink drivers were close to twice (1.918 times) the legal limit.  An overwhelming 
proportion of offenders (97.6%) were sentenced after being recorded as pleading guilty.  
Of the 3,677 offenders sentenced for more than one offence the most common 
accompanying offence was driving while disqualified (39.5%).  Almost one in every 
twenty offenders (4.9%) was sentenced for multiple drink driving offences.   
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for the offence seriousness variables for aggravated 
drink drivers sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 9,282) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 Standardised alcohol level 1.918 0.528 1.0 4.5 
 Total charges sentenced 1.778 1.437 1 34 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Multiple drink drive charges     
    No   0 8824 95.1  
    Yes  1 458 4.9  
 
Concurrent disqualified driving 
charges     
    No   0 7575 81.6  
    Yes  1 1707 18.4  
 Concurrent serious driving charges     
    No   0 8771 94.5  
    Yes  1 551 5.5  
 Concurrent minor driving charges     
    No   0 7942 85.6  
    Yes  1 1340 14.4  
 Concurrent breach of bail charges     
    No   0 8869 95.6  
    Yes  1 413 4.4  
 Concurrent breach of sentence charges     
    No   0 8877 95.6  
    Yes  1 405 4.4  
 Plea     
    Guilty          0 9059 97.6  
    Not guilty  1 223 2.4  
 Total charges sentenced     
    One                       0 5615 60.5  
    Two                       1 2065 22.2  
     Three or more  2 1602 17.3   
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Case processing variables 
The mean time from charge to sentencing was 15-16 weeks (108 days) but varied 
substantially from case to case (see Table 6.4).  Almost half (49.9%) of the offenders were 
sentenced within three months of being charged, but almost a quarter (24.5%) were 
sentenced more than six months after being charged. 
 
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for the case processing variables for aggravated drink 
drivers sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 9,282) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 
Elapsed time from charge to charge outcome 
(days) 108 87 1 3661 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Elapsed time from charge to charge outcome     
 ≤ 6 weeks 0 2133 23.0  
 > 6 weeks ≤ 3 months  1 2495 26.9  
 > 3 months ≤ 6 months  2 2377 25.6  
 > 6 months  3 2277 24.5  
 Judge type     
 Criminal  0 8213 88.5  
  Family 1 1069 11.5   
1 The maximum shown is not the true maximum.  The true maximum was much greater 
(3,300 days) and probably the consequence of the offender absconding.  The 345 cases that 
took more than one year were reset to a year and a day.  
 
Criminal history variables 
Offenders’ criminal histories varied widely (see Table 6.5).  The least prolific offenders 
had just the minimum two prior convictions for drink driving necessary to be an 
aggravated drink driver and no other convictions.  By contrast the most prolific drink 
driver had 22 prior convictions for drink driving and the most prolific general offender had 
368 prior convictions.  More than half the offenders had more than two prior drink driving 
convictions.  Most had a drink driving conviction within five years of the current 
sentencing.  Many (37.9%) had previously been incarcerated, with 23.4% of all sentenced 
offenders previously incarcerated for drink driving.  
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for the criminal history variables for aggravated 
drink drivers sentenced in 2008-2009 (N = 9,282) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 Prior convictions for drink driving 3.417 2.037 2 22 
 
Years since last drink driving 
conviction 6.099 5.244 0.1 39 
 Prior convictions for any offence 19.527 23.243 2 368 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Prior convictions for drink driving     
    Two 0 4092 44.1  
    Three 1 2177 23.5  
    Four 2 1199 12.9  
    Five or six 3 1114 12.0  
    Seven or more 4 700 7.5  
 Drink driving convictions in the last 10 years    
    None 0 1783 19.2  
    One 1 2567 27.6  
    Two 2 3292 35.5  
    Three or more 3 1640 17.7  
 Time since last drink driving conviction     
   More than 5 years 0 4122 44.4  
 
  5 years or less and more than 18 
months 1 3687 39.7  
   18 months or less 2 1473 15.9  
 Prior convictions for any offence     
    2 - 5 0 2222 23.9  
    6 - 11 1 2379 25.6  
    12 - 24 2 2376 25.6  
    25 or more  3 2305 24.9  
 
Prior convictions for disqualified 
driving     
    None 0 4182 45.0  
    One 1 1930 20.8  
    Two 2 974 10.5  
    Three or four 3 989 10.7  
    Five or more 4 1207 13.0  
 Prior convictions for breach of sentence     
   No or not in the past 5 years 0 7680 82.7  
   Yes in the past 5 years 1 1602 17.3  
 Prior incarceration     
    Never 0 5763 62.1  
    Yes but not for drink driving 1 1349 14.5  
     Yes including for drink driving 2 2170 23.4   
 
  
113 
 
Aggravated Drink Driving: In-out Model 
The final model comprised 17 variables: 8 seriousness variables, 5 criminal history 
variables, 3 offender demographic variables and the circuit variable.  A number of 
variables were included in the initial modelling but not retained because they were not 
statistically significant.  Variables for breach of bail and minor driving charges had no 
significant effect on incarceration.  A range of different formulations describing the 
offender’s total prior convictions were fitted but were not significant.  Likewise no 
formulation of the prior convictions for disqualified driving was found to be significant.  
The weight placed on the offender’s prior convictions for drink driving and prior 
incarceration predominated.  The inclusion of prior incarceration for an offence other than 
drink driving seemingly served as a broad indication of more serious offending for 
something other than drink driving in the past.  The judge type variable distinguishing 
those District Court judges who primarily sat in the criminal jurisdiction from those who 
primarily sat in the family jurisdiction was not significant. 
Variance inflation factors were measured for the variables included in the final 
model to detect multi-collinearity.  None of the variables approached the threshold level of 
10: the variance inflation factors for the variables ranged from 1.022 to 2.446. 
The model includes five variables that were converted from continuous to 
categorical because the assumption of linearity between the continuous predictor variable 
and the log (logit) of the outcome variable was violated.  The variables were: the age of the 
offender at the time of the offence; the number of days from charge to charge outcome 
being reached; the number of charges on the case; prior convictions for drink driving; and 
elapsed time since the prior conviction for drink driving.   
The logistic regression parameter estimates for the offence seriousness, criminal 
history and demographic variables are set out in Table 6.6.  These parameter estimates 
incorporate the influence of the circuits but the parameter estimates for the circuits are 
reported separately.  The model correctly predicted the outcome for 85.7% of cases (92.7% 
for those not incarcerated and 66.5% for those incarcerated).   
The offence seriousness and case processing variables had the expected effects with 
one exception.  As expected the likelihood of incarceration increased as the alcohol level 
increased, if the offender faced more than one drink drive charge, if the drink driving 
charge was accompanied by disqualified driving, serious driving or breach of sentence 
convictions, as the number of charges sentenced increased, and as the number of days to 
reach the charge outcome increased.  The exception was that offenders who were 
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sentenced after pleading not guilty and being found guilty following a defended hearing 
were less likely to be incarcerated.  This is a surprising result.  A possible explanation is 
that whatever led the offender to plead not guilty did not have the desired effect on 
conviction but may have contributed to a more lenient sentence.  It is not substantively 
significant as not guilty pleas only affect 223 of the 9,282 cases included in the model. 
Collectively the offence seriousness variables accounted for 34.0% of the 
improvement in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the 
constant was included (∆χ2= 1644.533, df= 11, p <.001). 
The effects associated with the criminal history variables were all in the expected 
direction.  The likelihood of incarceration increased with the number and recency of prior 
drink driving convictions.  The differences between the categories of prior conviction were 
substantial.  Each step in the scale was significantly higher than the previous step as well 
as the reference category.  Elapsed time was also significant: the likelihood of 
incarceration increased as the number of convictions for drinking and driving in the 
previous ten years increased, and decreased as the number of years since the immediate 
prior conviction increased.  A recent prior conviction for breach of sentence also increased 
the likelihood of incarceration.  Prior incarceration increased the likelihood of 
incarceration, and prior incarceration for drink driving had a larger effect than prior 
incarceration for other offending.   
Collectively the criminal history variables accounted for 39.6% of the improvement 
in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the constant was 
included, and significantly improved the fit of the model (∆χ2= 1917.245, df = 12, p 
<.001). 
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Table 6.6: Logistic regression parameter estimates for the offence seriousness, 
criminal history and offender demographic variables for the in-out model for 
aggravated drink drivers sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 9,282) 
Variable (reference categories in 
brackets) B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(B) 
          Lower Upper 
Constant -8.666 .285 .000 .000   
Alcohol level .529 .064 .000 1.697 1.498 1.921 
Multiple drink drive (no) 1.932 .152 .000 6.906 5.123 9.308 
Disqualified driving (no) .347 .108 .001 1.414 1.144 1.749 
Serious driving charge (no) .380 .143 .008 1.462 1.105 1.936 
Breach of sentence (no) .746 .155 .000 2.109 1.558 2.856 
Total convictions for sentence   .000    
  Two convictions (1) .239 .097 .014 1.270 1.050 1.535 
  Three or more convictions (1) .742 .122 .000 2.100 1.652 2.670 
Elapsed time - charge to charge outcome .000    
> 6 weeks ≤ 3 months (≤ 6 weeks) 1.026 .119 .000 2.791 2.210 3.525 
> 3 months ≤ 6 months (≤ 6 weeks) 1.168 .120 .000 3.216 2.540 4.070 
> 6 months(≤ 6 weeks) 1.012 .127 .000 2.751 2.145 3.529 
Plea (guilty)  -.512 .230 .026 .600 .382 .941 
Prior convictions for drink drive   .000    
  3 priors (2) 1.118 .106 .000 3.059 2.485 3.766 
  4 priors (2) 1.873 .125 .000 6.505 5.089 8.314 
  5 or 6 priors (2) 2.413 .138 .000 11.169 8.530 14.624 
  7 or more priors (2) 3.136 .170 .000 23.003 16.493 32.082 
Drink drive convictions in the past 10 
years   .000    
  1 conviction (0) 1.213 .153 .000 3.365 2.491 4.545 
  2 convictions (0) 1.757 .159 .000 5.797 4.242 7.922 
  3 or more convictions (0) 1.967 .174 .000 7.148 5.079 10.059 
Elapsed time since the last drink drive 
conviction   .000    
> 18 months ≤ 5 years (over 5 years) .714 .086 .000 2.041 1.725 2.416 
 ≤ 18 months (over 5 years) 1.052 .120 .000 2.864 2.265 3.622 
Prior incarceration   .000    
  Yes, not for drink drive (no) .326 .097 .001 1.385 1.146 1.675 
  Yes, including for drink drive (no) .577 .092 .000 1.781 1.488 2.132 
Conviction for breach of sentence in 
last 5 years (no) .503 .088 .000 1.653 1.393 1.963 
Female (male) -.091 .100 .362 .913 .751 1.110 
Ethnicity   .805    
  Māori (European) .067 .076 .375 1.069 .922 1.240 
  Pacific (European) .078 .137 .571 1.081 .826 1.415 
  Other or unknown (European) -.013 .172 .940 .987 .704 1.384 
Age at time of offending   .001    
  Aged 32 - 39 (17 - 31) -.225 .103 .028 .799 .653 .976 
  Aged 40 - 47 (17 - 31) -.342 .114 .003 .711 .568 .889 
  Aged 48 or older (17 - 31) -.493 .124 .000 .611 .479 .779 
Block of 17 circuits (Table 7.7)     .000       
∆χ2 = 4838.327, df = 46, p<.001;  R2 Nagelkerke .593     
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Neither gender nor ethnicity had a statistically significant influence on the 
likelihood of incarceration. These results differ from much of the research conducted 
elsewhere, especially the lack of difference between female and male offenders.  There 
was a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of incarceration by age  Younger 
offenders, those aged 17 – 31 who made up the reference category, were more likely to be 
incarcerated than any of the three older age categories.  For aggravated drink driving the 
age effect may be related to the specific nature of the offence, younger offenders are 
generally more likely to have been convicted of the pre-requisite two drink drive 
convictions more quickly than older offenders.  This may count against than at sentence.  It 
is also possible that disquiet about “boy racers” and anti-drink drive publicity campaigns 
may have combined to cause younger offenders to be viewed as more culpable.  
Collectively, the demographic factors only made a small contribution (2.0%) to the 
improvement in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the 
constant was included, but did significantly improve the fit of the overall model (∆χ2= 
97.581, df = 7, p <.001) . 
Table 6.7 summarises the main effects associated with the circuits.  Overall the 
addition of the circuit variables made a substantial contribution (24.4%) to the 
improvement in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the 
constant was included, and significantly improved the fit of the overall model (∆χ2= 
1178.960, df = 16, p <.001). 
The odds of incarceration were significantly higher than the reference circuit in 14 
of the 16 circuits.  One circuit (15) was significantly lower and the result was non-
significant for Circuit 13.  The odds ratios for the 14 circuits with higher odds of 
incarceration varied substantially, from 1.73 (Circuit 9) to 58.73 (Circuit 8). The odds 
ratios across the circuits were not clustered together.  Clustering would indicate that 
although almost all circuits varied from the reference circuit they were similar to one 
another.  The spectrum of odds ratios and associated 95% confidence intervals is portrayed 
graphically in Figure 6.1. 
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Table 6.7: Logistic regression parameter estimates for the circuit dummy variables 
for the in-out model for aggravated drink drivers sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 9,282) 
Circuit (Reference Circuit 0) B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(B) 
          Lower Upper 
Circuit    .000    
Circuit 1 2.329 .168 .000 10.269 7.389 14.270 
Circuit 2 2.752 .243 .000 15.671 9.731 25.236 
Circuit 3 1.337 .186 .000 3.808 2.646 5.480 
Circuit 4 2.980 .292 .000 19.686 11.115 34.867 
Circuit 5 .811 .171 .000 2.250 1.609 3.147 
Circuit 6 3.081 .188 .000 21.789 15.088 31.466 
Circuit 7 2.675 .236 .000 14.519 9.139 23.066 
Circuit 8 4.073 .231 .000 58.726 37.327 92.394 
Circuit 9 .550 .244 .024 1.733 1.074 2.797 
Circuit 10 2.436 .195 .000 11.433 7.802 16.753 
Circuit 11 1.840 .194 .000 6.296 4.308 9.201 
Circuit 12 3.428 .176 .000 30.819 21.821 43.528 
Circuit 13 -.446 .278 .108 .640 .371 1.104 
Circuit 14 2.135 .255 .000 8.458 5.135 13.932 
Circuit 15 -.514 .233 .027 .598 .379 .944 
Circuit 16 2.192 .184 .000 8.952 6.242 12.840 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for incarceration of aggravated 
drink drivers by circuit (Circuit 0 is the reference) 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
C
ir
cu
it
 1
5
C
ir
cu
it
 1
3
C
ir
cu
it
 0
C
ir
cu
it
 9
C
ir
cu
it
 5
C
ir
cu
it
 3
C
ir
cu
it
 1
1
C
ir
cu
it
 1
4
C
ir
cu
it
 1
6
C
ir
cu
it
 1
C
ir
cu
it
 1
0
C
ir
cu
it
 7
C
ir
cu
it
 2
C
ir
cu
it
 4
C
ir
cu
it
 6
C
ir
cu
it
 1
2
C
ir
cu
it
 8
O
d
d
s 
ra
ti
o
 w
it
h
 9
5
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
a
ls
118 
 
The high odds ratio for Circuit 8 tends to suppress perception of the degree of 
difference between the circuits.  The confidence intervals provide a guide to how the 
results would fall if a different circuit had been chosen as the reference circuit.  For 
instance, had Circuit 8 been chosen 15 circuits would have had significantly lower odds 
ratios with no significant difference between Circuit 8 and Circuit 12.  If the circuit at the 
centre of the spectrum before controls (Circuit 16) had been chosen, the circuits could have 
been formed into three groups: a lower severity grouping (15, 13, 0, 9, 5 and 3); a median 
grouping (11, 14, 16, 1, 10, 7, 2 and 4); and a higher severity grouping (6, 12, 8).  These 
are nominal groupings as evidenced by the fact that there are overlapping confidence 
intervals between the circuits at the high end of one group and the low end of the next and 
within each grouping there are some pairs of circuits with no overlap between their 
respective confidence intervals.   
As discussed in Chapter 4 the odds ratio is sometimes confused with relative risk.  
Odds ratios are not proportionate measures, whereas the relative risk is.  The more 
intuitively easily understood relative risk comparison can be derived from the odds ratios 
and the unadjusted relative risk.  The relative risks of incarceration by circuit are presented 
in Figure 6.2.   
 
 
Figure 6.2: Relative risk of incarceration for aggravated drink driving by circuit 
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The relative risk puts the risk of incarceration into proportion.  The higher odds of 
incarceration in Circuit 8 (odds 58 times greater than Circuit 0) translate to offenders being 
more than 7.4 times more likely to be incarcerated.  The spectrum of differences portrayed 
by the relative risk (Figure 6.2) is more regular than the spectrum portrayed by the odds 
ratio (Figure 6.1).     
Prediction 1 is supported for aggravated drink driving: after controlling for 
seriousness of offence, criminal history and offender demographic variables, similarly 
situated offenders were sentenced differently between circuits.  The differences were not 
just statistically significant but were also substantial. 
 
Male Assaults Female: Descriptive Statistics 
In 2008-2009 6,166 offenders were sentenced for male assaults female by resident judges 
in the 17 circuits included in this study.  Of these offenders 744 (12.1%) were incarcerated. 
 
The demographic profile of offenders sentenced for male assaults female offending 
The demographic profile of the offenders sentenced is set out in Table 6.8.  Māori and 
Pacific offenders are over-represented compared to their respective shares of the male 
population aged 17 or older in the 2006 census.  Māori were 45.8% of offenders sentenced 
compared to 10.6% of the population; and Pacific males were 15.9% of the offenders 
sentenced compared to 5.1% of the population.      
 
Table 6.8: Descriptive statistics for the demographic variables for male assault female 
offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 6,166)  
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 Age at the time of offending 32.214 10.224 17 82 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Ethnicity     
    European 0 1839 29.8  
    Māori 1 2825 45.8  
    Pacific 2 979 15.9  
    Other or unknown 3 523 8.5  
 Age at the time of offending      
    17 - 23 0 1472 23.9  
    24 - 30 1 1529 24.8  
    31 - 38 2 1554 25.2  
     39 or older 3 1611 26.1   
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The age profile for male assaults female offenders differed from the general age of 
offenders at sentence in 2008-2009.  Although the difference is less marked than it was for 
aggravated drink driving there are fewer young male assaults female offenders and a 
higher proportion of older offenders, especially offenders in their thirties.  Only 8% of 
male assaults female offenders were aged 17-19 compared to 20% of offenders in general, 
whereas 31% of male assaults female offenders were aged in their thirties compared to 
21% of offenders in general6.   
 
Offenders sentenced by circuit 
The volume of offenders sentenced per circuit is set out in Table 6.9.  The volumes vary 
widely ranging from 78 to 863 (M = 363, SD = 229). 
 
Table 6.9: Descriptive statistics for the circuit variable for male assaults female 
offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 6,166) 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n % 
 Circuit 0 0 701 11.4 
 Circuit 1 1 509 8.3 
 Circuit 2 2 181 3.0 
 Circuit 3  3 459 7.4 
 Circuit 4 4 98 1.6 
 Circuit 5 5 863 14.0 
 Circuit 6 6 365 5.9 
 Circuit 7 7 118 1.9 
 Circuit 8 8 175 2.8 
 Circuit 9 9 125 2.0 
 Circuit 10 10 231 3.8 
 Circuit 11 11 469 7.6 
 Circuit 12 12 496 8.0 
 Circuit 13 13 355 5.7 
 Circuit 14 14 78 1.3 
 Circuit 15 15 614 10.0 
  Circuit 16 16 329 5.3 
 
  
                                                 
6  The comparison is not perfect, because the general age of offenders is measured at the time of 
sentencing whereas the age variable used in this research is the age of the offender at the time 
of offending.  The data for all offenders was obtained on 6 March 2013 using the convicted 
offender calendar year statistics available from Statistics New Zealand  
(http://www.statistics.govt.nz/tools_and_services/tools/TableBuilder/justice-statistics.aspx) 
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Offence seriousness variables 
The statistics for offence seriousness variables are set out in Table 6.10. 
 
Table 6.10: Descriptive statistics for the offence seriousness variables for male 
assaults female offending sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 6.166) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 Total charges sentenced 1.853 1.546 1 19 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Multiple male assaults female charges     
    No   0 5639 91.5  
    Yes  1 527 8.5  
 Concurrent threat to kill or do GBH     
    No   0 6139 99.6  
    Yes  1 27 0.4  
 Concurrent breach of protection order     
    No   0 5645 91.6  
    Yes  1 521 8.4  
 Concurrent other violence     
    No   0 5339 86.6  
    Yes  1 827 13.4  
 
Concurrent wilful or intentional 
damage     
    No   0 5558 90.1  
    Yes  1 608 9.9  
 Charge type indicates use of weapon     
    No   0 6070 98.4  
    Yes  1 96 1.6  
 Concurrent breach of bail charges     
    No   0 5754 93.3  
    Yes  1 412 6.7  
 Concurrent breach of sentence charges     
    No   0 5864 95.1  
    Yes  1 302 4.9  
 Plea     
    Guilty          0 5723 92.8  
    Not guilty  1 443 7.2  
 Total charges sentenced     
    One                       0 3672 59.6  
    Two                       1 1303 21.1  
    Three 2 553 9.0  
     Four or more  3 638 10.3   
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Most offenders (almost 60%) were sentenced for a single male assaults female 
offence with no accompanying offences.  A further 21% had one accompanying charge.  
The 2,494 offenders who were sentenced for multiple offences mainly faced other 
violence, damage and breach offences and included 527 offenders (8.5% of the total) who 
were sentenced having been convicted of two or more charges of male assaults female.  
Based on whether the charge code for the offence included a reference to a weapon 1.6% 
of cases included a weapon.  A high proportion of offenders (92.8%) pleaded guilty.   
 
Case processing variables 
The mean time from charge to sentencing was 16-17 weeks (116 days) but varied 
substantially between cases.  Half the offenders were sentenced within three months of 
being charged, but a fifth (21.2%) were sentenced more than six months after being 
charged.  Only a small proportion of charges were laid indictably (85 or 1.4%), a proxy for 
more serious offending.   
Family Court judges sentenced 21.7% of offenders, which was approximately twice 
the rate for aggravated drink driving and burglary.  Just over one-third of offenders were 
sentenced in a location with an active family violence court.  Family Court judges 
undertook a higher proportion of sentencing in family violence courts (38.1%) than 
elsewhere (12.6%).  The 12.6% rate from non-family violence courts was commensurate 
with aggravated drink driving (11.5%) and burglary (10.9%) suggesting that Family Court 
judges are significant actors in the family violence courts.  The statistics for case 
processing variables are set out in Table 6.11. 
There was a difference in elapsed time from charge to charge outcome between the 
family violence courts and ordinary criminal courts, with 58.3% of offenders in the 
ordinary criminal courts sentenced within three months of the charge being laid compared 
to 35.4% in the family violence courts.  Conversely 14% of offenders in the ordinary 
criminal courts were sentenced more than six months after the charge was laid compared to 
34% in the family violence court locations.  This may be a consequence of a difference of 
process with sentencing delayed in the family violence courts to allow time for an offender 
to undertake agreed actions.   
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Table 6.11: Descriptive statistics for the case processing variables for male assaults 
female offending sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 6,166) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 
Elapsed time from charge to charge outcome 
(days) 116 97 1 3661 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Elapsed time from charge to charge outcome     
    ≤ 6 weeks 0 1665 27.0  
    > 6 weeks ≤ 3 months  1 1422 23.0  
    > 3 months ≤ 6 months  2 1772 28.8  
    > 6 months  3 1307 21.2  
 Charge laid indictably      
    No   0 6081 98.6  
    Yes  1 85 1.4  
 Judge type     
    Criminal  0 4827 78.3  
    Family 1 1339 21.7  
 
Case resolved in an active family violence court 
location    
    No   0 3953 64.1  
     Yes  1 2213 35.9   
1 The maximum shown is not the true maximum; the true maximum was much greater 
(2,985 days) and probably the consequence of the offender absconding.  The 246 cases that 
took more than one year were reset to a year and a day.  
 
Criminal history variables 
The statistics for the criminal history variables are set out in Table 6.12.  The criminal 
histories of offenders sentenced for male assaults female varied widely.  The average 
offender had 15 prior convictions for any offence but almost one in five offenders had no 
prior convictions.  The most prolific offender had 293 prior convictions.  Over 70% had no 
prior convictions for male assaults female, but 5.5% had three or more and the most 
prolific male assaults female offender sentenced had 11 prior convictions for the offence.  
Most offenders (68.6%) had not previously been incarcerated but 5.5% or 524 had been 
incarcerated on five or more separate occasions.  The proportions of offenders with more 
relevant convictions in the recent past tended to be low.  In the five years prior to the 
current sentencing, 18.2% of the offenders had been sentenced for male assaults female 
and 8.6% had been sentenced for a serious violent offence.   
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Table 6.12: Descriptive statistics for the criminal history variables for male assaults 
female offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 6,166) 
Continuous Variables  Mean SD Min Max 
 Prior convictions for male assaults female 0.510 1.049 0 11 
 Prior convictions for any offence  15.202 23.610 0 293 
Categorical Variables and Coding  Coding n %   
 Prior convictions for male assaults female    
    None  0 4398 71.3  
    One  1 1046 17.0  
    Two  2 384 6.2  
    Three or more  3 338 5.5  
 Convicted for male assaults female last 5 years    
    No  0 5043 81.8  
    Yes  1 1123 18.2  
 Convicted for serious violence last 5 years    
    No  0 5635 91.4  
    Yes  1 531 8.6  
 Convicted for breach of protection order last 5 years    
    No  0 5773 93.6  
    Yes  1 393 6.4  
 Convicted for breach of sentence last 5 years    
    No  0 4889 79.3  
    Yes  1 1277 20.7  
 Prior convictions for any offence      
    None  0 1134 18.4  
    1 - 9  1 2483 40.3  
    10 - 19  2 1047 17.0  
    20 or more   3 1502 24.3  
 Prior incarceration for any offence      
    Never  0 4233 68.6  
    Once  1 694 11.3  
    2 - 4 times  2 715 11.6  
     5 or more times  3 524 8.5   
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Male Assaults Female: In-out Model 
The final model comprised 17 variables: 7 seriousness variables, 7 criminal history 
variables, 2 offender demographic variables and the circuit variable.  A number of 
variables were included in the initial modelling but not retained because they were not 
statistically significant.  Offence seriousness variables for concurrent convictions for 
breach of a protection order, breach of bail, another violent offence, or wilful or intentional 
damage or for use of a weapon had no significant effect on incarceration and were omitted.  
The judge type variable distinguishing those District Court judges who primarily sat in the 
criminal jurisdiction from those who primarily sat in the family jurisdiction and a variable 
distinguishing whether the offender was sentenced in an active family violence court were 
not significant and were omitted. 
Variance inflation factors were measured for the 17 variables included in the final 
model to detect multi-collinearity.  None of the variables approached the threshold level of 
10: the variance inflation factors for the 17 variables ranged from 1.018 to 2.607. 
The model contains four variables that were converted from continuous to 
categorical because the assumption of linearity between the continuous predictor variable 
and the log (logit) of the outcome variable was violated.  The converted variables were: the 
age of the offender; the number of charges on the case; prior convictions for male assaults 
female; and prior convictions for any offence.   
The logistic regression parameter estimates for the offence seriousness, case 
processing, criminal history and demographic variables are set out in Table 6.13.  These 
parameter estimates incorporate the influence of the circuits but the parameter estimates for 
the circuits are reported separately.  The model correctly predicted the outcome for 91.3% 
of cases (97.4% for those not incarcerated and 47.0% for those incarcerated).   
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Table 6.13: Logistic regression parameter estimates for the offence seriousness, case 
processing, criminal history and offender demographic variables for the in-out model 
for male assaults female offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 6,166)  
Variable (reference categories in 
brackets) B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(B) 
          Lower Upper 
Constant -5.679 .371 .000 .003   
Multiple male assaults female (no) .530 .152 .000 1.700 1.261 2.290 
Threat to kill or do GBH (no) 1.882 .618 .002 6.563 1.956 22.018 
Breach of sentence (no) .579 .174 .001 1.784 1.269 2.509 
Total convictions for sentence   .000    
  Two convictions (1) .783 .139 .000 2.187 1.666 2.872 
  Three convictions (1) 1.031 .172 .000 2.804 2.003 3.927 
  Four or more convictions (1) 2.064 .163 .000 7.876 5.720 10.845 
Plea (guilty)  .758 .184 .000 2.133 1.486 3.061 
Elapsed time - charge to charge outcome   .001    
> 6 weeks ≤ 3 months (≤ 6 weeks) .495 .151 .001 1.640 1.221 2.204 
> 3 months ≤ 6 months (≤ 6 weeks) .346 .153 .024 1.414 1.048 1.907 
> 6 months(≤ 6 weeks) -.004 .177 .981 .996 .704 1.409 
Charge laid indictably (no) 1.870 .306 .000 6.486 3.559 11.821 
Prior convictions for male assaults female   .000    
  1 prior (0) .118 .175 .501 1.125 .798 1.586 
  2 priors (0) .642 .211 .002 1.901 1.256 2.876 
  3 or more priors (0) 1.221 .217 .000 3.392 2.215 5.194 
Conviction for male assaults female in last 5 
years (no) .609 .165 .000 1.838 1.331 2.539 
Conviction for serious violence in last 5 
years (no) .908 .133 .000 2.480 1.913 3.216 
Conviction for breach of protection order in 
last 5 years (no) .515 .151 .001 1.674 1.244 2.251 
Conviction for breach of sentence in last 5 
years (no) .723 .117 .000 2.060 1.637 2.593 
Prior convictions for any offence   .000    
  1-9 priors (0) .640 .315 .042 1.897 1.024 3.515 
  10-19 priors (0) 1.308 .331 .000 3.698 1.932 7.078 
  20 or more priors (0) 1.229 .355 .001 3.417 1.705 6.847 
Prior incarceration for any offence   .000    
  Once (0) .716 .166 .000 2.046 1.478 2.833 
  2-4 times (0) .914 .185 .000 2.493 1.734 3.585 
  5 or more times (0) 1.694 .211 .000 5.443 3.596 8.239 
Ethnicity   .332    
  Māori (European) .142 .132 .283 1.152 .889 1.492 
  Pacific (European) .350 .198 .077 1.419 .963 2.091 
  Other or unknown (European) .277 .304 .362 1.319 .728 2.392 
Age at time of offending   .000    
  Aged 24-30 (17-23) -.422 .153 .006 .656 .486 .885 
  Aged 31-38 (17-23) -.371 .163 .023 .690 .501 .951 
  Aged 39 or older (17-23) -.892 .185 .000 .410 .285 .589 
Block of 17 circuits (Table 7.14)     .000       
∆χ2 = 1921.32, df = 46, p<.001; R2 Nagelkerke  .514 
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The offence seriousness variables had the expected effects with one partial 
exception.  The partial exception was that offenders whose cases were not sentenced until 
more than six months after charges were laid were not significantly more likely to be 
incarcerated than those who were sentenced within six weeks of charge, although offenders 
in two intermediate categories between 6 weeks and 6 months were more likely to be 
incarcerated.  Although the family violence court variable was not significant in its own 
right it is possible that the unexpected result for those sentenced after 6 months is 
associated with the higher proportion of older cases sentenced in the family violence 
courts, with the cases taking longer to allow the offenders to complete agreed actions 
before sentencing occurred.  Otherwise the likelihood of incarceration increased as 
expected if the offender was sentenced for multiple assaults by a male on a female, had a 
concurrent conviction for threat to kill or do GBH, had a concurrent conviction for breach 
of a sentence, faced more than one charge, pleaded not guilty, or faced a charge laid 
indictably. 
Collectively the offence seriousness variables accounted for 47.6% of the 
improvement in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the 
constant was included (∆χ2=914.07, df = 11, p <.001). 
The effects associated with the criminal history variables were as expected and 
were all statistically significant with one partial exception.  The partial exception was that 
offenders with one prior conviction for male assaults female were not significantly more 
likely to be incarcerated than those with no prior convictions for the offence.  The 
likelihood of incarceration increased as the total number of prior convictions increased, as 
the number of prior terms of incarceration increased, if the offender had more than one 
prior conviction for male assaults female, if the most recent of those convictions was in the 
last 5 years, if the offender had a recent conviction for serious violence, if the offender had 
a recent conviction for breaching a protection order, or if the offender had a recent 
conviction for breaching a sentence. 
Collectively the criminal history variables accounted for 47.9% of the improvement 
in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the constant was 
included, and significantly improved the fit of the model (∆χ2= 919.83, df =13, p <.001). 
Ethnicity had no statistically significant influence on the likelihood of 
incarceration.  There was a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of 
incarceration by age.  Younger offenders, those aged 17 – 23 who made up the reference 
category, were more likely to be incarcerated than any of the three older age categories.  
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Collectively the demographic factors only made a small contribution (1.5%) to the 
improvement in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the 
constant was included, but did significantly improve the fit of the overall model (∆χ2= 
29.33, df = 6, p <.001) . 
Table 6.14 summarises the main effects associated with the circuits.  Overall the 
addition of the circuit variables made a small contribution (3%) to the improvement in 
prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the constant was 
included, and significantly improved the fit of the overall model (∆χ2= 58.08, df = 16, p 
<.001). 
 
Table 6.14: Logistic regression parameter estimates for the circuit dummy variables 
for the in-out model for male assaults female offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 
6,166) 
Circuit (Reference  
Circuit 0) B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(B) 
          Lower Upper 
Circuit    .000    
Circuit 1 .836 .228 .000 2.308 1.475 3.610 
Circuit 2 .761 .308 .013 2.140 1.170 3.914 
Circuit 3 .368 .233 .114 1.444 .915 2.279 
Circuit 4 .587 .401 .143 1.798 .819 3.944 
Circuit 5 .382 .219 .081 1.465 .954 2.252 
Circuit 6 .082 .264 .755 1.086 .647 1.822 
Circuit 7 1.048 .358 .003 2.852 1.413 5.757 
Circuit 8 .241 .334 .470 1.273 .662 2.448 
Circuit 9 .351 .478 .463 1.420 .557 3.622 
Circuit 10 .762 .272 .005 2.142 1.256 3.653 
Circuit 11 -.131 .245 .593 .878 .543 1.417 
Circuit 12 .618 .226 .006 1.855 1.190 2.891 
Circuit 13 -.981 .359 .006 .375 .185 .758 
Circuit 14 1.000 .402 .013 2.718 1.237 5.973 
Circuit 15 .156 .269 .562 1.169 .690 1.979 
Circuit 16 .348 .279 .212 1.416 .820 2.447 
 
The odds of incarceration were significantly higher than the reference circuit in 6 of 
the 16 circuits.  One circuit was significantly lower and the result was non-significant for 
nine circuits.  The odds ratios for the six circuits with higher odds of incarceration varied 
from 1.854 (Circuit 12) to 2.852 (Circuit 7).  The spectrum of odds ratios and associated 
95% confidence intervals is portrayed graphically in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3: Odds ratios and confidence intervals for incarceration of male assaults 
female offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 by circuit (Circuit 0 is the reference) 
 
The confidence intervals provide a guide to how the results would fall if a different 
circuit had been chosen as the reference circuit.  For instance, had Circuit 7 been chosen 2 
circuits would have had significantly lower odds ratios and there would not be any 
significant difference between Circuit 7 and the remaining 14 circuits.  If the circuit at the 
centre of the spectrum before controls (Circuit 6) had been chosen no circuits would have 
been statistically significantly different from the reference circuit.  However, a review of 
the confidence intervals would have identified that some circuits did differ significantly 
from one another just not from Circuit 6.   
The relative risks of incarceration by circuit for male assaults female are presented 
in Figure 6.4.  Figure 6.4 puts the risk of incarceration into proportion.  The higher odds of 
incarceration in Circuit 7 (odds 2.85 times greater than Circuit 0) translate to offenders 
being more than 2.34 times more likely to be incarcerated.  Unlike aggravated drink 
driving the spectrum of differences portrayed by the relative risk is similar to the spectrum 
portrayed by the odds ratio.  This has occurred because odds ratios are a closer 
approximation of relative risk when the odds ratios are lower.   
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Figure 6.4: Relative risk of incarceration for male assaults female offenders sentenced 
in 2008-2009 by circuit 
 
The odds ratios across the circuits were much more tightly clustered than for 
aggravated drink driving. There are two substantial clusters.  First, the six circuits (1, 2, 7, 
10, 12, and 14) that have significantly and substantially higher likelihoods of incarceration, 
and second, the balance of circuits, excluding circuit 13, that are not significantly different 
to the reference circuit.  Circuit 13 stands on its own with a significantly and substantially 
lower likelihood of incarceration.   
Prediction 1 is supported for male assaults female: after controlling for seriousness 
of offence, criminal history and offender demographic variables, similarly situated 
offenders were sentenced differently between circuits. 
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Burglary: Descriptive Statistics 
In 2008-2009 5,740 offenders were sentenced for burglary by resident judges in the 17 
circuits included in this study.  Of these offenders 2,434 (42.4%) were incarcerated. 
 
The demographic profile of offenders sentenced for burglary  
The demographic profile of the offenders sentenced is set out in Table 6.15.  Male and 
Māori and Pacific offenders were over-represented compared to their respective shares of 
the population aged 17 or older in the 2006 census.  Males were 90.6% of sentenced 
offenders compared to 48.0% of the population census; Māori were 50.6% of sentenced 
offenders compared to 10.1% of the population; and Pacific offenders were 7.6% of 
sentenced offenders compared to 4.8% of the population.  
 
Table 6.15: Descriptive statistics for the demographic variables for burglars (n = 
5,740)  
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 Age at the time of offending 24.117 8.127 13 71 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Gender     
    Male 0 5202 90.6  
    Female 1 538 9.4  
 Ethnicity     
    European 0 2202 38.4  
    Māori 1 2903 50.6  
    Pacific 2 437 7.6  
    Other or unknown 3 198 3.4  
 Age at the time of offending      
    13 - 19 0 2286 39.8  
    20 - 29 1 2209 38.5  
    30 - 39 2 868 15.1  
     40 or older 3 377 6.6   
 
The age distribution for burglars was the opposite of the other two offences.  
Burglars were younger than offenders in general.  Over 39% of the burglars were aged 17-
19, almost twice the proportion for offenders in general (20%), and only 7% were over 40 
compared to 21% of offenders in general7.   
                                                 
7 The comparison is not perfect, because the general age of offenders is measured at the time of 
sentencing whereas the age variable used in this research is the age of the offender at the time 
of offending.  The data for all offenders was obtained on 6 March 2013 using the convicted 
offender calendar year statistics available from Statistics New Zealand  
(http://www.statistics.govt.nz/tools_and_services/tools/TableBuilder/justice-statistics.aspx) 
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Offenders sentenced by circuit 
The volume of offenders sentenced per circuit is set out in Table 6.16.  The volumes vary 
widely ranging from 120 to 747 (M = 338, SD = 196).   
 
Table 6.16: Descriptive statistics for the circuit variable for burglars sentenced in 
2008-2009 (n = 5,740) 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n % 
 Circuit 0 0 522 9.1 
 Circuit 1 1 747 13.0 
 Circuit 2 2 193 3.4 
 Circuit 3  3 522 9.1 
 Circuit 4 4 120 2.1 
 Circuit 5 5 694 12.1 
 Circuit 6 6 278 4.8 
 Circuit 7 7 143 2.5 
 Circuit 8 8 227 4.0 
 Circuit 9 9 165 2.9 
 Circuit 10 10 335 5.8 
 Circuit 11 11 281 4.9 
 Circuit 12 12 490 8.5 
 Circuit 13 13 208 3.6 
 Circuit 14 14 120 2.1 
 Circuit 15 15 426 7.4 
  Circuit 16 16 269 4.7 
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Offence seriousness variables 
For ease of presentation the offence seriousness variables have been split between two 
tables.  Table 6.17 describes the variables that were included in the final model and Table 
6.18 describes variables that were included in earlier iterations but were not significant and 
not retained.   
 
Table 6.17: Descriptive statistics for the offence seriousness variables for burglary 
included in the final model (n = 5,740) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 Total charges sentenced 4.302 5.164 1 113 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Burglary convictions     
    One conviction  0 4157 72.4  
    Two convictions 1 821 14.3  
    Three or more convictions  2 762 13.3  
 
Concurrent serious receiving, unlawful taking, serious violence or serious driving 
conviction 
    No   0 4222 73.6  
    Yes  1 1518 26.4  
 Concurrent breach of sentence charges     
    No   0 4821 84  
    Yes  1 919 16  
 Approximate value of the lead burglary offence    
    Less than $500 0 2061 35.9  
    $500 to $5,000 1 2589 45.1  
    More than $5,000 2 674 11.7  
    Unknown 3 416 7.3  
 Total charges sentenced     
    One                       0 1825 31.8  
    Two 1 992 17.3  
    Three or four 2 1145 19.9  
    Five, six or seven 3 877 15.3  
    Eight or more 4 901 15.7  
 Order for reparation     
    No   0 3132 54.6  
     Yes  1 2608 45.4   
 
  
134 
 
Table 6.18: Descriptive statistics for the offence seriousness variables for burglary not 
included in the final model (n = 5,740) 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Burglary by day or night     
    Day 0 2416 42.1  
    Night 1 2908 50.7  
    Unknown 2 416 7.2  
 Burglary offence dates     
    One 0 4412 76.9  
    Two 1 762 13.3  
    Three or more  2 566 9.8  
 Total offence dates     
    One 0 2366 41.2  
    Two 1 1089 19  
    Three or four 2 1118 19.5  
    Five or more 3 1167 20.3  
 Concurrent receiving conviction     
    No   0 5226 91  
    Yes  1 514 9  
 Concurrent unlawful taking conviction     
    No   0 5224 91  
    Yes  1 516 9  
 
Concurrent other dishonesty 
conviction     
    None 0 4159 72.5  
    One 1 793 13.8  
    Two or more 2 788 13.7  
 Concurrent violent conviction     
    No   0 4870 84.8  
    Yes  1 870 15.2  
 Concurrent drug conviction     
    No   0 5163 89.9  
    Yes  1 577 10.1  
 Concurrent serious driving conviction     
    No   0 5087 88.6  
    Yes  1 653 11.4  
 Concurrent breach of bail convictions     
    No   0 4876 84.9  
    Yes  1 864 15.1  
 Plea     
    Guilty          0 5521 96.2  
    Not guilty  1 219 3.8  
 Reparation amount     
    None 0 3433 59.8  
 < $500 1 892 15.5  
 ≥ $500 < $1,000 2 413 7.2  
 ≥ $1,000 < $2,500 3 521 9.1  
  ≥ $2,500 4 481 8.4   
 
135 
 
Burglars were more likely than not to be sentenced for multiple offences, with 
68.2% of burglars sentenced for two or more charges and an average of 4.3 charges per 
case.  In most cases (72.3%) the offender was sentenced for a single burglary offence, 
although many also sentenced for other offences.  More than one in four (26.4%) had an 
accompanying conviction for a serious dishonesty offence.  A substantial proportion of 
offenders (45.4%) were ordered to pay reparation.  An overwhelming proportion of 
offenders (96.2%) were sentenced having pleaded guilty. 
 
Case processing variables 
Time from charge to sentence, charge laid type and the judge type are described in Table 
6.19.  The mean time from charge to sentencing (120 days) varied substantially.   
 
Table 6.19: Descriptive statistics for the case processing variables for burglary (n = 
5,740) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 
Elapsed time from charge to charge outcome 
(days) 120 96 1 3661 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Elapsed time from charge to charge outcome     
    ≤ 6 weeks 0 1212 21.1  
    > 6 weeks ≤ 3 months  1 1628 28.4  
    > 3 months ≤ 6 months  2 1681 29.3  
    > 6 months  3 1219 21.2  
 Charge laid indictably      
    No   0 5187 90.4  
    Yes  1 553 9.6  
 Judge type     
    Criminal  0 5116 89.1  
     Family 1 624 10.9   
1 The maximum shown is not the true maximum; the true maximum was much greater 
(4,429 days) and probably the consequence of the offender absconding.  The 267 cases that 
took more than one year were reset to a year and a day.  
 
Almost half (49.5%) of the offenders were sentenced within three months of being 
charged, but over a fifth (21.2%) were sentenced more than six months after the charge 
was laid.  Family Court judges sentenced 10.9% of burglars.  The charge for the lead 
burglary offence was laid indictably (a proxy for more serious offending) in 9.6 % of 
cases. 
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Criminal history variables 
Offenders’ criminal histories varied widely (see Table 6.20).   
 
Table 6.20: Descriptive statistics for the criminal history variables for burglars (n = 
5,740) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 Prior convictions for burglary 3.112 9.132 0 382 
 
Prior convictions for serious 
dishonesty 8.473 19.771 0 396 
 Prior convictions for any offence 22.363 34.421 0 471 
Categorical Variables and Coding Coding n %   
 Prior convictions for burglary     
    None 0 3134 54.6  
    One 1 701 12.2  
    Two, three or four  2 879 15.3  
    Five or more 3 1026 17.9  
 Convicted for burglary last 5 years     
    No 0 3669 63.9  
    Yes 1 2071 36.1  
 Prior incarceration for burglary     
    No 0 4082 1 71.1  
    Once 1 674 11.7  
    Twice or more 2 984 17.2  
 Longest term of incarceration for burglary    
    Never incarcerated for burglary 0 4095 1 71.3  
 ≤12 months 1 773 13.5  
 >12 months  ≤24 months 2 547 9.5  
 > 24 months 3 325 5.7  
 Prior convictions for serious dishonesty including burglary   
    None 0 2227 38.8  
    One or two 1 1004 17.5  
    Three to nine 2 1177 20.5  
    Ten or more 3 1332 23.2  
 Prior convictions for serious violence      
    No 0 4536 79.0  
    Yes 1 1204 21.0  
 Convicted for breach of sentence last 5 years    
    No 0 3586 62.5  
    Yes 1 2154 37.5  
 Prior convictions for any offence     
    None 0 915 15.9  
    1 - 4 1 1159 20.2  
    5 - 9 2 834 14.5  
    10 - 19 3 897 15.6  
    20 - 49 4 1145 20.0  
     50 or more 5 790 13.8   
1 The numbers for no prior incarceration and never incarcerated for burglary are not 
equal because the never incarcerated includes 13 observations where there was an 
incarceration sentence but the amount is unknown because of re-sentencing or a 
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successful appeal resulting in the original sentence term being set to zero in the 
Ministry of Justice Datawarehouse. 
 
The least prolific offenders had no prior convictions for any offence, and the most 
prolific offender had 471 prior convictions.  If criminal history is restricted to prior 
burglary convictions there was a similar range from 0 to 382 prior convictions for burglary.  
More than half the offenders sentenced (54.6%) had no prior convictions for burglary.  
However, only 15.9% of the offenders had no prior convictions for any offence.  A high 
proportion of those with a prior conviction for burglary (2,071/2,606 or 79.5%) had at least 
one burglary conviction within five years of the current sentencing.  A substantial minority 
of offenders (28.9%) had previously been incarcerated for burglary on at least one occasion 
and 41.5% of the offenders had previously been incarcerated for any offence on at least 
one occasion. 
 
Burglary: In-out Model 
The final model comprised 18 variables: 8 seriousness variables, 6 criminal history 
variables, 3 offender demographic variables and the circuit variable.  A number of 
variables were included in the initial modelling but not retained because they were not 
statistically significant.  Offence seriousness variables for concurrent convictions for 
receiving, unlawful taking, other dishonesty, a violent offence, a drug offence, serious 
driving, or a breach of bail had no significant effect on incarceration.  The variables for 
concurrent convictions for receiving, unlawful taking and serious driving were 
consolidated into a concurrent serious offence variable along with serious violent and 
serious drug offences and the consolidated variable was included in the final model.  
Variables representing the plea, the value of reparation ordered and whether the burglary 
was committed in the daytime or night-time were not significant.  The judge type variable 
distinguishing those District Court judges who primarily sat in the criminal jurisdiction 
from those who primarily sat in the family jurisdiction was not significant. 
A variety of criminal history variables were also rejected.  Criminal history is 
challenging because it can be represented in many ways by aggregating or disaggregating 
offence types or taking account of the age of past convictions or the seriousness of the 
sentences imposed.  The criminal history variables included in earlier models and rejected 
were: prior convictions for burglary, prior incarceration for burglary, prior convictions for 
receiving, prior convictions for unlawful taking, prior convictions for other serious 
dishonesty (excluding burglary, receiving and unlawful taking), a composite variable for 
138 
 
serious dishonesty excluding burglary (receiving, unlawful taking and other serious 
dishonesty), prior incarceration for any offence, the longest term of incarceration for any 
offence, and prior convictions for breach of sentence.  The rejection of prior convictions 
for burglary was, at first consideration, surprising.  However, it became understandable 
when placed in the context of the variables that were included.  Prior convictions for 
burglary were included in the variable covering all prior convictions for serious dishonesty.  
Indications of the offender’s burglary history were also included in the variables measuring 
time since the most recent prior burglary conviction (if any) and the longest previous term 
of incarceration for burglary (if any).   
Variance inflation factors were measured for the 18 variables included in the final 
model to detect any multi-collinearity.  None of the variables approached the threshold 
level of 10: the variance inflation factors for the 18 variables ranged from 1.027 to 5.423. 
The continuous variables were tested to determine if the assumption of linearity 
between the continuous predictor variable and the log (logit) of the outcome variable was 
met.  The model contains eight variables that were converted from continuous to 
categorical because the assumption was violated.  The converted variables were: the age of 
the offender at the time of the offence; the number of days from charge to charge outcome 
being reached; the number of burglary charges for sentence; the number of charges on the 
case; prior convictions for serious dishonesty; elapsed time since the prior conviction for 
burglary; the longest prior term of incarceration for burglary; and prior convictions for any 
offence.    
The logistic regression parameter estimates for the offence seriousness, case 
processing, criminal history and demographic variables are set out in Table 6.21.  These 
parameter estimates incorporate the influence of the circuits but the parameter estimates for 
the circuits are reported separately.  The model correctly predicted the outcome for 82.9% 
of cases (87.0% for those not-incarcerated and 77.4% for those incarcerated).   
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Table 6.21: Logistic regression parameter estimates for the offence seriousness, case 
processing, criminal history and offender demographic variables for the in-out model 
for burglars sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 5,740) 
Variable (reference categories in 
brackets) B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(B) 
          Lower Upper 
Constant 5.567 0.253 .000 0.004   
Burglary convictions for sentence   .000    
  Two (one) .461 .117 .000 1.585 1.260 1.993 
  Three or more (one) 1.087 .140 .000 2.964 2.254 3.897 
Other serious conviction (no) .463 .102 .000 1.588 1.301 1.939 
Breach of sentence conviction (no) .528 .115 .000 1.695 1.352 2.126 
Approximate value of the lead burglary offence  .000    
   $500 to $5,000 (< $500) .449 .089 .000 1.566 1.317 1.863 
   More than $5,000  (< $500) 1.022 .137 .000 2.779 2.126 3.633 
   Unknown  (< $500) .367 .155 .018 1.443 1.065 1.955 
Total convictions for sentence   .000    
   Two (one) .422 .127 .001 1.525 1.189 1.957 
   Three or four (one) .900 .126 .000 2.461 1.921 3.152 
   Five, six or seven (one) 1.409 .151 .000 4.092 3.045 5.499 
   Eight or more (one) 2.413 .171 .000 11.166 7.993 15.600 
Reparation ordered (no) -.513 .081 .000 .599 .510 .702 
Charge laid indictably (no) 1.638 .160 .000 5.144 3.758 7.042 
Elapsed time - charge to charge outcome   .023    
> 6 weeks ≤ 3 months (≤ 6 weeks) .351 .116 .003 1.420 1.131 1.784 
> 3 months ≤ 6 months (≤ 6 weeks) .212 .117 .071 1.236 .982 1.556 
> 6 months(≤ 6 weeks) .161 .131 .217 1.175 .909 1.519 
Prior convictions for serious dishonesty including burglary .016    
   One or two (none) .296 .133 .026 1.345 1.037 1.744 
   Three to nine (none) .447 .156 .004 1.563 1.151 2.122 
   Ten or more (none) .613 .206 .003 1.846 1.233 2.764 
Conviction for burglary last 5 years (no) .838 .107 .000 2.313 1.876 2.850 
Prior conviction for serious violence (no) .595 .103 .000 1.813 1.480 2.221 
Breach of sentence last 5 years (no) .434 .094 .000 1.543 1.284 1.856 
Prior convictions for any offence   .000    
   1 - 4 (none) .595 .172 .001 1.812 1.294 2.539 
   5 - 9 (none) 1.169 .191 .000 3.218 2.215 4.676 
   10 - 19 (none) 1.354 .212 .000 3.872 2.557 5.865 
   20 - 49 (none) 1.671 .241 .000 5.317 3.315 8.528 
   50 or more (none) 1.835 .291 .000 6.266 3.542 11.085 
Longest prior term of incarceration for burglary  .000    
≤12 months (none) .529 .138 .000 1.697 1.295 2.224 
>12 months  ≤24 months (none) .732 .177 .000 2.079 1.469 2.941 
> 24 months (none) 1.509 .251 .000 4.524 2.768 7.395 
Female (male) -.529 .144 .000 .589 .444 .782 
Ethnicity   .015    
  Māori (European) .274 .089 .002 1.315 1.104 1.567 
  Pacific (European) .323 .165 .049 1.382 1.001 1.908 
  Other or unknown (European) .075 .234 .749 1.078 .681 1.706 
Age at time of offending   .285    
  Aged 20-29 (13-19) .033 .102 .744 1.034 .846 1.263 
  Aged 30-39 (13-19) .030 .147 .839 1.030 .773 1.374 
  Aged 40 or older (13-19) -.282 .188 .135 .755 .522 1.091 
Block of 17 circuits (Table 7.22)             
∆χ2 = 3554.61, df = 53 p<.001; R2 Nagelkerke .620 
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The offence seriousness variables had the expected effects with one partial 
exception.  The partial exception was that offenders in the two categories whose cases 
were not sentenced until more than three months after charges were laid were not 
significantly more likely to be incarcerated than those who were sentenced within six 
weeks of charge, whereas those sentenced between 6 weeks and 3 months were more likely 
to be incarcerated.  This was unexpected but was explained by a higher proportion of older 
cases in the circuits with low odds ratios.  The hierarchical generalised linear model for 
burglary reported in Chapter 9 confirmed there was a significant decrease in the likelihood 
of incarceration in the circuits where it took longer for cases to progress from charge to 
charge outcome (the results can be seen in Table 9.7).  
Otherwise the likelihood of incarceration increased as expected if the offender was 
sentenced for multiple burglaries, had a concurrent conviction for a serious offence, had a 
concurrent conviction for breach of sentence, committed a burglary involving property 
with a higher nominal value, faced more than one charge, pleaded not guilty, or faced an 
indictably laid charge.  As expected the likelihood of incarceration reduced if the offender 
was ordered to pay reparation. 
Collectively the offence seriousness and case processing variables accounted for 
47.3% of the improvement in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model 
when only the constant was included (∆χ2=1683.02, df=16, p <.001). 
The effects associated with the criminal history variables were as expected.  The 
likelihood of incarceration increased as the number of prior convictions for serious 
dishonesty increased; the total number of prior convictions for any offence increased; if the 
offender had a prior conviction for serious violence; if the most recent conviction for 
burglary was within five years of the current sentencing; as the length of any prior 
incarceration for burglary increased; or if the offender had a recent conviction for 
breaching a sentence. 
Collectively the criminal history variables accounted for 44.5% of the improvement 
in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the constant was 
included, and significantly improved the fit of the model (∆χ2= 1583.22, df =14, p <.001). 
Gender and ethnicity both had statistically significant influence on the likelihood of 
incarceration.  The odds of incarceration were significantly lower for females (odds ratio = 
0.589) and when converted to relative risk equated to males being 1.4 times more likely to 
be incarcerated than similarly situated females.  Both Māori (odds ratio = 1.315) and 
Pacific (odds ratio = 1.382) offenders were more likely to be incarcerated than Europeans. 
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When expressed as a relative risk both Māori and Pacific offenders were approximately 1.2 
times more likely to be incarcerated than similar European offenders.  There was no 
statistically significant difference in the likelihood of incarceration by age.  This may be a 
consequence of the very high proportion of younger offenders, with 39% of offenders aged 
19 or younger.  Collectively the demographic factors only made a small contribution 
(1.2%) to the improvement in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model 
when only the constant was included, but did significantly improve the fit of the overall 
model (∆χ2= 42.44, df = 7, p <.001). 
Table 6.22 summarises the main effects associated with the circuits.  Overall the 
addition of the circuit variables made a moderate contribution (6.9%) to the improvement 
in prediction of incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the constant was 
included, and significantly improved the fit of the overall model (∆χ2= 245.94, df = 16, p 
<.001). 
 
Table 6.22: Logistic regression parameter estimates for the circuit dummy variables 
for burglary offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 5,740) 
Circuit  (Reference Circuit 0) B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(B) 
          Lower Upper 
Circuit    .000    
Circuit 1 0.976 0.18 .000 2.654 1.865 3.776 
Circuit 2 1.209 0.258 .000 3.351 2.021 5.556 
Circuit 3 1.38 0.191 .000 3.974 2.735 5.773 
Circuit 4 1.786 0.3 .000 5.963 3.313 10.734 
Circuit 5 1.064 0.184 .000 2.899 2.021 4.158 
Circuit 6 1.862 0.229 .000 6.436 4.112 10.073 
Circuit 7 1.207 0.281 .000 3.342 1.928 5.796 
Circuit 8 1.716 0.244 .000 5.56 3.447 8.968 
Circuit 9 -0.06 0.283 .832 0.942 0.54 1.641 
Circuit 10 1.761 0.215 .000 5.817 3.817 8.864 
Circuit 11 1.526 0.22 .000 4.599 2.986 7.084 
Circuit 12 1.666 0.195 .000 5.29 3.61 7.751 
Circuit 13 0.362 0.259 .162 0.696 0.419 1.157 
Circuit 14 1.4 0.308 .000 4.055 2.218 7.412 
Circuit 15 0.018 0.207 .929 1.019 0.678 1.53 
Circuit 16 1.528 0.232 .000 4.61 2.926 7.264 
 
The odds of incarceration were significantly higher than the reference circuit in 13 
of the 16 circuits.  No circuit was significantly lower and the result was non-significant for 
three circuits.  The odds ratios for the 13 circuits with higher odds of incarceration varied 
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from 2.654 (Circuit 1) to 6.436 (Circuit 6). The odds ratios fell into two distinct clusters.  
The spectrum of odds ratios and associated 95% confidence intervals is portrayed 
graphically in Figure 6.5. The circuits form into two clusters: the reference circuit plus the 
three circuits (9, 13, and 15) with odds ratios that are not significantly different to the 
reference circuit, and the remaining 13 circuits with significantly higher odds ratios.  
The confidence intervals provide a guide to how the results would fall if a different 
circuit had been chosen as the reference circuit.  For instance, if Circuit 6 had been chosen 
5 circuits would have had significantly lower odds ratios and there would have been no 
significant difference between Circuit 6 and the other 11 circuits.  If the circuit at the 
centre of the spectrum before controls (Circuit 12) had been chosen, 4 circuits would have 
had significantly lower odds ratios and there would have been no significant difference 
between Circuit 12 and the other 12 circuits.  However, based on the confidence intervals it 
is apparent that some circuits differed significantly from one another, irrespective of the 
choice of the reference circuit or how they compared to that circuit.   
 
 
Figure 6.5: Odds ratios for incarceration of burglary offenders sentenced in 2008-
2009 by circuit (Circuit 0 is the reference) 
 
The relative risks of incarceration for burglary by circuit in Figure 6.6 put the risk of 
incarceration into proportion.  The higher odds of incarceration in Circuit 6 (odds 6.44 
times greater than Circuit 0) translate to offenders being 2.49 times more likely to be 
incarcerated.   
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Figure 6.6: Relative risk of incarceration for burglary offenders sentenced in 2008-
2009  by circuit 
 
Prediction 1 is supported for burglary: after controlling for seriousness of offence, 
criminal history and offender demographic variables, similarly situated offenders were 
sentenced differently between the circuits.  The difference in the likelihood of 
incarceration was substantial as well as statistically significant. 
 
Residual Statistics, Influential Cases and Outliers 
The discussion of residual statistics, influential cases and outliers has been combined into a 
single section for all three models because there is considerable overlap in the discussion 
between the three models.  The residual statistics were reviewed for each model to identify 
influential cases and potential outliers.  The values for Cook’s distance were reviewed to 
identify any cases with an undue influence on the model and the standardised DFBeta 
measures were reviewed to identify any cases exerting an undue influence on any of the 
parameter estimates for the variables in the model.  Standardised residuals were scrutinised 
to identify and examine potential outliers in the models with particular attention paid to 
residuals with an absolute value in excess of 3. 
0.8
1.0
1.0 1.0
1.8
1.9
2.0 2.0
2.1 2.1
2.2 2.2
2.4 2.4
2.4 2.4
2.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
C
ir
cu
it
 1
3
C
ir
cu
it
 9
C
ir
cu
it
 0
C
ir
cu
it
 1
5
C
ir
cu
it
 1
C
ir
cu
it
 5
C
ir
cu
it
 7
C
ir
cu
it
 2
C
ir
cu
it
 3
C
ir
cu
it
 1
4
C
ir
cu
it
 1
1
C
ir
cu
it
 1
6
C
ir
cu
it
 1
2
C
ir
cu
it
 8
C
ir
cu
it
 1
0
C
ir
cu
it
 4
C
ir
cu
it
 6
R
el
a
ti
v
e 
R
is
k
144 
 
For all three models the values for Cook’s distance and the standardised DFBeta 
measures were below 1.  There were no cases exerting an undue influence on the model or 
on any of the parameter estimates for the variables in the models.   
Examination of the standardised residuals raised concern about potential outliers in 
all three models.  In all three models the proportion of standardised residuals with an 
absolute value greater than 1.96 (one standard deviation) was below 5% but more than 1% 
exceeded an absolute value of 2.58 (two standard deviations).  The cases with an absolute 
value of 3 or more were scrutinised as potential outliers.  The cases can be divided into two 
categories.  First, cases where the model strongly predicted incarceration, with 
probabilities in excess of .9, but the offender was not incarcerated.  Second, cases where 
the model strongly predicted a sentence other than incarceration, with probabilities less 
than .1, but the offender was incarcerated.   
There were 142 cases (1.5% of total cases) with an absolute value of 3 or more in 
the model for aggravated drink driving.  There were 37 cases of offenders who were not 
incarcerated despite the model strongly predicting they would be; and 105 cases of 
offenders who were incarcerated despite the model strongly predicting they would not be.  
The male assaults female model contained 112 cases (1.8% of total cases) with an 
absolute value of 3 or more.  There were 6 cases of offenders who were not incarcerated 
despite the model strongly predicting they would be; and 106 cases of offenders who were 
incarcerated despite the model strongly predicting they would not be.   
The burglary model contained 99 cases (1.7% of total cases) with an absolute value 
of 3 or more.  There were 41 cases of offenders who were not incarcerated despite the 
model strongly predicting they would be; and 58 cases of offenders who were incarcerated 
despite the model strongly predicting they would not be.   
Cases are likely to have high standardised residuals because the sentence was 
largely influenced by one or more variables omitted from the models.  There are a number 
of known variables that were omitted which may explain the outcomes for these cases.  
Many of these are generic variables applicable to all three models.  Judges who did not 
incarcerate an offender who otherwise had a high modelled probability of incarceration 
may have been influenced by a judgement that the offender was committed to change, or 
that a sentence of incarceration would have a disproportionate impact causing severe 
hardship to either the offender or the offender’s family.    
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Judges who incarcerated an offender who otherwise had a low modelled probability 
of incarceration may have been influenced by the fact that the offender was already a 
serving prisoner, the offender was being sentenced while in custody on a more serious 
charge, or the offender had already spent time remanded in custody.  In all three situations 
judges may consider that there is no viable alternative sentence to incarceration.  
The male assaults female and burglary cases were spread across the circuits with no 
apparent patterns.  Given that Cook’s distance and the standardised DFBeta measures did 
not indicate that any of the cases exerted an undue influence on the model or any of the 
model parameters the cases were retained in the model.     
The aggravated drink driving cases were also spread across the circuits, but there 
were two notable concentrations.  About two-thirds of the cases of no incarceration when it 
was strongly indicated occurred in circuits where sentencing was more severe. Likewise 
about two-thirds of the cases of incarceration when no incarceration was strongly indicated 
were in the circuits where sentencing was less severe.  Excluding the cases with high 
standardised residuals from the model would have increased the degree of disparity.  It is 
likely that for both groupings with high residuals the identity of the circuit was important.  
Assuming offenders incarcerated due to being sentenced prisoners, having spent time on 
remand or being in remand due to more serious charges yet to be resolved are relatively 
evenly spread across circuits they will constitute a higher proportion of incarcerated 
offenders in low incarceration circuits.  The same proposition is equally likely to apply in 
the reverse for offenders not incarcerated due to future prospects of “going straight”, they 
will account for a higher proportion of not-incarcerated offenders in high incarceration 
circuits.  In these circumstances removing these cases could be criticised as “cooking the 
books” to increase the apparent level of disparity.  Given that Cook’s distance and the 
standardised DFBeta measures did not indicate that any of the cases exerted an undue 
influence on the model or any of the model parameters the cases were retained in the 
model.   
 
Discussion of the Model Results 
With the exception of a related article (Goodall & Durrant, 2013) which reported the 
results from a substantively similar version of the aggravated drink driving in-out model, 
albeit with a different reference circuit, these results are understood to be the first 
examining the influence of location on the use of incarceration in New Zealand employing 
statistical controls for a broad range of offence and offender variables.   
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Sentencing does vary by circuit  
The model results strongly support the predicted effect of location: the circuit in which an 
offender was sentenced for aggravated drink driving, male assaults female or burglary 
significantly affected the likelihood of incarceration.  After controlling for seriousness of 
offence, criminal history and offender demographic variables, similar offenders were 
sentenced differently between circuits.   
For aggravated drink driving the odds of incarceration for almost all circuits 
(15/16) were statistically significantly different from the reference circuit.  The odds ratios 
for the 14 circuits more likely to incarcerate ranged from 1.73 to 58.73, which when 
converted to relative risk means that depending on the circuit offenders were 1.6 to 7.4 
times more likely to be incarcerated than offenders in the reference circuit.   
For male assaults female the odds of incarceration were statistically significantly 
different for 7 of the 16 circuits relative to the reference circuit.  The odds ratios for the 6 
circuits more likely to incarcerate ranged from 1.85 to 2.85, which when converted to 
relative risk means that depending on the circuit offenders were 1.7 to 2.3 times more 
likely to be incarcerated than offenders in the reference circuit.   
For burglary the odds of incarceration for 13 of the 16 circuits were statistically 
significantly different from the reference circuit.  The odds ratios for the 13 circuits ranged 
from 2.65 to 6.44, which when converted to relative risk means that depending on the 
circuit offenders were 1.8 to 2.5 times more likely to be incarcerated than offenders in the 
reference circuit.     
Contrary to the proposition made by Priestley (2009) there is no evidence that 
compositional differences in caseload explain the variations between locations observed by 
the Law Commission. 
  
The disparity was substantial as well as statistically significant 
The differences were substantial: they were not just statistically significant differences 
arising from a large number of cases, allowing relatively small substantive differences to 
attain statistical significance.  The relative risks for the 14 circuits with a significant and 
greater risk of incarceration for aggravated drink driving ranged from 1.6 to 7.4 times 
greater with the risk more than five time greater in seven circuits.  The relative risk of 
incarceration in the reference circuit was 1.6 times greater than circuit 15.   The relative 
risks for the 6 circuits with a significant and greater risk of incarceration for male assaults 
female ranged from 1.9 to 2.9.  The relative risk of incarceration in the reference circuit 
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was 1.6 times greater than circuit 13.  The relative risks for the 13 circuits with a 
significant and greater risk of incarceration for burglary ranged from 1.8 to 2.5.  The 
relative risks cannot be directly compared between the offences because the base rate of 
incarceration is different for each offence.  
The substance of these differences can be measured in a more direct and practical 
way by estimating what the change in the number of offenders incarcerated would be if the 
offenders sentenced in the circuits with the highest odds ratios were transferred to the 
reference circuit.  If the aggravated drink drivers from Circuit 8 were sentenced in Circuit 
0, the difference in relative risk indicates that the number incarcerated would reduce from 
140 to 19 (or 56 to 7.5 per 100).  If the male assaults female offenders from Circuit 7 were 
sentenced in Circuit 0, the difference in relative risk indicates that the number incarcerated 
would reduce from 20 to 9 (or 17 to 7.6 per 100).  If the burglars from Circuit 6 were 
sentenced in Circuit 0, the difference in relative risk indicates that the number incarcerated 
would reduce from 153 to 61 (or 55 to 22 per 100).  
There are statistically significant and substantial differences in the rates of 
incarceration between circuits.  The differences originally observed by the Law 
Commission (2006) cannot be explained by compositional differences in caseload between 
the circuits.  These findings suggest that the current guidance is inadequate and fails to 
ensure that similar offenders who commit similar offences receive similar sentences.   
 
Influence of seriousness of offence and criminal history variables (legal variables) 
The models for all three offences indicate that offence seriousness and criminal history 
variables are the most significant influences on sentencing.  Offence seriousness and 
criminal history variables made a 73.6% (aggravated drink driving), 95.5% (male assaults 
female) and 91.8% (burglary) contribution to the improvement in prediction of 
incarceration compared to the baseline model when only the constant was included.  The 
results supported the assumption that, consistent with prior research, the seriousness of 
offence and criminal history variables would be the strongest influences on the decision to 
incarcerate.  The importance of the seriousness of the offence and criminal history factors 
suggests the judges apply a common framework of factors when sentencing.  However, the 
variation between circuits that remained after controlling for the seriousness and criminal 
history factors suggests there are differences in the threshold for incarceration between 
circuits for each of the three offences.  There is little doubt that formally rational 
sentencing variables based on the Sentencing Act and appellate authorities dominate 
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sentencing decisions, especially for male assaults female and burglary.  However, the 
results also suggest that the interpretation and use of the formally rational factors is 
influenced by substantively rational sentencing concerns and that the influence of these 
concerns varies between circuits.  Based on the range and extent of differences in the 
sentencing of aggravated drink driving between circuits the influence of substantively 
rational concerns are greater for that offence.  This may reflect differing views on the 
seriousness of the offence by judges, by the local community or by both.  The multi-level 
random co-efficient models reported and discussed in Chapter 8 will shed more light on 
these propositions.  The random co-efficient models will reveal whether there are 
differences in use for all the variables, just a selection or possibly for none of them.   
 
Influence of gender and ethnicity (extra-legal) variables  
Neither gender nor ethnicity had a statistically significant effect on the sentencing of 
aggravated drink driving or male assaults female.  Both gender and ethnicity were 
significant influences on the sentencing of burglars.  These differences underscore the 
usefulness of disaggregating the modelling by offence type.   
The finding that gender was not statistically significant for aggravated drink driving 
adds an important qualification to the general findings in sentencing research in the United 
States (Ulmer, 2012) and in New Zealand (Jeffries et al., 2003; Triggs, 1999) which has 
almost universally found that females are sentenced more leniently.  The finding that this 
does not apply to aggravated drink driving suggests the effect may be more nuanced.  One 
possibility is that aggravated drink driving differs from the general run of offences, with 
the requirement that the offender must have two prior adult drink driving convictions 
possibly offsetting any sentencing leniency shown to females.   
The finding that ethnicity had no significant effects on sentencing for aggravated 
drink driving and male assaults female but a significant effect for burglary adds to the 
mixed results in prior Australian and New Zealand research on indigeneity (Bond & 
Jefferies 2011; Snowball & Weatherburn, 2006; and Triggs, 1999 found no differences but 
Bond et al., 2011 and Jeffries and Bond, 2009 did find differences) but it is out of step with 
the overall weight of the United States research (Mitchell & Mackenzie, 2004; Ulmer, 
2012).  The effect of ethnicity on burglary adds a new perspective to Trigg’s (1999) 
finding of no effect in New Zealand.  It suggests that generalised research carries a risk of 
obscuring important differences via an averaging of effects.    
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Rank order of the circuits within and between offences  
The position of each circuit on the spectrum from most lenient to most severe can be 
compared between the offences.  Similar rankings would suggest that the differences are 
potentially associated with an overall sentencing severity policy or approach; conversely 
little similarity would suggest that policies or approaches are more offence specific.  The 
order of circuits for each offence is portrayed in Table 6.23.  
Six of the circuits were significantly more likely to incarcerate than the reference 
circuit for all three offences, but this did not include either of the two circuits most likely to 
incarcerate for aggravated drink driving (Circuit 8) or burglary (Circuit 6) with neither 
circuit significantly more likely to incarcerate male assaults female offenders.  Two 
circuits (Circuits 13 & 15) were never significantly more likely to incarcerate than the 
reference circuit, with both of these circuits significantly less likely to incarcerate than the 
reference circuit for one offence each.   
 
Table 6.23: Order of circuits by odds ratio from highest to lowest by offence type1 
 Aggravated drink 
driving Male assaults female Burglary 
8 7 6 
12 14 4 
6 1 10 
4 10 8 
2 2 12 
7 12 16 
10 4 11 
1 5 14 
16 3 3 
14 9 2 
11 16 7 
3 8 5 
5 15 1 
9 6 15 
0 0 0 
13 11 9 
15 13 13 
1 The circuits that were statistically significantly different to the reference circuit are shown 
in bold. 
 Spearman’s rho (correlation co-efficient) was calculated for each of the three pairs 
of offences to determine whether there was any apparent link between the rank orders of 
the circuits for each offence.  There was a link between the order of the circuits for 
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aggravated drink driving and burglary, rs = .79, p < .001.  However, there was no link 
between aggravated drink driving and male assaults female (rs = .40, p = .107) or male 
assaults female and burglary (rs = .17, p = .523). 
The significant co-efficient for the pairing of aggravated drink driving and burglary 
points to the possibility that the sentencing of these offences is influenced by a general 
theory about the use of incarceration in each circuit.  However, the result was not 
replicated for the pairing of male assaults female with either of these offences suggesting 
that the decision to incarcerate may be influenced more by a view of the relative 
seriousness of each offence type in each circuit rather than by some general theory about 
the use of incarceration.  While it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions, a scan of 
the rank order of circuits across the offences does suggest the possibility that there was a 
general reluctance to incarcerate in the reference circuit and Circuits 13 and 15.  
 
Summary 
In sum, the logistic regression models support Prediction 1: similarly situated offenders 
were sentenced differently depending on which circuit they were sentenced in.  The extent 
of inconsistency and the pattern varied between the offences.  The strength of the findings 
also varied between the offences.  The odds of incarceration for aggravated drink driving 
were spread across a continuum with many of the circuits varying from another.  
Conversely the burglary model found that the circuits fell into two broad groupings, more 
lenient and more severe circuits, with a substantial difference between the two.  Although 
the circuit was significant the main determinants of sentence were offence seriousness and 
criminal history variables.  Comparison of the rank order of the circuits by offence resulted 
in contradictory findings suggesting that sentencing in some circuits may be influenced by 
a general theory minimising the use of incarceration whereas in other circuits sentencing 
may be based on a view of the seriousness of the specific offence.  
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Chapter 7: Consistency between Circuits in the Length of Incarceration 
 
This chapter reports descriptive statistics and the results of the sentence length models for 
each of the three offence types.  The material is organised by offence with descriptive 
statistics and commentary followed by the sentence length linear regression models and 
discussion of the models.  The discussion of residual statistics has been consolidated into a 
single section to minimise duplication. 
Inconsistency in the length of incarceration between circuits was demonstrated for 
each of the offences.  The position of the circuits on the spectrum from most lenient to 
most severe varied by offence.  A significant difference for a circuit in relation to one 
offence did not predict significant differences for the other offences.  Fewer circuits were 
significantly different for aggravated drink driving (7) and male assaults female (6) than 
burglary (14).  All of the circuits that were statistically significantly different from the 
reference circuit for burglary and aggravated drink driving were substantially different 
from the reference circuit whereas only two of the six circuits for male assaults female 
were substantially different.     
The number of circuits that were statistically significantly different on sentence 
length was similar to the number on the likelihood of incarceration for burglary (13 c.f. 14) 
and male assaults female (6 c.f. 7) but different for aggravated drink driving (7 c.f. 15).  
These distinctions validate the decision to model the sentence decision in two separate 
parts.  
Offence seriousness and criminal history variables were found to be the principal 
influence on the likelihood of incarceration for all three offences.  This finding is 
consistent with the findings of almost all sentencing research.  In conjunction with the 
finding of inconsistency this points to differences in the interpretation and use of the 
offence seriousness and criminal history factors across circuits in the determination of 
sentence length as well as the choice of sentence type.  If that is so, it supports the 
proposition that sentencing decisions are the result of a balance between formal rational 
sentencing factors and the influence of substantive rational sentencing concerns that varies 
between the circuits. 
The review of residuals for the sentence length models for aggravated drink driving 
and male assaults female raised a significant issue.  Almost all the observations reviewed 
as potential outliers had one of two characteristics: the incarceration sentence type was 
home detention (rather than imprisonment); or there were multiple offences and the 
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sentences were imposed cumulatively (rather than concurrently).  This was a surprising 
discovery, raising the possibility that variables for these two characteristics should be 
included in the models.  In the end they were not included, despite improving the 
performance of the models, because they are aspects of the outcome variable and their 
inclusion would have meant that the outcome was to some extent being used to predict the 
outcome.  A description of the investigation and consideration of these characteristics is 
addressed in the consolidated discussion of the residuals with a more detailed discussion in 
Appendix F.   
   
Aggravated Drink Driving: Descriptive Statistics 
Of the 9,282 offenders sentenced by resident judges for aggravated drink driving, 2,452 
(26.4%) were incarcerated.  Sentence lengths were available for 2,312 (94.3%) of the 
incarcerated offenders.  The mean sentence length for the 2,312 offenders for whom 
sentence length was available was 9.28 months, with a standard deviation of 5.10 months 
and a range from 0.5 months to 42 months.   
 
The demographic profile of offenders incarcerated for aggravated drink driving  
The demographic profile of incarcerated offenders is set out in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1: Demographic profile of offenders incarcerated for aggravated drink 
driving in 2008-2009 (n = 2,312) 
Continuous Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Age at the time of offending  37.87 10.55 17 75 
 Categorical Variables  N  % 
Gender     
   Male  2023  87.5% 
   Female  289  12.5% 
Ethnicity     
   European  901  39.0% 
   Māori  1184  51.2% 
   Pacific  150  6.5% 
   Other or unknown  77  3.3% 
 
Incarcerated aggravated drink drivers were: younger than those not incarcerated (37.9 c.f. 
40.4 years); about as likely to be male than those not incarcerated (87.5% c.f. 86%); and 
more likely to be Māori than those not incarcerated (51.2% c.f. 38.1%).   
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Offenders incarcerated by circuit  
The number of offenders incarcerated per circuit (Table 7.2) ranged from 27 to 357.  
 
Table 7.2: Number of offenders incarcerated for aggravated drink driving in 2008-
2009 by circuit (n = 2,312)  
Categorical Variables  N % 
   
Circuit 0 95 4.1% 
Circuit 1 311 13.5% 
Circuit 2 80 3.5% 
Circuit 3  134 5.8% 
Circuit 4 46 2.0% 
Circuit 5 186 8.0% 
Circuit 6 249 10.8% 
Circuit 7 79 3.4% 
Circuit 8 138 6.0% 
Circuit 9 46 2.0% 
Circuit 10 138 6.0% 
Circuit 11 136 5.9% 
Circuit 12 357 15.4% 
Circuit 13 27 1.2% 
Circuit 14 60 2.6% 
Circuit 15 43 1.9% 
Circuit 16 187 8.1% 
 
Offence seriousness and case processing variables  
Most incarcerated offenders were sentenced for more than one offence (69.4%), which was 
substantially higher than non-incarcerated offenders (30.4%).  The most common 
accompanying offence for offenders sentenced for more than one offence was driving 
while disqualified.  On average incarcerated aggravated drink drivers were twice the legal 
limit, slightly higher than those not incarcerated (1.88 times).  The proportion of 
incarcerated offenders sentenced after being recorded as pleading guilty was similar to 
those not incarcerated (98.2% c.f. 97.4%).  Descriptive statistics for offence seriousness 
factors for incarcerated offenders are set out in Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3: Descriptive statistics for offence seriousness variables linked to offenders 
incarcerated for aggravated drink driving in 2008-2009 (n = 2,312) 
     
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
     
Standardised alcohol level  2.03 0.54 1.0 4.4 
Total charges sentenced) 2.58 2.08 1 34 
Categorical Variables  N  % 
Multiple drink drive charges     
   No    2027  87.7% 
   Yes   285  12.3% 
Concurrent disqualified driving charges     
   No    1464  63.3% 
   Yes   848  36.7% 
Concurrent serious driving charges     
   No    2076  89.8% 
   Yes   236  10.2% 
Concurrent minor driving charges     
   No    1840  79.6% 
   Yes   472  20.4% 
Concurrent breach of bail charges     
   No    2107  91.1% 
   Yes   205  8.9% 
Concurrent breach of sentence charges     
   No    2069  89.5% 
   Yes   243  10.5% 
Plea     
   Guilty           2270  98.2% 
   Not guilty   42  1.8% 
 
The mean time from charge to sentencing for incarcerated offenders was longer than for 
those not incarcerated (125 c.f. 100 days).  The proportions of incarcerated offenders 
sentenced by criminal or family judges were similar to non-incarcerated offenders.  
Descriptive statistics for case processing factors for incarcerated offenders are set out in 
Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4: Descriptive statistics for case processing variables for offenders 
incarcerated for aggravated drink driving in 2008-2009 (n = 2,312) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Time from charge to charge outcome  125 85 1 366 
 Categorical Variables  N  % 
Judge type     
   Criminal   2038  88.1% 
   Family  274  11.9% 
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Criminal history variables  
Offenders’ criminal histories varied widely.  The least prolific only had the minimum two 
prior convictions for drink driving necessary to be an aggravated drink driver and no other 
convictions, whereas the most prolific offender had 368 convictions in total for all 
offences.  When the criminal history is restricted to drinking and driving the most prolific 
offender had 22 prior convictions.  The ranges of the number of prior convictions are 
similar to those for offenders who were not incarcerated (2-21 for drink driving 
convictions and 2-327 for total convictions).  However, incarcerated drink drivers had a 
higher mean number of prior drink driving convictions than those not incarcerated (4.70 
c.f. 2.96).  Likewise, incarcerated drink drivers had a substantially higher mean number of 
total prior convictions than those not incarcerated (30.25 c.f. 15.77).  Over half of those not 
incarcerated had the minimum two prior convictions for drink driving, whereas only 18.6% 
of those incarcerated had only two prior convictions for drink driving.  On average the 
immediate prior drink drive conviction for those incarcerated was 3.74 years ago, 
compared to 6.95 years for those not incarcerated.  Incarcerated offenders were almost four 
times more likely to have been incarcerated before for drink driving than non-incarcerated 
offenders (50.7% c.f. 13.6%).  The mean longest prior incarceration for drink driving for 
incarcerated offenders was longer than for offenders who were not incarcerated (6.63 
months c.f. 4.36 months).  Descriptive statistics for criminal history factors for incarcerated 
offenders are set out in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.5: Descriptive statistics for criminal history variables linked to offenders 
incarcerated for aggravated drink driving in 2008-2009 (n = 2312) 
     
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
  Prior convictions for drink driving 4.70 2.72 2 22 
  Years since last drink driving conviction 3.74 2.96 0.1 25 
  Longest prior incarceration for drink driving  6.63 4.83 0.5 24 
  Prior convictions for any offence 30.25 30.12 2 368 
 Categorical Variables  N  % 
  Prior incarceration for drink driving  1173  50.7% 
  Prior incarceration for any offence  1511  65.4% 
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Aggravated Drink Driving: Sentence Length Model  
The final model comprised 31 variables: 3 criminal history variables, 7 seriousness or case 
processing variables, 5 offender demographic variables and 16 circuit variables.  Many of 
these were dummy variables (e.g., ethnicity and circuit).  A range of variables included in 
the initial modelling were not retained because they were not statistically significant.  The 
excluded variables comprised dummy variables for the number of prior drink driving 
convictions in the previous ten years; prior convictions for breach of sentence; prior 
incarceration for drink driving; whether the current case included a serious driving charge; 
whether the offender pleaded guilty; whether the current case included a minor driving 
charge; prior convictions for any offence; prior convictions for disqualified driving; and 
whether the offender was sentenced by a criminal or a family judge.  The first five of the 
variables that were excluded from the model were significant in the in-out model thus 
demonstrating that different groupings of variables were significant for each decision and 
validating the decision to treat sentencing as a two part process separating type from 
quantum. 
The variance inflation factors for the variables included in the final models were re-
checked for multi-collinearity.  None of the variables approached the threshold level of 10: 
the variance inflation factors ranged from 1.052 to 4.160. 
The linear regression parameter estimates for the offence seriousness, criminal 
history and demographic variables are set out in Table 7.6.  These parameter estimates 
incorporate the influence of the circuits but the parameter estimates for the circuits are 
reported separately.   
The criminal history variables had the most substantial statistically significant 
influence on sentence length (R2 = .234).  As expected two of the variables had an 
aggravating effect and one had a mitigating effect.  Each prior conviction for drinking and 
driving contributed approximately 2 weeks to the sentence (about 9.5 weeks at the average 
of 4.7 prior convictions).  The longest prior term of incarceration for drink driving 
increased the sentence; it provided an additional measure of the seriousness of the prior 
offences.  Each additional month added about 9 days to the sentence (about 8 weeks at the 
average longest prior term of 6.6 months).  The impact of the prior drink driving 
convictions and incarceration was reduced if more time had elapsed since the immediate 
prior conviction; each additional year reduced the sentence by about 4 days (about 2 weeks 
at the average time since the last conviction of 3.7 years). 
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Table 7.6: Linear regression parameter estimates for the criminal history, offence 
seriousness, case processing and demographic variables for the sentence length model 
for aggravated drink drivers sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 2,312) 
Variable B S.E. Sig. 
(Constant) 1.769 .648 .006 
Prior convictions for drink driving .473 .047 .000 
Years since the last drink drive conviction -.131 .032 .000 
Longest term of imprisonment for drink driving .284 .024 .000 
Alcohol levels standardised 1.135 .159 .000 
Multiple drink drive charges 2.704 .292 .000 
Case includes disqualified driving charge(s) .503 .207 .015 
Case includes breach(es) of bail -1.498 .356 .000 
Case includes breach(es) of sentence -.692 .303 .023 
Total number of charges for sentence .501 .057 .000 
Days from charge to charge outcome .003 .001 .013 
Female  -.176 .262 .501 
Age when offended -.010 .010 .323 
Māori (cf European) -.358 .191 .061 
Pacific (cf European) .022 .381 .953 
Other (cf European) -.468 .488 .338 
Block of 16 circuit variables (Table 8.8)    
R2= .234 for Block 1 (Criminal history) p < .001; ∆R2 = .109 for Block 2 (Offence 
seriousness and case processing) p < .001, ∆R2 = .002 for Block 3 (Offender demographics) 
not significant; ∆R2 = .041 for Block 4 (Circuits) p < .001. 
 
The seriousness variables had a statistically significant influence on sentence length 
(∆R2 = .109).  The seven seriousness variables were all aggravating factors expected to 
increase the sentence.  This was only true for five of the variables.  The length of the 
sentence increased by 34 days each time the ratio of the alcohol level to the legal limit 
increased by one unit.  If the offender faced multiple drink driving convictions, sentence 
length increased by 81 days.  If the offender faced a concurrent conviction for driving 
while disqualified, sentence length increased by 15 days.  Sentence length increased as the 
total number of charges increased, with each additional charge adding 15 days to the 
sentence.  Sentence length increased as the elapsed time from charge to charge outcome 
increased.  Sentences were about 11 days longer for cases that took the average time (125 
days) to reach sentencing. 
The two seriousness factors that did not conform to expectations were the inclusion 
of breach of bail and breach of sentence offences.  The model suggests that conviction for 
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a breach of bail reduced the sentence by 45 days and conviction for breach of sentence 
reduced the sentence by 21 days.  A conviction for either offence must make the case more 
serious than the exact same case excluding either or both of these offences.  The 
explanation for these unexpected effects must therefore lie in the construction of the model 
and the particular distribution of the modelled sentencing factors across the cases.  The 
most likely explanation identified was that the correction occurs because these offences are 
associated with cases that have a disproportionately high average number of convictions 
for sentence but the breach offences are less serious than most other offences.  A review of 
the data showed that both breach of bail and breach of sentence convictions did tend to be 
associated with cases that had a higher number of convictions for sentence.  The 243 cases 
that included breach of sentence had an average of 4.9 convictions per case compared to 
2.3 for those cases that did not include breach of sentence.  The 205 cases that included 
breach of bail had an average of 5.8 convictions per case compared to 2.3 for those cases 
that did not include breach of bail.  Because breaches of bail and breaches of sentence are 
often less serious than most other offences the model makes a negative correction to 
differentiate cases including breach of bail and/or breaches of sentence from similarly 
sized cases made up of more serious offences.   
The combined contribution of the criminal history and offence seriousness 
variables to the overall model (a combined R2 = .342 of the total model R2 = .385) 
demonstrates that these variables are the principal influences on the length of incarceration. 
The demographic variables did not have a statistically significant influence on 
sentence length (∆R2 = .002).  None of the variables achieved statistical significance.  
Table 7.7 summarises the results for the circuit variables (a series of 16 dummy 
variables that contrast each of 16 circuits with the reference circuit (Circuit 0).  Overall the 
block of circuit variables had a statistically significant effect on the model (∆R2 = .041).  
Sentence lengths were significantly different in 7 of the 16 circuits.  The sentences ranged 
from about 6 weeks (Circuit 1) to almost 3 months longer (Circuit 16).  In the context of 
this offence with a mean sentence of 9.1 months in the reference circuit, these are 
substantively significant differences.   
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Table 7.7: Linear regression parameter estimates for the circuit variables for the 
sentence length model for aggravated drink drivers sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 
2,312) 
Variable B S.E. Sig. 
Circuit 1 v Circuit 0 1.510 .485 .002 
Circuit 2 v Circuit 0 .951 .625 .128 
Circuit 3 v Circuit 0 1.806 .547 .001 
Circuit 4 v Circuit 0 1.069 .730 .143 
Circuit 5 v Circuit 0 1.438 .521 .006 
Circuit 6 v Circuit 0 -.802 .496 .106 
Circuit 7 v Circuit 0 2.294 .621 .000 
Circuit 8 v Circuit 0 .203 .550 .713 
Circuit 9 v Circuit 0 1.163 .733 .113 
Circuit 10 v Circuit 0 .330 .545 .544 
Circuit 11 v Circuit 0 .952 .543 .080 
Circuit 12 v Circuit 0 1.809 .473 .000 
Circuit 13 v Circuit 0 -.921 .888 .300 
Circuit 14 v Circuit 0 1.750 .670 .009 
Circuit 15 v Circuit 0 -.065 .761 .932 
Circuit 16 v Circuit 0 2.996 .515 .000 
 
Prediction 2 is supported for aggravated drink driving: after controlling for criminal 
history, offence seriousness and offender demographic variables, similarly situated 
offenders were sentenced to different terms of incarceration in some circuits.  
 
Male Assaults Female: Descriptive Statistics 
Of the 6,166 offenders sentenced by resident judges for male assaults female, 744 (12.1%) 
were incarcerated.  Incarceration sentence lengths were available for 723 or 97.2% of the 
744 offenders incarcerated.  The mean sentence length for the 723 offenders for whom 
sentence length was available was 7.44 months, with a standard deviation of 4.76 months 
and a range from 0.25 months to 35 months.   
 
The demographic profile of offenders incarcerated for male assaults female  
Incarcerated male assaults female offenders were: younger than those not incarcerated 
(30.9 c.f. 32.4 years); and more likely to be Māori than those not incarcerated (63.6% c.f. 
43.4%).  The demographic profile of incarcerated offenders is set out in Table 7.8. 
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Table 7.8: Demographic profile of offenders incarcerated for male assaults female in 
2008-2009 (n = 723)  
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Age at the time of offending  30.91 8.38 17 73 
Categorical Variables  N  % 
Ethnicity     
   European  168  23.2% 
   Māori  460  63.6% 
   Pacific  78  10.8% 
   Other or unknown  17  2.4% 
 
 
Offenders incarcerated by circuit  
The number of offenders incarcerated per circuit (Table 7.9) ranged from 9 to 82.   
 
Table 7.9: Number of offenders incarcerated for male assaults female in 2008-2009 by 
circuit (n = 723)  
 Categorical Variables  N  % 
Circuit 0  82  11.3% 
Circuit 1  71  9.8% 
Circuit 2  34  4.7% 
Circuit 3   63  8.7% 
Circuit 4  18  2.5% 
Circuit 5  76  10.5% 
Circuit 6  46  6.4% 
Circuit 7  20  2.8% 
Circuit 8  21  2.9% 
Circuit 9  9  1.2% 
Circuit 10  44  6.1% 
Circuit 11  53  7.3% 
Circuit 12  82  11.3% 
Circuit 13  14  1.9% 
Circuit 14  16  2.2% 
Circuit 15  40  5.5% 
Circuit 16  34  4.7% 
 
Offence seriousness and case processing variables 
Incarcerated offenders were substantially more likely to be sentenced for more than one 
offence than non-incarcerated offenders (77.3% c.f. 35.4%).  The most common 
accompanying offences for offenders sentenced for more than one offence were another 
violent offence or a breach of a protection order.  Although most offenders were sentenced 
for one male assaults female offence, the proportion of incarcerated offenders sentenced 
for two or more such offences was almost three times greater than those not incarcerated 
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(19.9% c.f. 7.0%).  The proportion of incarcerated offenders sentenced after being 
recorded as pleading guilty was lower than those not incarcerated (90.5% c.f. 93.2%).  
Descriptive statistics for offence seriousness factors for incarcerated offenders are set out 
in Table 7.10. 
 
Table 7.10: Descriptive statistics for offence seriousness variables linked to offenders 
incarcerated for male assaults female in 2008-2009 by circuit (n = 723) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Total charges sentenced  3.50 2.71 1 19 
Categorical Variables  N  % 
Multiple male assaults female charges     
   No    579  80.1% 
   Yes   144  19.9% 
Concurrent breach of protection order 
charges     
   No    542  75.0% 
   Yes   181  25.0% 
Concurrent threat to kill do GBH charges     
   No    703  97.2% 
   Yes   20  2.8% 
Concurrent wilful or intentional damage charges     
   No    600  83.0% 
   Yes   123  17.0% 
Concurrent other violence charges     
   No    526  72.8% 
   Yes   197  27.2% 
Concurrent breach of bail charges     
   No    630  87.1% 
   Yes   93  12.9% 
Concurrent breach of sentence charges     
   No    564  78.0% 
   Yes   159  22.0% 
Weapon described in the charge     
   No    712  98.5% 
   Yes   11  1.5% 
Plea     
   Guilty           654  90.5% 
   Not guilty   69  9.5% 
 
The mean time from charge to sentencing for incarcerated offenders (114 days) was 
similar to those not incarcerated (116 days).  The proportion of incarcerated offenders 
sentenced by judges with a Family Court warrant was lower than non-incarcerated 
offenders (16.3% c.f. 22.5%).  A smaller proportion of incarcerated offenders were 
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sentenced in a District Court with an active family violence court than non-incarcerated 
offenders (24.9% c.f. 37.4%).  Descriptive statistics for case processing factors for 
incarcerated offenders are set out in Table 7.11. 
 
Table 7.11: Descriptive statistics for case processing variables linked to offenders 
incarcerated for male assaults female in 2008-2009 by circuit (n = 723) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Time from charge to charge outcome  114 87 1 366 
 Categorical Variables  N  % 
Offender sentenced in a Family Violence Court     
   No    543  75.1% 
   Yes   180  24.9% 
Judge type     
   Criminal   605  83.7% 
   Family  118  16.3% 
Charge Laid Type     
  Summary  687  95.0% 
  Indictable  36  5.0% 
 
Criminal history variables  
Offenders’ criminal histories varied widely.  The least prolific had no prior convictions for 
any offence.  By contrast the most prolific offender for male assaults female had 11 prior 
convictions for that offence and the most prolific general offender had 231 prior 
convictions.  These ranges were similar to those for offenders who were not incarcerated 
(0-8 for male assaults female convictions and 0-293 for total convictions).  However, 
incarcerated male assaults female offenders had a higher mean number of prior convictions 
for male assaults female compared to those not incarcerated (1.49 c.f. 0.38).  Likewise 
incarcerated male assaults female offenders had a substantially higher mean number of 
prior convictions for any offence than those not incarcerated (38.2 c.f. 12.1).  Of those 
incarcerated 62.9% had a prior male assault female conviction compared to 24.0% of 
offenders who were not incarcerated.  Incarcerated offenders were about seven times more 
likely to have been incarcerated before for male assaults female than non-incarcerated 
offenders (34.9% c.f. 4.9%).  Incarcerated offenders were about three times more likely to 
have been incarcerated before for any offence than non-incarcerated offenders (76.5% c.f. 
25.2%).  The mean longest prior incarceration for any offence for incarcerated offenders 
was longer than for offenders who were not incarcerated (20.9 c.f. 16.6 months).  
Descriptive statistics for criminal history factors for incarcerated offenders are set out in 
Table 7.12. 
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Table 7.12: Descriptive statistics for criminal history variables linked to offenders 
incarcerated for male assaults female in 2008-2009 by circuit (n = 723) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
  Prior convictions for male assaults female 1.49 1.71 0 11 
  Prior convictions for any offence 38.22 34.93 0 231 
  Longest prior incarceration for male asslts 
female 7.95 4.82 0.25 24 
  Longest prior incarceration for any offence 20.93 21.72 0.25 147 
 Categorical Variables  N  % 
Prior incarceration for male assaults female  252  34.9% 
Prior incarceration for any offence  553  76.5% 
Prior conviction for serious violence  376  52.0% 
In the previous five years the offender was:     
  Sentenced for male assaults female   349  48.3% 
  Sentenced for serious violence  222  30.7% 
  Sentenced for breach of a protection order  175  24.2% 
  Sentenced for breach of a sentence  422  58.4% 
  Sentenced to incarceration  460  63.6% 
 
Male Assaults Female: Sentence Length Model  
The final model comprised 27 variables: 4 seriousness or case processing variables; 3 
criminal history variables; 4 offender demographic variables and 16 circuit variables.  
Many of these were dummy variables (e.g. ethnicity and circuit).  A range of variables 
were included in the initial modelling but not retained because they were not statistically 
significant. The excluded variables comprised: whether the case included breach of a 
protection order; whether the case included other violence charges; whether the case 
included wilful or intentional damage charges; whether the case included breach of 
sentence charges; plea; the time from charge to charge outcome; the age of the most recent 
conviction for male assaults female; the longest prior term of imprisonment for male 
assaults female; total prior convictions for any offence; prior incarceration for any offence; 
the longest previous term of incarceration for any offence; and prior convictions for serious 
violence.  Seven of the variables that were excluded from the model were significant in the 
in-out model thus demonstrating that different groupings of variables were significant for 
each decision and validating the decision to treat sentencing as a two part process 
separating type from quantum.  The initial modelling included a variable representing 
whether or not the case included a charge or charges of threatening to kill or do GBH.  The 
variable was statistically significant but the parameter estimate for it was unduly 
influenced by one case with a standardised DFBeta measure above one.  When it was 
investigated it was found that it was the case with the longest sentence in the dataset (35 
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months).  The influence of that one case on the parameter estimate for the variable was 
judged by running the model excluding the case; the regression co-efficient decreased from 
2.674 to 1.664 and was not significant.  The model was modified to exclude the case and 
the threat to kill or do grievous bodily harm variable was removed from the model.  The 
change in the parameter estimate was a combination of the very high sentence for the case 
and low frequency of occurrence of charges of threatening to kill or do grievous bodily 
harm; such a charge was only present in 20 of the 723 cases.  
The variance inflation factors for the variables included in the final model were re-
checked for multi-collinearity.  None of the variables approached the threshold level of 10: 
the variance inflation factors ranging from 1.056 to 1.846. 
The linear regression parameter estimates for the offence seriousness, criminal 
history and demographic variables are displayed in Table 7.13.  These parameter estimates 
incorporate the influence of the circuits but the parameter estimates for the circuits are 
reported separately.   
The offence seriousness variables had the most substantial statistically significant 
influence on sentence length (R2 = .117).  All four variables were expected to increase the 
sentence but only three did.  Sentence length increased by almost two months if the 
offender was being sentenced for multiple male assaults female convictions, by 14 days for 
each charge in the case, and by more than 2 months if the charge was laid indictably.  An 
indictable charge indicated that the actual offending was more serious than the norm.  
The seriousness factor that did not conform to expectations was sentencing for a 
breach of bail.  The model suggested that conviction for a breach of bail reduced the 
sentence by 5 weeks.  The negative effect was observed in the aggravated drink driving 
model. The same explanation applies.  The breaches of bail were associated with cases that 
have a disproportionately high average number of convictions for sentence but breach of 
bail is less serious than most other offences.  A review of the data showed that breach of 
bail convictions did tend to be associated with cases that had a higher number of 
convictions for sentence.  The 93 cases that included breach of bail had an average of 6.4 
convictions per case compared to 3.1 for those cases that did not include breach of bail.  
Although sometimes the circumstances of a breach can be serious, they are often not very 
serious.  The model corrects for the lower seriousness of the mix of the charges in the case 
by reducing the sentence when a breach of bail offence is present.    
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Table 7.13: Linear regression parameter estimates for the criminal history, offence 
seriousness, case processing and demographic variables for the sentence length model 
for male assaults female offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 722) 
Variable B S.E. Sig. 
(Constant) 3.162 .894 .000 
Multiple male assaults female charges 1.989 .412 .000 
Case includes breach(es) of bail -1.172 .526 .026 
Total number of charges for sentence .478 .067 .000 
Charge laid indictably (cf summarily) 2.387 .733 .001 
Prior convictions for male assaults female .269 .120 .025 
Prior incarceration for male assaults female 1.387 .424 .001 
Recent serious violence conviction (cf none 
or > 5 years ago) 1.122 .344 .001 
Age when offended -.016 .020 .408 
Māori (cf European) .399 .413 .334 
Pacific (cf European) .109 .308 .724 
Other (cf European) -.311 .357 .384 
Block of 16 circuit variables (Table 8.17)    
 
R2= .117 for Block 1 (Offence seriousness and case processing) p < .001; ∆R2 = .055 for 
Block 2 (Criminal history) p < .001, ∆R2 = .004 for Block 3 (Offender demographics) not 
significant; ∆R2 = .072 for Block 4 (Circuits) p < .001. 
 
The criminal history variables had a statistically significant influence on sentence 
length (∆R2 = .055).  All three variables had the expected effect. Each prior conviction for 
male assaults female contributed approximately 8 days to the sentence.  Prior incarceration 
for male assaults female added about 6 weeks and a conviction for serious violence within 
the previous 5 years added about 5 weeks.   
The combined contribution of the criminal history and offence seriousness 
variables to the overall model (a combined R2 = .172 of the total model R2 = .247) 
demonstrates that these variables are the principal influences on the length of incarceration. 
The demographic variables did not have a statistically significant influence on 
sentence length (∆R2 = .004).  None of the variables achieved statistical significance.   
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Table 7.14 summarises the results for the circuit variables (a series of 16 dummy 
variables that contrast each of 16 circuits with the reference circuit (Circuit 0)).   
 
Table 7.14:  Linear regression parameter estimates for the circuit variables for the 
sentence length model for male assaults female offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 
722) 
Variable B S.E. Sig. 
Circuit 1 v Circuit 0 3.514 .689 .000 
Circuit 2 v Circuit 0 1.119 .429 .009 
Circuit 3 v Circuit 0 .834 .231 .000 
Circuit 4 v Circuit 0 .308 .274 .262 
Circuit 5 v Circuit 0 .346 .136 .011 
Circuit 6 v Circuit 0 -.044 .129 .732 
Circuit 7 v Circuit 0 .580 .149 .000 
Circuit 8 v Circuit 0 .120 .128 .350 
Circuit 9 v Circuit 0 .027 .163 .867 
Circuit 10 v Circuit 0 .118 .078 .129 
Circuit 11 v Circuit 0 .048 .067 .471 
Circuit 12 v Circuit 0 -.034 .055 .534 
Circuit 13 v Circuit 0 .091 .092 .325 
Circuit 14 v Circuit 0 -.014 .081 .859 
Circuit 15 v Circuit 0 .061 .054 .259 
Circuit 16 v Circuit 0 .115 .053 .030 
 
Sentence lengths were significantly different in 6 of the 16 circuits.  The 
differences ranged from a minimal 3 days longer (Circuit 16) to 3.5 months longer (Circuit 
1).  Only two circuits sentenced to terms more than one month different from the reference 
circuit.  In the context of this offence, with a mean sentence of 6.7 months in the reference 
circuit, these two circuits were substantively different.  Overall the block of circuit 
variables had a statistically significant effect on the model (∆R2 = .072).   
Prediction 2 is supported for male assaults female: after controlling for criminal 
history, offence seriousness and offender demographic variables, similarly situated 
offenders were sentenced to different terms of incarceration in some circuits.  
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Burglary: Descriptive Statistics 
Of the 5,740 offenders sentenced by resident judges for burglary, 2,434 (42.4%) were 
incarcerated.  Sentence lengths were available for 2,338 (96.1%) of the incarcerated 
offenders.  The mean sentence length for the 2,338 offenders for whom sentence length 
was available was 15.90 months, with a standard deviation of 11.24 months and a range 
from 0.25 months to 96 months.   
 
The demographic profile of offenders incarcerated for burglary 
Incarcerated burglars were: older than those not incarcerated (26.0 c.f. 22.8 years); more 
likely to be male than those not incarcerated (94.3% c.f. 88.1%); and more likely to be 
Māori than those not incarcerated (58.6% c.f. 44.8%). The demographic profile for the 
incarcerated offenders is set out in Table 7.15. 
 
Table 7.15: Demographic profile of offenders incarcerated for burglary in 2008-2009 
(n = 2,338)  
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Age at the time of offending 26.04 8.12 15 71 
 Categorical Variables  N  % 
Gender     
  Male  2204  94.3% 
  Female  134  5.7% 
Ethnicity     
   European  750  32.1% 
   Māori  1370  58.6% 
   Pacific  157  6.7% 
   Other or unknown  61  2.6% 
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Offenders incarcerated by circuit  
The number of burglars sentenced per circuit (Table 7.16) ranged from 45 to 285.   
 
Table 7.16: Number of offenders incarcerated for burglary in 2008-2009 by circuit (n 
= 2,338)  
Categorical Variables  N  % 
Circuit 0  150  6.4% 
Circuit 1  285  12.2% 
Circuit 2  79  3.4% 
Circuit 3   243  10.4% 
Circuit 4  45  1.9% 
Circuit 5  279  11.9% 
Circuit 6  149  6.4% 
Circuit 7  57  2.4% 
Circuit 8  80  3.4% 
Circuit 9  46  2.0% 
Circuit 10  146  6.2% 
Circuit 11  133  5.7% 
Circuit 12  203  8.7% 
Circuit 13  67  2.9% 
Circuit 14  57  2.4% 
Circuit 15  197  8.4% 
Circuit 16  122  5.2% 
 
Offence seriousness and case processing variables  
Incarcerated burglars were substantially more likely to be sentenced for more than one 
offence than those burglars not incarcerated (84.1% c.f. 56.5%).  Incarcerated burglars 
were also more likely to have been sentenced for multiple burglaries than non-incarcerated 
burglars (40.1% c.f. 18.3%).  The proportion of incarcerated burglars sentenced after being 
recorded as pleading guilty was slightly lower than those not incarcerated (95.2% c.f. 
96.6%).  Descriptive statistics for offence seriousness factors for incarcerated burglars are 
set out in Table 7.17. 
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Table 7.17: Descriptive statistics for offence seriousness variables linked to offenders 
incarcerated for burglary in 2008-2009 by circuit (n = 2,338) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Total charges sentenced  6.30 6.65 1 113 
Total burglary charges sentenced  2.35 3.47 1 63 
 Categorical Variables  N  % 
Concurrent receiving charges     
   No    1985  84.9% 
   Yes   353  15.1% 
Concurrent unlawful taking charges     
   No    2010  86.0% 
   Yes   328  14.0% 
Concurrent serious driving charges     
   No    1925  82.3% 
   Yes   413  17.7% 
Concurrent breach of bail charges     
   No    1860  79.6% 
   Yes   478  20.4% 
Concurrent breach of sentence charges     
   No    1683  72.0% 
   Yes   655  28.0% 
Concurrent other serious offences (receiving, unlawful taking, violence, drugs & driving) 
   No    1386  59.3% 
   Yes   952  40.7% 
Approximate value of the lead burglary 
offence     
   Less than $500 or unstated  876  37.5% 
   $500 to $5,000  1096  46.9% 
   More than $5,000  366  15.7% 
Order for reparation     
   No    1531  65.5% 
   Yes   807  34.5% 
Burglary by day or night     
   Day  1099  47.0% 
   Night  1069  45.7% 
   Unknown  170  7.3% 
Burglary offence dates     
   One  1518  64.9% 
   Two  415  17.8% 
   Three or more   405  17.3% 
Plea     
   Guilty           2237  95.7% 
   Not guilty   101  4.3% 
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The mean time from charge to sentencing for incarcerated burglars was longer than 
for those not incarcerated (133 c.f. 110 days).  The proportion of incarcerated burglars 
sentenced by a judge with a Family Court warrant was lower than for burglars who were 
not incarcerated (9.1% c.f. 12.1%).  A higher proportion of incarcerated burglars had been 
charged indictably than non-incarcerated burglars (18.9% c.f. 3.0%).  Descriptive statistics 
for case processing factors for incarcerated burglars are set out in Table 7.18.  
 
Table 7.18: Descriptive statistics for case processing variables linked to offenders 
incarcerated for burglary in 2008-2009 by circuit (n = 2,338) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Time from charge to charge outcome  133 98 1 366 
Categorical Variables  N  % 
Judge type     
   Criminal   2125  90.9% 
   Family  213  9.1% 
Charge Laid Type     
  Summary  1896  81.1% 
  Indictable  442  18.9% 
 
Criminal history variables  
Offenders’ criminal histories varied widely.  The least prolific had no prior convictions for 
any offence.  By contrast the most prolific burglar had 382 prior convictions for burglary 
and the most prolific general offender had 471 prior convictions.  Incarcerated burglars had 
a substantially higher mean number of prior convictions for burglary than those not 
incarcerated (5.9 c.f. 1.1).  Likewise, incarcerated burglars had a substantially higher mean 
number of prior convictions for any offence than those not incarcerated (37.4 c.f. 11.5).  
The majority (71.6%) of those incarcerated for burglary had at least one prior burglary 
conviction compared to 26.1% of burglars who were not incarcerated.  Incarcerated 
burglars were more than five times more likely than non-incarcerated burglars to have been 
incarcerated before for burglary (54.5% c.f. 10.3%). Incarcerated burglars were about three 
and a half times more likely to have been incarcerated before for any offence than non-
incarcerated burglars (71.8% c.f. 19.8%).  Incarcerated burglars who had previously been 
incarcerated had higher average longest prior terms than those not incarcerated (21.7 c.f. 
17.2 months).  Descriptive statistics for the criminal history factors for incarcerated 
burglars are set out in Table 7.19. 
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Table 7.19: Descriptive statistics for criminal history variables linked to offenders 
incarcerated for burglary in 2008-2009 by circuit (n = 2,338) 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Min Max 
  Prior convictions for burglary 5.92 12.95 0 382 
  Prior convictions for serious dishonesty excl 
burglary 9.32 19.04 0 382 
  Prior convictions for serious dishonesty incl 
burglary 15.24 25.9 0 396 
  Prior convictions for any offence 37.36 41.72 0 471 
  Longest prior incarceration for burglary (n =1274) 18.3 12.58 1 72 
  Longest prior incarceration for any offence 
(n=1678) 21.94 19.18 0.25 156 
Categorical Variables  N  % 
Prior incarceration for burglary     
  Never  1064  45.5% 
  Once  497  21.3% 
  Two or more occasions  777  33.2% 
Prior incarceration for any offence     
  Never  660  28.2% 
  Once  687  29.4% 
  Two or more occasions  991  42.4% 
 
Burglary: Sentence Length Model  
The final model comprised 50 variables: 15 seriousness or case processing variables, 14 
criminal history variables, 5 offender demographic variables and 16 circuit variables.  
Many of these were dummy variables (e.g. ethnicity and circuit).  A range of variables 
were included in the initial modelling but not retained because they were not statistically 
significant.  The seriousness variables excluded were: whether the case included unlawful 
taking (theft of a vehicle); whether the case included dishonesty offending other than 
burglary, receiving, or unlawful taking; the time since the last conviction for burglary; and 
whether the burglary occurred during the day or at night.  The criminal history variables 
that were omitted were: total prior convictions for any offence; prior incarceration for any 
offence; and the longest previous term of incarceration for any offence.  The extent of 
criminal history information available was very wide and could be used in different ways.  
For instance, it was possible to deal with different types of serious dishonesty separately or 
to combine them, and to include or exclude burglary convictions from the mix of serious 
dishonesty offences.  Other serious convictions for drug dealing or violence or other 
offending could also be disaggregated or aggregated together.  Ultimately a set of dummy 
variables for prior convictions for burglary, a set of dummy variables for prior convictions 
for other serious dishonesty offending, and a variable for all other serious offending 
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(excluding dishonesty) were included in the model.  Variables representing first offenders 
and prior incarceration for burglary were included in initial models but excluded because 
they had no significant effect.  Any effect expected due to an offender having no prior 
convictions at all was potentially captured by the other prior conviction variables.  Prior 
incarceration for burglary was indirectly incorporated via the variable for longest prior 
incarceration for burglary.   
The variance inflation factors for the variables included in the final model were re-
checked for evidence of multi-collinearity.  None of the variables approached the threshold 
level of 10: with the variance inflation factors ranging from 1.059 to 2.978. 
The linear regression parameter estimates for the offence seriousness, criminal 
history and demographic variables are set out in Table 7.20.  These parameter estimates 
incorporate the influence of the circuits but the parameter estimates for the circuits are 
reported separately.   
The offence seriousness variables had the most substantial statistically significant 
influence on sentence length (R2 = .343).  With two exceptions the variables were expected 
to increase sentence lengths.  The exceptions were cases that included an order for 
reparation and whether the offender was sentenced by a criminal or a family judge.  Orders 
for reparation are taken into account in determining the severity of sentence, and as 
expected, a reparation order reduced the sentence.  Judge type was not expected to affect 
sentence length but was included as a potential explanatory variable.  It was found to be 
significant: offenders sentenced by Family Court judges received sentences about 6 weeks 
shorter than those sentenced by criminal judges.   
The remaining 13 variables all represented increasing levels of seriousness and 
were expected to increase sentence length.  This expectation was true for 12 of the 13 
variables.  The 12 variables and their approximate effects on sentence length are described 
in Table 7.21.   
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Table 7.20: Linear regression parameter estimates for the criminal history, offence 
seriousness, case processing and demographic variables for the sentence length model 
for burglary offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 2,338) 
Variable B S.E. Sig. 
(Constant) -1.687 1.087 .121 
Number of burglary charges for sentence .713 .074 .000 
$500 to $5,000 cf Less than $500 or unknown 1.236 .366 .001 
More than $5,000 cf Less than $500 or unknown 3.541 .502 .000 
Count of offence dates for the burglaries 2.314 .259 .000 
Case includes receiving 2.440 .490 .000 
Case includes breach of bail -1.633 .449 .000 
Case includes breach of sentence .888 .388 .022 
Case includes violent offence 1.887 .416 .000 
Case includes serious driving offence 1.136 .463 .014 
Total number of charges for sentence .328 .039 .000 
Charge laid indictably or summarily 5.738 .463 .000 
Plea 1.951 .822 .018 
Days from charge to charge outcome .005 .002 .005 
Whether a reparation order was made -.831 .370 .025 
Categorisation of judges by warrant -1.391 .594 .019 
One cf no prior convictions for burglary .497 .546 .364 
Two cf no prior convictions for burglary .837 .640 .191 
3, 4 or 5 cf no prior convictions for burglary 2.569 .576 .000 
6 to 9 cf no prior convictions for burglary 3.571 .728 .000 
10 to 19 cf no prior convictions for burglary 5.355 .849 .000 
20 or more cf no prior convictions for burglary 6.374 1.062 .000 
Longest prior term of incarceration for burglary .128 .022 .000 
One cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty excl 
burglary 
.399 .601 .507 
Two cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty excl 
burglary 
1.036 .646 .109 
3, 4or 5 cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty 
excl burglary 
2.693 .578 .000 
6 to 9 cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty excl 
burglary 
2.672 .676 .000 
10 to 19 cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty 
excl burglary 
2.240 .665 .001 
20 or more cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty 
excl burglary 
2.957 .750 .000 
Criminal history for serious violent, drugs or driving 
offences 
.100 .034 .003 
Female -1.137 .723 .116 
Age at the time of offence -.014 .027 .604 
Māori cf European .359 .390 .358 
Pacific cf European .504 .743 .498 
Other or unknown cf European -.106 1.064 .921 
R2= .343 for Block 1 (Offence seriousness and case processing) p < .001; ∆R2 = .140 for Block 2 
(Criminal history) p < .001, ∆R2 = .001 for Block 3 (Offender demographics) not significant; ∆R2 = 
.039 for Block 4 (Circuits) p < .001. 
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Table 7.21:  Approximate effects of offence seriousness and case processing variables 
for burglary found to increase sentence length  
Variable Approximate impact on sentence  
Number of burglary charges for 
sentence 
An additional 3 weeks for each burglary charge 
$500 to $5,000 cf Less than $500 
or unknown 
An additional 5 weeks if the main charge indicated 
an offence where the property taken was more than 
$500 but less than $5,000. 
More than $5,000 cf Less than 
$500 or unknown 
An additional 3.5 months if the main charge 
indicated an offence where the property taken was 
more than $5,000. 
Count of offence dates for the 
burglaries 
An additional 10 weeks for each distinct date for the 
burglary offences being sentenced. 
Case includes receiving An additional 10 weeks if the case also included a 
receiving offence. 
Case includes breach of sentence An additional 3.5 weeks if the case also included a 
sentence breach offence. 
Case includes violent offence An additional 8 weeks if the case also included a 
violent offence. 
Case includes serious driving 
offence 
An additional month if the case also included a 
serious driving offence. 
Total number of charges for 
sentence 
An additional 9 days for each offence for sentence. 
Charge laid indictably or 
summarily 
An addition of almost 6 months if the main burglary 
large was laid indictably rather than summarily. 
Plea An addition of almost 2 months if the offender 
maintained a not guilty plea throughout. 
Days from charge to charge 
outcome 
An addition of time depending on how long the case 
took from charge to charge outcome.  Compared to 
an offender sentenced 30 days after being charged 
an offender sentenced after 3 months would receive 
an additional 9 days, an offender sentenced after 6 
months would receive an additional 22 days and an 
offender sentenced after one year would receive an 
additional 50 days.  
 
The seriousness factor that did not conform to expectations was sentencing for a 
breach of bail.  The model suggested that conviction for a breach of bail reduced the 
sentence by 7 weeks.  The negative effect was also observed in the aggravated drink 
driving model. The same explanation applies.  The breaches of bail were associated with 
cases that have a disproportionately high average number of convictions for sentence.  A 
review of the data showed that breach of bail convictions did tend to be associated with 
cases that had a higher number of convictions for sentence.  The 478 cases that included 
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breach of bail had an average of 9.6 convictions per case compared to 5.4 for those cases 
that did not include breach of bail.  Because breach of bail is often less serious than most 
other offences the model makes a negative correction to differentiate cases including 
breach of bail from similarly sized cases made up of more serious offences.   
The criminal history variables had a statistically significant influence on sentence 
length (∆R2 = .140).  All 14 variables had the expected effect. The number of variables was 
expanded by the inclusion of two sets of six dummy variables for prior convictions for 
burglary and prior convictions for other serious dishonesty offences (receiving, unlawful 
taking, fraud, deception and the most serious thefts).  The effect on sentence length of 
having 1 or 2 prior burglary convictions was not significantly different from the effect of 
having no prior burglary convictions.  However, offenders with 3, 4 or 5 prior convictions 
could expect an additional 2.5 months, with the additional amount rising to almost 6.5 
months for those with 20 or more prior convictions for burglary.  Likewise, although the 
effect on sentence length of 1 or 2 prior convictions for other serious dishonesty offences 
was not significantly different from no prior other serious dishonesty convictions, 
offenders with 3, 4 or 5 prior convictions could expect an additional 2.5 months.  The 
effect of more than 5 previous convictions for other serious dishonesty offences was only 
marginal with an additional 3 months for those with 20 or more prior convictions for other 
serious dishonesty compared to those with no such prior convictions.  The increases for 
those with 6 to 9 or 10 to 19 prior convictions was little different to those with 3, 4 or 5 
prior convictions.  If the offender had a wider criminal past encompassing serious violent, 
drug or driving offences, sentence length increased by 3 days for each prior conviction.  
The significance of the offender’s criminal history for burglary increased if the offender 
had previously been incarcerated for burglary, with sentence length increasing by almost 4 
days for each month of the longest prior term of incarceration for burglary, with offenders 
whose previous longest term matched the average previous longest term (almost 16 
months) receiving an additional 2 months.   
The combined contribution of the criminal history and offence seriousness 
variables to the overall model (a combined R2 = .482 of the total model R2 = .523) 
demonstrates that these variables are the principal influences on the length of incarceration. 
The demographic variables did not have a statistically significant influence on 
sentence length (∆R2 = .001).  None of the variables achieved statistical significance, in 
contrast to the results from the in-out model.  The more severe sentencing of males and 
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Māori and Pacific offenders reported in the in-out model was not replicated in the sentence 
length model. 
Table 7.22 summarises the results for the circuit variables (a series of 16 dummy 
variables that contrast each of the 16 circuits with the reference circuit (Circuit 0)).  
Overall the block of circuit variables had a statistically significant effect on the model (∆R2 
= .039).   
 
Table 7.22:  Linear regression parameter estimates for the circuit variables for the 
sentence length model for burglary offenders sentenced in 2008-2009 (n = 2,338) 
Variable B S.E. Sig. 
Circuit 1 v Circuit 0 6.315 .812 .000 
Circuit 2 v Circuit 0 5.038 1.125 .000 
Circuit 3 v Circuit 0 4.197 .832 .000 
Circuit 4 v Circuit 0 5.132 1.362 .000 
Circuit 5 v Circuit 0 4.768 .819 .000 
Circuit 6 v Circuit 0 5.146 .921 .000 
Circuit 7 v Circuit 0 3.594 1.255 .004 
Circuit 8 v Circuit 0 3.118 1.109 .005 
Circuit 9 v Circuit 0 -1.803 1.352 .183 
Circuit 10 v Circuit 0 4.691 .929 .000 
Circuit 11 v Circuit 0 5.788 .954 .000 
Circuit 12 v Circuit 0 5.535 .871 .000 
Circuit 13 v Circuit 0 -2.663 1.175 .024 
Circuit 14 v Circuit 0 5.841 1.239 .000 
Circuit 15 v Circuit 0 .056 .878 .949 
Circuit 16 v Circuit 0 4.553 .972 .000 
 
Sentence lengths were significantly different in 14 of the 16 circuits.  For the 13 
circuits with longer sentences the differences ranged from 3 months (Circuit 8) to more 
than 6 months longer (Circuit 1).  Offenders in Circuit 13 were sentenced to terms more 
than two and a half months shorter than Circuit 0.  In the context of this offence with a 
mean sentence length of almost 14.6 months in the reference circuit, the differences for all 
14 circuits are substantively significant. 
Prediction 2 is supported for burglary: after controlling for criminal history, offence 
seriousness and offender demographic variables, similarly situated offenders were 
sentenced to different terms of incarceration in some circuits.  
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Residual Statistics, Influential Cases and Outliers 
Residual statistics were reviewed to identify influential cases and potential outliers.  The 
values for Cook’s distance were substantially below 1 in all three models, indicating that 
there were no cases with an undue influence on the model.  The standardised DFBeta 
measures were all less than 1 for aggravated drink driving and burglary, indicating that 
none of the cases had an undue influence on the parameter estimates for any of the 
variables included in the model.  However, as reported earlier, one case in the male 
assaults female model had a standardised DFBeta value exceeding 1 for the threatening to 
kill or do grievous bodily harm variable.  This case had an undue influence on the 
parameter estimate.  The regression co-efficient for the variable was non-significant when 
the case was removed from the model and as a result both the case and the variable were 
excluded from the model.   
Examination of leverage values and standardised residuals raised concern about 
potential outliers in all three models.  Cases with leverage values that varied from the 
average leverage value by more than a factor of 2 were scrutinised.   
Similar patterns were observed for both aggravated drink driving and male assaults 
female.  The cases with high leverage values were unevenly distributed across the circuits.  
For aggravated drink driving 78% (102/131) of the cases were from four circuits (4, 9, 13 
& 15).  The four circuits had the lowest absolute number of incarcerated offenders across 
all circuits.  None of the four circuits was statistically significantly different from the 
reference circuit.  A similar result was found for male assaults female with 57% (21/37) of 
the cases from two circuits (9 & 13).  Neither circuit was statistically significantly different 
from the reference circuit.  As none of the cases for either offence had an undue influence 
on the model (all values for Cook’s distance were less than 1) no changes were made.   
Burglary was different; the 34 cases with high leverage values were spread across 
the circuits.  The high leverage values were found to be associated with cases that tended 
to have more extreme values for important sentencing factors.  Most of the 34 were 
associated with three important sentencing factors (very high numbers of burglary 
convictions for sentence; high total convictions for sentence; or extensive criminal 
histories). As none of the cases for either offence had an undue influence on the model (all 
values for Cook’s distance were less than 1) no changes were made.    
The standardised residuals for aggravated drink driving and male assaults female 
are dealt with together because the same issues are raised for both.  For aggravated drink 
driving the proportion of cases with an absolute value greater than 1.96 was marginally 
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above 5% and the number with an absolute value greater than 2.58 exceeded 1% (37 versus 
23).  Twenty-four cases with a standardised residual value exceeding an absolute value of 
3 were scrutinised.  For male assaults female 5% of cases had standardised residuals 
exceeding 1.96 and 2.2% had an absolute value exceeding 2.58.  There were seven cases 
that exceeded an absolute value of 3.   
All bar one of the cases for aggravated drink driving and all 7 of the cases for male 
assaults female had actual sentences substantially higher than the predicted sentence.  The 
cases for both offences were spread across the circuits with no apparent concentrations.  
Scrutiny of the offence seriousness and criminal history variables for both offences 
confirmed that these were cases likely to result in high actual sentences.  All bar one of the 
30 cases with high actual sentences between the offences were found to have either one of 
two common characteristics.  For 12 of the 29 cases the sentence type was home detention.  
For the remaining 17 cases the sentence was for cumulative terms of imprisonment.    
The imposition of cumulative sentences and the choice of home detention over 
imprisonment are significant characteristics; they are part of the sentencing decision and 
would not normally be thought of as sentencing factors. Cumulative versus concurrent 
sentencing is a choice of how to express the sentence when there are multiple charges.  The 
choice of home detention over imprisonment is the choice of sentence type within the 
incarceration grouping.      
The potential responses included making no changes or adding variables based on 
these characteristics. To assist in the consideration of the way forward, a detailed 
examination of the two characteristics was undertaken, including formulating new 
variables and observing their effects by adding them to the models.  The models were 
improved by the inclusion of both a cumulative sentence variable (0 = no cumulative 
sentence, 1 = cumulative sentence) and a home detention variable (0 = imprisonment, 1 = 
home detention).  An examination of the effects on the model and the possible 
explanations for the impact of the two variables led to the conclusion that their inclusion 
would amount to using an element of the outcome to predict the outcome and would result 
in mis-estimation of the parameter estimates for the circuit variables.  A detailed 
description of the examination of the two variables is contained in Appendix F.   
The models for aggravated drink driving and male assaults female were retained 
without adjustment.  Although there were a range of individual cases with high leverage 
values or with high standardised residuals, none of these observations had Cook’s distance 
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or standardised DFBeta values that indicated undue influence on the overall model or 
individual parameter estimates and no observations were removed. 
For burglary the number of cases with standardised residuals with an absolute value 
greater than 1.96 was above 5%.  There were 24 cases that exceeded an absolute value of 
3.  Twenty-three had actual sentences substantially higher than the predicted sentence and 
one was substantially lower.  The 24 cases were scrutinised as potential outliers.  Informed 
by the findings from similar scrutiny of residuals for aggravated drink driving and male 
assaults female, the initial focus was on the use of home detention and cumulative 
sentences.  However, there was no similar pattern for burglary.  Wider scrutiny did not 
reveal any other common features.  The high residuals were all from different circuits, and 
scrutiny of the seriousness and criminal history variables confirmed that these were cases 
likely to result in high actual sentences.  After examination of the residuals the burglary 
model was retained in its original form without adjustment.  Although there were a range 
of individual cases with high leverage values or with high standardised residuals, none of 
these cases had Cook’s distance or standardised DFBeta values that indicated undue 
influence on the overall model or individual parameter estimates and no cases were 
removed.   
 
Discussion of the Model Results 
Sentencing varies by circuit – statistically and substantively 
The model results strongly support the predicted effect of location: the circuit in which an 
offender was sentenced for aggravated drink driving, male assaults female or burglary 
significantly affected the length of sentence.  After controlling for seriousness of offence, 
criminal history and offender demographic variables similar offenders were sentenced 
differently between circuits.   
The extent of the difference varied between the three offences.  The number of 
circuits significantly different to the reference circuit was greatest for burglary, with 14 of 
16 circuits statistically significantly different from Circuit 0.  Thirteen of the 14 circuits 
imposed longer terms of incarceration and one (Circuit 13) imposed shorter terms.  For 
aggravated drink driving seven circuits imposed significantly longer terms and none 
imposed shorter terms.  For male assaults female six circuits imposed significantly longer 
terms and none imposed shorter terms. 
The circuits also varied in the proportionate size of the variations for the circuits 
significantly different to the reference circuit.  For burglary the differences ranged from 
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18.2% (Circuit 13 where sentences were 2.5 months shorter) to 43.2% (Circuit 1 where 
sentences were more than 6 months longer).  For burglary all the differences for the 
circuits that were statistically significantly different were substantively significant when 
compared to the mean sentence (14.6 months) in the reference circuit.  For aggravated 
drink driving the differences ranged from 15.8% (Circuit 5 where sentences were 6 weeks 
longer) to 32.9% (Circuit 16 where sentences were almost 3 months longer).  For 
aggravated drink driving all the differences for the circuits that were statistically 
significantly different were substantively significant when compared to the mean sentence 
(9.1 months) in the reference circuit.  The differences were more extreme for male assaults 
female, ranging from about 1.6% (Circuit 16 where sentences were 3 days longer) to 
52.6% (Circuit 1 where sentences were 3.5 months longer).  The differences were only 
substantively significant (a month or more) in two of the six circuits.  In the other four 
circuits sentences ranged from 3 to 25 days longer than the mean sentence (6.7 months) in 
the reference circuit.   
 
Influence of the seriousness of offence and criminal history variables 
The models for all three offences indicate that offence seriousness and criminal history 
variables are the most significant influences on sentencing.  Variables forming these two 
groupings contributed 88.9% (aggravated drink driving), 69.4% (male assaults female) and 
92.4% (burglary) of the R2 for the three models.  The results supported the assumption that 
the seriousness of offence and criminal history variables would be the strongest influences 
on sentence length.  The importance of the seriousness of the offence and criminal history 
factors suggests the judges apply a common framework of factors when sentencing.  
However, the variation between circuits that remained after controlling for the seriousness 
and criminal history factors suggests that the judges were not applying the factors in the 
same way.   
 
Influence of gender and ethnicity 
The demographic variables of gender, ethnicity and age were not statistically significant in 
any of the sentence length models.  The finding that gender was not statistically significant 
ran counter to the general findings in sentencing research in the United States (Ulmer, 
2012) and in New Zealand (Jeffries et al., 2003; Triggs, 1999).     
The finding of no significant effects for ethnicity adds to the mixed results in prior 
Australian and New Zealand research on indigeneity (Bond & Jefferies 2011; Snowball & 
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Weatherburn, 2006; and Triggs, 1999 found no differences but Bond et al., 2011 and 
Jeffries & Bond, 2009 did find differences) but it is out of step with the overall weight of 
the United States research (Mitchell & Mackenzie, 2004 & Ulmer, 2012).  These results 
may be due to the more detailed offence specific models employed in this research.  The 
extension of this approach to other offences does not mean that no effects due to gender or 
ethnicity will be found.  It is possible that more detailed models for other offences may 
reveal effects that would otherwise have remained hidden (as the ethnicity effect for the 
burglary in-out model demonstrates). 
 
Rank order of the circuits within and between offences and sentencing decisions 
The model results for the circuits can be combined into a single table showing the rank 
order of the circuits from highest to lowest co-efficient (from most severe to most lenient).  
The rank order of the circuits can also be compared between the two sentence decisions for 
each offence. 
The consideration of the rank order begins with rank order of circuits for the 
offences for sentence length, the rank orders are displayed in Table 7.23. Five circuits (1, 
3, 5, 7, & 16) imposed longer terms of incarceration than the reference circuit for all three 
offences.  Three circuits (9, 13 & 15) never incarcerated for longer terms than the reference 
circuit, although Circuit 13 did impose significantly shorter terms of imprisonment for 
burglary.  Spearman’s rho (correlation co-efficient) was calculated for each of the three 
pairs of offences to determine whether there was any apparent link between the rank orders 
of the circuits for each offence.  There was no correlation between the rank orders for any 
of the pairs: aggravated drink driving and burglary (rs = .34, p = .178); aggravated drink 
driving and male assaults female (rs = .34, p = .184); and male assaults female and 
burglary (rs = .02, p = .948).  These observations suggest that the decision on the length of 
incarceration is influenced more by a view of the relative seriousness of each offence type 
than by some general theory about sentence length.  This also means that the position of 
each circuit in the hierarchy for one offence is not a predictor of its position for another 
offence.     
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Table 7.23: Order of circuits by co-efficient from largest to smallest by offence type1 
Aggravated drink 
driving Male assaults female Burglary 
16 1 1 
7 2 14 
12 3 11 
3 7 12 
14 5 6 
1 16 4 
5 4 2 
9 10 5 
4 8 10 
11 13 16 
2 15 3 
10 11 7 
8 9 8 
0 0 15 
15 14 0 
6 12 9 
13 6 13 
1 The circuits that were statistically significantly different to the reference circuit are shown 
in bold. 
The order of circuits by sentence length was also contrasted with the order by the 
likelihood of incarceration (odds ratio) for each offence.  The order of the circuits across 
the six models is portrayed in Table 7.24. 
Two circuits (1 & 7) were both more likely to incarcerate and to impose longer 
sentences across all three offences.  Two circuits (13 & 15) were never more likely to 
incarcerate and never imposed longer sentences across all three offences.  
The contrast of the two decisions for each offence type reveals a different pattern 
for each offence type.  For aggravated drink driving all seven circuits that imposed longer 
sentences were also significantly more likely to incarcerate, thus leaving seven circuits that 
were more likely to incarcerate but which did not impose longer sentences.  For male 
assaults female three of the six circuits that imposed longer sentences were more likely to 
incarcerate.  Unlike aggravated drink driving there were circuits (Circuits 3, 5 & 16) that 
were not more likely to incarcerate but which did impose longer sentences.  The rank order 
for the likelihood of incarceration was not a good predictor of the rank order for length of 
sentence or vice versa for either offence, as demonstrated by the calculation of Spearman’s 
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rho: aggravated drink driving (rs = .20, p = .439); and male assaults female (rs = .42, p = 
.094).   
 
Table 7.24: Order of circuits by odds ratio from highest to lowest and by co-efficient 
(sentence length) from longest to shortest by offence type1 
Aggravated drink driving  Male assaults female  Burglary  
OR Co-efficient OR Co-efficient OR Co-efficient 
8 16 7 1 6 1 
12 7 14 2 4 14 
6 12 1 3 10 11 
4 3 10 7 8 12 
2 14 2 5 12 6 
7 1 12 16 16 4 
10 5 4 4 11 2 
1 9 5 10 14 5 
16 4 3 8 3 10 
14 11 9 13 2 16 
11 2 16 15 7 3 
3 10 8 11 5 7 
5 8 15 9 1 8 
9 0 6 0 15 15 
0 15 0 14 0 0 
13 6 11 12 9 9 
15 13 13 6 13 13 
1 The circuits that were statistically significantly different to the reference circuit are shown 
in bold. 
For burglary all 13 of the circuits that imposed longer sentences were more likely to 
incarcerate.  There was a link between the order of the circuits for the two decisions for 
burglary, rs = .52, p < .05.  The burglary result was due to the exact match for the four 
circuits that did not impose longer sentences and were not more likely to incarcerate.  
When the analysis was re-run for the 13 circuits that were all significantly more likely to 
incarcerate and impose longer sentences there was no correlation (rs = -.08, p = .803).  
Overall there is little evidence that the position of a circuit in the rank order for one 
offence or one decision is predictive of its position for another offence or decision.  The 
contrast of the rank orders for aggravated drink driving and burglary for the use of 
incarceration (see Chapter 6, p.149-50) is the exception.  These findings suggest that in 
general sentencing approaches are tailored to the offences rather than being based on some 
general theory.  The findings suggest that in addition to inconsistency of sentencing 
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decisions between circuits for the same offence there is little congruence within and 
between circuits on the general seriousness of the three offences relative to one another.  
In one sense the results for the rank ordering of the two decisions for each offence 
are puzzling.  If after controlling for sentencing variables some circuits are more likely to 
incarcerate than others it would be reasonable to assume that they would be more likely to 
impose shorter sentences.  They would impose shorter sentences because they are 
incarcerating less serious cases.  If that were true then Spearman’s rho would be negative.  
In fact, as is readily observed in the tables, circuits that more likely to incarcerate are more 
likely to impose longer terms.    
 
Summary 
In sum, the linear regression models for all three offences support Prediction 2: similarly 
situated offenders were sentenced differently depending on which circuit they were 
sentenced in.  The extent of inconsistency and the pattern varied between the offences.  
The strength of the findings varied between the offences.  Although the circuit was 
significant, the main determinants of the length of sentence were offence seriousness and 
criminal history variables.  Gender, ethnicity and age did not have any significant effect on 
sentence length.  Comparison of the rank order of the circuits by offence suggested that the 
order was more likely to be due to views about the appropriate sentence lengths related to 
the particular offence than any general theory about sentence lengths.   
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Chapter 8: The Interpretation and Use of Sentencing Variables 
 
Subject to evidence of inconsistency between circuits and confirmation that offence 
seriousness and criminal history variables were the principal determinants of sentence it 
was predicted that there would be differences in the interpretation and use of sentencing 
variables between circuits.  The models presented in the two preceding chapters 
demonstrate that both of conditions were met.  To test the predictions case level random 
co-efficient models were assembled.   
Significant random effects were demonstrated for a selection of offence seriousness 
and criminal history variables in the determination of incarceration and the determination 
of sentence length for all three offences.  However, the results for male assaults female 
were much weaker.  The weaker result is not surprising given that the extent of variation 
between circuits was more restricted for this offence.  It may also reflect limitations due to 
omitted variables, the comparatively low rate of incarceration and the narrow scope of the 
offence within the spectrum of physical assaults.  Overall, Predictions 3 and 4 were 
supported: the interpretation and use of some or all of the seriousness of offence, criminal 
history or extra-legal variables differed between circuits for both the use of incarceration 
and the determination of sentence length.   
   
Development of the Models 
The first iterations of the multi-level models were based on the logistic and linear 
regression models reported in the preceding chapters.  Ordinarily multi-level models would 
be built up based on the sequential addition of variables according to their empirical or 
theoretical relevance (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  However, for this research the 
development of the single level models made that process redundant.  Comparisons of the 
co-efficients reported in the single level models to case level fixed effects multi-level 
models using the same variables confirmed the validity of using the same variables.   
In accord with the advice of Raudenbush & Bryk (2002) no attempt was made to 
run a model saturated with all the individual variables that had significant fixed effects and 
then refine it backwards to delete any variables that did not have significant random 
effects.  To be effective the data had to be capable of sustaining stable parameter estimates 
in each separate unit (circuit).  The approach followed was to isolate those variables that 
might have random effects in a multivariate model by identifying those that had significant 
bivariate random effects (a significant effect when the variable was allowed to vary 
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randomly while all other case level variables were fixed).  The variables with significant 
random effects became the pool of variables for the development of a multivariate random 
co-efficients model.  The multivariate random co-efficient models were built up by the 
sequential inclusion of the variables based on the strength of their bivariate random effects.   
A problem was encountered with four of the six models.  The use of the variables 
as specified for the single level models was successful when the models were limited to 
fixed effects but were too complex when the models were extended to random effects.  The 
models had to be adjusted by simplifying some variables.  With one exception 
simplification was achieved by reducing the number of categories for some categorical 
variables.  The exception was the combining of two continuous variables into a new 
variable for the burglary sentence length model.  The simplifications were based on a 
review of the results of the earlier models and sought to minimise the loss of predictive 
power by combining categories with minimal differences in their co-efficients.  The 
specific changes made are listed in conjunction with the reporting of each of the models. 
Once the variables were simplified the modelling approach was repeated.  The first 
step was a model treating the case level variables as fixed and allowing the intercept to 
vary randomly.  The model was then varied to identify those variables that had a bivariate 
random effect.  Finally an iterative approach was followed to develop a model 
incorporating those variables that continued to have a significant random effect in a 
multivariate random co-efficient model.   
All continuous variables were grand mean centred to improve the interpretation of 
the model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  Grand mean centring means that the variable for 
each case was centred on the mean calculated across all the cases in the dataset.  The 
alternative was to use group mean centring, with the variable for each case centred on the 
mean for the circuit (group) the case was sentenced in.  In the context of this research the 
grand mean was preferred to the group (circuit) mean because the use of the group mean 
could result in cases that were otherwise identical, except for circuit, differing in relation to 
seriousness and criminal history variables whenever the group (circuit) means varied from 
the grand mean.  For instance, two cases for offenders with five previous convictions who 
were sentenced in different circuits could have transformed variables showing one as three 
above the mean (for a circuit mean of two) and the other as two above the mean (for a 
circuit mean of three), whereas a grand mean of 2.5 places both cases 2.5 above the mean.  
The use of the group mean would have resulted in a mis-estimation of the influence of the 
variable and the effect of circuits on sentencing.  Use of the grand mean allows the 
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intercept to be interpreted as representing an offender at the mean for continuous variables 
and in the reference category for categorical variables. 
    
Aggravated Drink Driving In-out Model 
Six variables were simplified for the aggravated drink driving in-out hierarchical 
generalised linear model.  The changes are listed in Table 8.1.   
 
Table 8.1: Aggravated drink driving in-out model simplification of case level 
variables 
Variable Original categories Simplified categories 
Age  0 = 17 - 31 0 = 17 - 31 
 1 = 32 - 39 1 = 32 or older 
 2 =  40 - 47  
 3 = 48 or older  
Total charges sentenced  
 0 = 1 charge for sentence 0 = 1 or 2 charges for sentence 
 1 = 2 charges for sentence 1 = 3 or more charges for sentence 
 2 = 3 or more charges for sentence  
Elapsed time from charge to charge outcome   
 0 =  ≤ 6 weeks 0 =  ≤ 6 weeks 
 1 = > 6 weeks ≤ 3 months  1 = > 6 weeks 
 2 = > 3 months ≤ 6 months   
 3 = > 6 months   
Drink driving convictions in the last ten years  
 0 = none 0 = none 
 1 = one 1 = one 
 2 = two 2 = two or more  
 3 = three or more  
Time since last drink driving conviction  
 0 = more than 5 years 0 = more than 5 years 
 
1 = 5 years or less and more than 18 
months 
1 = less than or equal to 5 years 
 2 = 18 months or less  
Prior incarceration  
 0 = never 0 = no 
 1 = yes but not for drink driving 1 = yes 
  2 = yes including for drink driving   
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The finalised model is reported in Tables 8.2 (the fixed effects) and 8.3 (the random 
effects).    
 
 Table 8.2: Case level random co-efficient model for aggravated drink driving in-out 
decision fixed effects component (for random effects see Table 8.3) (n = 9,282) 
Variables (reference 
categories in 
brackets) 
 Co-efficient S.E.  t-ratio  p-value 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Intercepta -6.929 0.376 -18.439 <.001 0.001 
Alcohol levela b 0.541 0.092 5.895 <.001 1.718 
Not guilty plea (guilty) -0.520 0.229 -2.273 .023 0.595 
Multiple drink drive 
charges (no)a 
2.515 0.305 8.245 <.001 12.372 
Disqualified driving 
(no) 
0.445 0.091 4.89 <.001 1.561 
Serious driving charge 
(no)  
0.492 0.142 3.473 <.001 1.636 
Breach of sentence 
(no) 
0.835 0.155 5.399 <.001 2.305 
Three or more 
convictions for 
sentence (no) 
0.559 0.098 5.68 <.001 1.748 
Charge to outcome > 6 
weeks (< 6 weeks) 
1.099 0.113 9.732 <.001 3.002 
Drink drive conviction 
in the last five years 
(no)a 
0.574 0.084 6.871 <.001 1.775 
Prior convictions for drinking and driving     
  3 priors (2)a 1.318 0.184 7.173 <.001 3.736 
  4 priors (2)a 2.052 0.189 10.868 <.001 7.785 
  5 or 6 priors (2)a 2.649 0.239 11.066 <.001 14.142 
  7 or more priors (2)a 3.459 0.280 12.357 <.001 31.799 
Drink drive convictions in the past 10 years    
  1 (0) 1.339 0.154 8.691 <.001 3.814 
  2 or more (0)  1.972 0.154 12.837 <.001 7.188 
Previously imprisoned 
(no)  
0.512 0.076 6.713 <.001 1.669 
Conviction for breach 
of sentence in the last 
five years (no) 
0.537 0.087 6.162 <.001 1.711 
Aged 32 or more 
(aged 17 - 31)a 
-0.395 0.151 -2.618 .019 0.674 
a There were 16 degrees of freedom for these parameters and 9119 for all other parameters. 
b The variable was grand mean centred. 
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Table 8.3: Case level random co-efficient model for aggravated drink driving in-out 
decision random effects component (for fixed effects see Table 8.2) (n = 9,282) 
Random Effect 
Standard Variance 
  d.f. χ2 p-value 
 Deviation  Component 
Intercept 1.184 1.401 16 56.150 <.001 
Alcohol level 0.257 0.066 16 28.843 .025 
Multiple drink drive 
charges (no) 
1.059 1.121 16 50.601 <.001 
Drink drive 
conviction in the last 
five years (no) 
0.230 0.053 16 32.728 .008 
Prior convictions for drinking and driving     
  3 priors (2) 0.628 0.395 16 34.373 .005 
  4 priors (2) 0.589 0.347 16 29.363 .021 
  5 or 6 priors (2) 0.821 0.674 16 38.534 .002 
  7 or more priors (2) 0.945 0.892 16 36.383 .003 
Aged 32 or more 
(aged 17 - 31) 
0.464 0.216 16 32.880 .008 
 
There were significant random effects for a series of offence seriousness and 
criminal history variables.  The variation in the likelihood of incarceration between circuits 
is partially explained by differences in the custodial threshold centred around: the alcohol 
level; whether the offender was being sentenced for multiple counts of drinking and 
driving; the timing of the most recent conviction; the number of prior convictions; and age.  
With the exception of age these variables are all directly representative of the seriousness 
of the current offending or the offenders’ past records for drink driving.  However, it is 
possible that age is indirectly related to criminal history and adds a nuance to the 
consideration of the timing of past convictions for drink driving.  Older offenders may be 
less likely to be incarcerated because their prior convictions were spread over a longer 
period and they were judged to be less culpable than younger offenders who had acquired 
the same record more quickly.  The influence of age might also reflect heightened concern 
about those younger offenders identified as or perceived to be “boy racers”.  It can be 
inferred from the results that differences in views about the significance of prior offending 
for incarceration are more important to understanding the variation in the custodial 
threshold than the offence seriousness factors.  While multiple drink drive charges have a 
substantial random effect the variable is only in play in 458 of the 9,282 cases.  The 
influence of other seriousness factors such as the presence of disqualified driving, other 
serious driving and breach of sentence convictions is similar across the circuits 
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demonstrating that variation is not located in differing interpretations of the significance of 
these variables.  The consequences of repeated offending and concern about the risk of re-
offending appear to vary between the circuits.  The variations between circuits for 
aggravated drink driving are associated with how seriously drink driving type is viewed by 
the judges and the wider community in each circuit.  
Prediction 3 is supported: the interpretation and use of some of the seriousness of 
offence and criminal history variables differed between circuits for the use of incarceration 
for aggravated drink driving.     
 
Aggravated Drink Driving Sentence Length Model 
No variables were simplified for this model.  The finalised model is reported in Tables 8.4 
(the fixed effects) and 8.5 (the random effects).  There were significant random effects for 
a series of offence seriousness and criminal history variables.  The variation in the length 
of sentence between circuits is partially explained by differences in the custodial threshold 
centred around: whether the offender was sentenced for multiple drink driving convictions; 
a greater number of charges for sentence; more prior convictions for drinking and driving; 
and longer prior terms of incarceration for drinking and driving.  While there is some 
overlap with the in-out decision there is also some notable differences.  In particular the 
alcohol level does not form part of the set of variables contributing to the explanation of 
variation in the determination of sentence length.  Conversely the number of charges for 
sentence is treated differently between the circuits in the determination of sentence length 
but was not a distinguishing factor for the custodial threshold.  The timing of prior 
convictions for drinking and driving was not a distinguishing factor in the determination of 
the custodial threshold but the longest prior term of incarceration was.  This suggests that 
the severity of prior offending matters more in some circuits than others for the 
determination of sentence length.  There is a more even balance between the seriousness of 
current offending and criminal history factors as determinants of the differences in 
approach between circuits than there was for the use of incarceration.      
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Table 8.4: Case level random co-efficient model for aggravated drink driving 
sentence length decision fixed effects component (for random effects see Table 8.5) (n 
= 2,312) 
Variable 
Co-efficient S.E. t-ratio 
Approx 
d.f. p -value 
Intercept 9.030 0.277 32.642 16 <.001 
Number of days from charge 
to charge outcomea 
0.003 0.001 2.555 2221 .011 
Alcohol levela 1.103 0.153 7.193 2221 <.001 
Multiple drink drive charges 
(no) 
2.514 0.403 6.232 16 <.001 
Disqualified driving (no) 0.452 0.204 2.222 2221 .026 
Breach of bail (no) -1.516 0.351 -4.315 2221 <.001 
Breach of sentence (no) -0.846 0.298 -2.835 2221 .005 
Total number of charges for 
sentencea 
0.546 0.113 4.824 16 <.001 
Prior convictions for drink 
drivinga 
0.456 0.072 6.325 16 <.001 
Years since the last drink 
drive convictiona 
-0.126 0.031 -4.135 2221 <.001 
Longest term of 
imprisonment for drink 
drivinga 
0.330 0.040 8.18 16 <.001 
a This variable was grand mean centred. 
 
Table 8.5: Case level random co-efficient model for aggravated drink driving 
sentence length decision random effects component (for fixed effects see Table 8.4) (n 
= 2,312) 
Variable 
Standard 
deviation 
Variance 
Component 
  d.f. χ2 p-value 
Intercept 0.964 0.929 16 145.278 <.001 
Multiple drink drive charges 1.085 1.176 16 28.643 .026 
Total number of charges for 
sentence 
0.391 0.153 16 70.144 <.001 
Prior convictions for drink 
driving 
0.242 0.058 16 46.790 <.001 
Longest term of 
imprisonment for drink 
driving 
0.125 0.016 16 46.648 <.001 
level-1, r 3.911 15.292       
 
Prediction 4 is supported: the interpretation and use of some of the seriousness of 
offence and criminal history variables differed between circuits for the determination of 
incarceration sentence lengths for aggravated drink driving.     
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Male Assaults Female In-Out Model 
Five variables were simplified for the male assaults female in-out hierarchical generalised 
linear model.  The changes are listed in Table 8.6.  The finalised model is reported in 
Tables 8.7 (the fixed effects) and 8.8 (the random effects).   
 
Table 8.6: Male assaults female in-out model simplification of case level variables 
Variable Original categories Simplified categories 
Age  0 = 17 - 23 0 = 17 - 23 
 1 = 24 - 30 1 = 24 or older 
 2 = 31 - 38  
 3 = 39 or older  
Total charges sentenced  
 0 = 1 charge for sentence 0 = 1 charge for sentence 
 1 = 2 charges for sentence 1 = 2 or more charges for sentence 
 2 = 3 charges for sentence  
 3 = 4 or more charges for sentence  
Prior convictions for any offence  
 0 = none 0 = none 
 1 = 1 - 9 1 = 1 - 9 
 2 = 10 - 19 2 = 10 or more 
 3 = 20 or more  
Prior convictions for male assaults female  
 0 = none 0 = none or 1 
 1 = one 1 = two or more  
 2 = two  
 3 = three or more  
Prior incarceration for any offence  
 0 = never 0 = no 
 1 = once 1 = yes 
 2 = 2 - 4 times  
  3 = 5 or more times   
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Table 8.7: Case level random co-efficient model for the male assaults female in-out 
decision fixed effects component (for random effects see Table 8.8) (n = 6,166) 
Variables (reference 
categories in 
brackets) 
 Co-efficient S.E.  t-ratio  p-value 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Intercepta -5.202 0.342 -15.213 <.001 0.006 
Charge laid indictably 
(no) 
1.866 0.297 6.285 <.001 6.466 
Not guilty plea (guilty) 0.544 0.176 3.095 .002 1.723 
Multiple male assaults 
female (no) 
0.702 0.144 4.865 <.001 2.017 
Threat to kill or do 
GBH (no) 
2.267 0.584 3.881 <.001 9.655 
Breach of sentence 
(no) 
1.026 0.159 6.446 <.001 2.790 
Two or more charges 
for sentence (one) 
1.113 0.120 9.297 <.001 3.044 
Elapsed time - charge to charge outcome    
> 6 weeks ≤ 3 months  0.550 0.144 3.808 <.001 1.733 
> 3 months ≤ 6 months  0.420 0.145 2.895 .004 1.523 
> 6 months  0.099 0.168 0.589 .556 1.104 
Two or more prior 
convictions for male 
assaults female (0 or 
1)a 
0.815 0.162 5.047 <.001 2.260 
Conviction for male 
assaults female in the 
last 5 years (no) 
0.609 0.119 5.134 <.001 1.839 
Conviction for breach 
of protection order in 
the last 5 years (no) 
0.607 0.143 4.244 <.001 1.834 
Conviction for serious 
violence in the last 5 
years (no) 
0.953 0.126 7.533 <.001 2.593 
Conviction for breach 
of sentence in the last 
5 years (no) 
0.852 0.108 7.86 <.001 2.344 
Prior incarceration for 
any offence (no)a 
0.964 0.177 5.464 <.001 2.623 
Prior convictions for any offence     
  1-9 priors (0) 0.541 0.312 1.735 .083 1.718 
  10 or more priors (0) 1.227 0.323 3.805 <.001 3.413 
Aged 24 or more at the 
time of offending (no) 
-0.399 0.132 -3.029 .002 0.671 
a There were 16 degrees of freedom for these parameters and 6099 for all other parameters. 
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Table 8.8: Case level random co-efficient model for the male assaults female in-out 
decision random effects component (for fixed effects see Table 8.7) (n = 6,166) 
Variables (reference 
categories in brackets) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Component 
  d.f. χ2 p-value 
Intercept 0.462 0.214 16 38.264 .002 
Two or more prior 
convictions for male 
assaults female (0 or 1) 
0.348 0.121 16 28.971 .024 
Prior incarceration for 
any offence (no) 
0.444 0.197 16 29.154 .023 
 
The difference in the likelihood of incarceration across the circuits is partially 
explained by differences in the thresholds for imprisonment depending: on the number of 
prior convictions; and whether the offender has ever been incarcerated before.  None of the 
seriousness factors modelled had random effects.  This indicates that variation between 
circuits for the decision to incarcerate hinges around different weight being placed on 
criminal history and the consequences of repeated offending or the risk of re-offending.  
However, the absence of variables indicating the seriousness of the offence in terms of 
either the level of violence employed or the impact of the offending on the victim prevents 
a conclusion being drawn to the effect that offence seriousness factors do not play a part in 
distinguishing the approaches between the circuits.        
Prediction 3 is supported: the interpretation and use of some of the seriousness of 
offence and criminal history variables differed between circuits for the use of incarceration 
for male assaults female.     
 
Male Assaults Female Sentence Length Model 
No variables were simplified for this model.  The finalised model is reported in Tables 8.9 
(the fixed effects) and 8.10 (the random effects).  The model only identifies the way the 
charge was laid having a significant random effect between circuits on the determination of 
sentence length.  As only 5.0% (36/722) of the cases include indictably laid male assaults 
female charges the explanatory value of the effect is limited.  The limited result is not 
surprising given that only two of the six circuits that varied significantly from the reference 
circuit in the single level models differed to a substantial extent.  The effectiveness of the 
model may be partly due to the smaller number of cases in the sentence length dataset, 
with 722 cases insufficient to enable differences to be discerned.  The result indicates that 
once a decision has been made to incarcerate there is reasonable consistency between 
circuits in terms of the influence of criminal history factors on sentence length.  If the 
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inter-circuit inconsistency is explained by differences in the weight afforded to any 
seriousness factors it is arguably likely to be associated with either or both of the omitted 
variables representing the level of violence employed or the impact of the offending on the 
victim.    
 
Table 8.9: Case level random co-efficient model for the male assaults female sentence 
length decision fixed effects component (for random effects see Table 8.10) (n = 722) 
Variable 
Co-efficient S.E. t-ratio 
Approx 
d.f. p -value 
Intercept 6.204 0.385 16.098 16 <.001 
Charge laid indictably (no) 3.896 1.335 2.919 16 .01 
Multiple male assaults female 
charges (no) 
2.033 0.413 4.917 683 <.001 
Breach of bail (no) -1.106 0.520 -2.129 683 .034 
Total number of charges for 
sentencea 
0.477 0.067 7.174 683 <.001 
Prior convictions for male 
assaults femalea 
0.266 0.118 2.258 683 .024 
Prior incarceration for male 
assaults female (no) 
1.433 0.421 3.407 683 <.001 
Recent serious violence 
conviction (none or > 5 years 
ago) 
1.144 0.341 3.352 683 <.001 
a This variable was grand mean centred. 
 
Table 8.10: Case level random co-efficient model for the male assaults female 
sentence length decision random effects component (for fixed effects see Table 8.9) (n 
= 722) 
Variable Standard 
deviation 
Variance 
Component 
  d.f. χ2 p-value 
Intercept 1.124 1.264 12 65.705 <.001 
Charge laid indictably (no) 3.841 14.757 12 38.227 <.001 
level-1, r 4.111 16.898       
Note: The chi-square statistics reported above are based on only 13 of 17 units that had 
sufficient data for computation. Fixed effects and variance components are based on all the 
data. 
  
There is limited support for Prediction 4: the interpretation and use of some of the 
seriousness of offence and criminal history variables differed between circuits for the 
determination of incarceration sentence lengths for male assaults female.     
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Burglary In-Out Model 
Eight variables were simplified for the burglary in-out hierarchical generalised linear 
model.  The changes are listed in Table 8.11.   
 
Table 8.11: Burglary in-out model simplification of case level variables 
Variable Original categories Simplified categories 
Burglary convictions for sentence  
 0 = 1 0 = 1 
 1 = 2 1 = 2 or more  
 2 = 3 or more  
Approximate value of the lead burglary offence  
 0 = <$500 0 = <$500 
 1 = $500 to $5,000 1 = $500 or more or unknown 
 2 = >$5,000  
 3 = unknown  
Total charges sentenced  
 0 = 1 charge for sentence 0 = 1 charge for sentence 
 1 = 2 charges for sentence 1 = 2, 3 or 4 charges for sentence 
 2 = 3 or 4 charges for sentence 2 = 5 or more charges for sentence 
 3 = 5, 6 or 7 charges for sentence  
 4 = 8 or more charges for sentence  
Prior convictions for any offence  
 0 = none 0 = none 
 1 = 1 to 4 1 = 1 to 4 
 2 = 5 to 9  2 = 5 to 19 
 3 = 10 to 19 3 = 20 or more 
 4 = 20 to 49  
 5 = 50 or more  
Prior convictions for serious dishonesty (including burglary) 
 0 = none 0 = none 
 1 = 1 or 2 1 = 1 to 9  
 2 = 3 to 9 2 = 10 or more 
 3 = 10 or more  
"Longest prior incarceration for burglary" became "Prior incarceration for burglary" 
 0 = never 0 = no 
 1 = less than or equal to 12 months 1 = yes 
 2 = greater than 12 months and less than or equal to 24 months 
 3 = greater than 24 months  
Elapsed time from charge to charge outcome   
 0 =  ≤ 6 weeks 0 =  ≤ 6 weeks 
 1 = > 6 weeks ≤ 3 months  1 = > 6 weeks 
 2 = > 3 months ≤ 6 months   
 3 = > 6 months   
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Variable Original categories Simplified categories 
Ethnicity   
 0 = European 0 = European or other 
 1 = Māori 1 = Māori or Pacific 
 2 = Pacific  
  3 = Other   
 
The finalised model is reported in Tables 8.12 (the fixed effects) and 8.13 (the 
random effects).   
There were significant random effects for a series of offence seriousness and 
criminal history variables.  The variation in the likelihood of incarceration between circuits 
is partially explained by differences in the custodial threshold centred around: whether the 
most recent conviction for burglary was in the last 5 years; whether the offender had been 
convicted for breach of sentence in the last 5 years; the number of convictions being 
sentenced; the time taken from charge to charge outcome (sentence); and the number of 
previous convictions for burglary or other serious dishonesty.  With the exception of time 
from charge to charge outcome these are all self-explanatory offence seriousness or 
criminal history variables.  The time from charge to charge outcome is a mitigating factor 
influencing the choice of sentence.  The shorter the time to the resolution the more likely it 
is that the offender entered an early guilty plea and the greater the likelihood that the 
offender is seen to be taking responsibility and is potentially more remorseful and thus the 
sentence is more lenient.  The circuits are distinguished by the extent to which they are 
more or less willing to sentence leniently in response to these considerations.  There are 
differences in the threshold related to criminal history and the consequences of repeated 
offending or the risk of re-offending.  The distinction between the circuits is only 
significant for offenders with 1-9 prior convictions with serious dishonesty; there was no 
random effect for offenders with 10 or more prior convictions.  This suggests that circuits 
differ in how to treat offenders with less extensive histories but not once they cross a 
threshold.  It is also notable that circuits place different emphasis on the offender’s recent 
willingness to comply with sentences.  Some circuits are less willing to take the risk of 
imposing a lesser sentence. 
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Table 8.12: Case level random co-efficient model for the burglary in-out decision 
fixed effects component (for random effects see Table 8.13) (n = 5,740) 
Variables (reference 
categories in brackets) 
 Co-efficient S.E.  t-ratio  p-value 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Intercepta -4.271 0.227 -18.83 <.001 0.014 
Female (male) -0.569 0.143 -3.98 <.001 0.566 
Charge laid indictably 
(no) 
1.707 0.155 11.022 <.001 5.515 
Breach of sentence (no) 0.559 0.114 4.911 <.001 1.749 
Other serious 
conviction (no) 
0.595 0.098 6.057 <.001 1.812 
Reparation ordered (no) -0.501 0.080 -6.248 <.001 0.606 
Conviction for burglary 
last 5 years (no)a 
0.833 0.167 5 <.001 2.301 
Prior conviction for 
serious violence (no) 
0.641 0.102 6.262 <.001 1.898 
Conviction for breach 
of sentence last 5 years 
(no)a 
0.533 0.160 3.332 .004 1.703 
Multiple burglary 
convictions for 
sentence (no) 
0.850 0.098 8.637 <.001 2.339 
Total convictions for sentence     
  2 to 4 convictions (1)a 0.559 0.156 3.587 .002 1.748 
  5 plus convictions (1) 0.889 0.070 12.724 <.001 2.432 
Charge to outcome > 6 
weeks (< 6 weeks)a 
0.179 0.208 0.861 .402 1.197 
Prior convictions for burglary and other serious dishonesty   
  1 to 9  (0)a 0.393 0.159 2.473 .025 1.481 
  10 or more (0) 0.338 0.089 3.788 <.001 1.402 
Prior convictions for any offence     
  1 to 4 (0) 0.486 0.166 2.927 .003 1.626 
  5 to 19 (0) 0.541 0.088 6.131 <.001 1.717 
  20 or more  (0) 0.512 0.071 7.242 <.001 1.669 
Previous incarceration 
for burglary (no) 
0.743 0.127 5.87 <.001 2.102 
Māori or Pacific 
Offender (no) 
0.239 0.084 2.866 .004 1.270 
Approximate value of 
lead offence $500 or 
more or unknown (no) 
0.541 0.083 6.525 <.001 1.718 
a There were 16 degrees of freedom for these parameters and 5623 for all other parameters. 
  
199 
 
Table 8.13: Case level random co-efficient model for the burglary in-out decision 
random effects component (for fixed effects see Table 8.12) (n = 5,740) 
Variables (reference 
categories in 
brackets) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Component 
  d.f. χ2 p-value 
Intercept 0.466 0.217 16 27.381 .037 
Conviction for 
burglary last 5 years 
(no) 
0.518 0.268 16 39.237 .001 
Conviction for breach 
of sentence last 5 years 
(no) 
0.522 0.272 16 47.853 <.001 
Sentenced for 2 to 4 
convictions (1) 
0.434 0.188 16 35.262 .004 
Charge to outcome > 6 
weeks (< 6 weeks) 
0.727 0.528 16 48.697 <.001 
1 to 9 prior convictions 
for burglary and other 
serious dishonesty (0) 
0.391 0.153 16 34.136 .005 
 
This was the only multi-level model that tested for random effects in the influence 
of gender and ethnicity on sentence.  These variables were not included in the other models 
because the variables were not significant in the single level models.  Both variables had 
significant fixed effects as expected, but no significant random effects were demonstrated.  
The effects of gender and ethnicity on the determination of sentence type were similar 
between the circuits.   
Prediction 3 is supported: the interpretation and use of some of the seriousness of 
offence and criminal history variables differed between circuits for the use of incarceration 
for burglary.     
 
Burglary Sentence Length Model 
The continuous variables representing prior convictions for burglary and prior convictions 
for other serious dishonesty were simplified for the burglary sentence length model.  The 
simplification differs from the reduction in the number of categories employed for the in-
out modelling.  The only change was the creation of a new continuous variable counting 
the total number of prior convictions for serious dishonesty including burglary.  The 
finalised model is reported in Tables 8.14 (the fixed effects) and 8.15 (the random effects).   
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Table 8.14: Case level random co-efficient model for the burglary sentence length 
decision fixed effects component (for random effects see Table 8.15) (n = 2,338) 
Variable 
Co-efficient S.E. t-ratio 
Approx 
d.f. p -value 
Intercept 13.148 0.666 19.745 16 <.001 
Charge laid indictably (no) 5.795 0.467 12.408 2239 <.001 
Days from charge to charge 
outcomea 
0.005 0.002 2.831 2239 .005 
Judge type (criminal) -1.295 0.593 -2.182 2239 .029 
Plea (guilty plea) 1.799 0.827 2.175 2239 .03 
Number of burglary chargesa 0.762 0.109 6.985 16 <.001 
Receiving (no) 2.326 0.492 4.727 2239 <.001 
Breach of bail (no) -1.761 0.451 -3.908 2239 <.001 
Breach of sentence (no) 0.822 0.631 1.303 16 .211 
Violent offence (no) 1.722 0.416 4.139 2239 <.001 
Serious driving offence (no) 1.109 0.465 2.387 2239 .017 
Total number of charges for 
sentencea 
0.319 0.039 8.218 2239 <.001 
Count of offence dates for the 
burglarya 
2.200 0.271 8.121 2239 <.001 
Reparation order (no) -0.956 0.369 -2.594 2239 .01 
Longest prior term of 
incarceration for burglarya 
0.258 0.026 9.766 16 <.001 
Prior convictions for serious 
dishonesty including 
burglarya 
0.040 0.014 2.94 16 .01 
Prior convictions for other 
serious offencesa 
0.151 0.031 4.859 2239 <.001 
Approximate value of the 
lead offence 
     
$500 to $5,000 (<$500 or 
unknown) 
1.115 0.365 3.057 2239 .002 
>$5,000 (<$500 or unknown) 3.426 0.504 6.801 2239 <.001 
a This variable was grand mean centred. 
There were significant random effects for a series of offence seriousness and 
criminal history variables.  The variation in the length of sentence between circuits is 
partially explained by differences in the custodial threshold centred on additions to 
sentence length accorded to offenders: being sentenced for multiple burglaries; being 
sentenced for a breach of sentence; who have served longer prior terms of incarceration for 
burglary; and who have for more prior convictions for serious dishonesty.  
While there is some overlap with the in-out decision there is also some notable 
differences.  The variation between circuits for the determination of sentence length is 
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more strongly centred on burglary specific factors than the decision on whether to 
incarcerate.  While breach of sentence features in both models it is notable that in the in-
out model circuits vary in terms of the influence of a recent prior conviction for breach of 
sentence but in determining sentence length they vary in terms of the influence of a current 
conviction.   
 
Table 8.15: Case level random co-efficient model for the burglary sentence length 
decision random effects component (for fixed effects see Table 8.14) (n = 2,338) 
Variable Standard 
deviation 
Variance 
Component 
  d.f. χ2 p-value 
Intercept 2.240 5.016 16 110.962 <.001 
Number of burglary charges 0.288 0.083 16 38.494 .002 
Breach of sentence 1.958 3.835 16 44.084 <.001 
Longest prior term of 
incarceration for burglary 
0.079 0.006 16 40.020 .001 
Prior convictions for serious 
dishonesty including 
burglary 
0.038 0.001 16 45.194 <.001 
level-1, r 7.872 61.969       
 
Prediction 4 is supported: the interpretation and use of some of the seriousness of 
offence and criminal history variables differed between circuits for the determination of 
incarceration sentence lengths for aggravated drink driving.     
 
Summary 
The models described above support Predictions 3 & 4: the interpretation and use of some 
seriousness of offence and criminal history variables varied between circuits in terms of 
their influence on the in-out decision (Prediction 3) and the determination of sentence 
length (Prediction 4).  There was variation in the results between offences.  The 
identification of the factors treated differently was more limited for male assaults female.  
This potentially reflects the lower level of variation for male assaults female but may also 
be a consequence of omitted variables, limited numbers for sentence length modelling or 
the narrowness of the offence within the wider spectrum of physical assaults limiting the 
observation of sentencing variation.  
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Chapter 9: The Influence of Circuit Context on Sentencing 
 
The research questions asked whether contextual differences between the circuits were 
associated with the variation in sentencing between circuits.  The question was addressed 
by expanding the case level random co-efficient models reported in Chapter 8 into circuit 
level random co-efficient models by including contextual variables applying to the circuits. 
The models were severely limited due to the small number of circuits.  With only 
17 circuits the models can only accommodate one circuit level variable at a time.  The 
influence of the contextual variables had to be examined in a series of bivariate models.  
Multi-collinearity between the available circuit level variables prevented determination of 
the influence attributable to any of the contextual variables. 
 To some extent the limitations were overcome by the inclusion of a variable 
separating metropolitan and provincial circuits in the range of variables modelled.  The two 
categories of circuit based on the proportion of the circuit population served by city or 
suburban courts were also distinguished from one another by many of the more substantive 
contextual variables included in the modelling.  Whether a circuit was metropolitan or 
provincial was significantly associated with variations in sentencing between circuits in 
three of the six models: the likelihood of incarceration for aggravated drink driving; the 
likelihood of incarceration for burglary; and the length of incarceration for burglary.  The 
modelling revealed associations between a range of other contextual variables and 
sentencing variation between circuits which were consistent with the differentiation of 
metropolitan and provincial circuits for each variable.  However, due to the high levels of 
multi-collinearity between the variables identification of the more substantive contextual 
variables contributing to the differences between metropolitan and provincial circuits was 
precluded.   
 Once again the aggravated drink driving and burglary models were more 
informative than the male assaults female models.  The distinction between the offences 
was consistent with the results of the earlier models.  It is likely to be attributable to the 
constraints affecting the modelling of male assaults female sentencing: the low 
incarceration rate; relatively small number of sentence length observations; and the 
narrowness of the offence.  These constraints compound to make the identification of 
contextual variables associated with sentencing variation difficult.        
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Development of the Models 
The hierarchical models including the circuit level contextual variables were an extension 
of the case level random co-efficient models.  Raudenbush & Bryk (2002) advise against 
the use of saturation models and deletion of non-significant variables when circuit level 
variables are added to the finalised case level models.  In this research saturation was not 
possible in any event.  With only 17 circuits it was necessary to model each circuit level 
contextual variable separately by adding it to the finalised case level model.   
 The selection of the variables was informed by the United States research, with the 
specific variables limited by the available data.  Seventeen contextual variables covering 
aspects of the demographic and socio-economic context (five variables) and the caseload 
and caseflow context (11 variables), plus a variable distinguishing metropolitan from 
provincial circuits, were included in the modelling.  A circuit was categorised as 
metropolitan if 70% or more of the population was served by a court located in a city or 
suburban area.  Except for the categorical variable distinguishing metropolitan and 
provincial circuits, the variables were continuous and grand mean centred. 
Many of the variables were recognised as likely to be inter-related.  For instance 
adult population, new cases per thousand adults, the count of full time equivalent judicial 
officers and new cases per full time equivalent judicial officer shared some common 
underlying values.  Other variables were likely to be associated due to well-known 
linkages.  For instance, higher incomes are known to be related to education and hence the 
median personal income variable was likely to be negatively associated with the proportion 
of adults with no educational qualifications.  Before the bivariate models were run 
correlation matrices were created and scanned to identify the degree to which the variables 
were correlated.  The matrices revealed that there were high levels of collinearity between 
the variables that would likely have caused problems if multivariate modelling had been 
possible.  Across 252 correlations between the variables, 83 could be categorised as strong 
(a correlation co-efficient of .5 or higher); 91 as moderate (.3 or higher but less than .5); 
and 78 as weak or not material (less than .3). Twenty of the 24 correlations between the 
Metropolitan/Provincial categorical variable and the other variables were strong (12) or 
moderate (8).  The correlation matrices are located in Appendix G. The high levels of 
collinearity poses a problem in the interpretation of the results from the bivariate models as 
it is not possible to distinguish which effects are most important.  
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9.1 describes the five demographic and socio-economic variables and seven caseload 
and caseflow variables that apply generically across the three offences.  Table 9.2 presents 
the offence specific values for the remaining four caseload and caseflow variables.  The 
demographic and socio-economic indicators were based on the 2006 census data and the 
case related data is from 2008 and 2009.  The metropolitan and provincial circuits are 
contrasted in terms of the other contextual variables in Tables 9.3 and 9.4.  The minimums 
and maximums for each variable demonstrate that there is substantial difference between 
the circuits at the ends of each spectrum.  Across the range of variables the spread of the 
circuits varies with proportionately larger standard deviations for some variables (e.g. adult 
population) and smaller deviations for others (e.g. median personal income).   
 
Table 9.1: Generic demographic, socio-economic and caseload and caseflow 
contextual variables 
Circuit Contextual Variables Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Demographic & Socio-economic Variables    
Adult population 176252 110592 40950 425766 
Median personal income 24941 2685 21100 30700 
Ethnic homogeneity 0.483 0.087 0.371 0.687 
Proportion adults with no 
educational qualifications 0.233 0.052 0.111 0.312 
Proportion of adults unemployed 0.030 0.006 0.018 0.040 
Caseload & Caseflow Variables     
Number of Judicial Officers 
(ftes) 10.6 7.8 2.3 29.7 
Number of Judges (ftes) 7.1 4.4 1.7 15.6 
New criminal cases per 1,000 
adults 128.8 31.2 90.6 209.9 
New criminal cases per Judicial 
Officer (ftes) 2038.5 499.4 992.6 2821.6 
Average active cases per Judicial 
Officer (ftes) 175.3 50.8 114.5 327.0 
Cases disposed per Judicial 
Officer (ftes) 2051.7 491.1 1045.1 2796.2 
Hearing rate 0.110 0.036 0.057 0.190 
 
 Three of the variables are measures of size (adult population, the number of judicial 
officers and the number of judges).  The inclusion of these variables enabled the modelling 
to test whether, consistent with the United States research; sentencing was more lenient in 
larger circuits.   
 The ethnic homogeneity variable enabled the modelling to test the racial threat 
hypothesis.  The hypothesis predicts that larger racial minorities are perceived as a threat to 
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the established order and are therefore associated with more severe sentencing.  In the 
United States sentencing research there was support for the hypothesis in some research 
with greater severity affecting all offenders sentenced not just racial minorities.  In this 
research support for the hypothesis, within the limitations of the modelling, would be 
indicated by more severe sentencing in less ethnically homogenous circuits.  
 The personal income, educational attainment and unemployment variables enables 
the modelling to test the economic threat hypothesis.  There was mixed support in the 
United States for the proposition that greater levels of disadvantage are a threat to the 
established order and are therefore associated with more severe sentencing.  
 Assuming that there are differences between metropolitan and provincial circuits in 
terms of broad politics (a combination of political leanings, values and attitudes) a tentative 
exploration of the effect of local political setting on sentencing can be undertaken.  
Assuming that provincial circuits can be broadly labelled as more conservative, sentencing 
may be more severe in provincial circuits. 
 The effect of caseload pressures on sentencing are explored through the offence 
specific variables, the measures of total caseload in terms of flow (new cases and disposal 
of cases) and stock (cases on hand at a point in time) and trial rates. These measures enable 
exploration of whether there is evidence that higher caseloads per judge are associated with 
more lenient sentencing, or that higher trial rates are associated with more severe 
sentencing. 
 In addition the models presented here include two other variables, the crime rate 
and the speed of disposal of cases.  The crime rate is measured in three ways.  The general 
crime rate is represented by new cases per 1,000 adults, and the offence specific crime rate 
is represented by the number of cases sentenced per 1,000 adults and the number of cases 
sentenced per judge.  These measures enable the effect of the prevalence of offending on 
sentencing variation between circuits to be explored.  The two perspectives on the offence 
specific rate provide a contrast between the prevalence of convicted and sentenced 
offenders relative to the population compared to a judge centric perception based on the 
number cases seen by a full time judge.  The speed of disposal is measured separately for 
each of the three offences.  Two measures are used, the mean time from charge to 
sentencing and the proportion of cases sentenced within three months of the charge date.   
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Table 9.2: Offence specific caseload and caseflow contextual variables 
Circuit Contextual Variables Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Aggravated drink driving     
Sentencings per 1,000 adults 4.31 1.81 1.95 8.10 
Sentencings per District Court 
Judge 104.7 40.3 60.3 193.9 
Mean days charge to sentencing  104.4 26.1 71.2 155.6 
Proportion of cases sentenced 
within 3 months of charge  0.572 0.133 0.345 0.760 
Male assaults female     
Sentencings per 1,000 males 5.58 2.80 1.99 13.77 
Sentencings per District Court 
Judge 64.1 26.6 27.4 124.8 
Mean days charge to sentencing  108.4 38.3 54.7 182.6 
Proportion of cases sentenced 
within 3 months of charge  0.542 0.171 0.238 0.840 
Burglary     
Sentencings per 1,000 adults 2.65 0.95 1.16 4.15 
Sentencings per District Court 
Judge 65.27 23.51 33.35 101.79 
Mean days charge to sentencing  118.8 33.1 68.5 181.5 
Proportion of cases sentenced 
within 3 months of charge  0.504 0.148 0.254 0.754 
 
The metropolitan and provincial circuits were substantially different.  The 
metropolitan circuits were larger with a less racially homogeneous population, the 
residents were better educated, had higher personal incomes and higher unemployment 
rates.  Consistent with serving a larger population the metropolitan circuits had more 
judges and more judicial officers (judges plus community magistrates and justices of the 
peace).   
The caseload and caseflow contrast was more complex.  The provincial circuits 
received more new cases per head of population and per judicial officer and disposed of 
more cases per judicial officer, but despite having lower rates of new cases the 
metropolitan circuits had a higher level of active cases on hand per judicial officer.  This 
counter-intuitive juxtaposition may be due to the higher hearing rate for the metropolitan 
circuits.  The higher hearing rate may result in cases progressing more slowly and may 
indicate that cases are more complex in metropolitan circuits.   
The provincial circuits sentenced more offenders for each of the three offences per 
head of population and per judge than the metropolitan circuits.  Cases progressed more 
quickly from charge to sentence in the provincial circuits. 
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Table 9.3: Means and standard deviations for the metropolitan and provincial 
groupings for the generic contextual variables 
  Metropolitan Group Provincial Group 
Contextual Variables Mean SD Mean SD 
Demographic & Socio-economic Variables    
Adult population 263771 83724.5 139786 101530.4 
Median personal income 28360 1955.2 23517 1253.2 
Ethnic homogeneity 0.568 0.090 0.448 0.058 
Proportion adults with no educational 
qualifications 0.173 0.047 0.258 0.028 
Proportion of adults unemployed 0.033 0.005 0.029 0.006 
Caseload & Caseflow Variables     
Number of Judicial Officers (ftes) 17.62 10.38 7.68 4.10 
Number of Judges (ftes) 11.70 4.54 5.17 2.53 
New criminal cases per 1,000 adults 108.81 12.12 137.15 33.25 
New criminal cases per Judicial Officer 
(ftes) 1742.99 600.43 2161.68 418.82 
Average active cases per Judicial 
Officer (ftes) 202.67 77.90 163.88 32.63 
Cases disposed per Judicial Officer 
(ftes) 1788.27 589.35 2161.49 424.08 
Hearing rate 0.146 0.031 0.094 0.026 
 
Table 9.4: Means and standard deviations for the metropolitan and provincial 
groupings for the offence specific contextual variables 
  Metropolitan Group Provincial Group 
Contextual Variables Mean SD Mean SD 
Aggravated drink driving     
Sentencings per 1,000 adults 3.164 0.917 4.782 1.908 
Sentencings per District Court Judge 72.54 15.97 118.09 40.05 
Mean days charge to sentencing  131.9 23.5 93.0 17.5 
Proportion of cases sentenced within 3 
months of charge  0.448 0.103 0.624 0.109 
Male assaults female     
Sentencings per 1,000 males 4.365 1.593 6.084 3.090 
Sentencings per District Court Judge 46.97 13.11 71.24 27.83 
Mean days charge to sentencing  154.7 25.1 89.1 22.8 
Proportion of cases sentenced within 3 
months of charge  0.347 0.095 0.623 0.122 
Burglary     
Sentencings per 1,000 adults 1.722 0.490 3.038 0.818 
Sentencings per District Court Judge 39.15 7.24 76.15 18.59 
Mean days charge to sentencing  158.1 24.6 102.4 19.4 
Proportion of cases sentenced within 3 
months of charge  0.348 0.095 0.569 0.115 
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The Multi-level Models 
For some of the models there were few contextual variables that were significant on a 
bivariate basis but for others there were many.  The challenge in reporting the outcomes of 
the modelling was to report in an informative and concise manner.  The raw results are 
often unhelpful because they reflect the units of measurement underlying each variable.  In 
models where the adult population was a significant variable the co-efficient is very small.  
The size of the co-efficient reflects the fact that it represents the shift in the likelihood of 
incarceration if the population is one person higher than the mean of 176,252.  Conversely, 
some of the variables are based on proportions varying between zero and one, so that a 
change of one is a nominal concept and results in a very large co-efficient.  The parameter 
estimates for each variable that was significant are reported but the meaning of those 
estimates required transformation to make the potential influence of each contextual 
variable clear.  The substantive effect of each variable on the likelihood of incarceration 
was measured by calculating the odds of incarceration one standard deviation either side of 
the mean and then calculating the odds ratio for the likelihood of incarceration between 
those two points.  The range one standard deviation either side of the mean covers the 
central two-thirds of the circuits.  The odds ratio between the values one standard deviation 
from the mean is an indicator of the difference between the circuits, and provides a sense 
of the degree to which a statistically significant effect is substantively significant.  In like 
manner the substantive effect of the variable on sentence length was calculated to 
determine the change in the length of sentence one standard deviation either side of the 
mean and the change between those two points.  The ranges one standard deviation either 
side of the mean are an estimate of the difference between the central two-thirds of the 
circuits.  In the case of the in-out models for aggravated drink driving and burglary the 
results are tabulated but for the other models the statistics for the small number of 
significant variables are described in the text.   
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Aggravated drink driving in out model  
Ten of the circuit level variables were significant on a bivariate basis when added to the in-
out case level random co-efficient model (Chapter 8: Tables 8.2 & 8.3).  The variables are 
listed in Table 9.5. 
 
Table 9.5: Parameter estimates for circuit level variables individually added to the 
case level model for the in-out decision for aggravated drink drive sentencing  
Circuit Contextual Variable B S.E. p - value 
Adult population -0.000 0.000 .036 
Median personal income -0.000 0.000 <.001 
Ethnic homogeneity -6.658 1.778 .002 
Proportion adults with no educational 
qualifications 
13.208 3.071 <.001 
Proportion of adults unemployed -70.883 29.348 .029 
New criminal cases per 1,000 adults 0.014 0.006 .028 
Hearing rate  -18.814 4.161 <.001 
Mean days charge to sentencing -0.030 0.006 <.001 
Proportion of cases sentenced within 3 months of 
charge 
6.170 1.190 <.001 
Provincial (Metropolitan) 1.809 0.260 <.001 
Note: there were 15 degrees of freedom for all these variables. 
The results demonstrate that there is an association between some aspects of the 
circuit context and the use of incarceration for aggravated drink driving.  Taken 
individually each of the variables appears to have a substantial impact on the likelihood of 
incarceration between circuits.  The small number of circuits and high correlations between 
the variables precluded the formation of a single model.  The substantive effect of each 
variable is shown in Table 9.6.  The odds ratios between the mean and one standard 
deviation either side of the mean and the odds ratio between the standard deviations are 
reported.  
In terms of demographic and socio-economic factors the odds of incarceration were 
greater in circuits with smaller populations, with lower median personal incomes, that are 
more racially homogeneous (i.e. with smaller representation of minorities), where a higher 
proportion of adults had no educational qualifications, or with proportionately fewer 
people unemployed.  In terms of caseflow factors the odds of incarceration were greater in 
circuits with a higher rate of new criminal cases per thousand adults, with a lower rate of 
cases proceeding to hearing, or with lower mean days from charge to sentence and a higher 
proportion of cases sentenced within three months of charge.  The degree of difference 
varied across these factors.      
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The variation between metropolitan and provincial circuits was significant and 
substantial.  The odds of incarceration for offenders sentenced in provincial circuits were 
6.101 times greater than offenders sentenced in metropolitan circuits.  The results for all 
the more substantive contextual factors with significant parameter estimates align with the 
metropolitan and provincial circuits.  The greater likelihood of incarceration in circuits 
with smaller populations, lower median personal incomes, greater ethnic homogeneity, 
proportionately more adults with no educational qualifications, lower unemployment, 
proportionately more new cases, lower hearing rates and faster case resolution are all 
consistent with the application of these measures to provincial and metropolitan circuits.  It 
is apparent that the broad context of provincial versus metropolitan circuits is important 
but it is not possible to conclude which of the distinguishing factors is most important or 
how they combine to produce the overall result.   
 
Table 9.6: Odds ratios one standard deviation from the mean for circuit level 
variables individually added to the case level model for the in-out decision for 
aggravated drink drive sentencing 
Circuit Contextual Variable Mean SD 
Range of OR +/- 1SD 
from the mean 
Mean–SD  Mean+SD 
OR for 
circuits 
+/-1SD 
from the 
mean  
Adult population 176252 110592 1.556 0.643 0.413 
Median personal income 24941 2685 1.957 0.511 0.261 
Ethnic homogeneity 0.483 0.087 1.785 0.560 0.313 
Proportion adults with no 
educational qualifications 0.233 0.052 0.503 1.987 3.950 
Proportion of adults 
unemployed 0.030 0.006 1.530 0.654 0.427 
New criminal cases per 1,000 
adults 128.8 31.2 0.651 1.536 2.361 
Hearing rate  0.110 0.036 1.969 0.508 0.258 
Mean days charge to 
sentencing 104.4 26.1 2.173 0.460 0.212 
Proportion of cases sentenced 
within 3 months of charge 0.572 0.133 0.440 2.272 5.161 
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Aggravated drink driving sentence length model  
Only one circuit level variable was significant on a bivariate basis when added to the case 
level random co-efficient model for sentence length (Chapter 8: Tables 8.4 & 8.5).  The 
variable was the proportion of offenders sentenced within three months of the date of 
charge.  Higher proportions of cases resolved within three months were associated with 
shorter sentences (B = -2.955, S.E. = 1.286, d.f. = 15, p = .036).  A proportion one full 
percentage point (.01) above or below the mean was associated with an increase or 
decrease in sentence length of approximately one day.  At one standard deviation from the 
mean (.133) sentence lengths increased or decreased by 12 days.  It is likely that the effect 
of this variable representing the proportion of cases resolved within three months is 
associated with the larger proportionate discount associated with early guilty pleas.  
 There was no significant difference between metropolitan and provincial circuits.  
The substantial difference in the use of incarceration does not carry over to sentence 
length.  One possible explanation is that the relatively low maximum penalty, two years 
imprisonment, limits the opportunity for variation.  This possibility is partially supported 
by the limited number of circuits (7) that varied significantly from the reference circuit for 
the length of incarceration compared to the substantially larger number (15) that varied for 
the use of incarceration.    
 
Male assaults female in-out and sentence length models 
Two of the circuit level variables were significant on a bivariate basis when added to the 
in-out case level random co-efficient model (Chapter 8: Tables 8.7 & 8.8).  The variables 
were the hearing rate for all offences and the number of male assaults female sentencings 
per thousand adult males.  Both variables had a negative effect on the likelihood of 
incarceration.      
 A higher hearing rate for all offences was associated with a reduced likelihood of 
incarceration (B = -5.213, S.E. = 2.211, d.f. = 14, p = .028).  At one standard deviation 
(.036) above the mean the odds of incarceration were 0.822 times those at the mean; 
conversely at one standard deviation below the mean the odds were 1.216 times greater 
than the mean.  The odds of incarceration for an offender sentenced in a circuit that was 
one standard deviation below the mean were 1.479 times the odds for a circuit that was one 
standard deviation above the mean. 
 The number of offenders sentenced for male assaults female per thousand adult 
males was associated with a reduced likelihood of incarceration (B = -0.062, S.E. = 0.026, 
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d.f. = 14, p = .030).  At one standard deviation (2.8 offenders sentenced) above the mean 
the odds of incarceration were 0.840 times those at the mean; conversely at one standard 
deviation below the mean the odds were 1.191 times greater than the mean.  The odds of 
incarceration for an offender sentenced in a circuit that was one standard deviation below 
the mean were 1.418 times the odds for a circuit that was one standard deviation above the 
mean. 
None of the circuit level variables were significant on a bivariate basis when added 
to the case level random co-efficient model for sentence length (Chapter 8: Tables 8.9 & 
8.10).     
 
Burglary in-out model  
As shown in Table 9.7 ten of the circuit level variables were significant on a bivariate basis 
when added to the in-out case level random co-efficient model (Chapter 8: Tables 8.12 & 
8.13).   
 
Table 9.7: Parameter estimates for circuit level variables individually added to the 
case level model for the in-out decision for burglary sentencing  
Circuit Contextual Variable B S.E. p - value 
Adult population -0.000 0.000 0.027 
Median personal income -0.000 0.000 0.046 
Proportion adults with no educational 
qualifications 
6.734 1.714 0.001 
Number of Judicial Officers (ftes) -0.034 0.011 0.008 
Number of Judges (ftes) -0.086 0.016 <0.001 
Hearing rate -5.787 2.713 0.05 
Mean days charge to sentencing -0.007 0.003 0.05 
Sentencings per 1,000 adults 0.342 0.083 <0.001 
Sentencings per District Court Judge 0.017 0.004 <0.001 
Provincial (Metropolitan) 0.306 0.093 0.005 
Note: there were 15 degrees of freedom for all variables. 
These results demonstrate that there is an association between some aspects of the 
circuit context and the use of incarceration.  Taken individually each of the variables 
appears to have a substantial impact on the likelihood of incarceration.  The small number 
of circuits and high correlations between the variables precluded the formation of a single 
model.  The substantive effect of each variable is shown in Table 9.8 reporting the odds 
ratios between the mean plus and minus one standard deviation and between the two points 
one standard deviation either side of the mean.   
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In terms of demographic and socio-economic factors the odds of incarceration was 
greater in circuits with smaller populations, with lower median personal incomes, where a 
higher proportion of adults had no educational qualifications, with proportionately fewer 
people unemployed, or with a lower complement of judicial officers or judges.  In terms of 
caseload and caseflow factors the odds of incarceration was greater in circuits where the 
rate of cases proceeding to hearing was lower, where cases proceeded to sentencing more 
quickly (the mean days from charge to sentence were lower), the rate of burglars sentenced 
per thousand adult population was higher, or the rate of burglars sentenced per judge was 
higher.   
 
Table 9.8: Odds ratios one standard deviation from the mean for circuit level 
variables individually added to the case level model for the in-out decision for 
burglary sentencing 
Circuit Contextual Variable Mean SD 
Range of OR +/- 1SD 
from the mean 
Mean–SD  Mean+SD 
OR for 
circuits 
+/-1SD 
from the 
mean  
Adult population 176252 110592 1.248 0.802 0.643 
Median personal income 24941 2685 1.230 0.813 0.661 
Proportion adults with no 
educational qualifications 0.233 0.052 0.705 1.419 2.014 
Number of Judicial Officers 
(ftes) 10.6 7.8 1.303 0.767 0.589 
Number of Judges (ftes) 7.1 4.4 1.459 0.686 0.470 
Hearing rate 0.110 0.036 1.232 0.812 0.659 
Mean days charge to 
sentencing 118.8 33.1 1.240 0.806 0.650 
Sentencings per 1,000 adults 2.65 0.95 0.723 1.384 1.915 
Sentencings per District Court 
Judge 64.1 23.51 0.667 1.499 2.248 
 
The variation between metropolitan and provincial circuits was significant and 
substantial.  The odds of incarceration for offenders sentenced in provincial circuits were 
1.358 times greater than offenders sentenced in metropolitan circuits.  The results for all 
the other contextual factors with significant parameter estimates align with the 
metropolitan and provincial circuit variable.  The greater likelihood of incarceration in 
circuits with smaller populations, lower median personal incomes, proportionately more 
adults with no educational qualifications, fewer judicial officers, lower hearing rates, faster 
case resolution, and more sentencings per adult and per Judge are all consistent with the 
application of these measures to provincial and metropolitan circuits.  It is apparent that the 
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broad context of provincial versus metropolitan circuits is important but it is not possible to 
conclude which of the distinguishing factors is most important or how they combine to 
produce the overall result.   
 
Burglary sentence length model  
Three of the circuit level variables were significant on a bivariate basis when added to the 
case level random co-efficient model for sentence length (Chapter 8: Tables 8.14 & 8.15).  
The variables were median personal income, the proportion of adults with no educational 
qualifications and the metropolitan/provincial split.      
Higher levels of median personal income were associated with shorter sentences (B 
= -0.001, S.E. = 0.000, d.f. = 15, p < .001).  At one standard deviation from the mean 
($2,685) sentence lengths increased or decreased by 51 days.  A higher proportion of adults 
with no educational qualifications was associated with longer sentences (B = 23.995, S.E. 
= 8.214, d.f. = 15, p = .011).  At one standard deviation from the mean (.052) sentence 
lengths increased or decreased by 37 days. 
Provincial circuits imposed sentences 3.5 months longer than metropolitan circuits 
(B = 3.490, S.E. = 0.831, d.f. = 15, p < .001).  This is a notable finding because offenders 
are also more likely to be incarcerated in provincial circuits.  The significant finding for 
burglary but not for aggravated drink driving may be attributable to the much higher 
maximum penalty for burglary (10 years imprisonment) compared to aggravated drink 
driving (2 years imprisonment).     
 
Discussion 
The incorporation of contextual variables into the models adds an extra layer to the prior 
findings.  The significant correlations between contextual variables and both incarceration 
rates and sentence lengths provide insights into the differences between the circuits that 
may explain the sentencing variations between circuits observed in the earlier single level 
and random effects models.  However, the results have to be treated with caution because 
of the need to construct separate models for each variable, and the high levels of multi-
collinearity between the contextual variables.   
The results vary between the models.  In two models (aggravated drink driving and 
burglary in-out models) ten contextual factors are identified that may be linked to variation 
in sentencing between circuits.  At the other end of the scale no variables were identified in 
the sentence length model for male assaults female.  Limited numbers were identified in 
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the other three models: burglary sentence length (3); male assaults female in-out (2); and 
aggravated drink driving sentence length (1).  The more limited results for the sentence 
length models is consistent with the United States research which also tended to find more 
associations between contextual variables and categorical decisions like sentence type or 
granting of a departure than for decisions represented by a continuous variable like 
sentence length or the amount of a departure.  In addition, the difference between male 
assaults female in-out model and the in-out models for the other two offences is likely to 
have been influenced by the constraints on modelling that offence.   
Despite these limitations there are a series of observations that can be drawn from 
the models.  Consistent with the United States research the results are mixed and in two 
instances contradictory.  There is evidence of an association between size and sentencing 
variation between circuits in the in-out models for aggravated drink driving and burglary, 
but there were no effects in the other models.  Larger populations (both models) and larger 
complements of judicial officers and judges (burglary) were associated with greater 
leniency.  This is consistent with the United States research.   
The models provided no support for the proposition that circuits with larger ethnic 
minorities would be more severe.  In the only model that showed a significant effect, the 
aggravated drink driving in-out model, offenders were sentenced more leniently in circuits 
that were more ethnically diverse (where ethnic minorities were larger).  This is out of step 
with three of the United States studies but supportive of one (Crow & Gertz, 2008).  It may 
be explained, as Crow & Gertz (2008) suggested, by a threshold at which the effect 
reverses, when minorities become sufficiently large they are able to exercise political 
power and effect changes to policy and practices.  Alternatively it may reflect a difference 
in race relations between New Zealand and the United States.  In New Zealand greater 
diversity may promote greater tolerance and that this extends to tolerance for criminal 
behaviour. 
The aggravated drink driving in-out, burglary in-out and burglary sentence length 
models all provide support for the proposition that greater economic disadvantage will be 
associated with more severe sentencing.  This effect was observed for lower personal 
incomes and lower educational achievement in all three models.  However, the reverse 
effect occurred for unemployment in the aggravated drink drive in-out model, where 
higher unemployment was linked to more lenient sentencing between circuits.   
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None of the three general measures of caseload pressure (new cases per judicial 
officer, disposals per judicial officer, or active cases per judicial officer) were associated 
with sentencing variation between circuits.  However trial rate was negatively correlated 
with sentencing variation between circuits in the in-out models for all three offences.  This 
is counter to the expectations tested in the United States where higher trial rates were 
expected to result in more severe sentences due to the application of a trial penalty.  The 
United States research found no significant association between trial rate and sentences.  
The three measures of crime rate all had some effect.  Aggravated drink drivers in 
circuits with a higher general rate of offending (criminal cases per head of population) 
were more likely to be incarcerated.  Burglars in circuits with higher rates of burglary 
(whether expressed as the rate of burglars sentenced per head of population or the rate 
sentenced per judge) were also more likely to be incarcerated.  However offenders 
sentenced for male assaults female in circuits with higher rates of male assaults female 
offenders sentenced per head of population were less likely to be incarcerated.   
The speed of disposal also had some effect.  Whether expressed in terms of mean 
days from charge to sentence or the proportion of cases sentenced within three months of 
charge, speedier case disposal was correlated with a higher likelihood of incarceration for 
aggravated drink driving and burglary.  However, the proportion of cases sentenced within 
three months of charge resulted in shorter sentences for aggravated drink driving.  This 
contradictory effect is probably due to greater sentencing discounts for guilty pleas the 
sooner the sentence is imposed after the charge is laid. 
The discussion of the metropolitan/provincial variable has been held over to the end 
because it not only addresses the political context but also brings a perspective to the other 
significant variables.  Sentencing was more severe if an offender was sentenced in a 
provincial circuit in three models, the in-out models for aggravated drink driving and 
burglary and the sentence length model for burglary.  These findings lend support to the 
proposition that more conservative political attitudes in provincial areas may influence 
sentencing approaches resulting in more severe sentencing.  Conversely greater tolerance 
and acceptance of diversity in metropolitan areas may foster more lenient sentencing.  The 
differences between the two categories of circuit were also consistent with the effects for 
the more detailed contextual variables.  The difference may be substantially explained by 
any one or some combination of those variables.     
 
  
218 
 
Summary 
There is evidence that the circuit context is associated with variations in sentencing 
between circuits.  However, the evidence of the association with the likelihood of 
incarceration (Research Question 1) and sentence length (Research Question 2) is mixed, 
and varied by offence type.  The modelling was more revealing in respect of the likelihood 
of incarceration for burglary and aggravated drink driving.  In both instances many of the 
variables were individually significant but the limited number of circuits precluded the 
formulation of multivariate models.  This would have had limited usefulness in any event 
because of the high levels of multi-collinearity.   
The strongest inference that can be drawn is that a difference or differences in the 
contexts of metropolitan and provincial circuits condition the formation of local sentencing 
approaches for aggravated drink driving and burglary.  However, a more detailed model in 
which the demographic, socio-economic and caseload or caseflow factors condition the 
differences between metropolitan and provincial circuits cannot be advanced.       
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Chapter 10: Summary of findings, discussion and conclusion 
 
In 2006 the New Zealand Law Commission recommended the establishment of a 
Sentencing Council to develop sentencing guidelines.  The recommendations were 
controversial.  Despite legislation establishing a Sentencing Council passing in 2007 the 
legislation has not been implemented.  The crux of the guidelines debate revolved around 
the adequacy of the current sentencing regime to deliver consistent sentences and evidence 
purporting to show that sentencing under the regime is inconsistent.   
The Law Commission took the view that inconsistency is virtually inevitable in a 
sentencing system with very wide sentencing discretion.  The argument was backed by an 
assertion of widespread anecdotal evidence of inconsistency and a comparison of 
substantial differences in sentencing outcomes for high volume offences between regions 
of the District Courts.  Opponents of guidelines rejected the argument that discretion leads 
to inconsistency.  They argued that discretion was needed to achieve fair treatment and just 
outcomes across the wide diversity of offending and offenders appearing for sentence.  As 
a corollary they argued that the observed differences from the Law Commission study 
were attributable to differences in the composition of caseloads between regions. 
The debate is largely unresolved but has gone into abeyance following the decision 
not to implement the legislation.  The principal aim of the current research was to examine 
the competing positions in an attempt to resolve or at least advance the debate.  Before 
embarking on a more rigorous examination of the evidence of inconsistency or the 
identification of compositional differences between regions, a framework for 
understanding sentencing disparity was developed.  The framework tracked how 
sentencing discretion could result in inconsistency of sentencing despite the operation of 
sentencing laws, appellate authorities and the moderating effect of sentence appeals. 
The framework has been likened to a chain linking discretion to inconsistency.  
Sentencing frameworks aim to bring consistency to sentencing outcomes but at the same 
time afford differing degrees of discretion to judges.  Discretion is allowed because of the 
challenges of sentence decision making to enable sentences to be fitted to circumstances.  
When decision makers are confronted with the challenges (complexity, incomplete 
information, uncertainty and time pressure) facing judges they are limited by “bounded 
rationality” and restricted to “satisficing” or making good enough decisions (Simon, 1976).  
In response decision makers, in this case judges, develop heuristic strategies or rules of 
thumb, to simplify and speed up decision making.  Sentencing discretion enables concerns 
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outside formal sentencing frameworks to influence outcomes, sentencing is a balance 
between formal rationalities based on the law or guidelines and substantive rationalities 
based on concerns, ideologies, attitudes, biases and individual interests (Savelsberg, 1992).  
It follows that if sentencing is a balance of rationalities that the content of any sentencing 
heuristic can be categorised into formal rationalities and substantive rational rationalities. 
These concepts explain how sentencing might vary between similar cases and between 
judges but it does not explain variation between locations.  Court community theory 
(Eisenstein & Jacobs, 1978; Eisenstein et al., 1988) and the commonality and sociality 
corollaries from personal construct psychology (Ostrom et al., 2004) bridge the gap.  Court 
community theory suggests that sentencing is influenced by the concerns and attitudes of 
the local courthouse community (the judges, prosecutors and defence counsel who 
regularly appeared in the same courtrooms) (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977) and by the 
concerns and attitudes of the wider community the court served (Eisenstein, Flemming & 
Nardulli, 1988).  The commonality corollary suggests that those who share a common 
environment are likely to make sense of it in similar ways.  Sentencing approaches 
converge between the judges in a locality because they share a similar set of experiences 
and observations.  Convergence is reinforced by the “sociality corollary” with those who 
work together on a regular basis sharing their experiences and approaches and anticipating 
and adopting the behaviour of others. 
A theoretical explanation is just that, a theory about how the system might work.  It 
does not of itself establish that the expected outcomes are actually manifested.  Based on 
the theory and the findings of research from the United States four predictions and two 
research questions were examined to test whether practical sentencing outcomes 
conformed to the theory.  The empirical testing focussed on the circuits of the District 
Courts and was undertaken in three stages.  The first stage addressed the two principal 
predictions: that after controlling for seriousness of offence, criminal history and offender 
demographic variables similar offenders will be sentenced differently between circuits.  
The second stage addressed two subsidiary predictions: that the weights applied to some or 
all of the seriousness of offence, criminal history or other variables will vary between 
circuits.  The subsidiary predictions were reliant on the support for the principal 
predictions and an assumption that seriousness of offence and criminal history variables 
will be the principal influences on the determination of sentence.  In the third stage the 
association between contextual variables at circuit level and sentencing variation between 
circuits was explored in an attempt to identify contextual variables that may have an 
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influence on sentencing approaches.  Each stage divided into two predictions or research 
questions because the research separately examined two distinct sentencing decisions: the 
use of incarceration and the length of incarceration.   
The sentencing of aggravated drink driving, males assaults female and burglary 
offending by resident judges in the 17 circuits of the District Courts was separately 
examined for each prediction and research question.  Differing forms of regression 
modelling appropriate to the sentencing decision and prediction or research question were 
employed.   
 The predictions were tested using a dataset specially assembled for this research.  
The base data was sourced from the Justice Data Warehouse, a store of raw data on 
offenders, charges, and charge outcomes maintained by the New Zealand Ministry of 
Justice.  The data in the warehouse was drawn from the Case Management System, an 
administrative system supporting the courts.  The base data was transformed into a set of 
cases for each offence.  Each case included information on the offender, information on the 
case, the sentence imposed, and the offender’s criminal history.  
 The research questions were examined using the case level data plus a series of 
circuit level contextual variables based on: socio-demographic data from the 2006 census; 
reports of caseflow and judicial sitting time; and measures of timeliness of case disposal 
derived from case dataset.  
 The present study advances the prior research in several ways.  In a New Zealand 
context it is the first study to examine consistency of sentencing between locations 
(circuits).  In the international context it is believed to be the first substantial study of the 
consistency of sentencing outside the United States.  It is distinct from contemporary 
United States research because it examines sentencing in a non-guideline system.  It differs 
from most studies because it looks separately at three diverse offences before drawing 
together the results thus enabling observation of any nuances that may be hidden in more 
broadly based research.   
 Like almost any study using statistical models the findings are sensitive to gaps in 
the models due to an absence of information resulting in variables being omitted from the 
analysis.  All of the models lack information on: positive post-offending behaviour 
(proactive steps toward reform); negative post-offending behaviour (e.g. attempts to 
influence witnesses); family responsibilities; employment status; occupation; or whether 
the offender was remanded in custody or was already a serving prisoner (these 
circumstances limit the choices available to the judge irrespective of the sentencing merits 
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of the case).  It is unlikely that the inclusion of controls for any of these generic variables 
factors would make a substantial difference to the differences between circuits.  To do so 
they would have to be disproportionately distributed across the circuits and the distribution 
would have to have a systematic relationship with incarceration rates or going rates for 
sentence lengths.   
Some offence specific variables were also omitted.  This was most significant for 
male assaults female.  The models do not have any variables representing the level of 
violence or the degree of injury or other harm.  The burglary models had no variables 
representing the degree of planning or premeditation, whether the premises were occupied, 
or any damage greater than that required to complete the burglary.  The aggravated drink 
driving models only partially accounted for driving behaviour (via the variables on other 
driving charges) but omitted any recognition of bad driving behaviour presented as an 
aggravating factor but not the subject of a separate charge.   
It was intended that these variables would be included in the sentence length 
models supported by information extracted from sentence notes.  However, as explained 
(Chapter 5 & Appendix D), problems with the uneven and non-random availability of 
sentence notes across the circuits precluded their use.  The sentence note data was analysed 
to gain an indication if inclusion of the variables would substantially improve each model 
and whether it would make a material difference to the estimation of the parameters for the 
circuit variables.  The results are presented in Appendix H.  The additional variables 
contributed to a material improvement to the male assaults female and burglary models but 
made little difference to the aggravated drink driving model.  The findings confirmed that 
the variables were relevant to the judges.  More importantly, however, there was no 
indication of a material change to the estimation of the parameters for the circuit variables.  
The lack of effect on the circuit variables supports a tentative conclusion that the omitted 
variables were relatively evenly distributed across the circuits.       
The balance of this chapter addresses the research findings, the policy implications 
arising from the findings and future research.   
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Inconsistency of Sentencing between Circuits 
The single level models demonstrate that the likelihood of incarceration and length of 
sentence vary between circuits for all three offences.  The findings strongly support 
Prediction 1 (likelihood of incarceration) and Prediction 2 (length of incarceration): after 
controlling for seriousness of offence, criminal history and offender demographic 
variables, similar offenders were sentenced differently between circuits.  The differences 
originally observed by the Law Commission (2006) cannot therefore be dismissed as the 
result of compositional differences between locations.   
 The results from the regression models varied between the three offences and 
between the sentencing decisions; the patterns of inconsistency are not a constant 
phenomenon irrespective of the offence.  More circuits had significantly different 
incarceration rates than the reference circuit for aggravated drink driving (14) and burglary 
(13) than male assaults female (7).  More circuits had significantly different sentence 
lengths than the reference circuit for burglary (14) than aggravated drink driving (7) and 
male assaults female (6).  While similar numbers of circuits were significantly different for 
both decisions for burglary (13 & 14) and male assaults female (7 & 6) there was a 
substantial difference for aggravated drink driving (14 & 7).   
The substance of the differences also varied between the offences and decisions.  In 
almost all instances statistically significant differences between a circuit and the reference 
circuit were substantial.  For aggravated drink driving the rates of incarceration ranged 
from 60 to 640% higher and one circuit was 40% lower8.  For burglary the rates of 
incarceration ranged from 80 to 150% higher.  For male assaults female the rates of 
incarceration ranged from 70 to 130% higher and one circuit was 60% lower.  For 
aggravated drink driving the length of incarceration ranged from 15.4 to 33% longer9.  For 
burglary the length of incarceration ranged from 21.2 to 43.2% longer and one circuit was 
18.5% lower.  For male assaults female the length of incarceration ranged from 1.5 to 
52.2% longer.  It was only male assaults female sentence length differences that were 
insubstantial, as four of the six significantly different circuits were less than one month 
higher than the reference circuit.  The differences in the rate of incarceration were 
proportionately greater than the differences in sentence length. 
                                                 
8 The proportionate differences were calculated from the relative risks in Chapter 6. 
9 The proportionate differences for each offence were calculated based on the unadjusted mean 
sentence lengths in months: aggravated drink driving (9.1); burglary (14.6); and male assaults 
female (6.7) 
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Furthermore the rank order of the circuits in one model was not a good predictor of 
a rank order in a related model (for the same decision between offences or between 
different decisions for the same offence).  In only two of the nine pairings was the rank 
order in one model a good predictor of the other.  The two were rates of incarceration for 
aggravated drink driving and burglary, and rate of incarceration and sentence length for 
burglary.  
The summation of the results by offence and decision indicates that the balance of 
formally rational considerations and substantively rational sentencing concerns varies 
between offences and decisions.  This suggests that judges do not share a common view of 
the proportionate relationship between offences across the circuits.  This is important 
because it suggests that any steps to increase the levels of consistency need to occur 
offence by offence rather than by generic change. 
As expected the models demonstrated that the circuit (location) was not the major 
determinant of sentence.  In all of the models offence seriousness and criminal history 
variables were the principal determinants of sentence.  The seriousness and criminal 
history factors dominated the improvement in prediction of incarceration, with 73.6% 
(aggravated drink driving), 91.8% (burglary) and 95.5% (male assaults female) of the 
improvement attributable to these factors.  Seriousness and criminal history factors 
accounted for the bulk of the variation in sentence length explained by the linear regression 
models, with 69.4% (male assaults female), 88.9% (aggravated drink driving) and 92.4% 
(burglary) of the variation attributable to these factors.  The extent to which sentence 
length was dependent on where an offender was sentenced varied between the offences. 
The estimates of the effect of gender and ethnicity on sentencing added to the 
understanding of sentencing and also varied between the offences.  In five of the models 
neither variable had a significant influence on sentencing.  The exception was the decision 
to incarcerate burglars, with male, Māori and Pacific offenders more likely to be 
incarcerated than similarly situated female or European offenders.  The models with no 
significant influence for gender and ethnicity variables indicate that the local substantively 
rational sentencing concerns are expressed via the offence seriousness and criminal history 
variables.  The judges are able to reach sentencing decisions based on legal factors; they do 
not resort to extra-legal factors because they cannot reach a conclusion.  These decisions 
are not significantly influenced by causal attributions (Albonetti, 1991) or perceptual 
shorthand (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  While legal factors dominate the determination of 
sentence for burglary there is evidence that judges have greater difficulty in deciding how 
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to sentence burglars who are on the cusp of incarceration or who might warrant a more 
lenient sentence due to the prospect of rehabilitation and reduced likelihood of re-
offending.     
The support for the predictions is consistent with the United States research, which 
has almost universally found that net of controls sentencing varies between locations.  The 
predominant role played by offence seriousness and criminal history factors is also 
consistent with the United States research.  The more pervasive role of gender and 
ethnicity in the determination of sentences in the United States was not matched in this 
study.  More detailed comparisons beyond these high level findings were not possible due 
to differences in the specifications of the models employed here and the United States 
research.  Because many of the United States studies have covered a range of offence types 
they may have “averaged” the effect of location on sentencing because the locations are 
not uniformly more or less severe across all the offence types.  In separately analysing 
individual offences, this study avoids the averaging effects due to inclusion of multiple 
offence types and may therefore have been able to identify a broader range of differences 
across locations.  The focus on individual offences in this research has allowed the 
modelling to be based on sentencing factors specifically chosen as relevant to that offence, 
thus potentially heightening the likelihood of differentiating one case from another.  Some 
United States studies have employed more generic factors that may result in less 
recognition of differences between cases.   
The results conform to expectations based on the framework for understanding 
sentencing decisions.  The effects of seriousness and criminal history variables are a 
tangible representation of the influence of formally rational considerations derived from 
the law and appellate authority.  The predominant influence of these factors indicates that 
the formally rational framework established in the law and appellate authorities is the core 
base for determination of sentences across the circuits.  Sentencing can be seen as a 
balance between formal and substantive rationalities.  The differences between circuits 
suggest that the substantive rationalities are embedded in local conditions. 
The significant differences between the circuits are evidence that the formally 
rational framework is not sufficient to achieve consistency and that sentencing is 
influenced by substantively rational sentencing concerns whose influence varies between 
circuits.  As predicted by Savelsberg (1992), judicial discretion allows for sentencing 
variation.  At one level this is precisely the purpose of discretion, it is intended to enable 
sentences to be crafted according to the particular facts of the case and the circumstances 
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of the offender.  Individualised sentencing is highly prized.  However, it is not intended 
that it should result in marked differences in the sentencing of similar cases for offenders 
in similar circumstances.  The finding of marked differences between circuits supports the 
propositions made by Ostrom et al. (2004) that the sentencing constructs of judges who 
share a common environment are likely to be similar and that the similarity will be 
increased to the extent that the constructs are shared.  Through these means distinct local 
sentencing norms and ‘going rates’ are formed.     
 
Variation between Circuits in the Interpretation and Use of Sentencing Factors 
Having established the predicted variation in sentencing between circuits and the expected 
role of offence seriousness and criminal history variables as the principal determinants of 
sentence the modelling moved to the second stage.  The multi-level random co-efficient 
models demonstrate variations between the circuits in the weight given to a range of 
variables for the determination of sentences.  The findings support Prediction 3 (likelihood 
of incarceration) and Prediction 4 (length of incarceration): the weight applied to some 
offence seriousness, criminal history or other variables differed between circuits.  The level 
of support varied substantially between the offences.  The aggravated drink driving and 
burglary models offered strong support but the male assaults female models provided 
partial support and need to be treated with caution.   
When determining whether an aggravated drink driver should be incarcerated the 
differences in the sentencing approaches between the circuits was located in differences in 
the weights placed on variables indicating the seriousness of the current drink driving 
offending or the offender’s history of drink driving.  Variables directly addressing drink 
driving seriousness and criminal history were also significant among the variables whose 
weight differed between circuits in the determination of sentence length for aggravated 
drink driving.  In addition circuits differed in the weight placed on the overall seriousness 
of the wider case when determining sentence length.  The criminal history variables whose 
influence varied between circuits differed between the two decisions.  The variables of 
interest for the incarceration decision were the number and timing of prior drink drive 
convictions whereas treatment of the number of prior convictions and the longest prior 
term of imprisonment for drink driving varied between circuits in the determination of 
sentence length.   
Circuits differed in the weight placed on the seriousness of the wider case, the 
speed of resolution, criminal history for burglary and serious dishonesty and recent 
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convictions for breaches of sentence when determining whether a burglary offender should 
be incarcerated.  The range of variables with different weights for the determination of 
sentence length differed from the incarceration decision.  The only common variable was 
prior convictions for serious dishonesty.  Circuits differed in the weight placed on the 
number of current burglaries being sentenced and whether the offender was also being 
sentenced for a breach of sentence.  Circuits also differed in the weight placed on the 
longest prior term of imprisonment for burglary.  It is notable that there was no difference 
between circuits in the weight placed on gender or ethnicity in deciding whether to 
incarcerate a burglar.  This indicates that the effects found in stage one are similar across 
the circuits with males, Māori and Pacific offenders more likely to be incarcerated than 
similarly situated females or European offenders irrespective of circuit.  
Circuits differed in weights placed in two variables when determining whether an 
offender should be incarcerated for male assaults female and a single variable in the 
determination of sentence length.  Circuits placed differing weights on prior convictions 
for male assaults female and the offender’s wider criminal history (as evidenced by a prior 
incarceration for any offence) when deciding whether to incarcerate.  Circuits placed 
differing weight on the way a charge was laid in the determination of sentence length.  In 
general indictable charges are laid for more serious offending; consequently the way a 
charge is laid can be interpreted as a measure of seriousness.  
The findings from the male assaults female models may be due to several 
limitations.  The lower incarceration rate for the offence may restrict the degree of 
difference when the sentencing decision is cast this way.  This effect may have been 
exacerbated if a substantial proportion of incarcerations were due to restriction of 
sentencing choices because the offender spent time remanded in custody or was already a 
serving prisoner.  The real incarceration rate representing the exercise of discretion may 
have been lower.  The narrowness of male assaults female as just one slice of the spectrum 
of physical assaults may have limited the opportunity for ready identification of differences 
in approach.  This effect may have limited the sentence length model.  The sentence length 
model may also have been limited by the smaller number of observations.     
The models add depth to the understanding of the influence of formal and 
substantive rationalities.  First, they demonstrate, consistent with theory, that the weight 
given to formally rational variables can and does vary between locations.  The absence of 
any random effects for either the gender or the ethnicity factors in the in-out model for 
burglary demonstrates that substantive rationalities can apply generally across locations 
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and do not always vary between locations.  When the influence of substantive rationalities 
is expressed through formally rational sentencing factors the effect is indirect and largely 
hidden.  Judges appear to be expressing their sentences in similar terms having followed a 
consistent framework but arrive at a different sentence.  A focus on the framework may 
therefore lead to an erroneous impression that sentencing is consistent.  Had the models 
only shown fixed effects it would have been inferred that the inconsistency was associated 
with other variables not represented in the models.  It is probable nonetheless that a portion 
of the inconsistency is due to variables that were not modelled.  
The models for aggravated drink driving and for burglary each identified four or 
five factors that were applied differently across the circuits in determining whether to 
incarcerate and how long a sentence of incarceration should be.  For both offences the 
variables were a subset of those indicated by the models as most influential in determining 
the sentence.  In contrast the male assaults female models were more limited, identifying 
one variable with random effects for the determination of sentence length and two for the 
use of incarceration.  The variables were not the most influential variables in the models.   
Further discussion can only be hypothetical.  The differences between circuits in 
the sentencing constructs for aggravated drink driving and burglary are suggestive of 
differences in the sentences required to hold an offender to account, or the need to protect 
the community from the offender, or a combination of both.  The differing weights placed 
on criminal history variables in five of the six models suggests that variation in the 
custodial threshold between circuits is at least partially based on differences of view about 
what characterises a recidivist offender, and in the uplift in sentence warranted for past 
offending.  Alternatively, sentencing approaches may differ because views of the 
seriousness of the offence type differ, with the difference practically expressed in 
differences in the likelihood of incarceration and lengths of incarceration in similar cases.  
Sentencing approaches may also vary because of localised differences in views on the best 
way to deal with some types of offending.  The establishment of Family Violence Courts in 
some locations and not others are a practical example of this effect.  
The models indicate that there appears to common agreement on what factors to 
take into account but there is less agreement on the significance of the factors for the 
incarceration decision and the determination of the length of sentence.     
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Associations between Circuit Context and Sentencing Variation 
The third stage of this study attempted to identify some of the contextual differences 
between circuits that may have influenced the differences in approach.  The limited 
number of circuits severely limited the exploratory modelling that could be undertaken, 
with a separate model having to be estimated for each contextual variable.  The high levels 
of multi-collinearity between the contextual variables limited any conclusions that could be 
drawn. 
 Some effect was found for many of the variables that were modelled.  Significant 
effects were found in one or more models for: all five demographic and socio-economic 
variables; four of the seven generic caseload and caseflow variables; all four offence 
specific variables; and for the variable distinguishing metropolitan and provincial circuits.  
The models demonstrate that whether offenders were sentenced in a metropolitan 
or provincial context was significant.  Aggravated drink drivers and burglars were more 
likely to be incarcerated and burglars to receive longer sentences in provincial circuits.  
This was the most significant finding because the metropolitan and provincial circuit 
categories were distinguished from one another by many of the other variables that had 
significant bivariate effects.  These variables provide some limited insight into the more 
specific aspects of the two types of circuit associated with sentencing variation between 
circuits.  The weight that can be placed on any particular variable is limited by multi-
collinearity between the variables.  The differences may be due to a complex combination 
of the variables or one variable may be dominant.  
Two of the considerations raised in the research literature concerning size resonate 
as partial explanations for more lenient sentencing in metropolitan circuits.  More routine 
sentencing is said to be likely to be less visible in metropolitan (larger) circuits, it is less 
likely to come under scrutiny and less likely to be subject to criticism for being soft or to 
calls for judges to be more punitive.  Secondly, metropolitan (larger) circuits are likely to 
attract a more diverse population with attendant wider range of behaviour, including more 
diverse deviant behaviour, promoting greater tolerance generally and in sentencing in 
particular.  Greater diversity is one of the distinguishing features separating metropolitan 
and provincial circuits.  Under a racial threat hypothesis this would result in more severe 
sentencing.  The modelling results did not support the racial threat hypothesis. The results 
might indicate however, that the proportionate size of ethnic minorities has passed a 
threshold as suggested by Crow and Gertz (2008).  In combination these factors all point to 
the possibility that the social politics of residents in metropolitan circuits may be more 
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liberal and permissive than in provincial circuits which may exhibit more conservative 
attitudes including a lower tolerance of deviance and being tougher on law and order.     
The influence of distinctions in the social politics and socio-economic make-up of 
metropolitan and provincial circuits may explain the counter-intuitive results found for 
caseflow and caseload factors in the bivariate analyses of effects.  For instance, faster 
resolution of aggravated drink driving and burglary cases was associated with higher use of 
incarceration.  Ordinarily faster resolution would indicate taking of responsibility, remorse 
and an earlier guilty plea and would be expected to be associated with more lenient 
sentencing.  Conversely, a higher trial rate for all offending in general was associated with 
lower use of incarceration for all three offences.  Ordinarily going to trial suggests the 
offender has not taken responsibility, is not remorseful, and does not attract any benefit 
from pleading guilty and would be expected to be associated with more severe sentencing.  
In this research faster resolution was found in the provincial circuits and higher trial rates 
were found in the metropolitan circuits.  These two findings are linked, more cases going 
to trial should, all other things equal, result in slower resolution of cases.  However, the 
expected effects on sentence severity were not demonstrated.  This strongly suggests that 
the influence of the views, preferences and attitudes of the local courthouse community 
and wider local community differs between metropolitan and provincial circuits and 
outweighs the influence of caseflow and caseload factors.  This may have flow-on effects 
with defendants in provincial circuits pleading guilty at higher rates to take advantage of 
the mitigation effects of an early plea to avoid more severe sentences whereas defendants 
in metropolitan circuits may be less concerned about sentences and more willing to go to 
trial.   
 
Sentencing Heuristics 
The research enables some limited observations to be made about the operation and 
content of sentencing heuristics.  The first is that separate heuristics apply to the 
determination of sentence type, in this case whether to incarcerate or not, and sentence 
length.  The separation is evident in the content of the single level models addressing 
consistency of sentencing; different combinations are used to decide on the two 
components of the sentence.  The distinction between the two decisions is consistent with 
the operation of a planning heuristic; the determination of sentence is broken into separate 
decisions. 
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 The second observation is that the content of the heuristics differs between circuits.  
This is evident in the random effects models that demonstrate differences in the 
interpretation and use of a range of significant sentencing factors.  The models provide an 
indication of the core variables that lie at the heart of the differences in the heuristics 
applied in the circuits but do not give any indication of the spread of the differences or the 
particular nature of the differences.  The best means of extending understanding of the 
sentencing heuristics would be to discuss the research with the judges and to seek from 
them a description of the influence of the factors on the custodial threshold and the 
contribution the factors make to the determination of the quantum of the sentence.    
 The more severe sentencing in provincial circuits compared to metropolitan circuits 
is a clear indication of differences in heuristics between those two groupings.  However, it 
does not reveal whether the heuristics are similar within each grouping or whether they just 
result in more similar sentencing outcomes that are arrived at in different ways.  
Discussion of the results of the research and description of the influence of the various 
factors on the two sentencing decisions may elucidate greater insight into the degree of 
similarity between the two groupings.  It is possible that the degree of similarity will vary 
by offence.  The wider spread of odds ratios for aggravated drink driving compared to the 
clustering of odds ratios for burglary suggests this may well be the case.  
 
The Policy Implications 
The findings of this research have significant implications for the judiciary and for 
sentencing policy makers.  The current sentencing framework seems to have worked 
effectively to inform judges about what factors to take into account.  This is evidenced by 
the significant role offence seriousness and criminal history factors play in sentencing.  
However, the statutory framework and appellate authority have not been sufficient to avoid 
substantial inconsistency between circuits by bringing about common sentencing 
approaches.  In other words, judges use relevant formally rational sentencing 
considerations as the basis for sentencing decisions but their use is influenced by 
substantively rational sentencing concerns based on local conditions.  The sentencing 
discretion seeking to enable individualisation of sentences has had the unintended 
consequence of allowing systematic differences to arise between circuits.  This situation 
has the potential to bring sentencing and justice into disrepute if it is not corrected.  What 
is needed is a solution that rebalances the influence of formal and substantive rationalities 
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but does not replace undue flexibility with undue rigidity preventing individualised 
sentencing in any circumstance.    
The discussion of contextual differences between circuits and the distinction 
between metropolitan and provincial circuits provides an indication of the possible factors 
underlying the differences in policy between circuits but does not offer direct options for 
change.  None of the contextual factors are amenable to adjustment to achieve greater 
consistency.  Although this may seem self-evident it is important because it points to the 
need to find a solution by addressing the guidance given to judges when dealing with 
individual cases.   
The observation of statistically and substantively significant variations between 
circuits in the use and length of incarceration supports the theory that inconsistency can be 
expected in a sentencing regime that features wide discretion, with guidance primarily 
focussed on process but not on substantive sentencing.  The Sentencing Act 2002 provides 
the judges with general guidance on the process of sentencing, providing purposes and 
principles to guide the sentencing process and lists of factors to take into account, but it 
offers little guidance on how to transform the seriousness of offending, the offender’s 
culpability and the offender’s personal characteristics into an actual sentence.  In the 
absence of substantive guidance on the custodial threshold or the weight to be given to 
sentencing factors in determining the length of sentence, judges form personal sentencing 
constructs which converge into circuit level constructs. 
The offence based models employed in the current research strongly indicate that 
any additional guidance needs to be offence based.  The variation in the relative influence 
of different categories of sentencing factors suggests that generic guidance is impractical. 
In the contemporary context there are two options for the provision for more 
detailed offence based sentencing guidance.  The first option is to extend the coverage of 
guideline judgments to a wider range of offending moving away from the focus on the 
most serious offences.  The second option is to revisit the Sentencing Council and 
implement the legislative framework for the Council and the development of sentencing 
guidelines.   
The Sentencing Council option has a number of advantages over an extension of 
guideline judgments.  As Chambers J said, the guideline judgment process does not enable 
the depth of research or consultation that accompanies other policy making processes 
(Hall, 2008).  If the Sentencing Council guideline development process was implemented 
as it stands in the legislation the guidelines would be subject to public consultation.  It is 
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likely that a Sentencing Council would seek and receive feedback from the legal 
profession; the Court of Appeal cannot do this.  The Sentencing Council would include 
representation from the High and District Courts.  This is important because it includes 
sentencing judges who can bring a direct and contemporary experiential voice to the 
process.   
The Court of Appeal has a limited capacity to issue guideline judgments; it must 
give attention to the individual appeals made to it in a timely fashion.  A Sentencing 
Council is focussed on the issuing of guidance, although part of its focus may be on the 
determination of guidelines for the release of prisoners on parole.   
To be effective the guideline judgment procedure would need major changes and 
would likely require legislative backing to enable a process that mirrors the advantages of a 
Sentencing Council.  Even with changes to achieve this, to enable the Court to issue 
guidelines free of any appeal, to consult and consider responses, and to monitor sentencing, 
it would require an increase in judges and support staff and there would still be a residual 
difficulty.  A continuation and extension of guideline judgments leaves responsibility for 
the development of most of the content of sentencing policy with the Judiciary.  Currently 
the Judiciary decide where the line separating community sentences from incarceration lies 
and the appropriate quantum increases in sentence lengths for incarcerated offenders.  The 
Executive (via Parliament) and Parliament can only exercise crude control over policy 
either by providing general guidance or by imposing more rigid set sentences such as those 
entailed by the three strikes regime.  There is no good reason for judicial control of 
sentencing policy.  The correction of perceived deficiencies in judicial policies by broad 
brush crude changes is undesirable and likely to result in a new form of inconsistency with 
one size fits all sentences resulting is vastly different offending and offenders being treated 
as if they are the same.  It would be preferable to have a mechanism that allows the 
Government of the day and Parliament to exercise more direct control over sentencing 
policy.  A guideline process that requires guidelines to be ratified by Parliament can meet 
this requirement. 
It would be optimistic to expect that all guidelines will achieve consistency or 
achieve the sentencing outcomes expected by the framers of the guideline.  To avoid the 
pitfalls of one size fits all and the practical difficulty of catering for all cases in the 
guidelines, judges must have sufficient sentencing discretion to impose sentences outside 
the guidelines in individual cases but not to formulate distinct sentencing policies that 
conflict with the guidelines.  To cater for more exceptional cases such as those warranting 
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mercy or a more severe sentence to protect the community a departure regime is required.  
The American experience is testimony to the reality that a guideline regime with some 
sentencing discretion allows inconsistency.  
There are however strategies that can be followed to minimise any resultant 
inconsistency.  The Sentencing Council must have the capability to monitor sentencing 
patterns and to review the working of individual guidelines.  It must provide feedback on 
sentencing patterns to judges, prosecutors and defence counsel.  Doing so may have the 
effect of curbing excessive differences.  The Council must also be open to and actively 
seek feedback from the users of guidelines. 
Sentencing guidelines are a heuristic device designed to overcome some of the 
challenges of sentencing.  Guidelines provide a framework for organising sentencing 
decisions in a coherent way across cases, judges and circuits.  By focussing on offence and 
offender based factors intended to be used to determine sentences and giving guidance 
about the range of sentences applicable for combinations of the central factors for each 
offence the balance between formal and substantive rationalities can be altered.  The 
influence of formal rationality should increase at the expense of substantive rationalities 
based on local conditions and social politics.  The extent to which justice is done in the 
sense of treating similar cases in a similar way will increase. 
 
Future Research 
The discussion of future research is broken into two sections.  First, a discussion of the 
lessons learnt during the conduct of the research that may benefit others in the design of 
research is provided.  Second, there is a discussion of the future directions and 
opportunities for sentencing research. 
 
Lessons 
Four broad lessons can be taken from this research.  The first lesson involves the selection 
of offences to be addressed in research of this type.  Based on the criteria employed male 
assaults female appeared to be a viable offence.  However, insufficient account was given 
to the importance of the offence standing alone.  Male assaults female is just one offence 
that is part of the wider array of physical assaults.  In New Zealand the array of physical 
assaults is detailed with offences with maximum penalties of 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 
years, 5 years, 7 years, 10 years and 14 years.  At the margins prosecuting agencies have to  
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decide which offence to charge, and these decisions may vary systematically from place to 
place.  This variation may account for unexplained variation in sentencing.  The obvious 
solution would be to treat physical assaults as a single offence grouping.  This would have 
the incidental benefit of allowing the inclusion of the offence type as a broad proxy 
variable for the seriousness of offending. 
A second lesson drawn from the modelling of male assaults female is that a 12% 
incarceration rate may not be sufficient to support effective modelling of the in-out or 
sentence length decisions.  Any investigation of inconsistency may be better directed to a 
lower threshold, perhaps addressing the split between community sentences and monetary 
penalties.  It is acknowledged that any such research would have to address factors such as 
the ability to pay which would require access to data that was not available for this 
research.  
The third lesson was the validation of the decision to disaggregate the research to 
address sentencing according to offence type and decision type.  The separation of decision 
types is common in sentencing research but the consideration of distinct offences is much 
less common.  If the decision types had not been separated it would not have been possible 
to identify that gender and ethnicity were influential in the use of incarceration for burglary 
but not the determination of sentence length.  The varying results found in this research 
demonstrate that the factors influencing sentence are not pervasive irrespective of offence. 
This is exemplified by the finding that gender and ethnicity were only significant for 
burglary but not aggravated drink driving or male assaults female.  Wider groupings of 
offences should be approached with caution because effects may be averaged out and 
important distinctions could go unobserved.     
 The fourth lesson is particular to New Zealand.  This research identified the risks of 
using sentence notes.  The uneven availability of sentence notes across the circuits was a 
practical problem peculiar to this research and could be overcome in future research.  
However, the variable quality of the content with some sentence notes providing no 
information linking the offence and the offender with the sentence and others providing a 
very detailed explanation of the basis for the sentence cannot be easily overcome.  In 
future, researchers may be better off seeking access to the statements of fact, pre-sentence 
reports and sentencing submissions that inform the determination of the sentence. 
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Future directions 
Because there is no tradition of sentencing research using large scale regression models in 
New Zealand, there is a multitude of opportunities for future research stemming from this 
study.  The following suggestions are those that are most closely tied to the current 
research.  Researchers could examine whether:  
1) there is any evidence of inconsistency in sentencing between judges within the 
same circuit, thus addressing whether personal sentencing constructs vary between 
judges in the same circuit or whether the convergence at circuit level eliminates any 
judge level variation;  
2) there is any evidence of variation in sentencing between courts within the same 
circuit when offenders are sentenced by resident judges, addressing whether the 
location of the court in the circuit has any influence on sentencing within the 
circuit; 
3) there is any evidence of any change in sentencing approach within a circuit when 
there are changes of judicial personnel, and in particular whether any changes vary 
with the size of the circuit;  
4) guideline judgments influence sentencing consistency between circuits; 
5) circuit level inconsistency of sentencing extends to the selection of sentences at 
lower levels in the sentencing hierarchy; or  
6) circuit level inconsistency extends to the application of specific sentences, in 
particular the use of supervision sentences, the hours of community work, the size 
of monetary penalties or the use of conviction and discharge or discharge without 
conviction.  
There are many other possible avenues for research.  Research designed to extend 
understanding of the effects of gender and ethnicity could be undertaken.  The research 
could take in a wider range of offence types and seek to identify whether there are any 
patterns in the influence of these factors.  The research could be extended to take account 
of interaction effects between demographic variables and between demographic variables 
and other sentencing variables. 
With the agreement of the Judiciary research could be undertaken into the 
relationship between judges’ backgrounds and sentencing outcomes to determine whether 
any aspect(s) of the judges’ backgrounds are influential in the formation of personal 
sentencing constructs and whether similarities are evident between the judges resident in 
the same circuit. 
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There are no real opportunities to overcome the limited ability to investigate 
contextual differences between circuits.  Research using the individual courts as an 
intermediate level of analysis is not feasible because the judges are not nested within 
courts, just within circuits. With the agreement of the Judiciary there may be greater 
opportunity to analyse context at the judge level but this may also be limited by the 
numbers of offenders sentenced per judge and would entail a need to cover a range of 
offences in the same model. 
The understanding of sentencing disparity could be advanced by undertaking 
qualitative research to add judicial, prosecutorial or defence counsel perspectives on 
sentencing and their responses to the findings of this quantitative research.  Interviews with 
these key participants may provide greater understanding of the forces behind differences 
in sentencing between metropolitan and provincial circuits. 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis reports the first large scale systematic study of sentencing consistency in New 
Zealand.  The results are clear.  There were statistically significant differences between 
circuits in the approach to sentencing for all three of the high volume offences sentenced in 
the District Courts that were the subject of regression models.  The sentences imposed on 
similar offenders who offended in similar situations differed substantially depending on 
where in New Zealand an offender was sentenced for aggravated drink driving, male 
assaults female or burglary.  The differences were not merely statistically significant, they 
were also substantively significant.  The reliability of this finding is strengthened because 
of the detailed list of sentencing variables able to be included in the models.  Those who 
rejected the evidence of inconsistency claiming it was the consequence of compositional 
differences in caseload were wrong. 
Consistent with prior research and theory, the decision to incarcerate and the length 
of incarceration were strongly influenced by legally relevant variables relating to offence 
seriousness and the criminal history of offenders.  Judges do not need guidance on what to 
take into account, as the models suggest there is already substantial agreement on that.  
The difficulty lies in the application of the factors, the determination of what level of 
offending warrants a step up the hierarchy of sentences and the determination of the 
quantum of sentence. 
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The mixed results in relation to the impact of gender and ethnicity suggests, 
consistent with theory, that when judges are uncertain of how to proceed they may be 
swayed by stereotypical views based on gender and ethnicity. 
The findings of this research have significant implications for the judiciary and for 
sentencing policy makers.  The current sentencing framework seems to have worked 
effectively to inform judges about what factors to take into account.  This is evidenced by 
the significant role offence seriousness and criminal history factors play in sentencing.  
However, the statutory framework and the results of appeals have not been sufficient to 
bring about common sentencing approaches for these three offences.  This situation has the 
potential to bring sentencing and justice into disrepute if it is not addressed and corrected. 
The distinctive nature of offences, the differing content of the models presented in 
this thesis, and the history of guideline judgments all point to the need for some form of 
offence-based guidance.  The guidance needs to extend beyond the narrow range of 
offences currently covered by guideline judgments.  The implementation of the Sentencing 
Council and the development of sentencing guidelines would enable guidelines to be 
introduced relatively quickly and enable timely periodic rapid revisions. 
Without change the current sentencing regime with wide discretion in the pursuit of 
individualised justice will continue to result in widespread injustice as similar offenders 
being sentenced for similar offending receive different sentences dependent on where they 
are sentenced.  As the analysis of burglary sentencing shows, the inconsistency can also 
manifest itself as differing treatment of offenders depending on gender or ethnicity.   
None of these findings and recommendations should be taken as a criticism of the 
judiciary.  Judges are not deliberately acting arbitrarily or outside the rules.  Inconsistency 
occurs despite the best efforts of judges to do justice across all the offenders who appear 
before them.  The inconsistency is the outcome of a system that in seeking to ensure 
individualised justice provides too little guidance.  The assumption that wide discretion is 
needed to deal with the infinite variety of cases is sorely tested.  The focus on the notion 
that every case is unique overlooks the prospect that for many offence types and offenders 
the similarities outweigh the differences.  Failure to recognise this, and the failure to 
provide guidance, has left judges having to fill in the gap for themselves.  The consistency 
that Hall (1991) described as inherent in the rule of law is not achieved, and the rule of law 
has broken down, arguably creating the manifest injustice that Ashworth (1998) thought 
capable of bringing a sentencing system into disrepute.  The sentence an offender gets 
should not be influenced by their gender, ethnicity or where they are sentenced.     
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Appendix A 
Sentencing Variability Associated with Socio-demographic Factors 
Much of the early research work investigating sentencing disparity focussed on 
demographic factors, and in particular on the race/ethnicity of the offender.  A substantial 
amount has also addressed gender/sex and age has also featured.  These variables have 
appeared have control factors in much of the research on geographic disparity, the 
importance of these controls is demonstrated by the incidence of statistically significant 
influence found in the models.  There has only been limited research exploring socio-
economic status, information on income, employment and educational attainment is not 
readily available.  This review uses the terms employed by the authors when referring to 
specific studies and otherwise uses the terms ethnicity and gender as these are the terms 
employed in official conviction and sentencing statistics in New Zealand. 
The direct influence of ethnicity on sentencing 
Driven, in part, by the overrepresentation of certain ethnic and racial groups in the prison 
population, many studies have examined whether the ethnicity or race of an offender leads 
to different sentencing outcomes for similar offending. Johnson (2011) concluded that 
contemporary research in the United States indicates that black and Hispanic offenders are 
often disadvantaged at sentencing but the disadvantage is not systemic and seems to be 
limited to certain contexts.  A substantial narrative review (Spohn, 2000) and a meta-
analysis (Mitchell & Mackenzie, 2004) illustrate the effects described by Johnson (2011). 
Spohn (2000) conducted a narrative review of the effects of race (black vs. white 
offenders) and ethnicity (Hispanic vs. white offenders) on sentencing following sentencing 
reforms seeking to establish a racially unbiased system. Spohn (2000) reviewed 40 studies 
published between 1983 and 2000.  Prior reviews had found that race only exerted a 
modest effect on sentencing once controls for legally relevant factors were employed 
(Spohn, 2000).  However, these reviews tended to be based on studies from the 1970s and 
earlier and thus reflected a different sentencing system and did not measure contemporary 
sentencing outcomes reflecting reforms such as the introduction of guidelines, determinate 
sentencing and mandatory minimums.   
Spohn (2000) determined that a group was treated more severely or leniently if the 
parameter estimate for the group was statistically significant at p < .05 level.  When this 
threshold was applied to sentencing in state courts Spohn (2000) found blacks were 
sentenced more severely than whites 41 times, more leniently 4 times and there was no 
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significant difference in 50 of 95 contrasts.  Hispanic offenders were sentenced more 
severely than whites 8 times, more leniently 2 times and there was no significant difference 
in 19 of 29 contrasts.  At Federal level blacks were sentenced more severely in 15 of 22 
contrasts and Hispanics more severely in 10 of 21 contrasts.  Neither blacks nor Hispanics 
were sentenced more leniently in any of the Federal level studies.   
The findings varied between contrasts of the in-out decision, sentence length and 
those based on other measures of severity.  At state level 30 of the 57 contrasts of the in-
out decision resulted in blacks or Hispanics being sentenced more severely, whereas only 
10 of 53 contrasts resulted in longer sentences.  At Federal level the results were more 
balanced with 6 of 14 in-out decision contrasts and 8 of 17 sentence length contrasts 
resulting in more severe sentences for blacks or Hispanics.  In 10 of 14 contrasts at state 
level and 11 of 12 contrasts at Federal level blacks or Hispanics were less likely to receive 
downward departures, more likely to be treated as habitual offenders, less likely to avoid a 
mandatory minimum sentence, and less likely to receive a reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility. 
Based on the totality of these results Spohn (2000) concluded that black and 
Hispanic offenders sentenced at state level and in the Federal system face higher odds of 
incarceration and in some jurisdictions longer sentences and lower chances of downward 
departure.   
Mitchell and Mackenzie (2004) took the assessment of the wider body of research a 
step further, undertaking a meta-analysis of sentencing studies at state and Federal level.  
The analysis covered 122 distinct sentencing contexts drawn from 71 studies, yielding 430 
effect sizes or contrasts that could be separately coded and standardised to enable results 
for dichotomous dependent variables (the in-out decision or departure decisions) and 
interval level or continuous dependent variables (sentence length, the amount of a 
reduction for departure) to be combined.  Two-thirds of the contrasts compared African 
Americans and whites and 25% compared Latinos and whites. 
The results across the studies were mixed, with a high proportion finding that 
minorities were sentenced more severely.  African Americans were sentenced more 
severely than whites in 83% of the contrasts across the Federal system and 77% of 
contrasts across state systems and Latinos were sentenced more severely than whites in 
72% of the contrasts across both Federal and state systems.  Using multivariate analysis 
Mitchell and Mackenzie (2004) found that the random effects mean odds ratio for African-
Americans was 1.28 (p < .01) across the studies of state systems.  Across the Federal 
243 
 
system studies the odds ratio was 1.15 but it was not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p = .093).  For Latinos it was 1.18 (p < .01) across Federal and state 
systems combined.  Whites were the reference category for these contrasts.   
Mitchell and Mackenzie (2004) described the results as demonstrating that 
minorities were sentenced more severely but also described the effect as small and highly 
variable.  To provide an indication of the relative size of the effect they said that if the 
incarceration rate for white offenders was 50% the rate for African-Americans would be 
56% in the state courts and 53% in the Federal courts.  The rate across both systems 
combined would be 54% for Latinos compared to the hypothetical 50% for whites.   
The importance of context is demonstrated by results disaggregated by offence and 
time period by Mitchell and Mackenzie (2004) and Mitchell (2005).  Mitchell and 
Mackenzie (2004) found that when the odds ratios for Federal studies were calculated by 
offence type the odds ratio for property offences was 1.32 (p > .01) but for drugs it was 
only 1.08 and not significant.  When Mitchell (2005) re-analysed the data taking account of 
the introduction of the Federal guidelines, limiting the analysis to studies based on data 
series with a mid-point in or after 1987 (the year the guidelines were introduced) the odds 
ratio for drugs increased to 1.44 and was higher than for property offences 1.35. 
The reviews of the literature generally conclude that racial disparities in sentencing 
exist (e.g., Mitchell & Mackenzie, 2004; Mitchell, 2005; Spohn, 2000), but that the overall 
magnitude of racial effects tends to be relatively small.  The variation in studies reported 
by both Spohn (2000) and Mitchell and Mackenzie (2004) confirms Johnson’s (2011) 
general conclusion that the sentencing disadvantage is not systemic but seems to be limited 
to certain contexts. 
Outside of the United States there has only been a limited amount of research.  
Research on ethnic differences in sentencing outcomes has generated mixed results in 
Australia.  Two studies of the in-out decision in Western Australia (Bond & Jeffries, 
2011), and New South Wales (Snowball & Weatherburn, 2006) found no statistically 
significant differences after controlling for legal factors. In South Australia Jeffries and 
Bond (2009) found that indigenous offenders were less likely to be incarcerated, reporting 
an odds ratio of 0.49 (p < .05), but were likely to receive sentences 1.21 times longer (p < 
.05) than non-indigenous offenders after controlling for legal factors.  The small size and 
weak controls for offence seriousness suggests these findings should be treated with 
caution.  A second New South Wales study (Snowball & Weatherburn, 2007) reported that 
a model controlling for indigenous status and sex showed that the odds of incarceration for 
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indigenous offenders were 2.76 greater than non-indigenous but when controls for offence 
seriousness and criminal history were added the odds were 1.17  (p < .05) times greater.  A 
study of sentence length on New South Wales offenders sentenced to imprisonment in 
2003 and 2004 found that indigenous offenders received slightly shorter sentences in the 
lower courts (incident risk ratio = 0.963, p < .05) but no significant difference in the higher 
courts (Bond et al., 2011).   
Two Canadian studies on the influence of indigeneity on sentencing across a 
variety of contexts found little evidence of a direct effect (Weinrath, 2007; Welsh & 
Ogloff, 2008).  In a study of the sentencing of young offenders Latimer and Foss (2005) 
found no effect in the likelihood of incarceration but did find that indigenous young 
offenders were likely to receive sentences 1.5 times longer than non-indigenous (p < .01).  
However, this result was challenged by Doob and Sprott (2007) who found that the model 
was mis-specified because it failed to take account of regional differences, sentence 
lengths were similar in different places but the proportion of indigenous offenders varied 
from place to place.   
Only one New Zealand study (Triggs, 1999) has addressed the direct influence of 
ethnicity on sentencing.  Ethnicity was one of 14 factors in a logistic regression model 
addressing the probability of imprisonment for offenders sentenced in 1995.  Neither 
Māori nor Pacific offenders were more likely to be imprisoned than Pakeha (European), 
though both Māori and Pacific offenders were significantly (p < .001) less likely to be 
fined and more likely to receive other non-custodial sentencing options like periodic 
detention and community service (Triggs, 1999).  Triggs (1999) recognised that these 
results may be due to differences in the ability to pay fines, which was a factor that could 
not be controlled for in her study. 
The Canadian, Australian and New Zealand research on indigenous offenders 
differs from the United States research on race.  In a review of research on the impact of 
indigenous status on sentencing outcomes in the United States, Canada, and Australia, 
Jeffries and Bond (2012) found that the empirical evidence was mixed with some studies 
finding that indigenous offenders were treated more leniently and others that they were 
treated more severely and suggested that the differences may be reflective of differences in 
the political and social contexts for indigenous people in different jurisdictions.  Jeffries 
and Bond (2012) also cautioned that the findings in some studies might be modified if 
there was better measurement of key variables describing criminal history, aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and the offenders’ social background. 
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Sentencing variability associated with gender or sex 
Research examining or controlling for the influence of gender or sex on sentencing 
outcomes has consistently found that women tend to receive less severe sanctions than men 
for like offences (e.g., Blackwell, Holleran & Finn, 2008; Jeffries et al., 2003; 
Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2001), leading Farrell, Ward and Rousseau (2010, pp. 85-86) to 
suggest that “leniency toward women has become an almost accepted phenomenon among 
scholars studying criminal case processing.”  Zatz (2000) in a review of the literature 
found that the difference between the sexes was greatest for the in-out decision with lesser 
effects on sentence length.   
Twenty-four of the studies from the United States included in this review controlled 
for gender (Albonetti, 1997; Albonetti & Baller, 2010; Britt, 2000; Crow & Gertz, 2008; 
Everett & Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Farrell et al, 2010; Fearn, 2005; Johnson, 2005 & 2006; 
Kautt, 2002; Kautt & Delone, 2006; Ostrom et al., 2004; Pasko, 2002; Sharp, 2007; Spohn, 
2000; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer, 2005; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Ulmer & Kramer, 
1996; Ulmer & Light, 2010; Weidner & Frase, 2003; Weidner, Frase & Schultz, 2005; 
Wheeler, Weisburd & Bode 1982).   
Females were significantly less likely to be incarcerated in 29 out of 33 contrasts in 
the 20 studies that addressed the in-out decision.  None of the studies found females were 
sentenced more severely.  Females were sentenced to significantly shorter terms in 22 out 
of 26 contrasts in the 21 studies that addressed sentence length.  None of the studies found 
females were sentenced more severely in terms of the likelihood of incarceration or 
sentence length.  Females were found to be more likely to receive downward departures in 
all three of the studies that addressed departures from sentencing guidelines (Johnson, 
2005; Johnson, Ulmer & Kramer, 2008; and Sharp, 2007).  Johnson (2005) also found 
females were less likely to receive upward departures.  Johnson et al. (2008) found that the 
magnitude of downward departures was larger for females. 
The Australian studies that focussed on the impact of indigeneity on sentencing 
also controlled for gender.  Three of the four studies that included the in-out decision found 
that men were significantly more likely to be imprisoned in Western Australia (Bond & 
Jeffries, 2011) and in New South Wales (Snowball & Weatherburn, 2006, 2007).  Jeffries 
and Bond (2009) found no significant effect in South Australia.  Both studies that 
addressed sentence length found that women received shorter sentences after controlling 
for seriousness and criminal history.  In the South Australian study sentences for women 
were 65% of the length of male sentences (IRR = 0.647, p < .01) (Jeffries & Bond, 2009).  
246 
 
In New South Wales, Bond et al. (2011) found that sentences for women were 81% of 
sentences for men in the lower courts and 78% in the higher courts (IRR = .806, p < .001 
[lower courts] and IRR = .781, p < .001 [higher courts]).  A Canadian study (Latimer and 
Foss, 2005) of the sentencing of young offenders found males were more likely to be 
incarcerated than females, and if incarcerated, to be incarcerated for twice as long (p < 
.01).   
Two New Zealand studies have addressed the influence of sex on sentencing.  
Triggs (1999) found that females were much less likely to be imprisoned, with an odds 
ratio of 0.518 (p < .001).  Jeffries et al. (2003) reported the results of a study of sentencing 
for a matched sample of 388 male and female offenders for more serious offences in 
Christchurch. The variables were entered in a series of blocks and the results for the partial 
models were reported.  The full model did not achieve statistical significance in relation to 
the in-out decision.  However, the sixth and last block of variables in the model included 
the pre-sentence report recommendation and that variable dominated all others in the 
model.  Prior to inclusion of the final block of variables and the recommendation, the 
model indicated that men were significantly and substantially more likely to be 
imprisoned.  When the model included demographics, criminal history, offence variables, 
court processing and remand status but excluded the recommended sentence, the odds ratio 
was 1.94 (p < .05).  The full model did show that women received statistically significantly 
shorter terms of imprisonment (21 months compared to 28 months for males, p < .05).  
Unlike race, the findings about the influence of the offender’s sex on sentencing are 
common between the United States research and research elsewhere.  With limited 
exceptions the research finds that, after controlling for legal factors, women are less likely 
to be incarcerated and when incarcerated their sentences are shorter.   
 
Sentencing variability associated with age 
Researchers often control for age.  However, they have not been particularly interested in 
the direct effects of age and have instead taken greater interest in how it conditions other 
social variables, especially race (Ulmer, 2011).  The direct effects of age were reported in 
20 of the studies that focussed on or controlled for location. (Britt, 2000; Everett and 
Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Farrell et al., 2010; Fearn, 2005; Iles, Bumphus & Zehel, 2011; 
Johnson, 2006; Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt & Delone, 2006; Ostrom et al., 2004; Pasko, 
2002; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer, 2005; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Ulmer & Kramer, 
1996; Ulmer & Light, 2010; Weidner et al., 2005; Wheeler et al., 1982).  Most of the 
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studies treated age as a continuous variable and found that the likelihood of incarceration 
reduced with age.  One study (Wheeler et al., 1982) departed from this pattern, finding that 
the likelihood of imprisonment increased with age.  This may be a consequence of that 
study focussing on white collar crime.  Three studies (Iles, Bumphus & Zehel, 2011; 
Pasko, 2002; Weidner et al., 2005) found no significant effects and 17 studies found at 
least some effects for one or more decisions (in-out, sentence length or departure).   
 However, these results must be treated with some caution due to the findings from 
four studies that treated age as a categorical variable.  Everett and Wojtkiewicz (2002), 
Fearn (2005), Ostrom et al. (2004) and Steffensmeier et al. (1998) found that middle-aged 
offenders were more likely to be incarcerated than younger and older offenders.  This 
suggests that age breaches the assumption of linearity and should be treated as a 
categorical variable or otherwise adjusted (e.g. Iles et al. (2011) included the square of the 
offender’s age as an extra variable). 
Triggs (1999) included age in logistic regression modelling of the probability of 
imprisonment for offenders sentenced in New Zealand in 1995.  Compared to 20 - 29 year 
olds, very young offenders ( < 17) were very unlikely to be imprisoned (OR 0.158, p < 
.001), whereas offenders aged 17 – 19 were not significantly different and offenders aged 
30 or more (OR 1.090, p < .05) were a little more likely to be imprisoned.  The finding that 
very young offenders were unlikely to be imprisoned was consistent with sentencing 
legislation, the Criminal Justice Act 1985 and the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act 1989 favoured the use of non-custodial sentences for young offenders.   
The direct effects of age are difficult to interpret, and are complicated if it is correct 
that those studies treating age as a continuous variable may be mis-specified because the 
assumption of linearity is not met.   
 
The interaction effects of gender, ethnicity and age  
More recently researchers have focused on the influence of interactions between gender, 
ethnicity and age on disparities in sentencing by including interaction variables in their 
models (e.g., Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006; Steffensmeier et 
al., 1998).  Others have addressed interactions less directly by specifying separate models 
and comparing and contrasting the results (e.g. Albonetti, 1997; Kautt & Spohn, 2007).  
Most of the research focuses on how ethnicity interacts with gender and age to produce 
disparities in sentencing, with a number of studies finding that young black and Hispanic 
males tend to be subject to more severe sentences (e.g., Doerner & Demuth, 2010; 
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Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006).  However, main effects for ethnicity, gender and age are 
also usually reported (e.g., Steffensmeier et al., 1998), with younger offenders more likely 
to be incarcerated (Ulmer & Bradley, 2006).  
Steffensmeier et al. (1998) demonstrated that the consideration of the interaction 
effects provides a richer and more subtle depiction of disparities, finding that young black 
men received the most severe sentences in terms of both type and length.  The sentences 
they received were more severe than for younger white males.  Younger males of both 
races were sentenced more severely than older males and there was no significant 
difference between older black and white males.  Conversely there were only marginal 
effects for age for females but at all ages black females were sentenced more severely than 
white females.  
The findings of interaction effects for offender race, sex and age are consistent with 
the direct effects for each of these factors and demonstrate a compounding effect so that 
young black males are treated more severely than blacks in general, males in general or 
offenders of any age.   
 
Sentencing variability associated with socio-economic status 
Research on potentially important social factors such as unemployment and social class 
remains limited and few definitive conclusions can be drawn at this stage (Johnson, 2011).   
Comparatively few researchers have attempted to address any difference between socio-
economic groupings and, when they have, it has most often been operationalised using 
educational achievement or employment as a proxy measure (Zatz, 2000).  The major 
challenge for researchers is the lack of information that is routinely captured.  Information 
on socio-economic status in any form is generally contained in documentary sources like 
pre-sentence reports and sentencing submissions and requires substantial effort to be 
assembled.  This contrasts with information on race, sex and age which are regularly 
captured in, or readily calculable from, administrative databases. 
The direct effects of educational attainment were reported in nine of the studies that 
focussed on or controlled for location (Albonetti, 1997; Albonetti & Baller, 2010; Everett 
& Wotjkiewicz, 2002; Iles et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt & Delone, 2006; Pasko, 
2002; Sharp, 2007; Ulmer & Light, 2010).  Employment was addressed in a single study 
(Spohn, 2000) and occupational status and social contribution were both addressed by 
Wheeler et al. (1982).  Higher educational attainment was associated with lower sentence 
severity in 20 out of 22 contrasts including 4/4 in-out, 8/10 sentence length (with two 
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contrasts not significant) and 7/7 departure decisions.  The remaining contrast combined 
sentence type and length into a single sentence seriousness scale. 
Spohn (2000) found no significant effects for employment status on sentence length 
or on the in-out decision.  Wheeler et al. (1982) found significant effects for both 
occupational status and social standing on the sentencing of white collar offences. The 
higher an offender’s occupational status the more likely he or she was to be incarcerated 
and the sentence was likely to be marginally longer.  Conversely, the more significant the 
offender’s social contribution (voluntary works, past behaviour) the less likely he or she 
was to be incarcerated and the shorter the sentence.    
Two of the Australian studies (Bond & Jeffries, 2011; Jeffries & Bond, 2009) 
included employment as a control.  Neither study found that employment status had a 
significant influence on sentence.  In New Zealand, Jeffries et al. (2003) included 
employment as a variable in the examination of sentencing by sex in Christchurch. 
Offenders not in paid employment were significantly more likely to be imprisoned but 
there was no effect on sentence length. 
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Appendix B 
 
Comparison of Parameter Estimates for Sentencing Variables in Single Level 
Regressions Models and Multi-level Random Intercept Models 
The tables in this appendix compare the parameter estimates for single level logistic and 
linear regression models for each of the six offence and decision scenarios modelled in this 
research with multi-level hierarchical generalised linear and hierarchical linear random 
intercept models to determine if there is any evidence that the parameter estimates in the 
single level models are under-estimated.  
 Examination of the tables indicates no evidence of systematic under-estimation of 
standard errors or over-estimation of statistical significance due to nesting of the data.  The 
differences between the two types of model are generally small and the relative magnitude 
of the standard errors is sometimes lower in the hierarchical models when the standard 
error is divided by the associated co-efficient.  The only large proportionate differences 
occurred in relation to variables that were not significant in either model. 
 There was one instance of a variable that was statistically significant in a single 
level model that became non-significant in the hierarchical model.  The change occurred in 
relation to the likelihood of a Pacific offender being incarcerated for burglary relative to a 
European offender with the p-value increasing .049 to .070.    
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Table B1: Comparison of parameter estimates for logistic regression and hierarchical 
generalised linear models for aggravated drink driving (n =9,282)  
Variable (reference categories in 
brackets) Single level model   Multi-level model 
  B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Constant -8.666 .285 .000 -5.762 .382 <.001 
Alcohol level .529 .064 .000 .526 .063 <.001 
Multiple drink drive (no) 1.932 .152 .000 1.916 .152 <.001 
Disqualified driving (no) .347 .108 .001 .344 .108 .001 
Serious driving charge (no) .380 .143 .008 .378 .143 .008 
Breach of sentence (no) .746 .155 .000 .744 .154 <.001 
Total convictions for sentence       
  Two convictions (1) .239 .097 .014 .239 .096 .013 
  Three or more convictions (1) .742 .122 .000 .739 .122 <.001 
Elapsed time - charge to charge outcome       
  > 6 weeks ≤ 3 months (≤ 6 weeks) 1.026 .119 .000 1.022 .119 <.001 
  > 3 months ≤ 6 months (≤ 6 weeks) 1.168 .120 .000 1.161 .120 <.001 
  > 6 months(≤ 6 weeks) 1.012 .127 .000 .998 .127 <.001 
Plea (guilty)  -.512 .230 .026 -.510 .229 .026 
Prior convictions for drink drive       
  3 priors (2) 1.118 .106 .000 1.114 .106 <.001 
  4 priors (2) 1.873 .125 .000 1.864 .125 <.001 
  5 or 6 priors (2) 2.413 .138 .000 2.400 .137 <.001 
  7 or more priors (2) 3.136 .170 .000 3.114 .169 <.001 
Drink drive convictions in the past 10 years       
  1 conviction (0) 1.213 .153 .000 1.211 .153 <.001 
  2 convictions (0) 1.757 .159 .000 1.753 .159 <.001 
  3 or more convictions (0) 1.967 .174 .000 1.958 .174 <.001 
Elapsed time since the last drink drive conviction       
  > 18 months ≤ 5 years (over 5 years) .714 .086 .000 .710 .086 <.001 
 ≤ 18 months (over 5 years) 1.052 .120 .000 1.045 .119 <.001 
Prior incarceration   .000    
  Yes, not for drink drive (no) .326 .097 .001 .327 .097 <.001 
  Yes, including for drink drive (no) .577 .092 .000 .582 .091 <.001 
Conviction for breach of sentence in last 5 years (no) .503 .088 .000 .500 .087 <.001 
Female (male) -.091 .100 .362 -.090 .100 .368 
Race   .    
  Māori (European) .067 .076 .375 .066 .075 .378 
  Pacific (European) .078 .137 .571 .062 .137 .65 
  Other or unknown (European) -.013 .172 .940 -.021 .172 .901 
Age at time of offending       
  Aged 32 - 39 (17 - 31) -.225 .103 .028 -.225 .102 .028 
  Aged 40 - 47 (17 - 31) -.342 .114 .003 -.341 .114 .003 
  Aged 48 or older (17 - 31) -.493 .124 .000 -.491 .124 <.001 
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Table B2: Comparison of parameter estimates for linear regression and hierarchical 
linear models for aggravated drink driving (n = 2,312)  
Variable (reference categories in 
brackets) Single level model   Multi-level model 
  B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
(Constant) 1.769 .648 .006 9.061 .295 <.001 
Prior convictions for drink driving .473 .047 .000 .466 .047 <.001 
Years since the last drink drive conviction -.131 .032 .000 -.129 .032 <.001 
Longest term of imprisonment for drink driving .284 .024 .000 .287 .024 <.001 
Alcohol levels standardised 1.135 .159 .000 1.130 .159 <.001 
Drink drive charges in the case 2.704 .292 .000 2.706 .291 <.001 
Case includes disqualified driving charge(s) .503 .207 .015 .511 .207 .014 
Case includes breach(es) of bail (no) 
-
1.498 .356 .000 -1.494 .355 <.001 
Case includes breach(es) of sentence (no) -.692 .303 .023 -.686 .303 .024 
Total number of charges for sentence .501 .057 .000 .494 .057 <.001 
The number of days from charge to charge outcome .003 .001 .013 .003 .001 .012 
Sex (male) -.176 .262 .501 -.184 .262 .481 
Age when offended -.010 .010 .323 -.009 .010 .351 
Māori (cf European) -.358 .191 .061 -.352 .190 .065 
Pacific (cf European) .022 .381 .953 -.025 .378 .948 
Other (cf European) -.468 .488 .338 -.486 .488 .319 
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Table B3: Comparison of parameter estimates for logistic regression and hierarchical 
generalised linear models for male assaults female (n = 6,166) 
Variable (reference categories in brackets) Single level model   Multi-level model 
  B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Constant -5.679 .371 .000 -5.265 .349 <.001 
Multiple male assaults female (no) .530 .152 .000 .527 .151 <.001 
Threat to kill or do GBH (no) 1.882 .618 .002 1.958 .615 .001 
Breach of sentence (no) .579 .174 .001 .571 .172 <.001 
Total convictions for sentence       
  Two convictions (1) .783 .139 .000 .782 .138 <.001 
  Three convictions (1) 1.031 .172 .000 1.020 .171 <.001 
  Four or more convictions (1) 2.064 .163 .000 2.044 .162 <.001 
Plea (guilty)  .758 .184 .000 .740 .183 <.001 
Elapsed time - charge to charge outcome       
  > 6 weeks ≤ 3 months (≤ 6 weeks) .495 .151 .001 .515 .149 <.001 
  > 3 months ≤ 6 months (≤ 6 weeks) .346 .153 .024 .340 .151 .024 
  > 6 months(≤ 6 weeks) -.004 .177 .981 -.003 .174 .988 
Charge laid indictably (no) 1.870 .306 .000 1.872 .303 <.001 
Prior convictions for male assaults female       
  1 prior (0) .118 .175 .501 .105 .174 .545 
  2 priors (0) .642 .211 .002 .641 .210 .002 
  3 or more priors (0) 1.221 .217 .000 1.196 .216 <.001 
Conviction for male assaults female in last 5 years (no) .609 .165 .000 .603 .164 <.001 
Conviction for serious violence in last 5 years (no) .908 .133 .000 .897 .132 <.001 
Conviction for breach of protection order in last 5 years 
(no) .515 .151 .001 .505 .150 <.001 
Conviction for breach of sentence in last 5 years (no) .723 .117 .000 .705 .117 <.001 
Prior convictions for any offence       
  1-9 priors (0) .640 .315 .042 .656 .314 .037 
  10-19 priors (0) 1.308 .331 .000 1.315 .331 <.001 
  20 or more priors (0) 1.229 .355 .001 1.233 .354 <.001 
Prior incarceration for any offence       
  Once (0) .716 .166 .000 .729 .165 <.001 
  2-4 times (0) .914 .185 .000 .933 .184 <.001 
  5 or more times (0) 1.694 .211 .000 1.707 .210 <.001 
  Māori (European) .142 .132 .283 .107 .129 .407 
  Pacific (European) .350 .198 .077 .272 .193 .158 
  Other or unknown (European) .277 .304 .362 .246 .301 .414 
Age at time of offending       
  Aged 24-30 (17-23) -.422 .153 .006 -.434 .152 .004 
  Aged 31-38 (17-23) -.371 .163 .023 -.389 .162 .017 
  Aged 39 or older (17-23) -.892 .185 .000 -.904 .184 <.001 
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Table B4: Comparison of parameter estimates for linear regression and hierarchical 
linear models for male assaults female (n = 722) 
 Variable (reference categories in brackets) Single level model   Multi-level model 
  B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
(Constant) 3.162 .894 .000 6.156 .466 <.001 
Multiple male assaults female charges 1.989 .412 .000 2.137 .418 <.001 
Case includes breach(es) of bail -1.172 .526 .026 -1.075 .529 .043 
Total number of charges for sentence .478 .067 .000 .478 .067 <.001 
Charge laid indictably (cf summarily) 2.387 .733 .001 2.994 .734 <.001 
Prior convictions for male assaults female .269 .120 .025 .278 .121 .021 
Prior incarceration for male assaults female 1.387 .424 .001 1.477 .430 <.001 
Recent serious violence conviction (cf none or > 5 years 
ago) 1.122 .344 .001 1.176 .349 <.001 
Age when offended -.016 .020 .408 -.022 .020 .262 
Māori (cf European) .399 .413 .334 .060 .408 .883 
Pacific (cf European) .109 .308 .724 -.019 .306 .951 
Other (cf European) -.311 .357 .384 -.363 .361 .316 
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Table B5: Comparison of parameter estimates for logistic regression and hierarchical 
generalised linear models for burglary (n = 5,740) 
Variable (reference categories in 
brackets) Single level model   Multi-level model 
  B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Constant -5.567 0.253 .000 -4.425 .261 <0.001 
2 burglary convictions for sentence (one) .461 .117 .000 .457 .116 <0.001 
3 burglary convictions for sentence (one) 1.087 .140 .000 1.081 .139 <0.001 
Other serious conviction (no) .463 .102 .000 .460 .101 <0.001 
Breach of sentence conviction (no) .528 .115 .000 .524 .115 <0.001 
Value of lead burglary $500 to $5,000 (< $500) .449 .089 .000 .439 .088 <0.001 
Value of lead burglary $5,000 +  (< $500) 1.022 .137 .000 1.006 .136 <0.001 
Value of lead burglary unknown  (< $500) .367 .155 .018 .364 .154 0.018 
Two convictions for sentence (one) .422 .127 .001 .416 .127 0.001 
Three or four convictions for sentence (one) .900 .126 .000 .893 .126 <0.001 
Five to seven convictions for sentence (one) 1.409 .151 .000 1.397 .150 <0.001 
Eight or more convictions for sentence (one) 2.413 .171 .000 2.378 .169 <0.001 
Reparation ordered (no) -.513 .081 .000 -.502 .081 <0.001 
Charge laid indictably (no) 1.638 .160 .000 1.633 .159 <0.001 
Elapsed time - charge to charge outcome       
  > 6 weeks ≤ 3 months (≤ 6 weeks) .351 .116 .003 .346 .116 0.003 
  > 3 months ≤ 6 months (≤ 6 weeks) .212 .117 .071 .202 .117 0.083 
  > 6 months(≤ 6 weeks) .161 .131 .217 .138 .130 0.288 
Prior convictions for serious dishonesty including burglary      
   One or two (none) .296 .133 .026 .294 .132 0.026 
   Three to nine (none) .447 .156 .004 .446 .155 0.004 
   Ten or more (none) .613 .206 .003 .606 .205 0.003 
Conviction for burglary last 5 years (no) .838 .107 .000 .826 .106 <0.001 
Prior conviction for serious violence (no) .595 .103 .000 .590 .103 <0.001 
Conviction for breach sentence last 5 years (no) .434 .094 .000 .434 .094 <0.001 
1 – 4 prior convictions for any offence (none) .595 .172 .001 .594 .171 <0.001 
5 - 9 prior convictions for any offence (none) 1.169 .191 .000 1.164 .190 <0.001 
10 - 19 prior convictions for any offence (none) 1.354 .212 .000 1.348 .211 <0.001 
20 - 49 prior convictions for any offence (none) 1.671 .241 .000 1.654 .240 <0.001 
50 + prior convictions for any offence (none) 1.835 .291 .000 1.809 .290 <0.001 
Longest prior incarceration for burglary       
   ≤12 months (none) .529 .138 .000 .538 .137 <0.001 
   >12 months  ≤24 months (none) .732 .177 .000 .733 .176 <0.001 
   > 24 months (none) 1.509 .251 .000 1.512 .250 <0.001 
Female (male) -.529 .144 .000 -.526 .144 <0.001 
Māori (European) .274 .089 .002 .275 .089 0.002 
Pacific (European) .323 .165 .049 .297 .163 0.07 
Other or unknown (European) .075 .234 .749 .062 .233 0.789 
Aged 20-29 (13-19) .033 .102 .744 .030 .102 0.769 
Aged 30-39 (13-19) .030 .147 .839 .012 .073 0.871 
Aged 40 or older (13-19) -.282 .188 .135 -.093 .062 0.135 
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Table B6: Comparison of parameter estimates for linear regression and hierarchical 
linear models for burglary (n = 2,338) 
Variable (reference categories in brackets) Single level model   Multi-level model 
  B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
(Constant) -1.687 1.087 .121 8.881 .895 <.001 
Number of burglary charges for sentence .713 .074 .000 .719 .074 <.001 
$500 to $5,000 cf Less than $500 or unknown 1.236 .366 .001 1.195 .365 .001 
More than $5,000 cf Less than $500 or unknown 3.541 .502 .000 3.501 .502 <.001 
Count of offence dates for the burglaries 2.314 .259 .000 2.291 .259 <.001 
Case includes receiving 2.440 .490 .000 2.426 .490 <.001 
Case includes breach of bail -1.633 .449 .000 -1.623 .449 <.001 
Case includes breach of sentence .888 .388 .022 .892 .388 .022 
Case includes violent offence 1.887 .416 .000 1.892 .416 <.001 
Case includes serious driving offence 1.136 .463 .014 1.123 .463 .015 
Total number of charges for sentence .328 .039 .000 .321 .039 <.001 
Charge laid indictably or summarily 5.738 .463 .000 5.773 .463 <.001 
Plea 1.951 .822 .018 1.989 .822 .016 
Days from charge to charge outcome .005 .002 .005 .005 .002 .009 
Whether a reparation order was made -.831 .370 .025 -.781 .369 .035 
Categorisation of judges by warrant -1.391 .594 .019 -1.323 .593 .026 
One cf no prior convictions for burglary .497 .546 .364 .515 .546 .346 
Two cf no prior convictions for burglary .837 .640 .191 .870 .640 .175 
3, 4 or 5 cf no prior convictions for burglary 2.569 .576 .000 2.571 .576 <.001 
6 to 9 cf no prior convictions for burglary 3.571 .728 .000 3.569 .728 <.001 
10 to 19 cf no prior convictions for burglary 5.355 .849 .000 5.327 .848 <.001 
20 or more cf no prior convictions for burglary 6.374 1.062 .000 6.337 1.062 <.001 
Longest prior term of incarceration for burglary .128 .022 .000 .129 .022 <.001 
One cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty excl 
burglary .399 .601 .507 .346 .600 .565 
Two cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty excl 
burglary 1.036 .646 .109 1.026 .646 .112 
3, 4or 5 cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty 
excl burglary 2.693 .578 .000 2.656 .578 <.001 
6 to 9 cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty 
excl burglary 2.672 .676 .000 2.641 .676 <.001 
10 to 19 cf no prior convictions for serious dishonesty 
excl burglary 2.240 .665 .001 2.192 .665 <.001 
20 or more cf no prior convictions for serious 
dishonesty excl burglary 2.957 .750 .000 2.933 .749 <.001 
Criminal history for serious violent, drugs or driving 
offences .100 .034 .003 .100 .034 .003 
Sex of the offender -1.137 .723 .116 -1.150 .723 .112 
Age at the time of offence -.014 .027 .604 -.015 .026 .569 
Māori cf European .359 .390 .358 .355 .388 .361 
Pacific cf European .504 .743 .498 .401 .741 .589 
Other or unknown cf European -.106 1.064 .921 -.118 1.064 .912 
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Appendix C 
 
Sentence notes as a data source 
It was originally planned that judges’ sentence notes would provide a second source of data 
to inform the modelling of sentence length.  A sentence note is a record of the judge’s 
remarks on sentencing.  In the District Courts these are not created for every case.  An 
audio recording is always taken of the judge’s remarks but only transcribed in certain 
circumstances.  The remarks are routinely transcribed if an offender is imprisoned or 
sentenced to home detention.  For other sentence types the remarks are only transcribed if 
the sentence is appealed or the judge otherwise orders a transcript.  As a consequence 
transcripts only exist for a minority of cases but always for incarceration.  Ordinarily the 
transcripts are not easily accessible because they are stored in the paper file for the case at 
the court.  However, for a limited period of time, including 2008-2009, a large holding of 
sentence notes was assembled at the Law Commission to inform the drafting of sentencing 
guidelines.  The Chief District Court Judge gave permission for transcripts held at the Law 
Commission to be accessed and for data on the sentencing factors to be coded. 
The sentencing notes summarise the judge’s view of the case, and may contain 
information on the offending, any aggravating or mitigating factors the judge saw fit to 
mention, the purposes of sentencing and the sentencing mathematics.  The sentencing 
mathematics may include the judge’s view of the starting point given the seriousness of the 
offending, plus any addition for aggravating factors (individually or collectively), and then 
a reduction for mitigating factors (individually or collectively) and a proportionate 
discount for a guilty plea.  Not all sentence notes have all these features.  Some judges 
provide considerable detail and some give very little.  The briefest do no more than state 
the sentence.     
A set of guidance material and coding sheets were developed for the extraction of 
data from the sentence notes.  The extraction covered information on the offences being 
sentenced, sentencing factors, the offender, and the determination of the sentence.  The 
selection of the sentencing factors was based on a review of reference texts on sentencing, 
appellate decisions, the draft sentencing guidelines developed by the Sentencing 
Establishment Unit and review of a sample of sentence notes for each offence.  The 
selection was reviewed in light of experience of use after initial experience of coding.  The 
guidance material, copies of the coding sheets and the results of reliability testing are 
available from the author. 
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There was always a risk that the sentence notes would not prove to be a viable 
source of data because the collection was incomplete and would not constitute a random 
sample drawn across the circuits thus biasing any models based on the data.  The 
proportions of sentence notes available by circuit and the differences between the mean 
sentence length for the comprehensive administrative dataset and the limited sentence note 
dataset provided a ready indication of the distortion.  There was wide variation in the 
proportion of sentence notes available per circuit for aggravated drink driving (see Table 
C1).   
 
Table C1: The number of cases and mean sentence lengths by circuit for the 
administrative and sentence note datasets for aggravated drink driving 
   Administrative data Sentence note data 
Proportion 
with sentence 
notes  
Proportionate 
change in mean 
sentence Circuit Cases 
Mean 
sentence 
(months) Cases 
Mean 
sentence 
(months) 
0 95 9.09 69 9.07 73% -0.2% 
1 311 9.71 138 10.21 44% 5.1% 
2 80 9.69 52 10.13 65% 4.5% 
3 134 10.22 87 9.51 65% -7.0% 
4 46 9.02 38 9.16 83% 1.5% 
5 186 10.35 69 8.48 37% -18.1% 
6 249 6.95 164 6.54 66% -5.8% 
7 79 10.34 41 9.39 52% -9.1% 
8 138 7.30 75 7.21 54% -1.2% 
9 46 9.91 8 11.25 17% 13.5% 
10 138 8.07 75 7.54 54% -6.6% 
11 136 8.98 103 9.30 76% 3.6% 
12 357 9.44 269 9.48 75% 0.5% 
13 27 9.48 14 9.00 52% -5.1% 
14 60 9.88 35 9.90 58% 0.3% 
15 43 9.36 20 8.88 47% -5.2% 
16 187 11.32 51 11.19 27% -1.1% 
Total  2312 9.28 1308 8.95 57% -3.5% 
 
The proportion ranged from a low of 17% (Circuit 9) to a high of 83% (Circuit 4) 
with the other 15 circuits ranged between these extremes.  The effect of differing levels of 
availability may have been limited if the sentencing outcomes for the available sample was 
similar to the population of incarcerated offenders.  The comparison of mean sentence 
lengths for the sample and the population showed that the distribution of sentence lengths 
in the samples varied substantially between circuits.  At one extreme, Circuit 5, the mean 
sentence for the sample was almost 2 months (18.1%) below the population of incarcerated 
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offenders for the circuit whereas in Circuit 9 the sample was about 6 weeks higher (13.5%) 
than the population for the circuit.       
There was a similarly wide variation in the proportion of sentence notes available 
per circuit for male assaults female (see Table C2).  The proportion ranged from a low of 
24% (Circuit 16) to a high of 81% (Circuit 11).  Excluding the change in Circuit 9 (a 
difference of 5.11 months (83.3%) based on low sentence volumes), the differences in 
mean sentence lengths between the sample and the population by circuit ranged from a 
decrease of  about 6 weeks (-20.7%) in Circuit 8 to an increase of  7 weeks (21.4%) in 
Circuit 5.     
 
Table C2: The number of cases and mean sentence lengths by circuit for the 
administrative and sentence note datasets for male assaults female  
  Administrative dataset Sentence note dataset Proportion 
with 
sentence 
notes  
Proportionate 
change in mean 
sentence Circuit Cases 
Mean sentence 
(months) Cases 
Mean sentence 
(months) 
0 82 6.68 52 7.39 63% 10.7% 
1 71 9.44 38 10.12 54% 7.1% 
2 34 8.04 19 9.41 56% 17.1% 
3 63 8.85 40 9.31 63% 5.2% 
4 18 8.56 14 8.71 78% 1.9% 
5 76 7.68 31 9.32 41% 21.4% 
6 46 6.56 31 5.91 67% -9.9% 
7 20 9.53 14 9.54 70% 0.1% 
8 21 6.60 11 5.23 52% -20.7% 
9 9 6.14 4 11.25 44% 83.3% 
10 44 7.22 28 6.89 64% -4.6% 
11 53 6.92 43 7.44 81% 7.5% 
12 82 5.82 52 6.00 63% 3.1% 
13 14 7.21 10 8.20 71% 13.7% 
14 16 5.55 7 5.57 44% 0.4% 
15 40 6.98 13 6.77 33% -3.0% 
16 34 8.15 8 9.13 24% 12.0% 
Total  723 7.44 415 7.85 57% 5.5% 
 
There was wide variation in the proportion of sentence notes available per circuit 
for burglary (see Table C3).  The proportion ranged from a low of 26% (Circuit 9) to a 
high of 81% (Circuit 6).  The differences in mean sentence lengths between the sample and 
the population by circuit ranged from a decrease of  a little less than 3 weeks (-3.6%) in 
Circuit 5 to an increase of more than 4 months (25.3%) in Circuit 16.     
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Table C3: The number of cases and mean sentence lengths by circuit for the 
administrative and sentence note datasets for burglary 
  Administrative dataset Sentence note dataset Proportion 
with 
sentence 
notes  
Proportionate 
change in mean 
sentence Circuit Cases 
Mean sentence 
(months) Cases 
Mean sentence 
(months) 
0 150 14.62 118 15.87 79% 8.5% 
1 285 18.08 168 19.85 59% 9.8% 
2 79 15.98 49 17.68 62% 10.6% 
3 243 14.82 136 15.97 56% 7.7% 
4 45 15.51 35 15.91 78% 2.6% 
5 279 16.74 109 16.14 39% -3.6% 
6 149 17.01 118 18.68 79% 9.9% 
7 57 14.89 39 15.76 68% 5.8% 
8 80 12.03 52 13.92 65% 15.7% 
9 46 13.57 12 17.25 26% 27.2% 
10 146 15.23 95 15.93 65% 4.6% 
11 133 15.56 95 16.85 71% 8.3% 
12 203 14.95 151 14.58 74% -2.5% 
13 67 12.54 32 13.44 48% 7.2% 
14 57 16.82 35 18.83 61% 11.9% 
15 197 17.76 103 19.60 52% 10.4% 
16 122 16.39 39 20.53 32% 25.3% 
Total  2338 15.90 1386 16.98 59% 6.8% 
 
These differences indicated that the sentence note data was unlikely to be a viable 
source of sentencing factor data to inform the sentence length models.   
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Appendix D 
 
Summary of the tests employed to determine primary offence status 
A hierarchy of tests was devised to accept or reject observations.  It began with a simple 
count of the number of charges the offender was sentenced on.  If there was only one 
charge it followed that it must be the most serious offence and the observation was 
retained.    
If there were two or more charges it was necessary to determine which was most 
serious.  Three objective tests based on the charge outcome, the sentence type and the 
sentence amount were used to attempt to resolve the status of cases with multiple 
convictions.  If only one charge resulted in a conviction and sentence and the others were 
discharged, the convicted and sentenced charge was the most serious and was retained if it 
was a subject offence.  Otherwise it was rejected.   
If the charge outcome did not identify one charge as the most serious, the sentence 
types were examined to identify if one charge received a more serious sentence in terms of 
the hierarchy of types set out in the Sentencing Act 2002.  If one charge attracted a more 
serious sentence type than any of the others that charge was recognised as the most serious 
and was retained if it was a subject offence.  Otherwise it was rejected.   
If the sentence type did not identify one charge as the most serious sentence, the 
magnitude of the sentences of that type were examined to determine if one charge received 
a larger or longer sentence than the other(s).  If one charge did attract a larger or longer 
sentence that charge was the most serious and was retained if it was a subject offence.  
Otherwise it was rejected.   
If none of these tests resolved which charge was most serious the selection was 
determined by the generic seriousness of the tied offence types. The generic seriousness 
was based on a seriousness scale maintained by the Ministry of Justice that ranked offences 
according to the average days of imprisonment, with non-custodial sentences scoring zero.  
If a single charge was identified as the most serious the case was accepted if the charge 
was for burglary, male assaults female or drink driving and rejected if it was any other 
offence.  If multiple charges remained tied the case was rejected if none of the tied 
offences were burglary, male assaults female or drink driving offences. 
Some cases survived this sequence of tests because two or more burglaries or two 
or more drink driving offences or two or more male assaults female charges had attracted 
the same charge outcome and/or sentence and were of equal seriousness.  Although such 
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cases were retained it was necessary to identify one of the charges as the lead offence to 
build the case around.  The first test favoured any charge that was laid indictably on the 
assumption that indictably laid charges were more likely to be more serious than 
summarily laid charges.  If some charges were still tied the offence committed most 
recently was chosen on the basis that the offender had gone on to re-offend having already 
offended.  If there was still a tie a random choice was made between the remaining 
charges.    
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Appendix E 
 
The predictor variables included in the modelling 
 
Table E1: Demographic variables and the circuit variable 
Variable Coding Expected Effect 
Gender Male (0) 
Female (1) 
Uncertain 
Ethnicity European (0) 
Māori (1) 
Pacific People (2) 
Other or unknown (3) 
Uncertain 
Age at 
Offence1 
Continuous variable or a 
categorical variable separately 
specified for each offence type. 
 
Drink driving: 
Aged 17-31 (0) 
Aged 32-39 (1) 
Aged 40-47 (2) 
Aged 48+    (3) 
 
Male assaults female: 
Aged 17-23 (0) 
Aged 24-30 (1) 
Aged 31-38 (2) 
Aged 39+    (3) 
 
Burglary: 
Aged 17-19 (0) 
Aged 20-29 (1) 
Aged 30-39 (2) 
Aged 40+    (3) 
 
Uncertain 
 
 
Circuit Dummy variables coded 0-16 
covering the 17 circuits 
Uncertain effect but expected to 
vary by circuit 
1 Age was specified as a continuous variable for the sentence length model but was 
categorised for the in-out models because it violated the assumption of linearity.  For male 
assaults female and drink driving the age of offenders was relatively evenly spread and the 
variable was formed by splitting the offenders into four “quarters” as close to equal as 
possible while placing all offenders of the same year of age in the same quarter.  This split 
into quarters did not make sense for burglary as a high proportion of offenders were very 
young (39% 19 or younger).  Teenagers formed the first category, followed by two ten 
year bands and a catch-all category for older offenders 
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Table E2: Drink driving offence seriousness, case processing and criminal history 
variables  
Variable Coding Expected Effect  
Offence seriousness and case processing variables  
Alcohol level A continuous variable with alcohol levels 
standardised based on the proportionate 
amount above the legal limit.  Refusal of a 
test was assigned a nominal level 2.25 times 
above the limit.  Offenders with no reading 
included with at a nominal reading 1.9 times 
the limit. 
Aggravating   
Multiple drink 
drive offences 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent 
driving while 
disqualified 
offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating    
Concurrent 
serious  driving 
offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating   
Concurrent 
minor driving 
offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating    
Concurrent 
breach of 
sentence offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating 
Concurrent 
breach of bail 
offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating 
Total convictions 
for sentence1 
Continuous variable or a categorical 
variable: 
0 (one charge) 
1 (two charges) 
2 (three or more charges) 
Aggravating 
Time from charge 
to sentence1 
Continuous variable in days or a categorical 
variable coded:  
0 (≤ 6 weeks) less)  
1 (> 6 weeks ≤ 3 months)  
2 (> 3 months ≤ 6 months)  
3 (> 6 months) 
Aggravating  
Plea Categorical variable coded:  
0 guilty plea  
1 not guilty plea 
Aggravating2 
Judge type Categorical variable coded:  
0 Criminal   
1 Family 
 
 
 
Uncertain 
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Variable Coding Expected Effect  
 
Criminal history variables  
Prior convictions 
for drink driving1 
Continuous variable or a categorical variable 
coded:  
0 (2 prior convictions)  
1 (3 priors)  
2 (4 priors) 
3 (5 or 6 priors)  
4 (7 or more priors) 
Aggravating  
Convictions for 
drink driving in 
the last ten years 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 (none) 
1 (1) 
2 (2)  
3 (3 or more) 
Aggravating  
Elapsed time 
since the last 
conviction1 
Continuous variable in years, or  
 
a categorical variable reverse coded:  
0 (over five years ago) 
1 (over 18 months ago and five or fewer 
years ago) 
2 (18 months or more recent) 
Mitigating  
 
Aggravating  
Prior 
incarceration 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 (no prior incarceration) 
1 (prior incarceration but not for drinking 
and driving) 
2 (prior incarceration, including for drinking 
and driving) 
Aggravating  
Prior 
incarceration for 
drink driving  
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Longest prior 
incarceration for 
drink driving  
Continuous variable in months Aggravating 
Prior convictions 
for disqualified 
driving1 
Continuous variable or a categorical variable 
coded: 
0 (no prior convictions)  
1 (1)  
2 (2) 
3 (3 or 4)  
4 (5 or more) 
Aggravating  
Prior convictions 
for any offence1, 3 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (2 - 5)  
1 (6 - 11)  
2 (12 -24) 
3 (25)  
Aggravating  
Recent conviction 
for breach of 
sentence 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes, convicted in the previous five years) 
Aggravating  
1 The variable was converted from a continuous to a categorical variable because it 
breached the assumption of linearity. 
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2 The explanation differs from the other factors because a not guilty plea is not an 
aggravating factor in sentencing terms, the effect of a not guilty plea is to lose the benefit 
of mitigation afforded to a guilty plea. 
3 An offender’s total convictions for any offence were capable of being expressed in many 
different ways.  An offender’s overall criminal history expressed as the number of 
convictions could be divided in many categories with choices as to the number of 
categories and the boundaries between them.  The formulation presented in the table splits 
the data into four quarters. 
 
Table E3: Male assaults female offence seriousness, case processing and criminal 
history variables  
 Variable Coding Expected Effect  
Offence seriousness and case processing variables  
Multiple male 
assaults female  
offences 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent threat 
to kill or do GBH 
offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent breach 
of protection order 
offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent other 
violent offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent wilful 
or intentional 
damage offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Charge type 
indicates weapon 
involved  
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent breach 
of bail offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent breach 
of sentence offence 
Categorical variable: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Time from charge 
to sentence1 
Continuous variable in days or a 
categorical variable coded:  
0 (≤ 6 weeks) less)  
1 (> 6 weeks ≤ 3 months)  
2 (> 3 months ≤ 6 months)  
3 (> 6 months) 
Aggravating  
Plea Categorical variable coded:  
0 guilty plea  
1 not guilty plea 
Aggravating2 
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Variable Coding Expected Effect  
Charge laid 
indictably 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 charge laid summarily  
1 charge laid indictably  
Aggravating 
Sentenced in an 
active family 
violence court   
Categorical variable coded:  
0 no   
1 yes 
Uncertain 
Judge type Categorical variable coded:  
0 Criminal   
1 Family 
Uncertain 
Criminal history variables  
Prior convictions 
for male assaults 
female1 
Continuous variable or a categorical 
variable coded:  
0 (none) 
1 (1) 
2 (2) 
3 (3 or more)  
Aggravating  
Conviction for 
male assaults 
female in the last 
five years 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
 
Aggravating  
Prior incarceration 
for male assaults 
female 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Longest prior 
incarceration for 
male assaults 
female 
Continuous variable in months Aggravating 
Prior conviction 
for serious violence 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Conviction for 
serious violence in 
the last five years 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Prior conviction 
for breach of 
sentence in the last 
five years 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Prior convictions 
for any offence1, 3 
Continuous variable or a categorical 
variable coded: 
0 (none)  
1 (1 - 9)  
2 (10 -19) 
3 (20 or more)  
Aggravating  
Prior incarceration 
for any offence 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 (no) 
1 (1) 
2 (2 – 4) 
3 (5 or more) 
Aggravating  
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 Variable Coding Expected Effect  
Longest prior 
incarceration for 
any offence 
Continuous variable in months Aggravating 
1 The variable was converted from a continuous to a categorical variable because it 
breached the assumption of linearity. 
2 The explanation differs from the other factors because a not guilty plea is not an 
aggravating factor in sentencing terms, the effect of a not guilty plea is to lose the benefit 
of mitigation afforded to a guilty plea. 
3 An offender’s total convictions for any offence were capable of being expressed in many 
different ways.  An offender’s overall criminal history expressed as the number of 
convictions could be divided in many categories with choices as to the number of 
categories and the boundaries between them.  The formulation presented in the table splits 
the data into four quarters. 
 
Table E4: Burglary offence seriousness, case processing and criminal history 
variables  
Variable Coding Expected Effect  
Offence seriousness and case processing variables  
Number of burglary 
charges for sentence 
Continuous variable or categorical 
variable coded: 
0 (1) 
1 (2) 
2 (3 or more) 
Aggravating  
Approximate value of lead 
burglary offence 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (less than $500 or unstated) 
1 ($500 to $5,000) 
2 (more than $5,000) 
Aggravating  
Burglary by day or night Categorical variable coded: 
0 (day) 
1 (night) 
2 (unknown) 
Aggravating  (if 
at night) 
Number of burglary 
offence dates 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (one) 
1 (two) 
2 (three or more) 
 
Aggravating  
Concurrent receiving 
charge 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent unlawful 
taking charge 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent other 
dishonesty charge 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (none) 
1 (1) 
2 (2 or more) 
Aggravating  
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 Variable Coding Expected Effect  
Concurrent violent 
offence charge 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent drug charge Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent serious 
driving charge 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent breach of bail 
offence 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent breach of 
sentence offence 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Concurrent other serious 
(receiving, unlawful 
taking, serious violence or 
serious driving) charges  
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
Aggravating  
Total convictions for 
sentence 
Continuous variable or categorical 
variable coded: 
0 (1) 
1 (2) 
2 (3 or 4) 
3 (5, 6 or 7) 
4 (8 or more) 
Aggravating  
Time from charge to 
sentence 
Continuous variable or categorical 
variable coded: 
0 (≤ 6 weeks) less)  
1 (> 6 weeks ≤ 3 months)  
2 (> 3 months ≤ 6 months)  
3 (> 6 months) 
Aggravating  
Plea Categorical variable coded:  
0 guilty plea  
1 not guilty plea 
Aggravating2 
Charge laid indictably Categorical variable coded:  
0 charge laid summarily  
1 charge laid indictably  
 
 
Aggravating 
Reparation order made  Categorical variable coded:  
0 no   
1 yes 
Mitigating 
  
272 
 
Variable Coding Expected Effect  
   
Reparation amount Categorical variable coded:  
0 (none)   
1 (<$500) 
2 (≥$500 <$1,000) 
3 (≥$1,000 <$2,500) 
4 (≥$2,500) 
Mitigating  
Judge type Categorical variable coded:  
0 Criminal   
1 Family 
Uncertain 
Criminal history variables  
Prior convictions for 
burglary 
Continuous variable or categorical 
variable coded:  
0 (no prior convictions)  
1 (1 prior)  
2 (2 – 4 priors) 
3 (5 or more) 
Aggravating  
Conviction for burglary in 
the previous five years 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 no   
1 yes 
Aggravating  
Prior convictions for 
serious dishonesty 
excluding burglary 
Continuous variable or categorical 
variable coded:  
0 (no prior convictions)  
1 (1 prior)  
2 (2 or 3 priors) 
3 (4 – 9 priors) 
4 (10 or more) 
Aggravating  
Prior convictions for 
serious dishonesty 
including burglary 
Continuous variable or categorical 
variable coded:  
0 (no prior convictions)  
1 (1 or 2 priors)  
2 (3 – 9 priors) 
3 (10 or more)  
Aggravating  
Prior convictions for 
serious violence  
Categorical variable coded:  
0 no   
1 yes 
Aggravating  
Prior convictions for 
serious violence, drug 
dealing or serious driving 
Continuous variable Aggravating  
Conviction for breach of 
sentence in the past five 
years 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 no   
1 yes 
Aggravating  
Prior convictions for any 
offence1, 3 
Continuous variable or categorical 
variable coded: 
0 (no prior convictions)  
1 (1 - 9 priors)  
2 (10 -19 priors) 
3 (20 or more priors)  
Aggravating  
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Variable Coding Expected Effect  
Prior incarceration 
for any offence 
Categorical variable coded:  
0 (no prior incarceration) 
1 (one prior incarceration) 
2 (2 – 4 prior incarcerations) 
3 (5 or more prior incarcerations) 
Aggravating  
Longest prior 
incarceration for burglary 
Categorical variable coded: 
0 (no prior incarceration) 
1 (≤ 12 months) 
2 (>12 months ≤ 24 months) 
3 (>24 months) 
Aggravating  
Longest prior 
incarceration for any 
offence 
Continuous variable Aggravating  
1 The variable was converted from a continuous to a categorical variable because it 
breached the assumption of linearity. 
2 The explanation differs from the other factors because a not guilty plea is not an 
aggravating factor in sentencing terms, the effect of a not guilty plea is to lose the benefit 
of mitigation afforded to a guilty plea. 
3 An offender’s total convictions for any offence were capable of being expressed in many 
different ways.  An offender’s overall criminal history expressed as the number of 
convictions could be divided in many categories with choices as to the number of 
categories and the boundaries between them.  The formulation presented in the table splits 
the data into four quarters. 
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Appendix F 
 
The Impact of Cumulative Sentencing and Home Detention on the Aggravated Drink 
Driving and Male Assaults Female Sentence Length Models  
When the high values (>3) for the standardized residual for both aggravated drink driving 
and male assaults female were scrutinised a pattern was readily apparent.  The cases were 
associated with two sentencing outcomes; the offender either received a cumulative 
sentence, or was sentenced to home detention (rather than imprisonment).    
For aggravated drink driving the standardised residuals for 24 cases exceeded an 
absolute value of 3.  All bar one of these was due to actual sentences substantially higher 
than the predicted sentence.  The cases were spread across the circuits with no apparent 
concentrations and they were spread across the demographic variables.  Scrutiny of the 
criminal history seriousness variables confirmed that these were cases likely to result in 
high actual sentences.  Ten of the 24 cases had the sentence type of home detention.  Of the 
remaining 14 cases, 13 had cumulative terms of imprisonment.    
For male assaults female the standardised residuals for 6 cases exceeded an 
absolute value of 3.  All involved actual sentences substantially higher than the predicted 
sentence.  The cases were all from different circuits, they were spread across the 
demographic variables, and scrutiny of the seriousness and criminal history variables 
confirmed that these were cases likely to result in high actual sentences.  Two of the six 
cases had the sentence type of home detention and three of the four remaining cases had 
cumulative terms of imprisonment.   
The imposition of cumulative sentences and the choice of home detention over 
imprisonment are significant characteristics; they are part of the sentencing decision and 
are not what would normally be thought of as sentencing factors. Cumulative versus 
concurrent sentencing is a choice of how to express the sentence when there are multiple 
charges.  Faced with multiple charges the judge has to decide whether to impose separate 
sentences that cumulate to form the total sentence or whether to impose a longer sentence 
on the lead charge to reflect the totality of the offending and concurrent regular sentences 
on the other charge(s).  The judge must also choose the sentence type within the 
incarceration grouping.  If a judge has decided that a short term of imprisonment (two 
years or less) is appropriate the judge then determines whether the sentence should be 
imprisonment or home detention taking account of the Sentencing Act requirement to 
impose the least restrictive sentence that is appropriate.  For both aggravated drink driving 
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and male assaults female this decision is regularly required because when a judge decides 
to imprison, home detention is always an option.  The only exception would be when the 
judge has determined that the totality of offending requires a cumulative sentence in excess 
of two years.    
In retrospect it is not surprising that some cumulative sentences would be 
associated with high residuals.  Cumulative sentences are sometimes imposed when the 
maximum sentence available for the lead offence is not sufficient to reflect the totality of 
the offending in the case.   
The association of high residuals with cases where home detention was imposed 
was unexpected.  Retrospective analysis revealed that the mean home detention sentence 
was 1.5 months longer than the mean imprisonment sentence (10.2 c.f. 8.7 months) for 
aggravated drink driving and 2.1 months longer (9.3 c.f. 7.2 months) for male assaults 
female.   
This was surprising for two reasons.  First, it was assumed that home detention was 
more likely to be “the least restrictive sentence appropriate” for a higher proportion of 
lower seriousness cases and that it would be judged inappropriate for a higher proportion 
of more serious cases.  Secondly, there may be concerns about the capacity of offenders to 
comply with longer terms of home detention.  The self-discipline required and the 
pressures of being restricted to the home may be too great if the term is too long.     
Investigation of the data indicated that the initial assumption that home detention 
would form a higher proportion of incarceration sentences for less serious offending was 
wrong.  Review of the sentences revealed that the difference in average sentences was due 
to the substantial proportion of very short imprisonment sentences (less than 6 months) and 
the small number of home detention sentences in that space.  The relative proportions are 
listed in Tables F1 (aggravated drink driving) and F2 (male assaults female).  
Table F1: Relative proportions of imprisonment and home detention sentences for 
aggravated drink driving by categories of sentence length 
Sentence length Imprisonment Home detention 
  # % # % 
3 months or less 164 11.8% 5 0.5% 
> 3 months < 6 months  220 15.9% 33 3.6% 
6 months  248 17.9% 146 15.8% 
> 6 months ≤ 9 months 320 23.1% 273 29.5% 
> 9 months < 12 months 88 6.3% 96 10.4% 
12 months 129 9.3% 223 24.1% 
> 12 months 219 15.8% 148 16.0% 
TOTAL 1388 100% 924 100% 
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For aggravated drink driving 27.7% of imprisonment terms were less than 6 months 
compared to 4.1% of home detention sentences.  For male assaults female 38.7% of 
imprisonment terms were less than 6 months compared to 9.8% of home detention 
sentences.  A proportion of the very short imprisonment sentences will have been in 
circumstances where the offender was remanded in custody and the sentence reflects the 
time in custody.  Otherwise it would seem that judges consider that a prison sentence of 3 
months (actual time served 6 weeks) can serve a valid purpose but they do not attach the 
same value to serving 6 weeks on home detention.  However, the distribution also supports 
the notion that long home detention sentences may be too difficult.  After adjustment to 
match the term of home detention to imprisonment 79.8% of home detention sentences for 
aggravated drink driving and 78.0% for male assaults female fell within the range 6 to 12 
months (meaning that the offenders serve 3 to 6 months).  
 
Table F2: Relative proportions of imprisonment and home detention sentences for 
male assaults female by categories of sentence length 
Sentence length Imprisonment Home detention 
  # % # % 
3 months or less 138 21.5% 3 3.7% 
> 3 months < 6 months  110 17.2% 5 6.1% 
6 months  115 17.9% 15 18.3% 
> 6 months ≤ 9 months 114 17.8% 26 31.7% 
> 9 months < 12 months 42 6.6% 7 8.5% 
12 months 57 8.9% 16 19.5% 
> 12 months 65 10.1% 10 12.2% 
TOTAL 641 100% 82 100% 
 
Although none of the observations were a cause for concern on their individual 
characteristics the recognition that they were either cumulative sentences or home 
detention was a major concern because the rates of both are uneven across the circuits.   
The proportions of sentences imposed as home detention for aggravated drink 
driving (Table F3) varied widely across the circuits ranging from 15% (Circuit 8) to 67% 
(Circuit 9) with no substantial clustering.  The proportion of sentences imposed as part of a 
cumulative package of sentences also varied, from 0% (Circuit 13) to 23% (Circuit 10) but 
there was a cluster of 10 circuits in the 11-15% range near the centre of the spectrum. 
  
278 
 
Table F3: The proportion of incarcerated aggravated drink drivers sentenced to 
home detention or who received a cumulative sentence of incarceration  
  Incarcerated Home detention Cumulative sentence 
    # % # % 
Circuit 0 95 31 33% 12 13% 
Circuit 1 311 131 42% 47 15% 
Circuit 2 80 20 25% 10 13% 
Circuit 3  134 43 32% 16 12% 
Circuit 4 46 11 24% 7 15% 
Circuit 5 186 71 38% 13 7% 
Circuit 6 249 53 21% 10 4% 
Circuit 7 79 35 44% 10 13% 
Circuit 8 138 21 15% 18 13% 
Circuit 9 46 31 67% 5 11% 
Circuit 10 138 46 33% 32 23% 
Circuit 11 136 51 38% 19 14% 
Circuit 12 357 228 64% 31 9% 
Circuit 13 27 12 44% 0 0% 
Circuit 14 60 14 23% 13 22% 
Circuit 15 43 27 63% 3 7% 
Circuit 16 187 99 53% 24 13% 
TOTAL 2312 924 40% 270 12% 
 
The proportions of sentences imposed as home detention for male assaults female 
(Table F4) also varied widely across the circuits.  Leaving aside Circuit 9 (no use of home 
detention), the proportions ranged from 2.2% (Circuits 6) to 33.3% (Circuit 4) with no 
substantial clustering.  The proportion of sentences imposed as part of a cumulative 
package of sentences also varied.  Again leaving aside Circuit 9 (no cumulative sentences), 
the proportions ranged from 7.1% (Circuit 13) to 47.7% (Circuit 10) with a limited cluster 
of six circuits in the 22-28% range near the centre of the spectrum.   
In order to understand the implications for the model and its interpretation, in 
particular the parameter estimates for the circuit variables, the models for both offences 
were re-run twice.  The first re-run included a cumulative sentence variable (0 = no 
cumulative sentence, 1 = cumulative sentence) and the second re-run omitted the 
cumulative sentence variable and included a home detention variable (0 = imprisonment, 1 
= home detention).  In theory neither of the variables should affect the models and neither 
should be statistically significant.  In theory the choice of cumulative versus concurrent 
sentencing should be neutral; the choices are just alternate ways of packaging what should 
be the same sentence reflecting the totality of the offending and the circumstances of the 
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offender.  In theory the choice of home detention versus imprisonment should be neutral in 
terms of sentence length; they are just alternative ways of serving the same term of 
incarceration.  However, the widely varied rates of use of home detention and cumulative 
sentences across the circuits suggested that they may not be neutral because different 
approaches were being followed in different places. 
 
Table F4: The proportion of offenders incarcerated for male assaults female 
sentenced to home detention or who received a cumulative sentence of incarceration  
  Incarcerated Home detention Cumulative sentence 
    # % # % 
Circuit 0 82 4 5% 13 16% 
Circuit 1 71 11 15% 20 28% 
Circuit 2 34 4 12% 13 38% 
Circuit 3  63 4 6% 22 35% 
Circuit 4 18 6 33% 4 22% 
Circuit 5 76 3 4% 7 9% 
Circuit 6 46 1 2% 7 15% 
Circuit 7 20 3 15% 7 35% 
Circuit 8 21 3 14% 3 14% 
Circuit 9 9 0 0% 0 0% 
Circuit 10 44 3 7% 21 48% 
Circuit 11 53 4 8% 7 13% 
Circuit 12 82 17 21% 19 23% 
Circuit 13 14 3 21% 1 7% 
Circuit 14 16 1 6% 4 25% 
Circuit 15 40 4 10% 10 25% 
Circuit 16 34 11 32% 8 24% 
TOTAL 723 82 11% 166 23% 
 
None of the adjusted models supported the proposition that the effects would be 
neutral.  When the cumulative sentence variable was added to the aggravated drink driving 
model as an additional fifth block it made a significant difference to the model.  The model 
R2 increased from .385 to .414, and the R2 change (.029) was significant (p < .001).  The 
cumulative sentence variable was statistically significant (B = 3.120, S.E. = 0.295, p < 
.001).   
When the home detention variable was added to the aggravated drink driving model 
it also made a significant and more substantial difference to the model.  The model R2 
increased from .385 to .474, and the R2 change (.089) was significant (p < .001).  The home 
detention variable was statistically significant (B = 3.529, S.E. = 0.180, p < .001).    
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When the cumulative sentence variable was added to the male assaults female 
model as a fifth block it made a significant difference to the model.  The model R2 
increased from .263 to .296, the R2 change (.032) was significant (p < .001).  The 
cumulative sentence variable was statistically significant (B = 2.321, S.E. = 0.410, p < 
.001).   
When the home detention variable was added to the male assaults female model it 
also made a significant and more substantial difference to the model.  The model R2 
increased from .263 to .305, the R2 change (.042) was significant (p < .001).  The home 
detention variable was statistically significant (B = 3.240, S.E. = 0.502, p < .001). 
These findings do not conclusively invalidate the proposition that the effects of the 
choices of concurrent or cumulative sentences and home detention or imprisonment will be 
neutral.  It is possible the results reflect the limitations of the models and the cumulative 
sentence and home detention variables may be proxies for other variables unable to be 
included in the models. 
The critical question was whether the cumulative sentence and/or the home 
detention variable should be included in the final model.  The argument against doing so is 
that both variables are elements of the sentencing outcome and that including them means 
that an element of the outcome is being used to predict the outcome.  The decision to 
sentence cumulatively may be a consequence of the judge wishing to impose a more severe 
sentence than concurrent sentencing would allow.  Because the rate of use of cumulative 
sentences varies between circuits, including the cumulative sentence variable may result in 
mis-estimation of the parameters for the circuit variables and suppress the degree of 
variability between circuits.  A comparison of the parameter estimates for the circuit 
variables between the original model and the adjusted model including the cumulative 
sentence variable confirmed that the degree of variability reduced.  In general if the circuit 
used home detention or cumulative sentences at a higher rate than the reference circuit the 
parameter estimate for the circuit reduced and if they were used at a lower rate the 
parameter estimates increased.   
Although the inclusion of the cumulative sentence variable improved the model it 
did so at the cost of obscuring or suppressing variability between the circuits that is at least 
partially due to differences in sentencing approach.  Therefore no adjustment to the model 
was justified.        
Three reasons why use of home detention might vary between circuits and affect 
the parameter estimates were identified and assessed to determine if they justified 
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adjustment of the model.  The availability of home detention is likely to vary between 
circuits for technical reasons.  Some circuits may have a higher proportion of residences 
that cannot support the sentence resulting in a higher rate of use of imprisonment 
irrespective of the preference of the judge in any individual case.  Assuming that 
incarceration sentence type has no or little influence on sentence amount (an assumption 
supported by the data collected from sentence notes and reported in Chapter 6 showing that 
the ratio of sentences expressed as prison terms before selecting home detention to the 
actual home detention sentence was 1:1.01) the inclusion of the home detention variable 
would result in mis-estimation of parameter estimates because an effect actually due to the 
availability of the sentence would be treated as if it were a sentencing factor used to 
determine sentence length. 
The second possibility was that the variation reflects differences between circuits 
about the appropriate use of home detention in general or for this offence in particular.  If 
different circuits were more or less liberal in the use of home detention, more or less 
inclined to consider it the least restrictive sentence appropriate and the differences were 
driven by different thresholds of seriousness and/or criminal history factors, the choice of 
sentence type could appear to contribute to variation in sentencing.  However, similar to 
the cumulative sentencing choice the choice of sentence type is an intrinsic part of the 
sentencing outcome and including it would result in the outcome being used to predict the 
outcome and result in mis-estimation of the parameter estimates for other variables.   
The third possibility considered was that home detention was a proxy for other 
sentencing variables that were not included.  If that were the case inclusion of the home 
detention variable would improve the model and would be justified on the basis that it 
stood in the place of some unspecified valid predictor variable(s).  Doing so would be 
problematic for two reasons.  Describing what the variable is a proxy for can only be done 
in vague general terms.  Secondly, to have a significant influence on the parameter 
estimates for the circuit variables the unknown variables would have to be unevenly 
distributed across the circuits.  There is no reasonable basis for assuming that to be the 
case.  In the absence of any alternative indications it is more reasonable to assume that 
such factors are evenly distributed. 
Although the inclusion of the home detention variable improved the model none of 
the possible explanations for the effect justify its inclusion.  There is a risk that the 
resultant parameter estimates for the circuit variables would be mis-estimated.        
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Appendix G 
 
Correlation Matrices for Circuit Contextual Variables for Multi-level Modelling 
The correlations between the various circuit variables are set out in Tables G1 & G2 
below.  Table G1 covers the correlations between each of the generic variables that apply 
across the models irrespective of offence.  Table G2 covers the correlations between the 
generic variables and the four offence specific variables plus the correlations between the 
respective offence specific variables for each offence. 
 
Table G1: Correlation matrix for the generic contextual variables 
 
 
 
 
  
Circuit Contextual Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Metropolitan or provincial court 1 -.527
*
-.847
**
-.648
**
.770
** -.295 -.602
* -.301 .427 .394 -.359 .357 -.668
**
2 Population aged 17+ 1 .583
* .325 -.618
** .108 .853
**
.531
* -.482 -.417 .137 -.402 .561
*
3 Median personal income 1 .433 -.827
** .083 .658
** .134 -.438 -.445 .236 -.425 .683
**
4 Racial homogeneity 1 -.321 .802
**
.557
* .269 .197 -.296 .059 -.260 .588
*
5 Proportion adults with no 
educational qualifications
1 -.022 -.636
** -.151 .535
* .432 -.456 .419 -.698
**
6 Proportion of adults unemployed 1 .361 .426 .467 -.195 -.074 -.168 .309
7 Number of Judicial Officers 
(FTEs)
1 .535
* -.289 -.711
** -.126 -.693
**
.700
**
8 Number of Judges (FTEs) 1 -.153 -.378 -.088 -.350 .308
9 New criminal cases for 000 adults 1 .370 -.203 .353 -.251
10 New criminal cases per Judicial 
Officer FTE
1 .325 .997
**
-.509
*
11 Average active cases per Judicial 
Officer FTE 
1 .319 .344
12 Cases disposed per Judicial 
Officer FTE
1 -.498
*
13 Hearing  rate 1
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table G2: Correlation matrix for the offence specific contextual variables and 
including the correlations between the generic variables and each offence specific 
variable 
 
 
14 15 16 17 14 15 16 17 14 15 16 17
1 Metropolitan or provincial 
court
-.700
**
.623
** .157 .219 -.806
**
.758
** .265 .376 -.790
**
.698
** .308 .374
2 Population aged 17+ .370 -.377 -.307 -.158 .483
*
-.491
* -.346 -.285 .427 -.386 -.410 -.211
3 Median personal income .690
**
-.611
** -.259 -.241 .816
**
-.801
** -.221 -.266 .700
**
-.584
* -.307 -.296
4 Racial homogeneity .526
*
-.537
* .469 .246 .486
*
-.498
* .395 .217 .536
*
-.484
* .279 .011
5 Proportion adults with no 
educational qualifications
-.738
**
.673
** .342 .296 -.821
**
.754
** .388 .406 -.785
**
.723
**
.539
* .461
6 Proportion of adults 
unemployed
.264 -.324 .470 .124 .132 -.180 .602
* .322 .240 -.258 .316 -.044
7 Number of Judicial Officers 
(FTEs)
.490
*
-.491
* -.171 -.232 .569
*
-.581
* -.120 -.194 .508
* -.463 -.324 -.349
8 Number of Judges (FTEs) -.007 -.003 -.334 -.426 .056 -.031 -.188 -.302 .105 -.081 -.522
*
-.561
*
9 New criminal cases for 000 
adults
-.263 .202 .777
**
.500
* -.473 .443 .926
**
.763
** -.379 .371 .655
** .323
10 New criminal cases per 
Judicial Officer FTE
-.471 .482 .313 .585
*
-.554
*
.590
* .250 .487
* -.470 .485
* .382 .605
*
11 Average active cases per 
Judicial Officer FTE 
.527
*
-.490
* .000 .091 .407 -.338 -.253 -.245 .585
*
-.550
* -.274 -.158
12 Cases disposed per Judicial 
Officer FTE
-.471 .488
* .298 .573
*
-.537
*
.575
* .242 .479 -.461 .482
* .377 .601
*
13 Hearing  rate .725
**
-.685
** .007 -.027 .678
**
-.660
** -.069 -.105 .798
**
-.734
** -.367 -.391
14 Mean days charge to 
sentencing
1 -.982
** .061 -.131 1 -.982
** -.293 -.484
* 1 -.967
** -.336 -.451
15 Proportion of cases sentenced 
within 3 months of charge
1 -.134 .081 -.982
** 1 .237 .449 -.967
** 1 .326 .447
16 Sentencings per 000 adults 1 .807
** -.293 .237 1 .855
** -.336 .326 1 .809
**
17 Sentencings per Judge FTE 1 -.484
* .449 .855
** 1 -.451 .447 .809
** 1
Aggravated drink driving Male assaults female Burglary
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Appendix H 
 
Using the sentence notes to identify omitted variables 
Although the data drawn from the sentence notes could not be used to improve the linear 
regression models for sentence length it could be used to gain insight into potential omitted 
variables.  This was done by forming a new dataset that combined the variables from the 
administrative dataset with the additional variables available from the sentencing notes and 
modelling sentence length to identify any sentence note variables that were significant.  
This process enables a tentative recognition of any variables that were important to the 
judges and were not included in the models.  The findings are summarised below.   
 
Aggravated drink driving 
Sentence note variables were available for 1,339 of the 2,312 cases included in the 
administrative dataset.  However, 31 were excluded because the sentence note revealed the 
offender was a sentenced prisoner at the time of sentencing (16 cases); the sentencing 
described a re-sentencing situation (13 cases) and did not cover the original sentence 
considered to be warranted for the offending; or the sentence note was incomplete (2 cases) 
- leaving a final combined dataset of 1,308 cases.  An additional 16 variables (see Table 
H1) were available.   
Table H1: Descriptive statistics for the sentence length decision sentencing variables 
sourced from sentence notes for aggravated drink driving (n = 1,308) 
Categorical Variables   Sentence notes 
      N % 
     
Risk to others   277 21.2% 
Damage caused   92 7.0% 
Attempt to avoid detection   127 9.7% 
Offended while on bail   108 8.3% 
Offended while subject to a sentence   89 6.8% 
Other aggravation   50 3.8% 
Positive steps to reform   155 11.9% 
Remorse   68 5.2% 
Other mitigation   89 6.8% 
Poor response to a prior sentence   224 17.1% 
Home detention inappropriate    182 13.9% 
Leave to apply for a substituted sentence   63 4.8% 
Offender on a final warning   123 9.4% 
Offender personal mitigating circumstances   203 15.5% 
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To determine if any of these variables were significant, an augmented model 
including an additional block of sentence note seriousness variables was run.  Three of the 
variables were found to be significant: risk to other road users (a tangible recognition by 
the judge that the offender was a risk); offending while on bail (that all or some of the 
offending being sentenced occurred while the offender was on bail); and the granting of 
leave for the offender to seek to substitute home detention for imprisonment.  The latter 
decision typically occurs when the offender could not offer an acceptable residence but the 
judge agrees that home detention is the least restrictive sentence appropriate.  It may be a 
proxy for unobserved mitigating circumstances; the negative co-efficient supports this 
proposition.  However, there is also a risk that including it at least partially uses an element 
of the sentence outcome to predict sentence length.  
The additional variables only made a modest contribution to the overall model (∆R2 
= .011, p < .001).  Parameter estimates for the three variables are set out in Table H2. 
 
Table H2: Parameter estimates for the statistically significant sentence note variables 
added to the sentence length model for aggravated drink driving (n =1,308) 
Variables B S.E. t Sig. 
Posed risk to other road users .703 .275 2.557 .011 
Offended on bail 1.968 .485 4.058 .000 
Leave granted to apply to substitute HD for 
imprisonment 
-1.138 .510 -2.230 .026 
 
Inclusion of the variables would improve the main model but on these results the 
improvement would be marginal.  As it is unlikely that the additional variables would be 
unevenly distributed across the circuits it is not plausible that addition of the variables 
would have a substantial impact on the estimates of variation between the circuits.   
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Male assaults female 
Sentence note variables were available for 415 of the 723 cases included in the 
administrative dataset.  An additional 17 variables (see Table H3) were available.   
 
Table H3: Descriptive statistics for the sentence length decision sentencing variables 
sourced from sentence notes for male assaults female (n = 415) 
Categorical Variables   Sentence notes 
      N % 
Degree of Physical Injury     
  None, none mentioned   199 48.0% 
  Minor injury   167 40.2% 
  Moderate or serious injury   49 11.8% 
Level of violence     
  Minor or unknown level of violence   156 37.6% 
  Moderate violence   129 31.1% 
  Serious violence   130 31.3% 
Victim suffered psychological or emotional 
impact     
  No, not mentioned   358 86.3% 
  Yes   57 13.7% 
Prior assault on the same victim by this 
offender     
  None, not mentioned   318 76.6% 
  Yes   97 23.4% 
Weapon used or threatened to be used     
  No, not mentioned   393 94.7% 
  Yes   22 5.3% 
Offence involved particular cruelty     
  No, not mentioned   393 94.7% 
  Yes   22 5.3% 
Child present during the assault     
  No, not mentioned   353 85.1% 
  Yes   62 14.9% 
Offending occurred while the offender was on 
bail     
  No, not mentioned   367 88.4% 
  Yes   48 11.6% 
Offending occurred while the offender was subject to a sentence   
  No, not mentioned   333 80.2% 
  Yes   82 19.8% 
Other aggravation (includes     
  None, none mentioned   387 93.3% 
  Yes   28 6.7% 
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Categorical Variables   Sentence notes 
      N % 
Other mitigation (includes     
  None, none mentioned   330 79.5% 
  Yes   85 20.5% 
Offender described as responding poorly to previous sentence(s)   
  No, not mentioned   329 79.3% 
  Yes   86 20.7% 
Leave to apply to substitute home detention for imprisonment granted    
  No   402 96.9% 
  Yes   13 3.1% 
Risk of re-offending     
  Low, not mentioned   332 80.0% 
  Moderate or high   83 20.0% 
Personal circumstances      
  None, none mentioned   363 87.5% 
  Yes   52 12.5% 
Offending occurred under influence of alcohol or drugs    
  No, not mentioned   314 75.7% 
  Yes   101 24.3% 
Offender had alcohol or drug problem     
  No, not mentioned   312 75.2% 
  Yes     103 24.8% 
 
To determine if any of these variables were significant an augmented model 
including an additional block of sentence note seriousness variables was run.  Three of the 
variables were found to be significant: the psychological or emotional impact on the 
victim; the degree of injury (expressed as two dummy variables: minor vs. no or unknown 
injury; and moderate or serious vs. no or unknown injury); and the degree of violence 
(expressed as two dummy variables: moderate vs. minor or unknown violence; and serious 
vs. minor or unknown violence).   
The additional variables made a substantial contribution to the overall model (∆R2 = 
.098, p < .001).  Parameter estimates for the variables are set out in Table H4. 
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Table H4: Parameter estimates for the statistically significant sentence note variables 
added to the sentence length model for male assaults female (n =415) 
 
  B S.E. t Sig. 
Victim suffered psychological or emotional 
impact 1.817 .592 3.067 .002 
Minor injury cf No or unknown injury .307 .460 .669 .504 
Moderate or serious injury cf No or unknown 
injury 1.697 .693 2.449 .015 
Moderate cf Minor or unknown violence 1.577 .519 3.038 .003 
Serious cf Minor or unknown violence 2.581 .529 4.882 .000 
 
Inclusion of the variables would substantially improve the main model.  The three 
variables are all intuitively significant, the level of violence and the physical or 
psychological harm resulting from it would likely be identified by most people as 
important in determining sentence length.  The significance of the omission of these factors 
for this research is dependent on the degree to which these factors are unevenly distributed 
across the circuits.  
An indication of the prospect that the inclusion of these variables would affect the 
assessment of variation between circuits can be gained by comparing the co-efficients for 
the circuit variables across three models.  The three models are: Model 1 (the main model 
reported in Chapter 8); Model 2 (the same model structure but restricted to the cases for 
which sentence note variables were available; and, Model 3 (Model 2 augmented by the 
significant sentence note variables).  A comparison across the three models is necessary 
because there are two changes at work.  The first is the change in the mix of cases due to 
the unavailability of the sentence notes (the difference between Models 1 & 2 is an 
indication of the effect of this change) and the second is the addition of the sentence note 
variables (the difference between Models 2 & 3 is an indication of the effect of this 
change).  The co-efficients are reported in Table H5.   
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Table H5: Comparison of the regression co-efficients for the circuit variables for 
models including and excluding sentence note variables for male assaults female  
   
Model 1  
(n = 722) 
Model 2  
(n = 415) 
Model 3  
(n = 415) 
Variable B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
Circuit 1 v Circuit 0 3.514 .000 2.923 .002 2.408 .007 
Circuit 2 v Circuit 0 1.119 .009 1.337 .023 1.085 .049 
Circuit 3 v Circuit 0 .834 .000 .776 .010 .765 .007 
Circuit 4 v Circuit 0 .308 .262 .079 .813 .029 .926 
Circuit 5 v Circuit 0 .346 .011 .610 .002 .542 .004 
Circuit 6 v Circuit 0 -.044 .732 -.059 .717 -.104 .502 
Circuit 7 v Circuit 0 .580 .000 .593 .002 .472 .008 
Circuit 8 v Circuit 0 .120 .350 -.123 .497 -.135 .428 
Circuit 9 v Circuit 0 .027 .867 .370 .139 .183 .443 
Circuit 10 v Circuit 0 .118 .129 .069 .495 -.012 .898 
Circuit 11 v Circuit 0 .048 .471 .063 .445 .050 .514 
Circuit 12 v Circuit 0 -.034 .534 -.046 .514 -.055 .409 
Circuit 13 v Circuit 0 .091 .325 .111 .327 .088 .410 
Circuit 14 v Circuit 0 -.014 .859 -.091 .468 -.052 .657 
Circuit 15 v Circuit 0 .061 .259 .086 .344 .040 .644 
Circuit 16 v Circuit 0 .115 .030 .139 .175 .136 .167 
 
Comparison of the co-efficients indicates that the additional variables may reduce 
the variation between circuits but not substantially.  Five of the six circuits (1, 2, 3, 5, & 7) 
that were significantly different remain significantly different but with marginally reduced 
parameter estimates between Models 2 & 3.  The other circuit (16) is not significantly 
different but this can be attributed to the change in mix and reduction in the number of 
observations.  Overall the results suggest it is unlikely that the additional variables are 
significantly unevenly distributed across the circuits and therefore it is not likely that 
addition of the variables would substantially impact on the estimates of variation between 
the circuits. 
 
Burglary 
Sentence note variables were available for 1,471 of the 2,338 cases included in the 
administrative dataset.  However, 85 were excluded because the sentence note revealed the 
offender was a sentenced prisoner at the time of sentencing (65 cases); or the sentencing 
described a re-sentencing situation (15 cases) and did not cover the original sentence 
considered to be warranted for the offending; the sentence note was incomplete (4 cases); 
291 
 
or, the offender was found to be mentally impaired (1 case) leaving a final combined 
dataset of 1,386 cases.  An additional 21 variables (see Table H6) were available.   
 
Table H6: Descriptive statistics for the sentence length decision sentencing variables 
sourced from sentence notes for burglary (n = 1,386) 
Categorical Variables N % 
Value of property taken or damage caused   
  Nothing or not mentioned 434 31.3% 
  $1,000 or less 234 16.9% 
  More than $1,000 but less than $10,001 463 33.4% 
  More than $10,000 255 18.4% 
Damage done   
  None or none mentioned 801 57.8% 
  Minimum necessary to effect the offence 495 35.7% 
  Property trashed 90 6.5% 
Level of planning   
  Opportunistic or not mentioned 412 29.7% 
  Some degree of planning  974 70.3% 
Residential premise   
  Non-residential or not mentioned 503 36.3% 
  Residential 883 63.7% 
Premises occupied, occupants confronted   
  No or not mentioned 1146 82.7% 
  Occupants present 189 13.6% 
  Confrontation occurred 51 3.7% 
Offending occurred while on bail   
  No or not mentioned 1222 88.2% 
  Yes 164 11.8% 
Offending occurred while subject to an earlier sentence   
  No or not mentioned 1080 77.9% 
  Yes 306 22.1% 
  No or not mentioned 1182 85.3% 
  Yes 204 14.7% 
Breach of trust   
  No or not mentioned 1280 92.4% 
  Yes 106 7.6% 
Other aggravating factors present   
  No or not mentioned 1275 92.0% 
  Yes 111 8.0% 
Offender co-operated with the authorities   
  No or not mentioned 1258 90.8% 
  Yes 128 9.2% 
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Categorical Variables N % 
Assist in recovering property or make amends 
  No or not mentioned 1133 81.7% 
  Yes 253 18.3% 
Positive actions post offending   
  No or not mentioned 1240 89.5% 
  Yes 146 10.5% 
Remorse   
  No or not mentioned 1264 91.2% 
  Yes 122 8.8% 
Other mitigation   
  No or not mentioned 1303 94.0% 
  Yes 83 6.0% 
Poor response to previous sentences   
  No or not mentioned 1133 81.7% 
  Yes 253 18.3% 
Granted leave to apply to substitute home detention   
  No or not mentioned 1336 96.4% 
  Yes 50 3.6% 
Risk of re-offending   
  Low or not mentioned 1078 77.8% 
  Moderate or high 308 22.2% 
Reference to personal circumstances   
  No or not mentioned 1169 84.3% 
  Yes 217 15.7% 
Offended under the influence of alcohol or drugs   
  No or not mentioned 1224 88.3% 
  Yes 162 11.7% 
Offender had alcohol or drug problem   
  No or not mentioned 871 62.8% 
  Yes 515 37.2% 
 
To determine if any of these variables were significant an augmented model 
including an additional block of sentence note seriousness variables was run.  Two of the 
variables were found to be significant: an estimate of the value of the property taken and 
damage caused and the degree of planning associated with the burglary offending.  The 
insignificant aggravating and mitigating factors were transformed into two new variables 
by summing the number of aggravating and mitigating factors present respectively.  The 
count of aggravating factors was found to be significant.   
The additional variables made a moderate contribution to the overall model (∆R2 = 
.047, p < .001).  Parameter estimates for the variables are set out in Table H7. 
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Table H7: Parameter estimates for the statistically significant sentence note variables 
added to the sentence length model for burglary (n = 1,386) 
  B SE t Sig 
Estimated value of property taken/damage 
caused  .007 .001 5.066 .000 
Degree of planning 2.182 .492 4.433 .000 
Number of aggravating factors excluding value 
and planning .922 .140 6.576 .000 
Number of mitigating factors -.249 .233 -1.069 .285 
 
Inclusion of the variables would substantially improve the main model.  The two 
offence specific variables are intuitively significant.  The estimated value of property taken 
or damage caused and the degree of planning would likely be identified by most people as 
important in determining sentence length.  The composite generic variables for the number 
of aggravating and mitigating factors would assist to differentiate the cases in terms of 
relative seriousness reflecting variations in the offending and offenders.  The significance 
of the omission of these factors for this research is dependent on the degree to which these 
factors are unevenly distributed across the circuits.  
An indication of the prospect that the inclusion of these variables would affect the 
assessment of variation between circuits can be gained by repeating the approach used for 
male assaults female and comparing the co-efficients for the circuit variables across three 
models.  The three models are: Model 1 (the main model reported in Chapter 7); Model 2 
(the same model structure but restricted to the cases for which sentence note variables were 
available; and, Model 3 (Model 2 augmented by the significant sentence note variables).  
The co-efficients are reported in Table H8.   
Three of the circuits (4, 7 & 13) that were previously significantly different are no 
longer significantly different.  Comparison of Models 2 & 3 for these circuits indicates that 
the additional variables could have had some influence but the reduction in case numbers 
and change in the mix of cases were also influential.  It is likely that the additional 
variables explain a portion of the difference.  The remaining eleven circuits that were 
significantly different remain significantly different and the changes in co-efficient 
between Models 2 & 3 are marginal with no pattern in terms of increase/decrease. 
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Table H8: Comparison of the regression co-efficients for the circuit variables for 
models including and excluding sentence note variables for burglary  
   
Model 1  
(n = 2,338) 
Model 2  
(n = 1,386)  
Model 3  
(n = 1,386) 
Variable B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
Circuit 1 v Circuit 0 6.315 .000 6.314 .000 6.172 .000 
Circuit 2 v Circuit 0 5.038 .000 5.293 .000 4.989 .000 
Circuit 3 v Circuit 0 4.197 .000 4.432 .000 4.439 .000 
Circuit 4 v Circuit 0 5.132 .000 4.480 .004 2.851 .055 
Circuit 5 v Circuit 0 4.768 .000 3.189 .003 4.212 .000 
Circuit 6 v Circuit 0 5.146 .000 5.153 .000 5.162 .000 
Circuit 7 v Circuit 0 3.594 .004 2.968 .044 2.757 .052 
Circuit 8 v Circuit 0 3.118 .005 3.377 .011 3.654 .004 
Circuit 9 v Circuit 0 -1.803 .183 -1.360 .570 -.930 .688 
Circuit 10 v Circuit 0 4.691 .000 3.981 .000 3.308 .002 
Circuit 11 v Circuit 0 5.788 .000 5.467 .000 5.524 .000 
Circuit 12 v Circuit 0 5.535 .000 4.149 .000 4.392 .000 
Circuit 13 v Circuit 0 -2.663 .024 -4.152 .009 -2.345 .130 
Circuit 14 v Circuit 0 5.841 .000 6.226 .000 5.711 .000 
Circuit 15 v Circuit 0 .056 .949 -.467 .669 -.404 .702 
Circuit 16 v Circuit 0 4.553 .000 5.099 .000 4.629 .001 
 
On balance while the additional variables would likely improve the performance of the 
model they would not significantly change the impact of circuit on sentencing.   
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